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INVESTIGATION OF FISCALLY INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT CITY SCHOOL DISTRICTS.

BY- GITTELL, MARILYN AND OTHERS

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A TWO-PART COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IS MADE OF LARGE AND SMALL CITY SCHOOL SYSTEMS. PART I ANALYZES A WIDE RANGE OF FISCAL AND NON-FISCAL VARIABLES ASSOCIATED WITH FISCAL STATUS OF CITY SCHOOL SYSTEMS. IT COVERS THE 2,788 CITY SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN THE UNITED STATES WITH ENROLLMENTS OVER 3,000. COMPLEX INTERRELATIONSHIPS SURROUNDING FISCAL STATUS IN COMMUNITY AND GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS ARE IDENTIFIED. THE STUDY ALSO IDENTIFIES APPROPRIATE COMBINATIONS OF POLITICAL AND FISCAL CONTROLS FOR DISTRICTS OF VARYING SIZE. THE COMBINATION OF FISCAL INDEPENDENCE, PUBLIC VOTE, AND SCHOOL BOARD ELECTIONS IS FOUND TO BE FAVORABLE FOR ADEQUATE FINANCING. PART II PROBES INTENSIVELY INTO THE FISCAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS OF SIX LARGE CITY SCHOOL SYSTEMS (BALTIMORE, CHICAGO, DETROIT, NEW YORK, PHILADELPHIA, AND ST. LOUIS) TO IDENTIFY THE CONDITIONING ROLE OF FISCAL STATUS AND TO DEVELOP A DESIGN FOR FURTHER RESEARCH. IT ALSO MEASURES THE OUTPUTS OF INNOVATION AND FLEXIBILITY AS REFLECTIVE OF THE ABILITY OF A SCHOOL SYSTEM TO RESPOND TO CHANGING NEEDS. SERIOUS DOUBTS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FISCAL STATUS AS A DETERMINATIVE FACTOR FOR LARGE SYSTEMS ARISE FROM THIS STUDY, AND SUGGESTIONS ARE MADE FOR AN APPROACH TO FURTHER RESEARCH USING INNOVATION AS AN OUTPUT IN A MODEL WITH ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE, COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION, AND FISCAL RESOURCES AS INPUTS. (HW)

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INVESTIGATION OF FISCALLY INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT CITY SCHOOL DISTRICTS

Cooperative Research Project No. 3,237

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1967

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INVESTIGATION OF FISCALLY INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT CITY SCHOOL DISTRICTS

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1967

The research reported herein was supported by the Cooperative Research Program of the Office of Education, U. S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

PREFACE

Although there is mounting concern with the pressing problems of city school systems, particularly with the largest ones, there has been a relative dearth of research on their operations. One kind of study common to the field takes the form of an individual study, generally describing the inadequacies of a system, its failure to meet fundamental educational needs and suggests recommendations for change. More academic analyses cover sub-standard reading performances, salaries, personnel and administration. Few provide comparative analyses and still fewer are concerned with the essential characteristics of a school system which are intrinsic to financing, administration and innovation.

This study attempts to fill a void by providing a comparative analysis of city school systems, small and large. The study was carried out in two parts. Part I, conducted at the Institute of Administrative Research, Teachers College, Columbia University, analyzes a wide range of fiscal and non-fiscal variables associated with fiscal status of city school systems. Part II, conducted at The City University, probes intensively into the fiscal and administrative operations of six large city school systems -- Baltimore, Chicago, Detroit, New York, Philadelphia and St. Louis -- in order to identify the conditioning role of fiscal status and to develop a design for further research.

The two studies have been conducted independently of one another, but the work and findings have been coordinated by the co-directors. Variations in the presentation and structure of Parts I and II reflect differences in approach and methodology necessary considering the essential differences of the tasks undertaken.

The first part of the study covers a population of 2,788 city school districts -- all such districts in the United States with enrollments of 3,000 or more pupils. Through multivariate analysis of a wide variety of data collected directly from the districts and from other sources, the study has identified the complex interrelationships surrounding fiscal status, especially in community and governmental relationships. Significantly, the study identifies appropriate combinations of political and fiscal controls for districts of varying size. The combination of fiscal independence, public vote and school board elections was found to be favorable for adequate financing, especially for small and medium size school districts. Fiscal independence coupled with tax limitations was found to be the least desirable combination. Districts operating subject to tax limitations, notably larger school districts, were found to be better financed if fiscally dependent. Size and wealth were also significantly related to school financing. This phase of the study identified the importance of state fiscal and administrative controls and suggests the need for continuing research on their impact on school district financing.

The second part of the study supplies a degree of comparative case study analysis of the influence of fiscal status using six large city school systems as the basis for study. It also measures the outputs of innovation and flexibility as reflective of the ability of a school system to respond to changing needs. Although the great similarity in the large city districts made one sample of six cities a limiting factor in the analysis, the study does suggest some new approaches for evaluation of large city school systems. Degree of openness -- measured by the nature of power and public participation were directly related to innovation in Detroit and Philadelphia. Further study should validate or reject this conclusion. The study also identified the processes of change and their relation to fiscal status. It raises serious doubts of the significance of fiscal status as a determinative factor for large systems. Finally, the study suggests an approach to further research using innovation as an output in a model with administrative change, community participation and fiscal resources as inputs.

The study began with consultants' reports to the New York City's Temporary Commission on City Finances. That study of New York City's school system provided the basis for the development of a design both for the statistical study and the six-city case study.

During the course of the two-year study, a dedicated research staff was the backbone of the project. Graduate and undergraduate students at The City University and Columbia University were deeply involved in our work and added much to the final product.

Most worthy of mention at City University were those who participated to the bitter end. Wendy Gismot, Betty Terrell and Robert Weingarten were involved throughout the study. Adele Spier, Beatrice Steinberg and Joseph Tarulli were vital to our final year of research. Several independent papers prepared by the staff are embodied in the report.

At Columbia University, Dr. Charles M. Bernardo played a key role in supervising the collection and analysis of the data. Dr. Maurice Lohman participated in the early stages of data processing. Robert Bates, on a year's leave as Superintendent of Schools, Vancouver, Washington, helped interpret the data. Peter Tremholme is especially commended for his work in developing the program for multivariate analysis. Out thanks, too, to Anthony Grant who was responsible for proof-reading, compilation of the bibliography, supervision of the typing and reproduction of the manuscript.

We would also like to thank the various Deans and staff of The City University graduate division and of Teachers College, Columbia University for their timely assistance in providing facilities, support and encouragement during the two years of work.

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AN EXPLORATORY STUDY OF THE INFLUENCE OF STATUTORY CONTROLS ON THE FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SCHOOL BOARDS WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO FISCAL INDEPENDENCE

A Report of a Subcontracted Investigation
Under Cooperative Research Project No. 3237

William S. Vincent
Co-Director

The figure on the following page delineates a generalized model that may be applied to all enterprises for which there is an input and an output. Whether the enterprise is General Motors, a corner drugstore, the American system of justice, or a school, the inner box represents the operation itself with an interior process that converts input to output. Surrounding the enterprise is the social and legal environment in which it operates. It may be hypothesized that the influence of this environment strongly qualified the internal process and consequently the effectiveness of the operation in converting input to output.

As applied to a school or a school system the inner box represents the educative process. Four distinct types of input may be discerned. First of all there is money. Grossly, this is number of dollars per pupil. But there is a variety of more highly refined measures of monetary input that reflects fundamental choices open to administration.

Entirely aside from monetary input there are staff policies that are significant. These relate to all possible measures that might be made on teachers individually and collectively, including personality, knowledge, training, teaching skills, background, and personal history.

Another type of input is organizational and managerial, of which there are several categories. One category relates to administrative staff and its web of organization and specialization (e.g., whether


ENVIRONMENTAL INFLUENCES
IN
PROCESS*
OUT*

Figure

there is an assistant superintendent in charge of business, or a director of guidance in charge of guidance counsellors). Another relates to administrator behavior, a third to the division of the school system into units (separate buildings, et. al.) and the autonomy of their operation, and a fourth to the division of the system by levels and the articulation of units and levels. From the last category instances abound: whether the system operates on a 6-6 plan or a 6-4-4 plan, whether it uses an ungraded primary, whether it employs departmentalization, homogeneous grouping, or variable promotion.

The foregoing are instrumental inputs, called instrumental because they facilitate process. There is also a purposive input, termed purposive because a purpose of the enterprise is to deal with that particular input. In a newspaper publishing enterprise the instrumental inputs are (in addition to working capital) newsprint, ink, type-setting machines, presses, and the like. The purposive input is information. The very reason we have newspapers is to process this input. It is conceivable that a newspaper could be published and serve its purpose adequately using an entirely different set of instrumental inputs. In a school the purposive input is pupils. If it were not for pupils, there would be no need of a school.

The Problem

Presumably environmental influences impinge to greater or less on all enterprises. Even if it were ever true, the business attitude expressed by the phrase "the public be damned" has long since gone into folk lore. In the case of the school, the public school district in particular, its legal entity is so contrived as to make it practically naked to external influences. It must obtain funds from state legislature and local tax receipts. Its governing body (or board) is composed of ordinary citizens, and whether they are elected or appointed they are intended to respond to public interest. Basic policy choices are circumscribed, to greater or less degree, by a state school code and designated powers of a state department of education which influence selection of teachers and textbooks, building plans, the school calendar, and a variety of budgetary allocations.

These influences, indicated by the surrounding circular arrows in the model, may be classified into two types of measurable factors: (1) community factors and (2) factors relating to the pattern of state finance and control. Much has been done to investigate the former.(1) The evidence is clear that the process, probably the output, and most certainly the input of the school are strongly influenced by socio-economic factors generated within the boundaries of the individual school district. Among these factors are an educational measure of the population (such as per cent college graduates), an occupational measure (such as per cent professional and managerial), a measure of community group impingement upon school policy formulation, and a measure of public attitude toward education. There are, it is clear, many other local community factors, including size of the school district, that qualify the internal process of the school.(2)

There is less evidence but much presumption that specific controls imposed by state legislatures influence inputs and process in the individual school district. One is at a loss to explain why there should be state regulations if they are not intended to do something. The number and variety of these from state to state is so great that, as is well known, there is no such thing as an American school system. Rather what we have is 50 different state systems.

It may be noted that in the United States the fifty separate state systems provide patterns of control which are immensely varied and in which the numerous variables pertaining to state regulation are seen in varying degree and in varying combination with each other. Thus the country as a whole provides a ready made "experimental" setting for investigating the question of whether, or how much, state controls of various types influence other factors.

Factors relating to the patterns of state finance and control may be grouped into classes relating to the presumed intention of the control. There are certain controls intended to centralize the state's authority on education: textbook mandate, appointment of local boards, audit by state agency, tax limits, debt ceilings, and the like. There is a converse set of controls intended to permit greater degree of local democracy: popular vote on budget, election of local board, election of chief state school officer, and so on. Another set of state regulations has to do with maintaining stability in the system: teacher tenure, permission of long-term indebtedness of local boards, automatic formula for state aid, fully funded teacher retirement system, etc. Still another class of regulation might be termed state paternalism: major share of support of all districts from state aid, state purchase of bonds, supervision of assessments by the state, among a great many others.

The Present Investigation As An Aspect of Environmental Influence

The present investigation lies in the area of environmental influences upon the local school district, specifically those modes of action within the local educational enterprise that result from the pattern of state control under which the district operates. Among state controls which have received considerable attention, not only from researchers in education but also from theorists and practitioners, are those concerned with the method of budget approval. Within this category of controls falls the familiar dichotomy of fiscal dependence/independence. Fiscal dependence or fiscal independence of the local board derives from the pattern of state control by means of which the central authority circumscribes or qualifies the powers granted to the local agency, the school board, to carry out the state's responsibility for education. Studies of the relative importance of one or the other of these mutually exclusive arrangements go back to the early decades of this century. Until recently, however, no study had been undertaken to examine the effectiveness of this variable on a set of school districts representative of the variety of attendant regulations obtaining in all the states.

The requirement of fiscal dependence, or approval of the budget by a non-school agency of local government, represents one of many arrangements that are commonly used by state legislatures throughout the fifty states to exercise some degree of control, fiscal or non-fiscal, over local boards. This arraggement is among a number that place power over schools either above or outside the agency created to manage local schools. Other arrangements that tend to do the same thing include audit of local expenditures by a state agency, large proportion of state aid for specified purposes, short term local indebtedness (no long-time bonding power), local textbooks chosen from a state list, local school board members appointed by a governor or other non-local agency, tax limit or budget ceiling, and debt ceiling.

The opposite of this tendency to circumscribe the powers of local boards, which may also be widely observed among the states, is a series of arrangements that permit greater local participation such as popular vote on the budget, popular vote to relax the tax limit, popular vote to relax a debt ceiling, and local election of school board members.

The matter of fiscal dependence/independence cannot be examined exclusive of certain other arrangements that are closely allied to it. The intent of the legislature in prescribing fiscal dependence is to limit the authority of the local agency to which it has conveyed the responsibility for carrying on the program of education. The legislature, however, can be even more stringent; it can require the local educational agency to operate under a tax limitation. Furthermore, it can tie these two arrangements together, permitting independence below a set tax limit, but requiring the board to surrender its fiscal independence if it elects to exceed the limit. The option of public vote to exceed the limit, or public vote on the entire budget, effectively frees the board from going to some other non-school local governmental agency and at the same time keeps the power of budgetary decision within the locality.

Thus it is that in the present investigation the variables being examined are not only fiscal independence and fiscal dependence, but also tax limitation and public vote. The meaning of these terms as they are employed here is as follows:

Fiscal Independence. This characteristic is defined as an arrangement under which the local school board is not required to submit its budget for the approval of any other governmental agency.

Fiscal Dependence. This characteristic is defined as an arrangement by which the school district budget must be approved by some non-school local governmental agency, or a non local agency (i.e. state department of education).

Tax Limitation. This factor exists when a dollar amount, millage, or percentage is prescribed by law as a figure which the local (school district, city, town, township,borough, or county) tax levy for school purposes may not exceed.

Public Vote. This factor is defined as the actual annual exercise of a vote by the eligible electorate of a school district on the entire budget or tax levy, or that part of the budget requiring a levy above a legal tax limit.

It should be clear that the above definitions are functional definitions. James, Kelly and Garms have observed, "how difficult it is to dichotomize all such relationships [i. e. governmental arrangements for budget approval] as fiscal independence or dependence. The real world is more complex. The term 'fiscal dependence' is not accurate as a description of a specific set of governmental arrangements."(3)

It may be observed that the real world is always more complex than the scientist's categories for classifying its phenomena. However, it is the function of science to attempt to define and measure the variables which account for differences in the real world. Whatever the variables may be called (which is unimportant), the precise definition of them makes possible a precise analysis of the results observed when they are present or absent. It is for this reason that a functional definition was employed for the so-called fiscal dependence/independence variable. In discussion, it is convenient to retain the traditional terms if the precise difference in the two categories is clearly noted: (1) situations where the school budget requires the official approval* of some non-school local governmental agency, or any state agency; and (2) situations where the school budget does not require the official approval of any governmental agency other than the school board. The former may be designated "fiscal dependence", the latter "fiscal independence", and school districts may be classified into these mutually exclusive categories and other differences among the categories noted.

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* Approval in the strongest sense--i.e. of having the opposite power to reject.

It cannot be denied, however, that a variety of attendant circumstances accompanies fiscal practice of the actual districts in these two categories, overlapping the categories and, presumably, introducing other variables which modify the effect of the particular variable defined. As James and his colleagues also state:

> The set of variables related to fiscal independence and dependence is extremely complex, and involves inter-locking systems of federal, state, local, and school district governments, with their accretions of constitutional, charter, and contractual relationships.(4)

It is hypothesized that two of the most crucial factors related to fiscal dependence/independence are the tax limit/no tax limit variable and public vote. Some tax limit districts may be fiscally independent (e.g. if the limit is sufficiently high), while others (actually the majority) may be fiscally dependent; some may also be public vote districts (where the public may make the decision to exceed the limit). Accordingly, public vote districts may be tax limit districts, or they may be fiscally independent, not requiring the board to obtain any part of budget approval from some other agency. Thus the total sample of school districts examined in this study is distributable into either fiscally independent or fiscally dependent categories. The categories of public vote and tax limitation are subsets of the sample and do not include between them all the districts in the sample. Regardless of what state law permits, no district was classified as a public vote district unless a public vote on the budget or some part of it was actually held in 1962-63, the date of the data collected in this investigation.

There is a further issue in the present investigation. This relates to fiscal competition between the school government and the local general government which provides municipal services. Under either arrangement, fiscal dependency or fiscal independency, both governments obtain a part of their support from the same local tax resources. In a state like New York, where state participation in the support of education is relatively generous, the keenness of this competition may be somewhat lessened. Equalization of state support, however, in states where cities are looked upon as wealthy without respect to municipal overburden would tend to increase the competition. Municipal overburden refers to the fact that the requirement for municipal services is greater per capita in densely populated areas than in areas of normal population size throughout the state. In this investigation the variable fiscal competition is defined by the proportion of local revenues going to school support. The issue is clouded, however, by the variable practice, particularly evident in fiscally dependent districts, of providing some school services (e.g. health services) under municipal control and not as a charge upon the school budget.

Collection of Data

A data collection system was devised consisting of the following units prior to the financing of the project by the Office of Education and distributed to districts under a plan supported by the Temporary Commission on City Finances of the City of New York.

1. A six-page printed questionnaire was prepared to obtain data unavailable except from the records of individual school districts. This included classification data, fiscal data, and quality related data. The original mailing went to 2,863 school districts in the fifty states and the District of Columbia. A second copy of the questionnaire was mailed to key districts which did not respond by the second month from the original mailing. Key districts were those needed to fill size group and classification quotas to accomplish the representativeness reflected in Table I. Copies of the instruments appear in the Appendix.

2. A follow-up on defective data or data not provided in the original questionnaire was administered around the following cases: (a) Districts whose original response was substantially incomplete had their questionnaire form returned. (b) Districts on which only one or two items of data were missing received a request post card with the applicable queries. (c) Districts that initially reported an enrollment figure for grades beyond K-12 were asked to provide their post-twelfth grade enrollment. (d) Districts not responding received a second questionnaire.

3. The results of a questionnaire dealing with local school board organization and practice administered to a subsample of districts by the U. S. Office of Education was obtained from that agency.

4. A one-page data form for recording from census sources fiscal and demographic data on political subdivisions with which selected school districts are coterminous or partly overlapping was prepared.

5. A post card questionnaire constructed for the purpose of ascertaining relationships between the boundaries and spatial differentiations of school districts and political subdivisions was sent to each district that returned the first questionnaire. Data obtained from selected school administrators by this instrument were used as a means for interpreting the influence of fiscal and demographic factors of political subdivisions on the fiscal performance of their districts.

The Sample of School Districts

There are in the United States 2788 school districts that are classified as city school districts by the research division of the National Education Association. These are divided into six size groups: size group No. 1 comprising those of 100,000 or more pupils, size group No. 2 comprising those of enrollments of 50,000 to 99,999 pupils, size group No. 3 comprising those of enrollments of 25,000 to 49,999 pupils, size group No. 4 comprising those of enrollments of 12,000 to 24,999 pupils, size group No. 5 comprising those of enrollments of 6,000 to 11,999 pupils, and size group No. 6 comprising those of enrollments of 3,000 to 5,999 pupils. The number of districts in each group break down as follows: 21 in Size Group 1, 49 in Size Group 2, 72 in Size Group 3, 299 in Size Group 4, 758 in Size Group 5, and 1589 in Size Group 6.

The basic sample under investigation comprises 1,215 city school districts, stratified into size groups in the following manner: 17 (or 81%) of the districts in size group No. 1, 47 (or 96%) of the districts in size group No. 2, 51 (or 71%) of the districts in size group No. 3, 187 (or 63%) of the districts in size group No. 4, 317 (or 42%) of the districts in size group No. 5, and 588 (or 35%) of the districts in size group No. 6. Numbers and percentages of Totals in the sample makeup are shown in Table I classified by budgetary approval patterns and by size group. For some of these districts, members of Metropolitan School Study Council and Associated Public School Systems, extensive data on staff, financial policies, and program are available in addition to the information compiled for this study. It was originally intended to use this group as a set of reference districts, a plan which was later abandoned for the time being. Districts belonging to these two organizations smaller than 3000 pupils and not classified as city school districts by the NEA Research Division are carried in the Table as Size Group 7.

Size as a Factor

The question of size is important to this investigation. As examination of the Table will show, the factor of fiscal dependence/independence is a size-related factor in the sense that the majority of districts below Size Group 3 are fiscally independent. Legislatures appear to be willing to allow fiscal independence (frequently with public vote) to the smaller district. They appear more reluctant to allow comparable exercise of local discretion over fiscal decisions affecting education in the larger cities. Reasons for this are historical, partisan, and partly distrust of cities among rurally controlled legislatures. It would appear that there

TABLE 1

CITY SCHOOL DISTRICTS IN SAMPLE: DISTRIBUTION BY SIZE AND BUDGETARY APPROVAL PATTERN

Size Group	Total in U.S.A.*	Total in Sample	% Sample of Total U.S.	NUMBERS OF DISTRICTS IN SAMPLE BY BUDGETARY PATTERN**				
				Dependent	Independent	Public Vote	Tax Limit	Independent Minus Public Vot
1	21	17	81.0	10	7	3	10	5
2	49	47	95.9	21	26	20	32	15
3	72	51	70.8	29	22	11	28	15
4	299	187	62.5	72	115	81	97	49
5	758	317	41.8	110	207	115	155	101
6	1,589	558	35.1	156	402	241	274	187
7	75	38	50.6	2	36	32	7	4
TOTALS	2,788*	1,177*	42.2*	400	815	503	603	376

* Excepting Group #7

** Dependent and Independent categories are mutually exclusive and, thus, added together equal the total sample. The remaining categories are overlapping sub-samples is no empirical reason to account for this situation. Nevertheless, it is necessary to keep in mind that an analysis of the fiscal dependence/independence variable must include size as one of the factors in the complex of influences upon school district fiscal performance.

Types of Data Collected

Four types of data were collected and examined:

(1) Classification data were obtained which would permit the district to be classified as fiscally dependent, fiscally independent, operating under a tax limit, or operating with public vote.

(2) A wide range of fiscal data were obtained, both current (for the year 1962-63) and historical (going back to the fiscal year 1942-43).

(3) A series of measures were obtained which previous studies have shown to be quality related.

(4) Organization data were obtained including school board member characteristics, certain aspects of school board practice, and a measure of school district coterminousness with other units of local government.

An attempt was made to obtain population data from census sources. For purposes of control it would be useful to have such measures as percent non white, percent in professional, managerial and technical occupations, and percent college graduates, variables which certainly contribute to the total variance. The problem of non-coterminousness of district boundaries with those of census tracts, plus the present age of census figures, thwarted this effort for the time being. An attempt to obtain substitute data from school district records was abandoned because of reporting errors.

Classification Data

Of particular importance in this, as indeed in any, investigation is precise classification by independent variable of the subjects under investigation. Since we have chosen to study the influence of fiscal dependence or independence upon fiscal policy and are aware that tax limitation and public vote also relate to this influence, it is necessary to obtain from the districts of the sample data which will enable the precise classification of each district in accordance with the definitions given above (P. 8).

The data collection system devised included a series of statements to be supplied and queries to be answered which progressively separated the districts by steps, operating somewhat like the series of alternatives in a system of biological classification keys. Positive response to Statement A: The entire budget or tax levy is approved annually or regularly by public vote, automatically classifies a district as fiscally independent. It is also classifiable as a public vote district. If Statement A does not apply to the district in question, Statement B focuses more closely upon its budget approval procedure: The school board determines the budget (or tax levy) without public vote or approval of any other agency as follows: (1) Entire budget, or (2) That part of budget below a legal tax limit. If B. 1. applies, the district is fiscally independent; if B. 2., the question remains open, but we know that it is a tax limit district. The next query: *If there is a legal tax limit, the budget may exceed it if approved by* . . . supplies the clues for the ultimate determination of fiscal independence/dependence. The choices are 1. *public vote* (in which case the district is fiscally independent), 2. municipal government agency, 3. county agency, 4. state agency, 5. other (specify), (in all of which latter cases the district is fiscally dependent). It is also a tax limit district. A positive response to a final statement: *Approval of the entire budget is required by an agency other than the school board* automatically classifies a district as fiscally dependent, whether or not it has a tax limit. Subsidiary queries identify the approval agency and the manner of budgetary control, i.e. whether line-by-line, by major categories, or by total amount. *Approval* in the above statement is defined in the strongest sense--i.e. as implying the opposite power to reject.

Fiscal Data

Fiscal data obtained made possible the computation of measures which have served successfully in past studies as yardsticks of school district fiscal performance:

A long series of studies from 1920 to the present have shown net current expenditure per pupil to be an important index of school system health and quality. Ayres(5) was among the first to show this on a state-wide basis where he obtained a correlation of .78 between certain financial items and non-financial items measured on state school systems. Subsequent studies by Norton,(6) Powell,(7) Mort,(8) Ferrell,(9) and Grace and Moe(10) consistently obtained correlations between net current expenditure and some criterion of school quality ranging from .50 to .92. Vincent,(11) Strayer,(12) Woollatt,(13) and McClure,(14) all made more extensive investigations of the cost quality relationship and found it to be positive.

An investigation by Furno(15) opened up a newer dimension of cost quality research. It is apparent from common sense, for example, that a sudden increase in net current expenditure is not likely to bring immediately a comparable increase in quality. Furno found that there is a lag in the effectiveness of increasing expenditure and that the full effects of this lag extend over a period of twenty years. For this and other reasons the current investigation included fiscal data from budget years twenty years apart. Included were data for 1962-63 as current and for 1942-43. Thus the historical performance can be computed for each district which was in existence in the prior years. It should be remembered that consolidation, rapid population growth and expansion into areas formerly sparely occupied are factors which severely limit the number of present districts in which historical trends can be examined.

With respect to historical fiscal performance, it should also be kept in mind that strong economic trends following the close of World War II began to set in around 1942. These trends include inflation, general improvement in productivity of the economy, and a consequent competition among all employers for educated manpower. Thus it may be hypothesized that a test of school district fiscal capabilities includes success in maintaining a relatively favorable fiscal position over the whole twenty year period of rising economic activity. A fiscal "growth ratio" is computed for each of the districts in the sample which has existed over the twenty year span. This is expressed as the percentage which the 1942-43 figure is of the 1962-63 figure. Hence the smaller the ratio the greater the relative growth.

Data on sources of funds were obtained so that amount raised locally could be computed for each district. While the degree of state participation in school financing has a bearing on the amount needed to be raised from local sources, it would nevertheless be expected that fiscal dependence/independence would have a closer bearing on this figure than upon net current expenditure. Fiscal competition from municipal government, it would be expected, would also have a bearing upon the amount raised locally for school purposes. For the non-coterminous subsample on which census data were available information was tabulated on general revenue from local sources, general expenditure, municipal capital outlay, and utility revenue and expenditure.

Differences in fiscal ability of districts should of course be taken into account. Property assessments and their relation to true value conform to no standard yardstick throughout the country. Assessed valuations were obtained, however. Still, some other means of estimating fiscal ability of districts is required. Effective buying income estimates per capita for 1962, 1952, and 1942 were obtained from the pertinent issues of Sales Management(16) for those districts coterminous with the data report areas used by Sales Management.

Data on teachers' salaries were obtained, both current and for the twenty year period. Since approximately 80% of the total budget goes for teachers' salaries, it would be expected that this figure represents one of the most important fiscal items. Mort and Cornell(17) showed 25 years ago that average teachers' salaries are related to a criterion of quality by a correlation of better than .50. More recently Teresa(18) obtained correlations of .42 and .50. In addition to average teachers' salary the present investigation examines the structure of the salary schedule. The salary on the initial step of the salary schedule is obtained for the reason that current competition among employers for the available pool of college graduates would tend to affect the starting salary more than the average. The salary paid at the highest step of the salary schedule for experienced teachers with maximum preparation is also obtained on the grounds that this is at least an indication of the long term objective toward which teachers currently employed by the district in question can look. It would thus have some logical relation to the ability of the district to retain its best teachers. Between these two extremes is a figure for experienced teachers obtained from the salary paid a teacher for five years of training (master's degree or equivalent) on the tenth-year step of the salary schedule. There is some indication that this figure may be sharper measure for the purpose than average teachers' salary since it eliminates the effect of age distribution in the staff. No attempt was made to collect data on staff age.

Quality Related Data

Quality related data have been confined to items that are readily obtainable. There is evidence to show, however, that the half dozen measures investigated are predictive of school quality. Amount spent for library books and for audio visual aids, both current and over the two-decade period, have been obtained. These are among the budget items called "quality improvement expenditures" by Campbell.(19) They are among the so-called "non-maintenance, non-instructional staff" factors investigated by Brickell(20) and Teresa.(18) Campbell made a painstaking analysis of vouchers in a selected group of school districts in order to classify what he termed quality improvement expenditures (expenditures for materials, supplies, services, and other items that seem to be made with the idea of improving the program). He found that a relatively small amount spent for this category of items is unusually effective in predicting quality. Brickell found that a similar category of items made up of (1) net current expenditure, (2) less maintenance, and (3) less instructional staff salaries predicted the quality criterion to the extent of a correlation of .44. Teresa got similar results in a measure obtained from the instruction account minus professional salaries per pupil which, together with other materials and expenses of instruction, yielded a multiple correlation of .36 with the quality criterion.

The criterion in these and other studies is a field work appraisal of the school program as determined by trained observers employing a standard instrument which yields a score.(21)

Another quality related factor is the size of the professional staff in relation to the number of pupils, normally measured as the number of professionals per 1000 pupils (or the number of teachers per thousand pupils where it is difficult to obtain an accurate time-equivalent breakdown on all professionals). In the present study number of teachers per thousand pupils was the measure employed. The measure is similar to pupil-teacher ratio, or average class size. McKenna(22) showed, however, that the former measure is superior to and more easily calculated than average class size, and Ross (23) presents tables to show zero order correlations between this measure and a criterion of school quality to be of the magnitude of .5 to .6. With regard to class size, Blake(24) shows that, up to the time of his investigation, the preponderance of all well-controlled studies favored small classes. He selected the sizeable body of writings on class size reviewed in the Encyclopedia of Educational Research, adding to the list other studies that had been made since the 1950 edition of that reference work. According to the 267 studies reported, the results were fully inconclusive. However, applying criteria of scientific adequacy to the studies, Blake found that only 22 out of the 267 reported in the Encyclopedia could claim to be "real" research. Of these 22, he found that 16 favored small classes, 3 favored large classes, and 3 were inclusive.

Teacher preparation, as measured by the number of years of post high school training, has consistently appeared as a factor predicting school quality. Earliest reports by Mort and Cornell (17) show a correlation of about .50. Ross (23) reports various studies showing correlations ranging from .30 to .58. More recently Moll, in a study as yet unpublished, obtained a correlation of .60 between proportion of staff with 5½ years of training and a criterion of quality based on achievement of pupils. Data obtained in the present study on each of the school districts makes it possible to compute percentage of teachers with bachelor's degrees, percentage with master's degrees, and percentage with doctor's degrees.

Staff deployment appears to have a bearing upon quality. In addition to the factor of class size, the employment of certain types of specialists in the school system predicts a criterion of quality as reported by McKenna. (22) A series of zero order correlations obtained between number of professionals per thousand pupil units in various job classifications and a criterion of school quality shows number of staff employed in guidance and psychological services, health, and the number of librarians to be highly predictive of quality whereas the numbers employed in other job classification studied do not. In an attempt to sample this factor, the current study obtained data to permit the computation of number per 1000 pupils of guidance counsellors, librarians, and certified health personnel, including physicians, dentists, nurses, and psychiatrists.

In the same report, McKenna cites the relationship between a quality criterion and number of total clerical personnel per 1000 pupils in the school system to be .55, and points out that this particular finding for a group of high-expenditure school districts shows a stronger relationship with the criterion than any other in the categories of professional personnel examined. The evidence is strong that adequate number of clericals are important in assisting the work of professionals. The current study obtains a figure enabling a computation of secretarial and clerical personnel currently employed per thousand pupils.

Organizational Data

From a set of data, collected by the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, a series of factors relating to school board membership and method of board procedure were selected. These include number of school board members, methods of selection, and education and occupation of members. There was no prior evidance that such factors are influential on fiscal policy or school quality, other than observational testimony that school board attitudes and acts sometimes appear to result from personal status of the members.

In all 94 variables were computed from the data and subjected to

In all, 94 variables were computed from the data and subjected to various methods of investigation. These are listed in the Appendix appended to Table A.

Treatment of Data

In general the procedure employed in examining the data were eclectic and dependent at each stage upon what appeared in previous stages. In an exploratory study of this nature the precise formulation of mutually exclusive hypotheses a priori would not be practical. Moreover this step would not be possible in the present state of our knowledge of the relative strength and the interrelation of the whole range of external influences that impinge upon the operation of the school district. Even regarding aspects of state law such as fiscal independence and tax limitation, it must be admitted that not enough is known about these external statutory influences upon school board operation to formulate useful hypotheses. Hence the likely most fruitful approach at this point is exploratory. This suggests first an attempt to obtain some information on how the different fiscal variables relate individually to various forms of budget approval, and then an investigation of some of the major multivariate patterns, leading to information about the phenomena sufficient for the formulation of useful hypotheses for further study.

The first step was an ordering of the data into 94 variables which are appended to Table A in the appendix. At the same time a computation of the mean of each of these variables by category of budget approval and by size group was compiled and the significance of differences of means

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calculated for the total of the districts in each category of budget approval. The results of this simple comparison appear as Table A in the appendix. Data derived from school districts of a variety of classes in a variety of states do not make the tidiest tables imaginable. Table A exhibits some of the complexities attendant upon a study of this kind reflecting the multitude of variable circumstances affecting schools throughout the states. In particular the variable *n* among the various cells of the table calls attention to differences in the availability of data and to the limitations which this circumstance imposes on subsequent

NOTES ON TABLES:

(1) Table 2 has been excised.

(2) In Tables 3 and 5 the munus sign preceeding some of the numbers designated R^2 is meant to indicate that the relation between the variables in question is inverse.

statistical treatment. Variability in n results principally from such exigencies as district reorganization and lack of historical data, other failure to provide historical data because of defective records, noncoterminousness of district lines with census tracts, noncoterminousness with municipalities, ambiguity of district names with respect to location, and differences from decade to decade in sampling techniques of agercies (like Sales Management) from which some data were obtained.

These limitations mean that the total sample is available only for roughly 23 of the variables, particularly the fiscal and quality related measures for 1962-63. One can determine the identity of these by referring to the n's in Table A (variables with total n--sum of Dependent and Independent categories--totaling approximately 1177). What we have left are subsamples for which other variables are available for treatment on the limited number of cases.

The second procedure was a factor analysis embracing 74 variables

The second procedure was a factor analysis embracing 74 variables of the subsample which included effective buying income per capita in 1962. A principal component factor analysis with varimax rotation was used. In this procedure each variable is correlated with every other variable. The number of rotations was 16 and the number of iteration cycles was 18. The cumulative proportion of the total variance after 16 rotations was .71. The factors are listed in appendix Table B, and a discussion of the factors appears in the following section of this monograph.

A principal outcome of the factor analysis was to demonstrate the considerable interrelation of the variables indicative of "fiscal performance" of the school district--net current expenditure per pupil, amount raised locally per pupil, teachers salary indices, and the like--and to reveal the relationship between these and wealth (effective buying income). This is seen in Factor 1 (Table 8) which has been labeled Wealth and Quality. The fiscal performance variables appearing in Factor 1 are employed in later multivariate analyses as a composite criterion labeled Composite Fiscal Performance.

A series of multivariate analyses of variance was run to investigate the influence of independent variables (wealth, size dependence/independence, tax limitation, public vote, personal characteristics of school board members, and combinations of these) on the dependent variables (particularly those appearing in Factor 1 and labeled composite fiscal performance). The procedure was to determine the percent of the total variation (R^2) in

The procedure was to determine the percent of the total variation (R^2) in

the dependent variable accounted for by changes in the independent variable, and to test the probability (critical limit) that the variation in each X was independent of the variation of Y. The assumption underlying the particular procedure is that the correlation among independent variables remains the same for each district. Each test of significance was performed in the presence of all the other variables. That is to say, significance of an independent variable means it has a significant effect when the effect of all the other independent variables has been removed.

In the first analysis size, dependence/independence, tax limitation, and public vote were regressed on measures of fiscal performance, singly and as a measure of composite fiscal performance, employing the total sample of 1215 districts (including Size Group 7). The particular model employed eliminated cases which did not contain all data relevant to the particular analysis. This of course biases the results somewhat. However the consistency of the relationship of the variables (with a few exceptions) among the different runs suggests that this effect was slight.

In the second analysis wealth was added to the independent variables and the regression of these upon the measures of fiscal performance was investigated in a subsample of 492 districts (235 fiscally dependent and 257 fiscally independent) on which the wealth measure, effective buying income per capita in 1962, and other fiscal data were obtainable.

In the third analysis the list of independent variables was enlarged to include personal characteristics of school board members, each considered separately. There was no authority deriving from the factor

to include personal characteristics of school board members, each considered separately. There was no authority deriving from the factor

analysis for any useful composite of these variables. This was performed on a subsample of 529 districts for which both wealth and school board data were obtainable. Plots of the residuals for each of the dependent variables were also made to determine their randomness, a freedom from unknown variables.

The outcome of these various forms of statistical treatment is discussed in the following section.

Analysis of the Data

Table A in the appendix presents means of the 94 variables by school district size group and by method of budget approval. This array presents a cross section of the data obtained on the full sample and subsamples, indicated by the number of cases represented in each variable.

The first impression that one obtains from a study of this table is the general superiority in fiscal performance of the fiscally independent districts over the dependent districts, and particularly the superiority of that group of districts which employs public vote. Net current expenditure (Variable 1) in the independent districts is superior to that of the dependent districts and the public vote districts, we find, present the highest net current expenditure average of any group of districts classified by budget approval procedure. Not only are the fiscally independent and public vote districts superior in 1962-63, we find that they are superior 20 years before. The growth index for net current expenditure since 1942-43 (Variable 5) shows that the dependent districts have improved their position somewhat with respect to the other groups in the 20-year span. They show the smaller growth index. Since the growth index is the percentage that the 1942 figure is of the 1962 figure, the smaller growth index for all data indicates improvement over the 20 year span of time.

Since the concern of this investigation has to do with a method of budget approval and the effectiveness of the various methods of budget approval in obtaining funds, fiscal data such as net current expenditure provide us with a reasonable criterion against which to judge these methods. Even more critical is amount raised locally (Variable 7), since budget approval, normally a local process, might be expected to have effect on the obtaining of local revenues. We see that amount raised locally averages more among the independent districts than among the dependent districts and that, by a slight margin, the public vote districts show up best of all. This superiority is historical. Looking all the way back to 1942 we see a similar superiority of these districts over the dependent districts.

As to the matter of competition for local revenue, we see that in the dependent districts a larger share of local tax revenues goes for municipal purposes. Variable 90 shows municipal revenue per pupil at $628 for the dependent districts compared to $407 in the independent districts and $388 in the public vote districts. This works out to 34% of the local tax take for schools in the dependent districts compared to 45% and 48% respectively in the independent and public vote districts. This information is necessarily based on a subsample of school districts whose boundaries are, for comparison purposes, coterminous with municipal boundaries.

Several factors could explain the superiority of the independent districts over the dependent districts in net current expenditure. One is state aid. We see (Variable 10) that the dependent and public vote districts do better in obtaining funds from state tax sources. We see also (Variable 84) that they are wealthier by one of the wealth measures (Variable 84), effective buying income, which is obtainable on a subsample. On the other hand, Variable 54 presents the estimate of property evaluation reported by each of the participant districts in the full sample. We see that the dependent districts by these estimates are wealthier. It would be argued, however, that this observation is meaningless, since the figures are subject to large uncontrolled variation from district to district within many states and from state to state throughout the country. All we can say here is that respondents report dependent districts taxing on higher valuations than other districts.

Whatever the reasons, teachers' salaries average considerably higher among the independent and public vote districts (Variable 19). The beginning salary (Variable 21) and the maximum (Variable 22) likewise are higher. The salary for a teacher on the tenth step of the salary schedule with a master's degree, a relatively experienced and well prepared teacher, averages 7% greater in independent districts and in districts where the people vote on the budget than in dependent districts. It is interesting to note that in the salary comparisons between independent and public vote districts on the one hand and dependent districts on the other, the average of tax limit districts falls somewhere in between and that the independent districts without public vote, a subsample of the independent districts, as a whole fall below the tax limit districts.

Among the so called quality related measures, the independent and public vote districts are superior in audio-visual expenditures (Variable 4), both currently (1962-63) and over the 20 year span since 1942 (Variable 5). The slight different in teachers per 1000 pupils

(Variable 27) and librarians (Variable 29) favors the dependent districts. The number of guidance personnel per 1000 pupils (Variable 28) favors the independent districts as does the employment of clerical personnel (Variable 31). In short, the picture here is mixed and it would appear that in general, the attempt to obtain fiscal and other input data to serve as some sort of quality criterion has not been discriminating.

The principal exception to this is the evidence obtained on the preparation of teachers. The percentage of staff with only the bachelor's degree (Variable 32) is lowest among the independent and public vote districts and highest among the dependent districts. The tax limit and independent districts without public vote fall somewhere in between. The percent with master's degrees and doctor's degrees (Variables 33 and 34) also favors independent over dependent districts. Since, as is to be expected, all teachers nowadays have degrees, the evidence of Variable 35 is relatively useless and the averages in excess of one hundred percent result from rounding errors.

In addition to fiscal data, certain other information is of interest. From a study of Variables 55-66, we see that election of school board members is more typical of the independent districts than of the dependent, whereas appointment of school board members is more typical of dependent districts. Three hundred and eighteen of the reporting 376 fiscally independent districts show selection of school board members by elections, 231 of these non-partisan; whereas only 229 of the 341 dependent districts report elections with a smaller proportion having non-partisan elections. One hundred twelve of the 341 use appointment by municipal county, state or other authorities in school board selection compared to only 29 of the 376 independent districts.

There is similarly a pattern in audit regulations revealed in the array of data. In two-thirds of the independent districts option audit may be employed by certified public accountant compared to only 50% of the dependent districts.

Factor Analysis

A variety of attendant circumstances accompanies fiscal practice of school districts, qualifying the effect of the dependence/independence variable and overlapping the two principal categories. As James and his colleagues point out:

> The set of variables related to fiscal independence and dependence is extremely complex, and involves interlocking systems of federal, state, local and school district governments, with their accretions of constitutional, charter, and contractual relationships.*

It is precisely to illuminate this kind of situation that factor analysis is useful. Variables which are highly intercorrelated are produced in each of the factor lists. Thus one may make some judgment on characteristics that tend to appear simultaneously among the school districts. It may be inferred also that within the total sample of districts there is a group of districts which exhibit to a greater or lesser degree the combination of variables appearing in each of the factors. Thus each factor may be viewed as a set of circumstances which occurs in a set of school districts. One may go further and compute factor scores to determine the degree to which each district in the sample belongs in the set of districts characterized by each factor; this last step has not been taken.

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*James, Kelly and Garms, op. cit., p. 81.

A further advantage of factor analysis is to provide insight into which factors may function as independent variables and which may be dependent upon these. One result of the factor analysis, for example, was to confirm the overriding importance of wealth to the fiscal measures. All the wealth figures appeared in the first factor along with most of the discriminating fiscal factors such as net current expenditure, amount raised locally, and various measures of teachers' salaries. The fiscal factors appearing with wealth, and thus highly intercorrelated with the wealth measure used, were later employed as a criterion in the multivariate analysis. They were used as a measure of composite fiscal performance on which were requested the various classes of budget approval.

The results of the factor analysis itself are interesting, particularly if one attempts some logical interpretation of them. One outcome of this phase of the work was indication that the occupational and educational characteristics of school board members may have some influence on fiscal policies irrespective of categories of budget approval. While one could expect from an examination of the tables of means as discussed in the foregoing section that some of the fiscal variables would be intercorrelated as they appear in the factor analysis, there is no information in these tables themselves that personal characteristics of school board members might have a bearing on fiscal performance of the school board.

The interrelationships occurring in many of the factors confirm the results of previous investigations. This is particularly true of Factor 1.

Possible Meaning of the Factors

The interrelationships occurring in many of the factors confirm the results of previous investigations. This is particularly true of Factor 1. It has been labeled the wealth and quality factor because it illustrates as well as any tabular data could that local community wealth influences expenditure which in turn influences salary levels, and that this fiscal progression influences quality. Factor 1 contains virtually all the wealth and expenditure variables. It contains all the salary variables and most of the so called "quality related" variables which were included in the study--numerical staff adequacy (professionals per 1000 pupils), clerical workers per 1000 pupils, percent of staff holding master's and doctor's degrees, and guidance counselors per 1000 pupils.

It is interesting to note that two of the variables investigated in the data collection as possible quality-related factors appear as wealth-related in Factor 1. These are percent that summer school enrollment is of average daily attendance for the regular school year and percent of districts having adult education programs.

Factor 2 is labeled competitive capability of school boards because most of the contributing variables relate to amount raised locally and the proportion of this that goes to schools relative to the revenues of general government.

Factor 3, which has been called the low personal income factor, reflects conditions in small, homogeneous (low non-public school enrollment), rural communities of low personal income, low wealth and, consequently, high state aid. Indications of this are the high loadings of occupational classifications of retired, service workers, housewives, farmers, semi-skilled and unskilled workers.

In Factor 4, *rising expenditure* reflects success in economic competition. It would appear from this that many schools have been able to compete successfully with other elements in the economy. However, we see here that the primary factor associated with the capacity to compete is not wealth. In fact, none of the growth indices--measures of improvement from 1942 to 1962--appear in the wealth and quality Factor 1. What is associated in Factor 4 are (1) a school board member occupational characteristic, and (2) a capacity to solve capital program problems as revealed by *percent of operational buildings on double sessions* (negative).

Current budget versus capital and debt is the substance of Factor 5. The high loading and opposite sign show that certain districts are forced to choose between financing the educational program or the building program. Net current expenditure is negatively related to capital outlay and debt service. It is interesting that one of the quality related input measures appears in this factor: *library and audio-visual aids expenditure per pupil*. Associated with debt service and capital outlay this indicates that, in general, the stocking of libraries and film depots occurs when the building is new and that original expenditures for such purposes exceed any later outlays for expansion or renovation of book and film collections.

Diminishing wealth results in diminishing revenue, says Factor 6, in states where equalization of aid is not sufficient to cope with the problems of variability in wealth. Evidence for this is the fact that state aid, as well as local revenue, declines as wealth declines in school districts which exhibit these conditions.

Factor 7 is a rural factor, as the occupational variables attest, but it differs from Factor 3, also indicative of rurality, principally in the matter of state aid. Districts which would exhibit a high factor score on Factor 7, it is surmised, are in states where equalization is not a prominent factor in the aid formula. The opposite is the case for districts that score high on Factor 3.

Factor 8 is equalization in action. In districts where this combination of circumstances obtains, wealth declined over the ten-year period from 1952-62, and the percent of non-white population increased. All other variables (except the positive loading on farmers as board members) are quality-related input variables. In these fortunate districts the means are made available for staffing the schools more in accordance with the needs of their (presumably) depressed communities. These data, it should be noted, precede the inauguration of programs like Head Start whose purpose is to equalize for these factors.

Among some districts a wealth disadvantage results in larger classes (teachers per 1000 pupils), and in districts where the circumstances of Factor 9 dominate, the policy is to employ teachers who have had minimal preparation. Districts exhibiting these circumstances are low in number of staff as well as in preparation of staff.

Factor 10 suggests that some schools are characterized by high occupational and educational attainment of their board members, irrespective of community wealth.

Factor 11 has been called the *medium-size city factor* for no particular reason other than that it obviously reflects neither rural nor big city conditions. The calibre of school board members as measured by occupational status is not high.

Factor 12 characterizes schools that have slipped badly in the economic competition, as attested by the high negative loading on *growth index of amount raised locally*. Coupled with a similar high negative loading on *growth index of state aid*, it is quite evident that districts scoring high on this factor would be in bad shape indeed. Irrespective of other conditions that may prevail, board members are from low income groups.

We have called Factor 13 the *small items expenditure factor* because the highest loadings are on two variables concerned with such expenditures. So-called "small item expenditures" and their relation to quality were first investigated by Brickell,(20) and later by Teresa(18) and Campbell.(19) Their work, which was not conclusive, suggested that the relatively small budget allocation for teaching materials (principally textbooks, library materials and supplies) is predictive of quality. Relatively small sums appeared to have great leverage. In Factor 13, the single variable related to small items expenditures stands almost alone. The only variables appearing with it concern characteristics of school board members, which suggests that policies of "giving teachers the tools to work with" are associated with personal characteristics of board members in the school district.

In Factor 14 there is a combination of circumstances which clearly indicates a type of community where people of high socio-economic status have brought their own non-skilled and service help into the population (percent non-white). Percent white collar workers, percent college graduates, percent buying income per capita are all measures originally uncovered by Mort and Cornell as predictive of "highly favored" community settings for schools.(17)

High proportions of managers and officials on the school board tend to cluster with lower percentages of professionals and farmers on the board. This combination of variables, seen in Factor 15, is accompanied by a favorable competitive average teachers' salary in the district relative to the state's average. This indicates the situation, common in so many states, of a single city of several hundred thousand people holding all of the state's economic trumps.

Overall Indications

Methods of budget approval were not included as variables in the analysis. Aside from identifying variables to be included in a measure of composite fiscal performance for later multivariate analysis, the purpose of the factor analysis was to reduce the number of variables in relation to which the various forms of budget approval could be examined. The procedure for doing this would be to compute factor scores for each district in the sample and to examine mean, standard deviation and range of factor scores of districts grouped by method of budget approval. This procedure has not been followed at this writing. It is intended as a subsequent analysis which may perhaps prove more meaningful as one means of investigating the hypothesis which has come from the initial exploratory investigation and which will be discussed in the concluding section.

The major surprise of the factor analysis is the persistence of many of the variables having to do with characteristics of school board members throughout the 16 factors. Of the 74 variables submitted to the factor analysis, 65 appeared in the factors with a loading above 30, and although only 17 of these 65 relate to school board members, these 17 appear in no less than 13 of the 16 factors. There are places, in fact, where we seem to view specific policies as related to some type of school board member. The clearest example of this is in Factor 13. But note also in Factors 2, 4, and 13 how a certain fiscal policy seems related to the position of board members in the community power structure. Factor 10 is actually a description of some of the essential attributes of a highly competent board.

Another persistent influence appears to be equalization of aid. Although no actual measure of degree of equalization was obtained in this study, combinations of other variables point distinctly to the likelihood that equalization--or the lack of it--has a fundamental influence on the fiscal well-being of school districts. Factor 3, for example, exhibits a healthy combination of conditions because of equalization in aid, whereas Factor 7 shows an unhealthy state of affairs. Factor 8 displays some of the consequences of equalization, Factor 9 what happens when equalization is minimal and Factor 6 the situation when local wealth declines in the absence of adequate equalization. Factor 12 combines variables that attest to the complete breakdown of the equalization principal.

It is an interesting exercise to divide the factors into "favorable-unfavorable", "wholesome-unwholesome" or "good-not-so-good" dichotomies. One favors the combination of variables revealed in Factors 1, 3, 4, 8, 10, 14 and 15, but is not so impressed by Factors 2, 5, 6, 7, 9, 12 and 13; one has feelings neither way about Factors 11 and 16. So in less than half the instances could one discuss with any confidence "what's right with the schools!"

Multivariate Analysis

The first multivariate analysis regresses independent variables designating method of budget approval against dependent variables of composite fiscal performance. These latter were drawn from Factor 1 of the factor analysis and represent the principal fiscal measures associated with wealth. A measure of wealth was not included, since it was desired to include the full sample, on only a portion of which a suitable wealth measure was available. To the independent variables designating the methods of budget approval size was added as a possible determinant associated with method of budget approval, and the influence of growth was examined through the ratio of 1962 to 1942 enrollment. The perameters of eight variance models were established involving the independent variables singly and in combination as follows: (1) Fiscal Dependence/Independence; (2) Tax Limitation/No Tax Limitation; (3) Tax Limitation/No Tax Limitation-

Fiscal Dependence/Independence Interaction; (4) Size; (5) Quadratic Size; (6) Fiscal Dependence/Independence - Size Interaction; (7) Tax Limitation/No Tax Limitation - Fiscal Dependence/Independence - Size Interaction; and (8) Ratio Enrollment 1962 to 1942.

These eight combinations of independent variables were regressed against the following dependent variables singly and in a combination; numbered as they appear in the List appended to Table A: (1) *net current expenditure 1962*, (2) *net current expenditure 1942*, (7) *amount raised locally 1962*, (8) *amount raised locally 1942*, (19) *average teachers' salary*, (20) *percentage that salaries in the district are of salaries in the state*, (21) *beginning teachers' salary*, (22) *maximum teachers' salary*, (23) *salary on the tenth step of the salary schedule with a master's degree*, and (89) ratio of amount *raised locally* for schools to *total local revenue*. The results of this work are reported herewith in Table 3 where R^2 represents the percent of the total variation in the dependent variable accounted for by changes in the independent variable and CL (critical level) indicates the probability that variation in the particular dependent variable in question was independent of variation in the independent variable. The direction of the relationship of each of these independent binary variables, as determined by the least squares estimate of the unknown parameters, is as follows: fiscal dependence negative, fiscal independence positive, tax limitation negative, no tax limitation positive, all others positive. Table 3 lists only one side of each of these binaries.

The evidence from Table 3 seems to suggest a number of hypotheses. The influence of the fiscal independence variable appears most significantly upon the teachers' salary factors, and through these upon composite fiscal performance. The tax limitation variable is significantly related to amount raised locally, both in 1962 and 1942. The tax limitation variable in combination with the fiscal independence variable finds all these significant relationships washed out. The reason for this is probably the influence of wealth. With wealth controlled, as in the next stage of the analysis, this combination is highly significant. As regards to size variable, the advantage larger districts hold over the smaller districts of a state are seen in the significant relation between size and the ratio of district teachers' salaries to average salaries for the state. In general, the larger the district the higher the salary as seen through the significant amount of the variances accounted for by size in the teachers salary measures. The influence of size is also historical, appearing on net current expenditure in 1942 and on amount raised locally in 1942. The effect of extreme size, as measured by the quadratic, is similar to size itself, except in the measure of fiscal competition with municipal government. The ratio of amount raised locally for schools to total local revenue is significantly related to quadratic size. Fiscal independence combined with size tends to cancel some of the effect of size alone, except in the composite. The relation of this combination to composite fiscal performance is significant. It is in the size combination with fiscal independence and without tax limitation that the greatest effect upon the independent variables is seen. Net current expenditure, amount raised locally, teachers' salary

TABLE 3

Multivariate Analysis: Variance and Critical Levels, Regression of Eight Combinations of Methods of Budget Approval, Size and Growth Rate on Ten Measures of Fiscal Performance and Composite Fiscal Performance, Measure of Wealth Not Included, 1200 School Districts

Method of Budget Approval, Size, and Growth Combinations		1 NCE 62	2 NCE 42	7 ARL 62	8 ARL 42	19 AV TS	20 TS DIST/ ST	21 BEG TS	22 MAX TS	23 Lev. 10 TS	89 ARL/ TLR	CEP Composite Variables
Fiscal Independence	R^2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.002	.002	.010	.006	.007	.001	.008
	CL	.876	.458	.631	.686	.155	.146	.000**	.004**	.002**	.368	.001**
Tax Limitation	R^2	-.000	-.001	-.005	-.013	-.001	-.000	-.000	-.001	-.001	-.000	-.000
	CL	.836	.244	.009**	.000**	.314	.961	.520	.152	.286	.945	.976
Tax Limitation plus Fiscal Independence	R^2	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.001	.001	.000	.000	.002	.000
	CL	.986	.813	.839	.934	.186	.354	.198	.787	.902	.139	.666
Size Group	R^2	.000	.011	.000	.012	.011	.034	.003	.007	.004	.003	.000
	CL	.634	.000**	.612	.000**	.000**	.000**	.061	.002**	.019*	.059	.541
Size 2	R^2	.001	.005	.006	.007	.002	.002	.000	.000	.000	.004	.001
	CL	.385	.013*	.008**	.003**	.072	.140	.535	.462	.516	.021*	.267
Fiscal Independence plus Size	R^2	.000	.000	.004	.000	.003	.001	.002	.004	.002	.000	.003
	CL	.446	.704	.024*	.903	.066	.409	.067	.013*	.067	.648	.031*

TABLE 3 (continued)

Method of Budget Approval, Size, and Growth Combinations		1 NCE 62	2 NCE 42	7 ARL 62	8 ARL 42	19 AV TS	20 TS DIST/ ST	21 BEG TS	22 MAX TS	23 Lev. 10 TS	89 ARL/ TLR	CEP Composite Variables
No Tax Limitation plus Fiscal Independence plus Size	R^2	.006**	.001	.007**	.000	.030	.001	.038	.038	.034	.004	.040
	CL	.008**	.192	.003**	.846	.000**	.411	.000**	.000**	.000**	.002*	.000**
Growth Ratio	R^2	.000	.000	.002	.001	.004	.000	.003	.004	.002	.001	.004
	CL	.914	.584	.075	.425	.017*	.947	.033*	.015*	.125	.356	.022*

data and the composite are all influenced significantly by this combination. No less than 4% of the variation of composite fiscal performance is accounted for by this combination of independent variables. The principal influence of growth rate is on beginning and maximum teachers salaries, and also on the composite.

Influence of Wealth

One phenomenon is the frequency of influence of the independent variables on such dependent variables as teachers' salaries but relatively less frequent influence upon the variables from which teachers' salaries flow, namely net current expenditure. The reason for this, it might be hypothesized, lies in the influence of wealth which in the analysis reported in Table 3 has not been included. In order to probe the influence of wealth, a second multivariate analysis was undertaken in which the independent variables comprise the ones investigated in the previous analysis plus the addition of wealth. The principal difference other than the inclusion of wealth is the fact that this analysis had to be obtained on a subsample of districts for which the most reliable measure of wealth available, effective buying income per capita in 1962, was obtainable.

The results of this procedure are presented in Table 4, in the form of critical levels of significance between the independent variables and composite fiscal performance. Several indications are immediately apparent. Of all the independent variables, wealth accounts for more of the variance than any other, having a significant level somewhat less than .005. This

TABLE 4

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS: CRITICAL LEVELS, REGRESSION OF EIGHT COMBINATIONS OF METHODS OF BUDGET APPROVAL WITH WEALTH ON COMPOSITE FISCAL PERFORMANCE, 498 DISTRICTS

Combinations of Methods	Critical Level Composite Fiscal Performance
Fiscal Independence	.85
Tax Limitation	.01**(neg.)
Fiscal Independence plus no Tax Limit	.05*
Size	.63
Size ^{2}	.72
Biscal Independence plus Size	.44
Wealth (Effective Buying Income)	.00**

was to be expected in view of the high correlations which have consistently been obtained by many researchers between wealth (fiscal capacity) and various measures of fiscal performance. The Table also shows that the matter of tax limitation is also highly significant and that, with wealth in the matrix, fiscal independence is no longer significant (being at the .85 level). However, when the fiscal independence is combined with the no tax limitation, the result is a significance level of .05. This occurs irrespective of the high reliability of the tax limitation variable by itself. It will be seen that neither linear size effect nor quadratic size effect is significant when wealth is taken into account. Whether the difference between this result and that of the first analysis is due to some non-random factor is not clear.

The effect of this program is to hold wealth constant at each level of fiscal performance for each method of budget approval. The results of this analysis are further graphed in the Figure. The variables which define the different methods of budget approval are plotted as separate curves and labeled. In all cases, as wealth increases, composite fiscal performance increases. Fiscal performance rises to a plateau and levels off at a figure somewhat above an effective buying income of $5,000 per capita. What the graph seems to be saying, in sum, is that schools in the most wealthy communities tend to be on a par financially. These are represented on the relatively horizontal part of the curve at the top. The long declining tail to the left of the graph is the effect of unequalization in American education. As the level of wealth falls off,



Figure #1: Relationship between Composite Fiscal Performance Index and Effect Buying Income Per Capita by Patterns of Fiscal Control.

the level of fiscal performance falls off almost linearly and this event occurs irrespective of the method of budget approval. The five curves plot mean fiscal performance in relation to wealth for districts in five budget approval categories in the following order from top to bottom: independent/non-tax-limit; non-tax-limit; dependent/non-tax-limit; tax limit; dependent/tax limit; and independent/tax limit. What we see from the curve is that this order describes their order of fiscal performance. The curve for the independent, non tax limit districts lies on top. Whatever the level of wealth, the composite fiscal performance of this group of school districts is superior to all the others. The curve for the dependent, tax-limit districts lies near the bottom. Interestingly enough, it is the curve for the independent, tax limit districts that actually shows up most poorly on composite fiscal performance when wealth is controlled, while that of the dependent, non-tax-limit districts occupies the middle range.

Thus it would appear that irrespective of wealth, fiscal independence leads to superior fiscal performance _if_ the board may operate without a tax-limit. Since, in the absence of tax limits, fiscally independent school boards almost universally employ some form of public vote or approval of the school budget or tax rate, it would appear that this method is to be preferred where the criterion is the school board's ability to meet the competition of other publicly supported agencies in a period of rapid economic growth and inflation.

On the other hand, fiscal independence is the least successful in fiscal performance where there is a tax-limit. This curve lies below all the others. It would appear that the effect of a tax limit is to hold down expenditure in a period of rising costs. We see that tax limitation occurs in the three lowest curves in the Figure. The alternative to remaining below the tax limit is, in most instances, to petition the public for an "override." Where public vote is not a regularized procedure, boards appear to shrink from public exposure. Under fiscal dependence, the regularized procedure is to obtain approval of some other agency of local government, such as a city council, and it would appear that with a tax limitation this is the superior arrangement. Dependence is not the most effective arrangement for maintaining support of the schools, it would appear, but it is superior where local discretion is hampered by tax limitation. On the other hand, the higher degree of local discretion exercised without tax limitation appears to be the best arrangement of all as measured in terms of the ability to obtain funds for schools within the competition for tax revenue in an inflationary economy.

Influence of Personal Characteristics of School Board Members and Public Vote on the Budget

Because certain personal characteristics of school board members appeared with some consistency in the factor analysis, a third multivariate analysis was undertaken in which these characteristics were treated as independent variables along with size, wealth, and tax limitation. Public vote, which had not been a part of previous analyses, was also added to the independent variables. The relation between these and fourteen measures of fiscal performance, including composite fiscal performance, was examined.

We see from Table 5, where percentage of variance and critical levels are presented, that school board membership appears to make a difference. A high educational level (percentage of college graduates) and immediacy of interest in schools (percentage of housewives) appear the most critical. The relationship of the latter factor, percentage of school board members that are housewives, to the measures of fiscal performance is undoubtedly attributable to the fact that housewives, as mothers, represent the most closely involved clientele of the schools. Any measure of percentage of parents on the board, were it available, would likely show as strong a relationship. Specifically the significant influence of college graduates and housewives on the board is seen in net current expenditure, amount raised locally, teachers' salaries, and the composite (which in this table is the same as composite fiscal performance appearing in Table 3 and consists of the combination of the ten variables appearing there).

Other school board characteristics appear to have minor importance compared to these two. The critical level for all responses in the analysis is shown in Table 6 as an indication of the relative significance of the independent variables. All responses in this analysis refers to a combination of dependent variables in which greatest total change occurs when the independent variable is changed. Those who feel that retired persons on the school board work against fiscal expansion find little support for this view here. Percent farmers, most likely, is an inverse measure of wealth. Also contrary to what many writers in school administration have maintained, the use of standing committees of the board does not appear a thoroughly bad thing. We see their presence significantly related to amount raised locally, teachers' salaries, and debt service.

The principal feature of the data presented in Table 5 and 6 is the outstanding position of the public vote districts, confirming the observations made above in connection with Table A (the table of means). Note the relatively large percentage of the variance in net current expenditure and debt service expenditure sccounted for by public vote on the budget. Significant also is the percentage of the variance in amount raised locally, the salary variables, the "quality related variables"--number of total staff, guidance counsellors, librarians, and clerical personnel per 1000 pupils--and in composite fiscal performance. The all responses critical level of the public vote variable is greater than that of the tax limitation variable. Wealth again shows up as highly significant, but not more so than public vote. In combination with size the effect of public vote decreases; but then the effect of size is highly significant in itself, and negative.

A subsample was used for the third run. These were the 529 districts for which both school board and wealth data were available. In order to test the representativeness of this sample, plots of the frequency functions of the residuals were made. For each dependent variable the estimated value was computed based upon the prediction equation describing the assumed relationship variance between dependent and independent variables. This estimated value

TABLE 5

Multivariate Analysis: Variance and Critical Levels Regression of Certain Budget Approval Variables, Size, Wealth and Characteristics of School Board Members on Fourteen Measures of Fiscal Performance

For Subsample of 529 Districts

		1 NCE 62	4 LIB EX	7 ARL 62	19 AVG TS	20 TS DIST /ST	21 BEG TS	22 MAX TS	23 LEV 10 TS	27 TEACH/ 1000	28 GUID COUNS/ 1000	29 NO LIB/ 1000	31 NO CLR/ 1000	52 DEBT SERV. EXP	CFP
Tax Limitation	R^2	-.001	-.003	-.001	-.003	.000	.000	-.009	-.001	-.003	-.003	-.003	.000	-.014	-.001
	CL	.300	.230	.415	.178	.914	.631	.007*	.313	.191	.210	.172	.593	.003**	.305
Public Vote	R^2	.046	.004	.013	.029	.000	.024	.045	.020	.011	.015	.015	.013	.049	.027
	CL	.000**	.121	.003*	.000**	.598	.000**	.000**	.000**	.009*	.003*	.004*	.006*	.000**	.000**
Tax Limitation plus Size	R^2	.004	..003	.000	.006	.005	.001	.002	.000	.000	.001	.001	.008	.001	.004
	CL	.101	.176	.795	.043*	.074	.310	.182	.680	.993	.442	.477	.033*	.524	.085
Public Vote plus Size	R^2	-.013	-.003	-.003	-.006	-.001	-.007	-.008	-.002	-.005	-.009	-.012	-.010	-.011	-.007
	CL	.002*	.230	.142	.034*	.460	.027*	.011*	.193	.072	.024*	.010*	.014*	.009*	.016*
No. School Board Members	R^2	-.001	-.004	-.000	-.002	.000	-.013	-.006	-.011	.006	.000	.002	-.004	.000	-.003
	CL	.368	.163	.664	.254	.816	.002*	.034*	.005*	.044*	.836	.291	.146	.634	.155

TABLE 5 (cOntinued)

% School Board Members College Graduates	R^2	.027	.003	.029	.017	.002	.022	.034	.026	.013	.019	.000	.012	.016	.033
	CL	.000**	.198	.000**	.001**	.237	.000**	.000**	.000**	.004*	.001**	.893	.009*	.002	.000**
% School Board Members Professional Occupation	R^2	.001	.003	.001	.006	.004	.005	.005	.003	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000	.010
	CL	.324	.214	.541	.045*	.110	.049*	.034*	.120	.997	.844	.661	.684	.835	.004*
% School Board Members Managerial Occupation	R^2	.001	.001	.001	.000	.002	.000	.000	.001	.000	.002	.000	.000	.000	.001
	CL	.435	.437	.391	.970	.245	.804	.852	.535	.698	.320	.774	.861	.616	.530
% School Board Members Clerical Occupation	R^2	.000	.001	.002	.001	.000	.001	.001	.001	.002	.000	.002	.000	.000	.001
	CL	.591	.523	.226	.478	.758	.322	.320	.495	.273	.666	.259	.817	.652	.336
% School Board Members Farmers	R^2	-.006	.002	-.008	-.004	-.001	-.007	-.003	-.010	-.006	-.006	.000	-.002	-.001	-.002
	CL	.037*	.367	.022*	.096	.491	.027*	.152	.006*	.049*	.060	.677	.326	.336	.165
% School Board Members Foremen	R^2	.001	.001	.000	.002	.001	.002	.005	.006	-.003	-.003	-.004	.000	.000	.007
	CL	.395	.547	.982	.184	.555	.174	.054	.036*	.163	.181	.152	.904	.930	.019*
% School Board Members Unskilled	R^2	.001	.000	.005	.005	.004	.003	.001	.002	.000	.002	-.005	.002	.002	.010
	CL	.314	.922	.056	.059	.131	.153	.361	.262	.994	.301	.096	.266	.257	.006*

TABLE 5 (continued)

% School Board Members Service Occupation	R^2	.000	.001	.001	.000	.000	.002	.002	.001	.000	.003	.005	.000	.000	.000
	CL	.756	.459	.507	.710	.915	.281	.244	.412	.925	.200	.100	.645	.720	.719
% School Board Members Housewives	R^2	.014	.001	.009	.037	.011	.031	.038	.027	.000	.000	.002	.009	.000	.036
	CL	.002*	.405	.011*	.000**	.011*	.000**	.000**	.000**	.800	.713	.343	.022*	.950	.000**
% School Board Members Retired	R^2	.002	.000	.001	.001	.000	.000	.004	.000	.001	.000	.002	.019	.001	.001
	CL	.271	.881	.523	.341	.975	.852	.083	.550	.389	.917	.266	.001**	.530	.342
% School Board Members Ex-officio	R^2	.002	.000	.001	.000	.001	.000	.000	.001	.001	.002	.000	.001	.002	.000
	CL	.192	.815	.492	.840	.571	.840	.819	.398	.456	.278	.626	.561	.239	.748
No Special Committees	R^2	.000	.000	.002	.000	.000	.000	.000	.001	.000	.001	.007	.000	.000	.000
	CL	.642	.620	.308	.909	.681	.951	.782	.490	.901	.431	.054	.952	.999	.793
No Standing Committees	R^2	.005	.000	.008	.002	.000	.006	.015	.012	.004	.000	.001	.000	.012	.009
	CL	.051	.835	.021*	.286	.770	.040*	.001**	.003*	.127	.613	.419	.968	.006*	.009
Effective Buying Income 1962	R^2	.000	.001	.001	.001	.031	.016	.013	.017	.000	.006	.003	.004	.025	.038
	CL	.915	.449	.482	.475	.000**	.001**	.001**	.001**	.770	.066	.183	.105	.000**	.000**
Size (Enrollment)	R^2	-.029	-.002	-.012	-.002	.008	-.002	-.001	-.000	-.079	-.023	-.031	-.007	-.031	-.012
	CL	.000**	.366	.004**	.221	.028*	.281	.291	.548	.000**	.000**	.000**	.043*	.000**	.002*

TABLE 6

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS: CRITICAL LEVELS, ALL RESPONSES, BUDGET APPROVAL VARIABLES, SIZE, WEALTH, AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SCHOOL BOARD MEMBERS

Independent Variable	Critical Level, All Responses, 14 Measures of Fiscal Perfor
Tax Limitation	.03*
Public Vote	.00**
Tax Limitation plus Size	.22
Public Vote plus Size	.08
Number School Board Members	.09
% School Board Members College Graduates	.00**
% School Board Members Professional Occupation	.28
% School Board Members Managerial	.61
% School Board Members Clerical Occupation	.77
% School Board Members Farmers	.09
% School Board Members Foremen	.21
% School Board Members Unskilled Occupation	.40
% School Board Members Service Occupation	.59
% School Board Members Housewives	.00**
% School Board Members Retired	.05*
% School Board Members Ex-officio	.52
Number Special Committees	.73
Number Standing Committees	.05*
Effective Buying Income 1962	.00**
Size (Enrollment)	.00**
Quadratic Size	.00**

was plotted against the actual deviation of each characteristic from its estimated value. The resultant chart should exhibit a random scatter if there is no factor (independent variable) unaccounted for in the analysis. Otherwise the influence of this uncontrolled factor would be expected to show as non-randomness in the distribution. Such a chart was plotted for each of the fourteen dependent variables.

The plots are not appended to this report. However, the following dependent variables show highly randomized (virtually circular or oval) patterns: composite fiscal performance, all the teachers' salary measures, and number of teachers per 1000 pupils. Number of clerks per 1000 pupils is relatively flat, indicating little deviation from prediction among the 529 districts, Less flat but moderately so, and randomized patterns are exhibited by net current expenditure, and expenditures for library and audio visual aids. The pattern for amount raised locally is not random by virtue of much greater deviation above the mean of the prediction than below. The factor(s) unaccounted for here would presumably be state aid and/or some equalized measure of local effort. The plots for guidance counsellors and number of librarians per 1000 pupils are non-random. The same effect appears as in the plot for amount raised locally, although more exaggerated.

It would appear safe to conclude from this that the major influences upon most of the fiscal variables have been accounted for. They seem to comprise wealth, without tax limitation, employing public vote in budget approval and hence fiscal independence, and board members who themselves are educated and have some immediate personal interest in school affairs. Size is also a factor, as has been surmised, though its influence is far from clear in this analysis.

It will be noted that the size effect, being negative, is opposite to its effect in the first and second analyses, where it is positive (Tables 3 and 4). In the first and second runs, size means the size intervals categorized by the size groups designated in Table 1 and defined on Pages 13 and 14. In the third run, size is the actual enrollment of each district in the analysis. This is not the frist time that array of data by intervals has affected results. It must be agreed that measurement of size by enrollment and not by size category is the more precise method of the two, and that the result of the third run is probably the more reliable. However, the discrepancy illustrates peculiarities regarding the relation of size to various other measures, and its probable non-linearity.

As we see in Table 5, the relationship of size is, in general, highly significant. But while this relationship is negative, that of quadratic size is not. Size in combination with both public vote and tax limitation reduces the significance of both. It would appear from what little we can see here that there is probably such a thing as optimum size. It would also appear that the regression of size on fiscal performance is non-linear, and there is the suggestion that the large city suffers more from size than the giant city. And it would also appear questionable whether voting on the budget would help either the large or the giant city school district in improving its fiscal position. However, it must be emphasized, proposals for dealing with the negative effects of size are still pretty much conjectural.

Conclusions

This has been an exploratory study in which a variety of evidence has been accumulated with respect to school board fiscal regulation, capability, and performance. A variety of statistical procedures has been employed in order to study the variables in a variety of contexts and to gain some insight into how the variables defining fiscal regulation and capability influence variables defining fiscal performance. It is intended that the outcome should provide evidence to make possible the effective formulation of useful hypotheses for further investigation.

The "Two Pattern" Hypothesis

We do find that state regulations surrounding the process of budget approval appear to make a difference in the fiscal capability of school districts. We cannot be certain that any particular method of budget approval, in and of itself, is responsible. School district size is a troublesome factor whose particular influence, aside from the likelihood that its relation to fiscal criteria is non-linear, has not been clarified. The probability is, it would appear, that an optimum method of budget approval, if there is such a thing, varies with school district size.

Despite its frequent difficulties for the administrator, the power of public vote on the budget to gird some school districts effectively for the fiscal wars seems clear from the evidence in hand. Those that benefit most appear to be the smaller districts rather than the larger ones. There is considerable evidence to suggest that the combination of public vote and relatively modest size (enrollment) is effective in maintaining the school district's economic position in these times.

The clearest evidence we get from this investigation relates to the matter of tax limitation. Tax limitation seriously hampers the school district in economic competition with other agencies relying upon public support. By extension, it is suggested that all agencies of public support are hampered relative to the general economy by arbitrary limitation upon their ability to benefit from general economic well being. Relative to tax limitation, fiscal dependence of school boards is greatly to be preferred. Indeed, it would appear that where tax limitation is the model that has been chosen by legislative action to restrict the fiscal powers of the state's local agents, the school boards, fiscal dependence is superior to fiscal independence.

Fiscal independence appears to have some qualified superiority over fiscal dependence. The qualifications relate, as indicated above, to tax limitation, but more particularly to size. The essence of fiscal independence includes the ingredient of public vote on the budget. The alternative is some form of tax limitation, which we find to be a kind of poison. Otherwise there is no fiscal restriction of any kind upon the local board, a situation which legislatures seek to avoid. Moreover, most districts with fiscal independence are also districts with public vote. But it is suggested by the evidence, we see above, that public vote is not necessarily the best procedure for the largest districts. One would then be inclined to question the use of fiscal independence for the largest districts, since the alternative would be to subject them either to tax limitation or to the authority of some board well removed from the local influence (like, for example, the Port of New York Authority). One could hardly care for either alternative as a means of governing schools. Hence a form of fiscal dependence, exercised without tax limitation, would appear preferable among the extant methods of regulating the fiscal powers of the local school boards of the largest cities. One alternative to this would be, of course, to break up the largest districts. If fiscally independent districts with public vote and of smaller size appear best off in the fiscal competition, the argument is strong for organizing all districts in accordance with conditions that predict optimum performance. Indeed, one is at a loss to explain why those methods invented so far for rendering the stewardship of local boards responsible to the state are the only ones which have been proposed for dealing with the obvious problems of the overly large, or the overly poor, school district. There should be new approaches possible and a new round of creative thinking in the organization of school government.

Related to this question is the entire rationale of the population characteristics, the socio-economic conditions of the community which, one would expect, greatly influence the capacity of school boards to cope with their problems, fiscal and otherwise. These factors have not been investigated in the present analyses. One problem relates to the noncoterminousness of school districts in many states to census tracts.* Census data were collected on the coterminous districts, but variables were not properly computed for inclusion in the foregoing analyses. This work will be undertaken subsequent to this report.

Also yet to be undertaken is the computation of factor scores on each of the districts in the sample. These will then be studied in relation to method of budget approval and other aspects of legislative control. It may be observed in passing that evidence from the factor analysis, and also from the second multivariate analysis where wealth was controlled, suggests that in general the nation's schools have not participated in the benefits from the exceptional economic growth our country has enjoyed in the past two decades. Only seven of the sixteen factors resulting from the factor analysis present a favorable combination of variables, and the plotting of fiscal performance against wealth, irrespective of method of budget approval, shows a long declining curve. Only at the highest local wealth levels is the curve relatively horizontal; the declining tail of the curve shows an almost linear relation between fiscal performance and local wealth. Moreover the tail of the curve represents the vast majority of American school districts. Thus, in 1962-63 and after 40 years of state efforts at equalization, it could be said that the fiscal capability of most school districts is still tied to the greatly variable characteristic of local wealth.

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*Norman Walsh is presently at work on a procedure for obtaining census data on noncoterminous districts which will satisfy acceptable margins of error. When this work is completed it is intended that the full sample of districts in this study will be re-examined relative to socio-economic variables.

Also from the factor analysis the influence of the school board member was discerned. A subsequent multivariate analysis tended to confirm the view that, irrespective of method of budget approval, certain personal characteristics of school board members are to be preferred. Specifically, members with college education and members with some immediacy of interest in schools, such as housewives as mothers have, improves the board's fiscal capabilities. Whether this circumstance is related to method of school board member selection is not clear. We do find that appointment is more frequently the method of selection in the fiscally dependent districts than in the independent districts,where the prevailing method is by election.

One might expect that what are called the independent variables are actually independent of each other. It is well known that the multitude of controls prescribed by state legislatures makes for complex influences on local boards from state to state. Yet each control is legislated for a specific reason. So one might expect fiscal dependence, independence, tax limitation, public vote, methods of school board selection, and the like to be each independent of the other in the sense of one occurring as a function of a particular legislative intent without implying the presence of another.

The evidence is, however, that this is not the case. It would appear that the various legislative regulations tend to fall into patterns. Tax limitation seems to accompany fiscal dependence more often than not. Election of school board members occurs more frequently where there is public vote on the budget, while appointment of school board members is more typical of fiscal dependence. Certain features seem to fall together and are characteristic of one pattern, other features which appear together tend to be characteristic of other patterns. Thus legislative intentions are in number fewer than the many regulations which exist. There appear to be rather general patterns of intent. The question is then, how many patterns are there? The evidence is cumulative that the decisions made by a legislature in setting up controls over local districts are not unitary with respect to each control. Some underlying point of view, philosophy, or ideal with respect to education and its finance and management, provides the context within which the legislature selects the various controls. The hypothesis that emerges from the foregoing analysis is that there are fundamentally two patterns of local school district organization and control. For purposes of discussion one might be called "the fiscally independent pattern" and the other "the tax limit pattern".

The origin of the legislature's point of view, philosophy, or ideal (whatever one might wish to call it) rises from the constitution of each of the states which, for the most part, places responsibility for public education in the hands of the legislature. It is from this circumstance that we derive the legal theory that education is a state function. In every state (except Hawaii) the legislature has chosen a common device through which to exercise this function. It created a local agency rather than a state ministry. The special district, a form of special purpose government, was adopted as the device for educational government ruled by a local governing board. It is from the legislature's choice to delegate the constitutionally mandated educational function to local boards that we derive the principle that school boards are state boards of local jurisdiction. Certain means for obtaining funds were given to these state boards of local jurisdiction in each of the states. Thus the three requirements were met which must be met before there can be government: a district with designated boundaries, a governing agency, and fiscal powers.

But the legislature does not give its creatures completely free rein over fiscal affairs. Some sort of checkrein in consistently applied to the power of boards to raise and spend money. Three devices have generally been employed by the legislatures for this purpose: (1) public vote (or let those who putup the money approve its expenditure); (2) tax limitation (or take all you want as long as you go only so far); and (3) fiscal dependence (or let some "more responsible agency" approve the board's decisions).

It would appear from the evidence presented in the foregoing analysis that where the legislature is inclined to give to its local agent, the school board, a relatively high degree of control over the source of funds (as through a provision of fiscal independence) they also tend to view the local electorate as a party to the decision (as through provision for public vote.) The two arrangements are not always present together, though they tend to be. Fiscal independence, then, is one characteristic of a point of view, philosophy, or ideal of local non-partisan control over educational fiscal policy. Provision for public vote on the budget or tax rate appears to be a second related characteristic. We have seen that fiscal independence is superior to fiscal dependence _if_ the school board may operate without a tax limit. We see that, as regards a criterion of fiscal performance, public vote districts appear superior. Public vote districts, particularly, offer the better salaries for teachers.

A third characteristic that appears to be associated with the other two in this particular ideal of local fiscal control is election of school board members, this method of board selection occurring more frequently among the independent and public vote districts. Non-partisanship also appears more likely to accompany this context than not.

How valuable is this ideal? In a period when greater national resources are being allocated to education and there is increasing national concern for its output, would not the more effective ideal be in the opposite direction? Would not a lessening of local control over school policy operate more in the national interest?

The opposite ideal, it would appear, results in the other pattern of fiscal controls, the tax limit pattern. In the fiscally independent pattern it is the intent of the legislature, it would appear, to view education apart from general government. In the tax limit pattern, it appears, the legislature views education as not different from the functions of general government. In the first place, where tax limits exist, both schools and general government share in the same limit. Thus the convenient procedure is to place the school board under local general government--to make it fiscally dependent. Even where the school board is nominally independent and operates under tax limit it can, and usually does, become "functionally" dependent. It appears practically impossible to set a limit that in time does not become too low. Tax limits, once set, appear difficult to raise. Some form of safety device is required, then, with a tax limitation. The most common provision is for the school board to surrender its fiscal independence and make a request for additional funds from the general government. Less common is the provision permitting the board to submit to the electorate that part of a budget which exceeds the limit. Thus tax limit districts may be independent or dependent. As independent districts they may also be public-vote districts. But where the board is reluctant for some reason to go to the general government or to the people, whichever its option may be, for additional funds, its alternative is to attempt to operate within the prescribed limit. In a period of rising costs the results of this policy can be disastrous. The board may be reluctant to make the request, either to officers of general government or the people, whichever the case may be, except in terms of extreme need. Thus it is likely that under the tax-limit arrangement, regardless of the method of overriding the limit, channels of communication to the ultimate authority over revenues are not regular and tend to occur only in periods of crisis.

Thus we see that tax limit districts do not fare so well fiscally as public vote districts and usually not so well as dependent districts. We have seen that fiscal independence is superior to fiscal dependence only if the school board may operate without a tax limit. In the presence of a tax limit, fiscal dependence is preferable. Thus, it would appear, a mixing of characteristics from the two patterns is not desirable. Public vote is not an advantage without fiscal independence, and vice versa. Tax limitation is not a healthful concomitant of fiscal independence or public vote. Tax limitation and fiscal dependence work better together than with any combination of one of these with some other provision for checkreining the fiscal powers of local boards. The available data make it clear that in regard to the measure of composite fiscal performance, a greater portion of the variance in this criterion is accounted for by the tax limitation variable than by the fiscal independence variable. Thus tax limitation is the prevailing characteristic of the view that schools are a part of general government. The prevailing characteristic of the view that schools are apart from general government is fiscal independence with public vote. We see that with tax limitation we are likely to have appointment of school board members (or else partisanship in their election) and fiscal dependence. With fiscal independence we are likely to have public vote on the budget with no tax limitation, election of school board members, and non-partisanship in election.

Thus two patterns of control begin to emerge from the data, expressive of two views, one of which, it is suggested, characterizes the political leadership of some states, the other of other states. What other features distinguish these two patterns? The evidence suggests that coterminousness is one of them. Of the 1177 districts of the full sample, 779 are fiscally independent, a proportion roughly corresponding to the preponderance of fiscal independence to fiscal dependence throughout the districts of the country. But when we reduce the sample to that number which are coterminous with some other unit of local government for which census and other data are available (as in the multivariate analysis employing effective buying income as a measure of wealth), we have an almost even distribution remaining--260 independent and 238 dependent districts. The opposite characteristic is noncoterminousness, or the provision by which the special district set up for educational government is made up on the basis of the vote of those who wish to be in it.

Geographical size also appears to be related. It can be seen in the tables of means (Table A in the appendix) that the proportion of dependent districts is greater in the larger size groups than in the smaller. This is size computed by enrollment, but the largest districts in enrollment are also large in area. Furthermore, the county unit organization, and the city-county unit (characteristic of the southern states and found also in other states) are without exception fiscally dependent. They also show the other characteristics typical of what I have called the tax limit pattern--appointment of school board members, tax limits, coterminousness with city or county boundaries. These are also in area among the largest school districts in the nation. The majority of the largest city school districts in other states are fiscally dependent and/or under tax limitations.

Germane to this hypothesis of the two patterns is the proposition that political partisanship enters into the tax limit pattern. The opposite of this characteristic would be in the fiscally independent pattern the use of open nomination, nonpartisan nomination and election, and the like. The evidence from this study shows little relationship of these practices to fiscal dependence or independence. But implications of partisanship extend far beyond the mere matter of elections. Partisanship is least visible and most effective in the inner decisions of government--particularly where they do not have to be subjected to public confirmation. What would be the advantage, for example, of coterminousness of school district lines with city or county lines? It is that all public works within the single boundary can be planned as deriving from a single policy. The concept that education should be viewed as a part of general government requires that those in power in general government--which necessarily are partisan--maintain control over school fiscal policies. Noncoterminousness of school district lines with any other unit of local government, troublesome as it is to effective data collection and lacking as it is in the neatness so prized by political scientists, offers greater opportunity for protection of school government from partisanship.

It appears also that personal characteristics of school board members may be a factor in the two pattern hypothesis. This variable is related to fiscal performance, as we see from the factor analysis. Whether the influence of this variable, assuming there is influence, results from method of school board selection, partisanship/non-partisanship, socio-economic factors in the community, or other factors is a question that must await further analysis. In any case, school board member characteristics show up in 13 of 16 factors rotated on 74 variables, in which variables describing board members numbered only 17. It can be seen in the contrast of some of the factors (notably Factors 2 and 10 where wealth is not an issue) that differences in socio-economic status of board members are associated with different types of districts. It is hypothesized that the difference in socio-economic status of board members is associated with the two patterns of control.

In sum the evidence from this study supports the view that the regulations under which the legislature requires the local board to operate cannot be optimized on the basis of any unitary trait. Certainly fiscal dependence and independence* considered alone and out of context with other legislative regulations do not exert the major influence upon a criterion of fiscal performance as measured by such variables as net current expenditure per pupil, amount raised locally per pupil, teachers salary averages, minima and maxima, and the like. More predictive of fiscal performance is the tax limitation/no tax limitation variable. When this latter variable is analysed in combination with fiscal dependence/independence, we see that the influence of the combination is greater than that of either variable alone.

Other evidence points to a characteristics combining of independent variables such that a "two pattern hypothesis" is suggested. It is suggested that in the legislatures and political leadership of the several states two divergent points of view have influenced the establishment of state policies under which local school districts are regulated by legislation. One of these appears to view education as a part of general government; the other views education as apart from general government. Characteristic of the first view is a pattern of regulation that stresses such factors as tax limitation, fiscal dependence, appointment of school board members (or partisanship in their election if elected), partisanship in formulating school fiscal policies, coterminousness of school district lines with boundaries of some other unit of local government, large geographical size, school board members not high in socio-economic status. Characteristic of the other view is a pattern of regulation that stresses such factors as fiscal independence, no tax limitation, public vote on the budget, election of school board members, nonpartisanship, noncoterminousness of school district lines with any other unit of local government, medium to small size geographically, school board members representative of the community's highest socio-economic groups.

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*These terms are given precise, functional definitions that are mutually exclusive. See p. 8.

The "two pattern hypothesis" is submitted as worthy of test. Germane to the existence of two characteristic and more less mutually exclusive patterns of state regulation, if they exist, is the question; which is better? The primary characteristics of such hypothetical patterns here adduced, the combination of fiscal independence with public vote and without tax limitation is superior to the combination of fiscal dependence with tax limitation, when compared against a criterion of fiscal performance. Integrity of the two patterns is suggested by the fact that when characteristics from the two are mingled in practice, serious problems result. For example, fiscal independence with tax limitation is the poorest combination studied; permissive use of public vote (as on an override) combined with tax limitation tends to result in reduced economic support of the school system, either through failure to use public vote or lack of experience in obtaining favorable vote. It is proposed that a test would show the view that education is best served by a government separate from general government and with high dependence upon local public consent and (equalized) fiscal participation to be superior to the view that education is a part of general government and subject to the crises of partisan politics. The test would be the same as that employed in this study; a measure of fiscal capability in an expanding economy.

It should be pointed out that other controls that flow from state legislation are logically related to the two patterns here hypothesized. For example: election for a term of chief state school officer as opposed to selection as a career officer by a state board; categorical aid as opposed to general aid; mandated curricular subjects and textbooks as opposed to locally developed curriculum and open textbook selection. As the federal government becomes more involved in education, a clearer view of how the regulations under which schools operate influence their quality is imperative.

APPENDIX

TABLE A: Means for 94 Variables

List of Variables

TABLE B: Sixteen Factors

Copy of Instrument

TABLE A (Continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	4	9	6.49	21	2.45	28	2.13	68	3.23	107	2.97	154	3.49	387	3.46
Public Vote		4	2.45	19	2.76	10	4.07	76	3.27	108	4.21	236	7.91	453	4.11
Independent		8	3.17	24	3.11	19	2.82	109	3.29	199	4.11	391	6.05	750	3.76
Tax Limit		10	4.43	30	2.83	25	2.84	93	3.39	151	3.79	269	4.73	578	3.67
Independent/No Public Vote		5	3.29	12	3.51	13	1.77	48	3.19	99	3.84	181	3.16	358	3.13
Dependent	5	5	0.38	16	0.32	17	0.43	41	0.49	60	0.55	83	0.81	222	0.50
Public Vote		4	0.84	16	0.51	7	0.63	48	0.78	51	1.11	112	0.73	238	0.77
Independent		5	1.25	17	0.56	9	1.37	64	0.81	84	0.96	173	0.82	352	0.96
Tax Limit		8	0.87	23	0.50	14	0.98	51	0.75	78	0.95	130	0.90	304	0.83
Independent/No Public Vote		2	1.46	7	0.54	5	1.79	26	0.77	40	0.63	77	0.89	157	0.01
Dependent	6	4	0.48	16	0.19	17	0.30	40	0.22	59	0.22	82	0.29	218	0.28
Public Vote		4	0.27	16	0.23	7	0.37	47	0.32	49	0.32	112	0.25	235	0.29
Independent		5	0.29	17	0.21	9	0.72	62	0.29	81	0.28	173	0.30	347	0.35
Tax Limit		7	0.38	23	0.22	14	0.55	51	0.29	76	0.29	130	0.34	301	0.34
Independent/No Public Vote		2	0.21	7	0.17	5	0.96	25	0.28	39	0.22	77	0.40	155	0.37

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	7	9	320.93	21	258.77	29	286.94	72	319.82	110	279.66	154	272.47	395	289.76
Public Vote		4	282.58	20	294.90	11	237.90	81	289.31	115	345.42	243	363.02	474	302.19
Independent		8	329.36	26	272.95	22	248.53	115	277.58	207	328.59	402	320.78	780	296.30
Tax Limit		11	315.15	32	266.81	28	263.40	97	279.41	156	302.94	273	276.86	597	284.10
Independent/No Public Vote		5	327.15	13	241.09	15	245.70	49	270.07	101	305.57	185	259.62	368	274.86
Dependent	8	8	93.72	19	81.11	23	91.67	47	72.81	67	72.70	95	80.82	259	82.14
Public Vote		4	94.13	18	89.41	8	48.58	58	77.40	64	98.45	134	103.78	286	85.29
Independent		6	122.52	22	89.59	15	53.17	76	86.98	106	98.46	209	91.49	434	90.37
Tax Limit		10	109.10	27	90.93	18	64.71	59	76.10	86	78.84	138	69.88	338	81.59
Independent/No Public Vote		3	132.05	11	79.51	11	57.95	29	95.94	49	93.67	91	67.47	194	87.77
Dependent	9	8	0.35	19	0.31	23	0.33	47	0.28	67	0.28	95	0.28	259	0.30
Public Vote		4	0.33	18	0.31	8	0.25	58	0.28	64	0.39	134	0.39	286	0.33
Independent		6	0.38	22	0.33	15	0.22	76	0.32	105	0.36	209	0.35	433	0.33
Tax Limit		10	0.37	27	0.33	18	0.29	59	0.28	86	0.34	138	0.28	338	0.31
Independent/No Public Vote		3	0.42	11	0.32	11	0.23	29	0.36	48	0.31	91	0.28	193	0.32

Table A (Continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	10	10	190.92	21	156.55	28	155.36	72	260.40	108	151.57	149	162.36	388	158.17
Public Vote		4	136.28	20	151.17	11	228.12	81	210.75	115	218.11	238	216.28	469	193.45
Independent		8	130.99	26	139.79	22	194.85	115	207.01	207	197.12	397	205.54	775	179.22
Tax Limit		11	161.68	32	152.85	28	185.45	97	207.47	156	189.12	271	190.26	595	181.14
Independent/No Public Vote		5	138.02	13	138.72	15	174.06	49	190.34	101	170.28	184	187.52	367	166.49
Dependent	11	8	28.92	19	29.10	21	30.58	47	28.39	65	30.46	88	32.94	248	30.07
Public Vote		4	41.47	18	36.80	8	47.09	58	46.57	62	44.83	126	44.95	276	43.62
Independent		6	35.45	22	39.42	15	37.95	75	45.57	103	40.44	197	41.18	418	40.00
Tax Limit		10	38.58	27	33.13	17	36.06	59	43.70	85	41.51	133	43.92	331	39.48
Independent/No Public Vote		3	27.63	11	39.95	11	32.25	28	41.10	48	34.39	87	37.01	188	35.39
Dependent	12	8	0.16	19	0.22	21	0.19	47	0.20	65	0.22	87	0.21	247	0.20
Public Vote		4	0.32	18	0.26	8	0.20	58	0.24	62	0.34	125	0.78	275	0.36
Independent		6	0.27	22	0.27	15	0.21	75	0.23	102	0.29	197	0.58	417	0.31
Tax Limit		10	0.24	27	0.23	17	0.18	59	0.23	85	0.30	132	0.26	330	0.24
Independent/No Public Vote		3	0.17	11	0.28	11	0.21	28	0.23	47	0.20	87	0.25	187	0.22

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	13	10	56.16	20	40.03	27	35.44	66	34.24	98	33.70	141	42.49	362	40.35
Public Vote		4	81.17	19	27.34	11	36.85	76	48.27	114	59.85	227	57.19	451	51.78
Independent		7	46.22	25	48.90	22	34.39	107	48.15	196	55.01	368	48.50	725	46.86
Tax Limit		10	67.84	30	38.62	27	26.36	91	50.52	146	56.74	250	50.38	554	48.41
Independent/No Public Vote		4	23.98	12	74.13	15	40.72	45	48.59	91	49.62	164	35.20	331	45.37
Dependent	14	7	16.65	16	12.75	16	6.93	33	12.85	51	8.53	73	13.02	196	11.79
Public Vote		4	17.79	16	15.66	8	7.53	45	22.16	48	16.54	109	23.91	230	17.27
Independent		5	3.93	19	15.39	13	10.24	58	21.94	76	15.29	174	19.04	345	14.30
Tax Limit		8	16.73	23	13.89	15	9.46	45	17.08	67	15.76	113	17.38	271	15.05
Independent/No Public Vote		2	3.59	9	16.20	9	9.45	22	22.23	34	12.29	77	10.94	153	12.45
Dependent	15	7	0.16	16	0.48	16	0.32	33	0.40	50	0.76	72	0.81	194	0.49
Public Vote		4	0.31	16	0.79	8	0.62	44	2.21	48	0.77	109	1.01	229	0.95
Independent		5	0.21	19	0.85	13	0.60	57	1.95	76	0.64	172	1.57	342	0.97
Tax Limit		8	0.26	23	0.72	15	0.60	44	1.95	66	0.83	113	1.03	269	0.90
Independent/No Public Vote		2	0.20	9	0.78	9	0.36	22	0.84	34	0.48	75	2.23	151	0.82

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	16	0	0.00	2	54.00	2	40.00	1	100.00	3	50.00	10	44.90	18	57.78
Public Vote		0	0.00	1	8.00	1	50.00	2	62.50	0	0.00	11	51.45	15	42.99
Independent		1	100.00	2	50.00	0	0.00	6	54.17	11	60.00	41	64.54	61	65.74
Tax Limit		1	100.00	2	29.00	1	50.00	3	58.33	5	58.00	12	53.67	24	58.17
Independent/No Public Vote		1	100.00	2	50.00	0	0.00	4	50.00	11	60.00	31	67.13	49	65.43
Dependent	17	2	100.00	5	98.40	3	73.33	6	100.00	15	90.00	24	83.63	55	90.89
Public Vote		1	100.00	6	98.67	2	27.50	12	97.92	14	93.00	26	83.50	61	83.43
Independent		2	100.00	9	83.44	4	76.25	21	84.57	35	82.66	53	76.23	124	83.86
Tax Limit		2	100.00	11	90.27	4	63.75	15	95.00	34	94.41	45	85.29	111	88.12
Independent/No Public Vote		1	100.00	6	75.17	3	100.00	12	75.08	22	76.86	34	72.65	78	83.29
Dependent	18	10	3.70	19	3.58	26	3.65	69	3.72	101	3.68	148	3.71	373	3.68
Public Vote		4	3.50	18	3.67	10	3.40	78	3.83	113	3.77	235	3.81	458	3.66
Independent		8	3.38	25	3.72	22	3.55	110	3.75	200	3.74	387	3.76	752	3.65
Tax Limit		11	3.45	30	3.67	27	3.56	92	3.78	149	3.72	260	3.73	569	3.65
Independent/No Public Vote		5	3.40	12	3.75	15	3.60	47	3.60	95	3.77	176	3.70	350	3.64

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	19	10	6580.75	21	6441.73	29	6349.19	72	6177.05	110	5897.40	157	5784.58	399	6205.12
Public Vote		4	6497.65	20	6612.06	11	6455.07	81	6574.37	115	6647.95	242	6621.24	473	6568.06
Independent		8	7088.95	26	6353.00	22	6576.37	116	6510.24	208	6398.20	402	6296.57	782	6537.22
Tax Limit		11	7039.89	32	6478.64	28	6488.35	97	6511.05	156	6249.79	274	6046.57	598	6469.05
Independent/No Public Vote		5	7085.21	13	6090.35	15	6403.80	50	6383.25	102	6114.92	186	5799.73	371	6312.88
Dependent	20	10	1.16	21	1.16	29	1.14	72	1.07	110	1.03	157	1.01	399	1.10
Public Vote		4	1.11	20	1.15	11	1.11	81	1.05	115	1.04	242	1.02	473	1.08
Independent		8	1.18	26	1.12	22	1.07	116	1.06	208	1.03	402	1.01	782	1.08
Tax Limit		11	1.19	32	1.15	28	1.12	97	1.06	156	1.03	274	1.00	598	1.09
Independent/No Public Vote		5	1.21	13	1.15	15	1.07	50	1.08	102	1.02	186	0.99	371	1.09
Dependent	21	10	4694.50	21	4630.48	29	4620.10	72	4571.86	110	4578.18	154	4551.83	396	4607.83
Public Vote		4	4962.50	20	4752.15	11	4612.55	81	4899.40	115	4940.97	243	4917.57	474	4847.52
Independent		8	4970.00	26	4791.19	22	4767.73	116	4863.59	208	4903.88	404	4812.67	784	4851.51
Tax Limit		11	4884.09	32	4732.53	28	4713.64	97	4850.97	156	4765.23	274	4720.51	598	4777.83
Independent/No Public Vote		5	4852.00	13	4675.23	15	4734.80	50	4722.32	102	4819.96	187	4628.93	372	4738.87

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	22	10	8913.80	21	8264.38	29	8215.93	72	7996.50	110	7837.12	154	7578.27	396	8134.3
Public Vote		4	9200.00	20	8681.60	11	8531.91	81	8979.70	115	9280.44	241	9104.55	472	8963.0
Independent		8	9296.13	26	8659.69	22	8782.27	116	8692.77	207	9007.43	400	8646.14	779	8847.4
Tax Limit		11	9204.55	32	8478.56	28	8486.75	97	8698.93	156	8449.65	273	8086.33	597	8567.4
Independent/No Public Vote		5	8963.80	13	8253.08	15	8619.67	50	8202.88	101	8592.63	185	7895.93	369	8421.3
Dependent	23	10	7186.30	21	6900.10	29	6776.62	71	6839.03	109	6627.47	149	6648.18	389	6829.62
Public Vote		4	7277.25	20	7279.25	11	6907.91	81	7541.51	112	7638.19	239	7512.59	467	7359.45
Independent		8	7440.13	26	7299.54	22	7213.77	116	7345.53	206	7543.49	394	7281.05	772	7353.75
Tax Limit		11	7333.09	32	7112.84	28	6895.00	97	7376.71	154	7197.11	265	7013.95	587	7154.79
Independent/No Public Vote		5	7244.20	13	7043.31	15	7119.13	50	6981.24	102	7403.35	180	6873.47	365	7110.78
Dependent	24	10	172661.69	21	63862.86	29	32053.72	72	15121.40	110	7568.41	157	3853.14	399	49186.87
Public Vote		4	344966.99	20	92568.35	11	34962.27	81	15772.54	115	7271.10	243	5430.19	474	83495.24
Independent .		8	202106.24	26	83367.50	22	30531.45	116	15213.93	208	7853.89	404	4910.81	784	57430.64
Tax Limit		11	185733.17	32	80492.84	28	31337.21	97	15389.24	156	7385.41	275	4032.28	599	54061.69
Independent/No Public Vote		5	67373.20	13	57622.15	15	28675.33	50	14204.70	102	8444.74	187	4101.76	372	30070.31

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	25	10	103203.89	20	34943.25	26	16426.96	56	7225.98	74	4197.26	110	2008.95	296	28001.05
Public Vote		4	290548.49	19	42631.58	7	15226.14	55	5816.82	69	3071.72	151	1570.15	305	59810.82
Independent		7	184257.71	21	38597.38	13	13965.85	80	5970.36	127	3300.19	241	1779.00	489	41311.75
Tax Limit		10	152846.09	29	39038.34	21	14032.57	67	5403.25	98	3409.26	160	1709.29	385	36073.14
Independent/No Public Vote		4	42948.25	9	25874.56	9	13512.89	36	6411.31	63	3512.70	107	2124.71	228	15730.73
Dependent	26	10	0.52	20	0.53	26	0.51	56	0.46	74	0.55	110	0.50	296	0.51
Public Vote		4	0.72	19	0.48	7	0.46	55	0.36	69	0.42	151	0.42	305	0.48
Independent		7	0.71	21	0.44	13	0.46	80	0.38	127	0.44	241	0.46	489	0.48
Tax Limit		10	0.67	29	0.49	21	0.46	67	0.35	98	0.46	160	0.44	385	0.48
Independent/No Public Vote		4	0.64	9	0.39	9	0.47	36	0.43	63	0.47	107	0.51	228	0.48
Dependent	27	10	40.53	21	40.15	29	42.55	72	42.31	110	43.82	157	44.05	399	42.24
Public Vote		4	37.82	20	39.91	11	39.93	81	42.28	115	45.40	242	46.32	473	41.95
Independent		8	38.41	26	38.76	22	40.02	116	42.32	208	44.67	402	45.29	782	41.58
Tax Limit		11	39.13	32	39.49	28	40.92	97	42.14	156	43.75	274	43.43	598	41.48
Independent/No Public Vote		5	39.55	13	38.12	15	40.44	50	42.07	102	43.65	186	43.68	371	41.25

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	28	10	0.97	21	0.81	29	1.10	71	1.07	102	0.99	148	1.04	381	1.00
Public Vote		4	0.50	20	0.85	11	0.85	79	1.10	110	1.26	237	1.29	461	0.97
Independent		8	0.93	26	0.81	22	0.92	114	1.02	197	1.21	392	1.20	759	1.01
Tax Limit		11	0.89	32	0.78	28	1.04	95	1.06	144	1.11	262	1.07	572	0.99
Independent/No Public Vote		5	1.17	13	0.69	15	0.89	50	0.92	96	1.15	178	1.07	357	0.38
Dependent	29	10	0.77	21	0.78	29	0.91	71	0.89	108	0.86	156	0.96	395	0.86
Public Vote		4	0.52	20	0.56	11	0.93	79	0.76	112	0.85	238	1.00	464	0.77
Independent		8	0.67	26	0.61	22	0.67	114	0.66	204	0.80	396	0.94	770	0.72
Tax Limit		11	0.71	32	0.62	28	0.78	95	0.76	152	0.75	270	0.91	588	0.76
Independent/No Public Vote		5	0.94	13	0.68	15	0.64	50	0.61	101	0.73	184	0.86	368	0.74
Dependent	30	7	0.61	8	0.52	6	1.13	23	0.67	37	0.49	45	0.69	126	0.68
Public Vote		2	0.21	1	0.13	2	0.46	13	0.65	13	0.33	46	0.85	77	0.44
Independent		2	0.13	2	0.22	4	0.77	16	0.57	27	0.52	72	0.86	123	0.51
Tax Limit		5	0.57	3	0.22	3	0.48	13	0.51	27	0.32	60	0.65	111	0.46
Independent/No Public Vote		1	0.02	2	0.22	3	0.97	7	0.34	15	0.73	35	0.79	63	0.51

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	31	10	4.74	21	3.89	28	4.41	72	3.54	108	3.38	154	3.37	393	3.89
Public Vote		4	4.11	20	4.85	11	4.88	80	4.91	114	4.91	240	4.68	469	4.72
Independent		8	5.56	26	4.61	22	4.57	114	4.75	207	4.64	399	4.44	776	4.76
Tax Limit		11	5.44	32	4.68	28	4.47	95	4.63	154	4.26	272	4.22	592	4.62
Independent/No Public Vote		5	6.18	13	4.30	15	4.27	49	4.22	102	4.22	185	3.92	369	4.52
Dependent	32	8	0.73	20	0.78	29	0.76	69	0.77	109	0.73	155	0.76	390	0.75
Public Vote		4	0.67	20	0.73	11	0.81	79	0.72	112	0.74	238	0.71	464	0.73
Independent		8	0.67	25	0.73	21	0.71	115	0.72	203	0.75	395	0.73	767	0.72
Tax Limit		10	0.69	31	0.74	27	0.76	95	0.74	154	0.75	269	0.76	586	0.74
Independent/No Public Vote		5	0.69	12	0.74	14	0.68	50	0.72	100	0.76	183	0.76	364	0.72
Dependent	33	8	0.28	20	0.28	29	0.31	69	0.27	109	0.27	155	0.24	390	0.28
Public Vote		4	0.33	20	0.31	11	0.24	79	0.34	112	0.35	238	0.33	464	0.32
Independent		8	0.35	25	0.30	21	0.33	115	0.34	203	0.33	396	0.31	768	0.33
Tax Limit		10	0.36	31	0.30	27	0.30	95	0.33	154	0.31	270	0.27	587	0.31
Independent/No Public Vote		5	0.35	12	0.29	14	0.36	50	0.33	100	0.30	184	0.27	365	0.32

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	34	8	0.00	16	0.00	23	0.00	30	0.00	35	0.01	35	0.01	147	0.00
Public Vote		3	0.01	16	0.01	8	0.00	42	0.01	49	0.01	87	0.01	205	0.01
Independent		6	0.01	18	0.01	15	0.00	65	0.01	82	0.01	126	0.01	312	0.01
Tax Limit		9	0.01	24	0.01	19	0.00	47	0.00	51	0.01	61	0.01	211	0.01
Independent/No Public Vote		4	0.01	8	0.00	11	0.00	29	0.00	36	0.01	42	0.01	130	0.01
Dependent	35	8	1.01	20	1.06	29	0.07	70	1.03	109	1.01	155	1.01	391	1.03
Public Vote		4	1.01	20	1.04	11	1.05	80	1.05	113	1.08	238	1.04	466	1.05
Independent		8	1.02	25	1.04	21	1.04	115	1.06	204	1.08	396	1.03	769	1.05
Tax Limit		10	1.06	31	1.05	27	1.07	96	1.06	155	1.05	270	1.03	589	1.05
Independent/No Public Vote		5	1.04	12	1.04	14	1.04	50	1.06	100	1.06	184	1.02	365	1.04
Dependent	36	8	0.19	21	0.07	26	0.11	65	0.10	87	0.09	111	0.10	318	0.11
Public Vote		4	0.15	19	0.08	9	0.23	75	0.14	104	0.15	185	0.13	396	0.15
Independent		7	0.11	25	0.09	18	0.16	107	0.13	184	0.14	303	0.13	644	0.13
Tax Limit		10	0.19	31	0.07	23	0.18	90	0.13	132	0.13	207	0.13	493	0.14
Independent/No Public Vote		4	0.14	13	0.08	13	0.16	46	0.13	87	0.12	133	0.13	296	0.13

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	37	10	0.18	18	0.08	23	0.14	50	0.13	68	0.12	90	0.08	259	0.12
Public Vote		4	0.15	20	0.13	8	0.12	57	0.19	79	0.18	153	0.18	321	0.16
Independent		8	0.09	25	0.14	18	0.13	87	0.16	133	0.16	239	0.16	510	0.14
Tax Limit		11	0.15	32	0.11	23	0.14	70	0.17	93	0.17	142	0.13	371	0.14
Independent/No Public Vote		5	0.07	12	0.12	14	0.15	42	0.12	63	0.13	105	0.12	241	0.12
Dependent	38	3		4		6		8		8		4		33	
Public Vote		2		3		2		9		13		16		45	
Independent		3		5		2		14		19		29		72	
Tax Limit		4		6		2		8		16		14		50	
Independent/No Public Vote		2		3		2		7		8		14		36	
Dependent	39	0		1		3		18		24		41		87	
Public Vote		0		5		4		55		76		191		331	
Independent		0		9		11		81		135		271		507	
Tax Limit		0		9		12		62		84		180		347	
Independent/No Public Vote		0		4		7		31		60		90		192	

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	40	2		9		7		19		29		54		120	
Public Vote		3		12		3		24		30		41		113	
Independent		6		13		7		27		39		67		159	
Tax Limit		7		17		6		25		47		59		161	
Independent/No Public Vote		3		5		4		11		14		37		74	
Dependent	41	1		1		1		2		2		0		7	
Public Vote		1		1		1		0		1		0		4	
Independent		0		0		0		2		0		1		3	
Tax Limit		1		1		1		1		1		1		6	
Independent/No Public Vote		0		0		0		2		0		1		3	
Dependent	42	1		3		6		11		20		28		69	
Public Vote		0		2		3		2		3		8		18	
Independent		1		3		1		6		21		52		84	
Tax Limit		1		4		4		7		11		18		45	
Independent/No Public Vote		1		3		1		6		20		48		79	

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	43	2		4		7		12		15		15		55	
Public Vote		0		0		0		0		4		1		5	
Independent		1		0		3		0		9		3		16	
Tax Limit		2		0		4		1		9		6		22	
Independent/No Public Vote		1		0		3		0		5		3		12	
Dependent	44	1		1		3		4		11		8		28	
Public Vote		0		0		0		0		1		0		1	
Independent		0		0		0		0		2		3		5	
Tax Limit		0		0		0		1		3		6		10	
Independent/No Public Vote		0		0		0		0		1		3		4	
Dependent	45	2		2		1		5		6		5		21	
Public Vote		0		0		0		0		0		0		0	
Independent		0		0		0		0		2		1		3	
Tax Limit		0		0		1		0		0		2		3	
Independent/No Public Vote		0		0		0		0		2		1		3	

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	46	0		0		1		0		2		5		8	
Public Vote		0		0		0		0		0		0		0	
Independent		0		1		0		0		0		4		5	
Tax Limit		0		1		0		0		0		3		4	
Independent/No Public Vote		0		1		0		0		0		4		5	
Dependent	47	2		0		0		3		0		4		9	
Public Vote		1		0		0		0		0		1		2	
Independent		1		0		0		0		1		5		7	
Tax Limit		1		0		0		0		1		4		6	
Independent/No Public Vote		0		0		0		0		1		4		5	
Dependent	48	0		0		0		2		1		0		3	
Public Vote		0		0		0		1		1		0		2	
Independent		0		0		0		0		0		1		1	
Tax Limit		0		0		0		1		1		1		3	
Independent/No Public Vote		0		0		0		0		0		1		1	

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	49	5		9		9		27		46		73		169	
Public Vote		2		11		7		24		34		75		153	
Independent		3		12		6		25		52		119		217	
Tax Limit		5		15		11		30		55		88		204	
Independent/No Public Vote		2		7		3		11		25		60		108	
Dependent	50	2		11		17		38		55		75		198	
Public Vote		1		9		4		54		77		157		302	
Independent		4		13		15		85		144		259		520	
Tax Limit		4		15		14		64		94		177		368	
Independent/No Public Vote		3		5		11		35		68		112		234	
Dependent	51	0		0		1		0		0		0		1	
Public Vote		0		0		0		0		0		0		0	
Independent		0		0		0		1		1		2		4	
Tax Limit		0		0		1		0		0		1		2	
Independent/No Public Vote		0		0		0		1		1		2		4	

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	52	10	39.96	16	40.55	22	38.06	54	43.79	92	45.66	124	50.09	318	43.02
Public Vote		4	27.85	17	35.11	9	47.48	71	53.82	103	69.37	211	139.56	415	62.20
Independent		7	40.60	23	35.83	16	48.19	100	47.74	185	63.02	348	105.49	679	56.81
Tax Limit		11	35.89	27	33.81	24	43.45	82	51.37	141	52.00	220	53.31	505	44.97
Independent/No Public Vote		4	45.95	12	35.98	11	43.52	44	41.61	90	54.01	160	53.03	321	45.68
Dependent	53	9	39.35	20	29.34	27	33.42	67	28.54	106	41.00	154	32.61	383	34.05
Public Vote		4	3.58	20	37.06	11	55.41	79	36.68	114	55.23	239	37.92	467	37.65
Independent		8	12.35	25	38.65	21	42.07	114	41.01	205	47.07	395	34.04	768	35.87
Tax Limit		10	19.62	30	38.31	27	34.75	95	41.84	156	56.27	270	40.80	588	38.60
Independent/No Public Vote		5	17.41	12	41.16	14	34.88	49	47.03	100	36.26	181	29.12	361	34.31
Dependent	54	8	28357.46	19	27421.06	28	26186.08	69	35883.34	107	23838.90	151	23045.02	382	27455.31
Public Vote		4	13909.52	20	13729.37	11	18605.98	81	16839.17	114	17152.30	241	21022.75	471	16876.52
Independent		8	18784.16	26	20460.02	22	20244.25	114	26117.34	205	24350.64	391	22408.27	766	22227.44
Tax Limit		11	26849.32	32	18959.07	28	15806.62	97	20155.22	156	23346.75	270	21434.19	594	21091.86
Independent/No Public Vote		5	20238.51	13	27681.43	15	19320.49	48	45414.36	100	33625.09	176	23046.62	357	28221.09

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	55	2	1.00	10	1.00	5	1.00	20	1.00	37	1.00	37	1.00	110	1.00
Public Vote		3	1.00	9	1.00	2	1.00	46	1.00	45	1.00	84	1.00	189	1.00
Independent		5	1.00	7	1.00	8	1.00	58	1.00	78	1.00	117	1.00	273	1.00
Tax Limit		6	1.00	14	1.00	8	1.00	43	1.00	63	1.00	81	1.00	215	1.00
Independent/No Public Vote		2	1.00	2	1.00	6	1.00	21	1.00	38	1.00	42	1.00	111	1.00
Dependent	56	1	1.00	4	1.00	7	1.00	14	1.00	13	1.00	14	1.00	53	1.00
Public Vote		1	1.00	6	1.00	4	1.00	3	1.00	3	1.00	7	1.00	24	1.00
Independent		2	1.00	6	1.00	3	1.00	9	1.00	19	1.00	15	1.00	54	1.00
Tax Limit		2	1.00	6	1.00	6	1.00	10	1.00	10	1.00	11	1.00	48	1.00
Independent/No Public Vote		1	1.00	2	1.00	2	1.00	8	1.00	18	1.00	14	1.00	45	1.00
Dependent	57	1	1.00	3	1.00	5	1.00	11	1.00	14	1.00	19	1.00	53	1.00
Public Vote		0	0.00	8	1.00	6	1.00	28	1.00	43	1.00	43	1.00	128	0.83
Independent		2	1.00	9	1.00	13	1.00	44	1.00	70	1.00	75	1.00	213	1.00
Tax Limit		2	1.00	11	1.00	14	1.00	37	1.00	57	1.00	72	1.00	193	1.00
Independent/No Public Vote		2	1.00	3	1.00	7	1.00	18	1.00	28	1.00	39	1.00	97	1.00

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	58	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Public Vote		0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	1.00	5	1.00	7	0.33
Independent		0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	1.00	7	1.00	0	0.33
Tax Limit		0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	1.00	0	0.00	1	0.17
Independent/No Public Vote		0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	1.00	2	0.17
Dependent	59	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	1.00	2	1.00	0	0.00	3	0.33
Public Vote		0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	1.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	0.17
Independent		0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	1.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	0.17
Tax Limit		0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	1.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	0.17
Independent/No Public Vote		0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Dependent	60	0	0.00	0	0.00	4	1.00	3	1.33	9	1.00	7	1.00	23	0.72
Public Vote		0	0.00	2	1.00	0	0.00	6	1.17	7	1.14	7	1.43	22	1.79
Independent		0	0.00	3	1.00	0	0.00	9	1.00	15	1.20	14	1.29	41	0.75
Tax Limit		0	0.00	3	1.00	2	1.00	6	1.17	7	1.14	7	1.29	25	0.98
Independent/No Public Vote		0	0.00	1	1.00	0	0.00	4	1.00	9	1.22	7	1.14	21	0.73

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	61	0		0		0		4		1		0		5	
Public Vote		0		0		0		3		3		2		8	
Independent		0		0		0		12		10		3		25	
Tax Limit		0		0		0		8		2		3		13	
Independent/No Public Vote		0		0		0		10		7		1		18	
Dependent	62	0		0		0		0		0		0		0	
Public Vote		0		0		0		0		0		2		2	
Independent		0		0		0		0		0		2		2	
Tax Limit		0		0		0		0		0		2		2	
Independent/No Public Vote		0		0		0		0		0		0		0	
Dependent	63	0		0		2		3		12		9		26	
Public Vote		0		0		0		2		8		4		14	
Independent		0		0		0		2		12		7		21	
Tax Limit		0		0		0		2		9		4		15	
Independent/No Public Vote		0		0		0		1		6		3		10	

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	64	0		2		2		2		5		0		11	
Public Vote		0		3		0		9		11		8		31	
Independent		0		2		1		14		22		11		50	
Tax Limit		0		4		2		7		17		5		35	
Independent/No Public Vote		0		1		1		5		11		3		21	
Dependent	65	0		2		0		4		6		0		12	
Public Vote		0		1		0		6		2		5		14	
Independent		0		2		0		5		4		8		19	
Tax Limit		0		2		0		6		2		4		14	
Independent/No Public Vote		0		1		0		1		2		3		7	
Dependent	66	0		0		4		0		0		0		4	
Public Vote		0		0		3		1		0		0		4	
Independent		0		0		6		2		0		0		8	
Tax Limit		0		0		6		2		0		0		8	
Independent/No Public Vote		0		0		3		1		0		0		4	

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	67	8	7.88	19	7.00	22	6.91	56	6.32	90	6.33	93	6.10	288	6.76
Public Vote		2	7.00	18	6.56	10	6.90	65	6.00	84	6.30	112	6.15	291	6.48
Independent		7	7.57	19	7.32	19	7.00	95	6.29	145	6.22	179	6.17	464	6.76
Tax Limit		9	7.44	28	7.18	25	6.48	79	6.06	123	5.90	156	5.78	420	6.48
Independent/No Public Vote		5	7.80	8	9.38	12	7.58	43	6.65	69	6.17	86	6.14	223	7.29
Dependent	68	8	0.84	19	0.74	22	0.76	53	0.61	80	0.60	82	0.55	264	0.68
Public Vote		2	0.79	18	0.79	10	0.59	64	0.63	79	0.69	106	0.64	279	0.69
Independent		7	0.81	19	0.79	19	0.62	88	0.65	136	0.67	165	0.63	434	0.69
Tax Limit		9	0.82	28	0.79	25	0.66	74	0.63	109	0.65	138	0.55	383	0.68
Independent/No Public Vote		5	0.83	8	0.76	12	0.61	37	0.64	64	0.61	75	0.59	201	0.67
Dependent	69	5	0.23	14	0.35	12	0.33	46	0.45	81	0.48	82	0.49	240	0.39
Public Vote		2	0.21	12	0.29	7	0.39	59	0.39	65	0.41	89	0.45	234	0.36
Independent		7	0.19	13	0.29	17	0.39	81	0.43	119	0.41	146	0.45	383	0.36
Tax Limit		8	0.20	20	0.28	19	0.37	69	0.44	104	0.45	133	0.50	353	0.37
Independent/No Public Vote		5	0.17	6	0.33	11	0.41	34	0.49	62	0.43	73	0.48	191	0.39

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	70	1	0.11	0	0.00	4	0.34	11	0.26	15	0.23	26	0.31	57	0.25
Public Vote		0	0.00	1	0.20	3	0.47	7	0.23	9	0.25	18	0.27	38	0.29
Independent		0	0.00	1	0.20	2	0.30	13	0.27	16	0.32	33	0.28	65	0.27
Tax Limit		0	0.00	1	0.20	4	0.40	9	0.24	16	0.34	39	0.32	69	0.30
Independent/No Public Vote		0	0.00	0	0.00	1	0.20	9	0.30	11	0.31	22	0.31	43	0.28
Dependent	71	8	0.50	15	0.50	21	0.46	47	0.36	69	0.34	67	0.39	227	0.42
Public Vote		2	0.50	16	0.43	9	0.25	57	0.40	71	0.40	95	0.41	250	0.40
Independent		7	0.39	18	0.39	17	0.28	82	0.39	122	0.41	144	0.39	390	0.38
Tax Limit		9	0.38	25	0.43	22	0.32	67	0.40	92	0.38	119	0.39	334	0.38
Independent/No Public Vote		5	0.35	8	0.36	11	0.30	36	0.36	57	0.41	62	0.37	179	0.36
Dependent	72	7	0.36	13	0.52	17	0.42	48	0.42	83	0.41	83	0.37	251	0.42
Public Vote		2	0.36	13	0.38	9	0.57	59	0.41	70	0.40	98	0.41	251	0.42
Independent		7	0.37	16	0.40	17	0.50	88	0.42	125	0.41	149	0.42	402	0.42
Tax Limit		8	0.43	21	0.43	22	0.50	71	0.40	111	0.42	129	0.43	362	0.43
Independent/No Public Vote		5	0.38	7	0.47	11	0.43	42	0.44	63	0.42	69	0.43	197	0.43

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	73	0	0.00	4	0.13	1	0.11	18	0.16	26	0.22	25	0.20	74	0.21
Public Vote		0	0.00	3	0.13	3	0.17	19	0.22	28	0.22	28	0.22	81	0.19
Independent		1	0.29	4	0.15	6	0.13	30	0.21	43	0.21	53	0.22	137	0.20
Tax Limit		1	0.29	5	0.15	4	0.16	25	0.20	38	0.22	42	0.22	115	0.21
Independent/No Public Vote		1	0.29	3	0.15	3	0.10	14	0.18	20	0.20	30	0.21	71	0.19
Dependent	74	0	0.00	3	0.18	4	0.22	11	0.34	30	0.35	41	0.36	89	0.29
Public Vote		0	0.00	2	0.17	4	0.22	5	0.20	12	0.27	25	0.29	48	0.23
Independent		0	0.00	1	0.12	5	0.19	10	0.20	21	0.26	43	0.34	80	0.22
Tax Limit		0	0.00	4	0.17	5	0.26	11	0.21	27	0.31	53	0.37	100	0.26
Independent/No Public Vote		0	0.00	1	0.12	2	0.14	6	0.21	10	0.23	26	0.39	45	0.22
Dependent	75	0	0.00	3	0.16	0	0.00	13	0.20	18	0.23	20	0.23	54	0.20
Public Vote		0	0.00	3	0.16	1	0.20	11	0.20	17	0.24	22	0.23	54	0.21
Independent		0	0.00	2	0.09	6	0.18	20	0.19	29	0.22	32	0.26	89	0.19
Tax Limit		0	0.00	5	0.13	4	0.21	17	0.19	22	0.28	33	0.26	81	0.22
Independent/No Public Vote		0	0.00	2	0.09	5	0.18	12	0.20	15	0.20	16	0.29	50	0.19

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	76	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	0.13	1	0.40	0	0.00	5	0.17	8	0.23
Public Vote		0	0.00	0	0.00	1	0.06	1	0.22	2	0.27	8	0.19	12	0.18
Independent		0	0.00	0	0.00	1	0.11	2	0.21	8	0.25	9	0.18	20	0.19
Tax Limit		0	0.00	0	0.00	1	0.06	1	0.20	5	0.22	7	0.18	14	0.16
Independent/No Public Vote		0	0.00	0	0.00	1	0.11	1	0.20	6	0.25	4	0.18	12	0.18
Dependent	77	0	0.00	0	0.00	1	0.12	3	0.16	4	0.12	1	0.20	9	0.15
Public Vote		0	0.00	0	0.00	1	0.12	3	0.15	5	0.12	5	0.18	14	0.14
Independent		0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	5	0.15	8	0.16	9	0.19	22	0.16
Tax Limit		0	0.00	0	0.00	1	0.12	6	0.15	3	0.15	4	0.20	14	0.15
Independent/No Public Vote		0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	3	0.16	5	0.18	4	0.20	12	0.18
Dependent	78	5	0.24	12	0.16	11	0.22	27	0.21	43	0.21	36	0.23	134	0.22
Public Vote		2	0.14	13	0.22	6	0.23	34	0.24	45	0.20	47	0.21	147	0.21
Independent		7	0.19	14	0.18	13	0.23	41	0.24	76	0.20	67	0.20	218	0.21
Tax Limit		8	0.22	19	0.20	14	0.24	36	0.23	57	0.21	49	0.22	183	0.22
Independent/No Public Vote		5	0.21	6	0.13	9	0.21	13	0.22	32	0.19	25	0.19	90	0.19

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	79	2	0.16	3	0.16	3	0.13	8	0.17	8	0.14	9	0.18	33	0.16
Public Vote		0	0.00	5	0.21	3	0.15	7	0.22	8	0.16	5	0.17	28	0.18
Independent		0	0.00	6	0.20	5	0.15	15	0.19	18	0.17	12	0.22	56	0.19
Tax Limit		1	0.11	7	0.19	4	0.16	13	0.19	15	0.18	10	0.21	50	0.17
Independent/No Public Vote		0	0.00	2	0.13	4	0.14	10	0.17	10	0.18	7	0.25	33	0.17
Dependent	80	8	0.14	19	0.17	21	0.19	54	0.21	85	0.19	91	0.21	278	0.19
Public Vote		2	0.14	18	0.19	10	0.17	64	0.19	83	0.19	109	0.18	286	0.18
Independent		7	0.14	19	0.19	18	0.17	94	0.19	142	0.19	175	0.19	455	0.18
Tax Limit		9	0.14	28	0.19	24	0.18	78	0.19	121	0.20	152	0.20	412	0.18
Independent/No Public Vote		5	0.14	8	0.16	11	0.16	43	0.19	67	0.20	85	0.19	219	0.17
Dependent	81	3	1.00	6	2.33	7	4.43	28	3.32	30	2.60	38	2.63	112	2.72
Public Vote		1	8.00	5	1.60	2	6.50	24	2.75	35	2.74	44	3.02	111	4.10
Independent		4	3.75	5	1.60	5	6.40	40	3.05	51	2.55	70	3.09	175	3.41
Tax Limit		4	3.25	8	2.00	6	7.00	32	2.97	48	2.60	54	3.20	152	3.50
Independent/No Public Vote		3	2.33	3	1.67	4	6.50	21	3.29	20	2.35	32	3.31	83	3.24

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	82	5	3.80	5	3.40	7	4.71	22	4.45	28	3.86	20	3.70	87	3.99
Public Vote		3	5.00	8	3.88	3	3.00	15	5.00	24	4.21	39	4.38	92	4.24
Independent		6	4.50	10	3.70	5	4.60	23	5.00	44	4.45	69	4.41	157	4.44
Tax Limit		7	4.57	13	3.77	5	4.00	24	4.25	31	3.45	37	3.84	117	3.98
Independent/No Public Vote		3	4.00	6	3.17	3	5.67	14	4.79	22	4.59	31	4.35	79	4.43
Dependent	83	8		19		24		55		90		92		288	
Public Vote		3		20		10		66		86		122		307	
Independent		8		21		19		95		151		190		484	
Tax Limit		10		30		26		79		124		160		429	
Independent/No Public Vote		5		8		12		43		73		87		228	
Dependent	84	7	2183.43	18	2155.78	22	2170.91	54	1980.20	66	2110.38	68	1824.69	235	2070.9
Public Vote		2	2479.00	12	2245.92	7	1950.86	30	2231.10	38	2367.68	49	2312.57	138	2264.5
Independent		5	2350.40	15	2206.67	13	2148.54	50	2150.26	76	2176.54	98	2018.45	257	2175.1
Tax Limit		7	2406.57	22	2168.32	19	2102.53	41	2044.49	62	2002.18	91	1808.49	242	2088.7
Independent/No Public Vote		3	2264.67	9	2054.00	9	2195.33	28	2051.54	42	1966.26	59	1675.81	150	2034.6

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	85	7	1606.43	18	1661.28	22	1610.05	51	1473.86	60	1453.63	65	1128.45	223	1488.9
Public Vote		2	1814.50	12	1712.83	7	1547.86	28	1732.11	33	1739.36	44	1598.20	126	1690.8
Independent		5	1775.80	15	1706.40	13	1699.38	45	1640.02	67	1624.73	91	1369.97	236	1636.0
Tax Limit		7	1783.71	22	1696.59	19	1618.63	38	1612.34	58	1513.50	86	1225.40	230	1575.0
Independent/No Public Vote		3	1750.00	9	1648.89	9	1655.78	24	1535.42	38	1495.21	57	1141.16	140	1537.7
Dependent	86	7	1263.14	18	1010.11	22	1044.86	51	966.45	56	742.63	62	650.44	216	946.2
Public Vote		2	1390.50	12	1296.17	6	765.17	28	939.89	26	865.27	36	874.56	110	1021.9
Independent		5	1274.00	15	1225.67	12	1031.33	45	967.02	57	860.77	80	764.74	214	1020.55
Tax Limit		7	1306.29	22	1248.36	18	985.11	39	917.10	49	755.84	80	679.04	215	981.96
Independent/No Public Vote		3	1196.33	9	1147.44	9	1075.00	24	969.04	34	831.79	54	658.15	133	979.63
Dependent	87	7	0.75	18	0.77	22	0.75	51	0.74	60	0.71	63	0.67	221	0.73
Public Vote		2	0.75	12	0.77	7	0.80	26	0.77	32	0.75	44	0.72	123	0.76
Independent		5	0.76	15	0.79	13	0.81	43	0.76	66	0.76	90	0.69	232	0.76
Tax Limit		7	0.75	22	0.79	19	0.78	36	0.77	58	0.77	85	0.69	227	0.76
Independent/No Public Vote		3	0.77	9	0.82	9	0.77	24	0.74	38	0.77	56	0.68	139	0.76

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	88	7	0.59	18	0.48	22	0.49	51	0.50	56	0.38	62	0.38	216	0.47
Public Vote		2	0.57	12	0.58	6	0.40	26	0.41	25	0.37	36	0.39	107	0.45
Independent		5	0.55	15	0.55	12	0.48	43	0.44	56	0.40	80	0.38	211	0.47
Tax Limit		7	0.55	22	0.57	18	0.47	37	0.43	49	0.38	80	0.37	213	0.46
Independent/No Public Vote		3	0.53	9	0.56	9	0.50	24	0.47	34	0.42	54	0.38	133	0.47
Dependent	89	5	0.59	8	0.50	13	0.73	30	0.67	38	0.66	52	0.79	146	0.66
Public Vote		2	0.38	7	0.40	3	0.57	25	0.52	36	0.52	58	0.61	131	0.50
Independent		5	0.48	11	0.52	10	0.55	44	0.52	67	0.53	83	0.71	220	0.55
Tax Limit		6	0.56	15	0.50	12	0.63	30	0.53	46	0.46	59	0.81	168	0.58
Independent/No Public Vote		3	0.55	6	0.60	7	0.55	24	0.52	33	0.54	32	0.84	105	0.60
Dependent	90	7	941.57	18	570.71	22	692.91	54	507.69	66	538.19	89	514.01	256	627.51
Public Vote		2	631.50	12	404.57	7	237.18	32	302.72	43	319.10	70	433.30	166	388.06
Independent		5	577.03	15	535.54	13	343.67	53	273.88	81	321.23	119	389.41	286	406.79
Tax Limit		7	797.11	22	526.82	19	368.69	44	309.27	63	285.51	103	350.55	258	439.66
Independent/No Public Vote		3	540.71	9	542.55	9	405.13	29	251.18	42	315.89	62	315.84	154	395.22

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	91	7	0.31	18	0.35	22	0.35	54	0.38	66	0.34	87	0.34	254	0.34
Public Vote		2	0.36	12	0.47	7	0.49	32	0.52	43	0.55	72	0.50	168	0.48
Independent		5	0.37	15	0.35	13	0.46	54	0.54	81	0.50	121	0.45	289	0.45
Tax Limit		7	0.36	22	0.39	19	0.47	44	0.50	63	0.49	102	0.42	257	0.44
Independent/No Public Vote		3	0.38	9	0.31	9	0.42	30	0.55	42	0.45	62	0.38	155	0.42
Dependent	92	7	0.46	18	0.54	22	0.54	54	0.59	65	0.56	86	0.55	252	0.54
Public Vote		2	0.81	12	0.62	7	0.85	32	0.82	43	0.83	71	0.74	167	0.75
Independent		5	0.57	15	0.61	13	0.79	54	0.83	81	0.80	120	0.76	288	0.73
Tax Limit		7	0.63	22	0.62	19	0.74	44	0.78	63	0.79	102	0.76	257	0.72
Independent/No Public Vote		3	0.40	9	0.65	9	0.76	30	0.84	42	0.76	62	0.77	155	0.70
Dependent	93	7	0.47	17	0.67	22	0.55	54	0.67	66	0.84	87	0.68	253	0.65
Public Vote		1	0.57	12	0.58	7	[illegible]	32	0.67	43	0.67	72	0.64	167	0.62
Independent		4	0.48	15	0.49	13	0.58	53	0.68	81	0.64	122	0.63	288	0.58
Tax Limit		6	0.47	21	0.54	19	0.59	44	0.68	63	0.66	103	0.63	256	0.60
Independent/No Public Vote		3	0.45	9	0.50	9	0.57	29	0.68	42	0.63	63	0.61	155	0.57

TABLE A (continued)

Method	Var.	N	Group 1	N	Group 2	N	Group 3	N	Group 4	N	Group 5	N	Group 6	N	Total
Dependent	94	4	1.15	8	0.78	11	2.30	21	0.82	31	0.94	34	1.46	109	1.24
Public Vote		2	1.05	6	1.02	3	0.89	23	1.64	23	1.60	41	1.36	98	1.26
Independent		5	0.99	10	0.96	10	1.05	37	1.39	47	1.24	61	1.26	170	1.15
Tax Limit		5	1.10	15	0.86	11	1.02	25	1.58	39	1.24	49	1.15	144	1.16
Independent/No Public Vote		3	0.96	6	0.88	7	1.12	19	0.95	26	0.90	26	1.09	87	0.98

TABLE A (APPENDIX)

List of Variables

1. Adjusted Net Current Expenditure per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1962-63
2. Adjusted Net Current Expenditure per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1942-43
3. Growth Index of Net Current Expenditure per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance from 1942-43 to 1962-63
4. Library and Audio-Visual Aids Expenditure per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1962-63
5. Library and Audio-Visual Aids Expenditure per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1942-43
6. Growth Index of Library and Audio-Visual Aids Expenditure per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance from 1952-53 to 1962-63
7. Amount Raised Locally per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1962-63
8. Amount Raised Locally per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1942-43
9. Growth Index of Amount Raised Locally per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance from 1952-53 to 1962-63
10. State Aid per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1962-63
11. State Aid per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1942-43
12. Growth Index of State Aid per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance from 1942-43 to 1962-63
13. Other Aid, Including Federal Funds, per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1962-63
14. Other Aid, Including Federal Funds, per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1942-43
15. Growth Index of Other Aid, Including Federal Gunds, per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance from 1942-43 to 1962-63
16. Number School Districts Reporting part or all of Local Sales Tax going to Schools and Average Percent of Total to Schools
17. Number School Districts Reporting part or all of Local Sales Tax going to Municipal Government and Average Percent of Total to Municipal Government

18. Recency of Adoption of Teachers' Salary Schedule in Years, Average

19. Average Teachers' Salary in 1962-63

20. Percent that District Average Teachers' Salary is of Average Teachers' Salary for own State in 1962-63

21. Beginning Teachers' Salary

22. Maximum Teachers' Salary

23. Teachers' Salary on Tenth Step with Master's Degree or Equivalent

24. Pupils in Average Daily Attendance in 1962-63

25. Pupils in Average Daily Attendance in 1942-43

26. Growth Index of Pupils in Average Daily Attendance from 1942-43 to 1962-63

27. Number of Full Time Teachers per 1000 Pupils in Average Daily Attendance in 1962-63

28. Number of Guidance Counselors per 1000 Pupils in Average Daily Attendance in 1962-63

29. Number of Librarians per 1000 Pupils in Average Daily Attendance in 1962-63

30. Number of Certified Specialists from other Agencies per 1000 Pupils in Average Daily Attendance in 1962-63

31. Number of Full Time, Salaried Clerical Personnel per 1000 Pupils in Average Daily Attendance in 1962-63

32. Percent of Total Teaching Staff Holding Only Bachelor's Degrees in 1963-64

33. Percent of Total Teaching Staff Holding Master's Degrees in 1963-64

34. Percent of Total Teaching Staff Holding Doctor's Degrees in 1963-64

35. Percent that Degreed Teachers are of Total Teaching Staff in 1963-64

36. Percent that Summer School Enrollment in Average Daily Attendance is of Average Daily Attendance for Regular School Year in 1962-63 or 1963-64

37. Percent of Districts Having Adult Education Programs in 1963-64

38. Number Districts Reporting Operational School Buildings on Double Sessions in 1963-64

39. Number Districts Reporting Non-Partisan, Separate Election in 1963-64

40. Number Districts Electing School Board Members by Non-Partisan Election Combined with Other Elections in 1963-64

41. Number Districts Electing School Board Members by Partisan Separate Election in 1963-64

42. Number Districts Electing School Board Members by Partisan Election Combined with Other Elections in 1963-64

43. Percent of Districts having School Board Members Appointed by Municipal Agency or Official(s) in 1963-64

44. Number Districts Reporting School Board Members Appointed by County Agency or Judge in 1963-64

45. Number Districts Reporting School Board Members Appointed by State Agency or Official(s) in 1963-64

46. Number Districts Reporting School Board Members Appointed by Other Agencies in 1963-64

47. Number Districts Reporting State Mandated Audit by City Office or Agency in 1963-64

48. Number Districts Reporting State Mandated Audit by County Office or Agency in 1963-64

49. Number Districts Reporting State Mandated Audit by State Office or Agency in 1963-64

50. Number Districts Reporting State Mandated Audit by Public or Certified Public Accountant in 1963-64

51. Number Districts Reporting State Mandated Audit by Other Agencies in 1963-64

52. Debt Service Expenditure per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1962-63

53. Capital Outlay Expenditure per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1962-63

54. Assessed or True Valuation per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1962-63

55. Number Districts Employing Election that Nominate Candidates for School Board by Petition of Qualified Voters in 1959-60

56. Number Districts Employing Election that Nominate Candidates for School Board by Primary Elections in 1959-60

57. Number Districts Employing Election that Nominate Candidates for School Board by Individual Announcement in 1959-60

58. Number Districts Employing Election that Nominate Candidates for School Board by Annual Meeting in 1959-60

59. Number Districts Employing Election that Nominate Candidates for School Board by Convention in 1959-60

60. Number Districts Employing Election that Nominate Candidates for School Board by Caucus in 1959-60

61. Number Districts Employing Caucus for Nomination of Candidates for School Board Election that Have Caucus Members Chosen by School Board in 1959-60

62. Number Districts Employing Caucus for Nomination of Candidates for School Board Election that have Caucus Members Chosen by Municipal Government in 1959-60

63. Number Districts Employing Caucus for Nomination of Candidates for School Board Election that have Caucus Members Chosen by Political Leaders in 1959-60

64. Number Districts Employing Caucus for Nomination of Candidates for School Board Election that have Caucus Members Chosen by Community Organizations in 1959-60

65. Number Districts Employing Caucus for Nomination of Candidates for School Board Election that have Caucus Members Chosen by Other Methods in 1959-60

66. Number Districts Employing Caucus for Nomination of Candidates for School Board Election that have Caucus Members Chosen by Methods not known to Respondent in 1959-60

67. Number of School Board Members in 1959-60

68. Percent of School Board that are College Graduates in 1959-60

69. Percent of School Board that are High School Graduates but not College Graduates in 1959-60

70. Percent of School Board that are not High School Graduates in 1959-60

71. Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Professional and Technical Services in 1959-60

72. Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Managers, Officials, and Business Owners (except Farmers) in 1959-60

73. Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Sales and Clerical Personnel in 1959-60

74. Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Farmers in 1959-60

75. Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Skilled Craftsmen, Other Skilled Workers, and Foremen in 1959-60

76. Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Semi-Skilled Operatives and Unskilled Workers in 1959-60

77. Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Service Workers in 1959-60

78. Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Housewives in 1959-60

79. Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Retired in 1959-60

80. Percent of Ex-Officio Members on School Board in 1959-60

81. Average Number Special Committees in 1958-59

82. Average Number Standing Committees in 1958-59

83. No Reporting Board Meetings Other than Closed Executive Sessions

84. Effective Buying Income per Capita in 1962

85. Effective Buying Income per Capita in 1952

86. Effective Buying Income per Capita in 1942

87. Growth Index of Effective Buying Income per Capita from 1952 to 1962

88. Growth Index of Effective Buying Income per Capita from 1942 to 1962

89. Percent that Amount Raised by Property Tax is of Total Local Municipal or General Revenue in 1962

90. Total Local Municipal or General Revenue per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1962

91. Percent that Amount Raised Locally for Schools is of Total Local Municipal and School Revenue in 1962

92. Percent that State Aid and other Non-Local Aid for Schools are of Total Intergovernmental Revenue for Municipal and School Purposes in 1962

93. Percent that School Expenditures are of Total Municipal and School Expenditures less Capital Outlay in 1962

94. Ratio of Utility Expenditures to Utility Revenue in 1962

TABLE B: SIXTEEN FACTORS

Listing of Component Variables with Factor Loadings

Factor 1: Wealth and Quality

Maximum Teachers' Salary	.885
Teachers' Salary of Tenth Step with Master's Degree or Equivalent	.880
Beginning Teachers' Salary	.871
Average Teachers' Salary	.843
Effective Buying Income per Capita in 1952	.747
Effective Buying Income per Capita in 1962	.709
Amount Raised Locally per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1942-43	.609
Clerical Workers per 1000 Pupils in Average Daily Attendance	.597
Net Current Expenditure per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1942-43	.582
Percent Non-White Population is of Total Population	-.557
Amount Raised Locally per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1962-63	.510
Effective Buying Income per Capita in 1942	.462
Percent of Total Teaching Staff Holding Master's Degrees	.462
Percent that Summer School Enrollment in Average Daily Attendance is of Average Daily Attendance for Regular School Year	.459
Percent having Adult Education Programs	.426
Percent that District's Average Teachers' Salary is of Average Teachers' Salary for State	.418
Net Current Expenditure per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1962-63	.407

Guidance Counselors per 1000 Pupils in Average Daily Attendance	.386
Percent that Amount Raised Locally for Schools is of Total Local Municipal and School Revenue	.345
Total Local Municipal or General Revenue per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1962	.339
Percent of Total Teaching Staff holding Doctor's Degrees	.328
Percent that College Graduates are of Total Population	.328
Percent that Degreed Teachers are of Total Teaching Staff	.322

Factor 2: Competitive Capability of School Boards

Total Local Municipal or General Revenue per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1962	.839
Percent that State Aid and other Non-Local Aid for Schools are of Total Intergovernmental Revenue for Municipal and School Purposes	-.804
Percent that Amount Raised Locally for Schools is of Total Local Municipal and School Revenue	-.761
Percent that School Expenditures Less Capital Outlay are of Total Municipal and School Expenditure Less Capital Outlay	-.362
Percent of School Board that are not High School Graduates	-.353

Factor 3: Low Personal Income

Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Service Workers	.880
Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Retired	.837
Number of School Board Members	-.784
Percent of Ex-Officio Members on School Board	.685

Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Semi-Skilled Operatives and Unskilled	.466
Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Housewives	.452
Number of Special Committees	-.403
Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Sales and Clerical Personnel	.379
Percent that Non-Public School Enrollment is of Total k-12 Enrollment	-.378
State Aid per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1942-43	.341
Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Farmers	.304

Factor 4: Rising Expenditure

Percent of Operational School Buildings on Double Sessions	-.990
Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Semi-Skilled Operatives and Unskilled Workers	-.770
Growth Index of Net Current Expenditure per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance from 1942-43 to 1962-63	.549
Number of Standing Committees	-.414

Factor 5: Current Budget Versus Capital and Debt

Debt Service Expenditure per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1962-63	.990
Library and Audio-Visual Aids Expenditure per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1962-63	.912
Net Current Expenditure per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1962-63	-.902

Capital Outlay Expenditure per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1962-63	.634
Net Current Expenditure per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1942-43	-.457

Factor 6: Diminishing Wealth-Revenue

Growth Index of Effective Buying Income per Capita from 1942 to 1962	-.947
State Aid per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1962-63	-.847
Effective Buying Income per Capita in 1942	-.806
Assessed or True Valuation per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1962-63	-.708
Amount Raised Locally per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1962-63	-.676

Factor 7: Unequalized Rural

Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Skilled Craftsmen, other Skilled Workers, and Foremen	-.796
State Aid per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1942-43	-.632
Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Farmers	.496
Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Service Workers	.437
State Aid per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1962-63	-.333
Percent that Amount Raised by Property Tax is of Total Local Municipal or General Revenue	.302

Factor 8: Equalization in Action

Librarians per 1000 Pupils in Average Daily Attendance	.645
Growth Index of Effective Buying Income per Capita from 1952 to 1962	-.607
Percent of Total Teaching Staff Holding Doctor's Degrees	.522
Teachers per 1000 Pupils in Average Daily Attendance	.413
Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Farmers	.405
Percent that Non-White Population is of Total Population	.389
Guidance Counselors per 1000 Pupils in Average Daily Attendance	.383

Factor 9: Low Staff

Percent of Total Teaching Staff Holding only Bachelor's Degrees	.802
Percent that Degreed Teachers are of Total Teaching Staff	.614
Teachers per 1000 Pupils in Average Daily Attendance	-.487
Effective Buying Income per Capita in 1962	-.404
Effective Buying Income per Capita in 1952	-.390
Number of Standing Committees	-.323

Factor 10: High Socio-Economic Status of Board

Percent of School Board that are High School Graduates but not College Graduates	-.832
Percent of School Board that are College Graduates	.721

Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Professional and Technical Services	.482
Growth Index of Other Aid per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance from 1942 to 1962	-.357
Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Skilled Craftsmen, other Skilled Workers, and Foremen	-.346
Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Sales and Clerical Personnel	-.332

Factor 11: Medium Size City

Specialists from Other Agencies per 1000 Pupils in Average Daily Attendance	-.723
Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Semi-Skilled Operatives and Unskilled Workers	.709
Degree to which School Board Meetings other than Closed Executive Sessions are Open to the Public	.504
Ratio of Utility Expenditures to Utility Revenue	.441
Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Skilled Craftsmen, other Skilled Workers, and Foremen	.330

Factor 12: Economic Decline

Growth Index of Amount Raised Locally per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance from 1942 to 1962	-.944
Growth Index of State Aid per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance from 1942 to 1962	-.941
Amount Raised Locally per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1942-43	-.517
Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Semi-Skilled Operatives and Unskilled Workers	.368

Factor 13: Small Items Expenditure

Growth Index of Library and Audio-Visaul Aids Expenditure per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance from 1942 to 1962	-.858
Library and Audio-Visual Aids Expenditure per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1942	-.793
Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Service Workers	-.371
Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Retired	-.314

Factor 14: High Status Suburban Community

Percent that White Collar Workers are of Total Population	.826
Percent that College Graduates are of Total Population	.720
Percent of School Board that are not High School Graduates	-.397
Effective Buying Income per Capita in 1962	.358
Percent that Non-White Population is of Total Population	.326
Percent of School Board that are College Graduates	.316

Factor 15: Middle Class, Middle-Size City

Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Managers, Officials, and Business Owners (except Farmers)	.787
Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classifications of Professional and Technical Services	-.472
Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Farmers	-.404

Percent that District's Average Teachers' Salary is of Average Teachers' Salary for State	.374
Ratio of Utility Expenditures to Utility Revenue	.356
Percent of Total Teaching Staff Holding only Master's Degrees	.321

Factor 16: Peculiar Situation

Other Aid, including Federal Funds, per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1942-43	.695
Other Aid, including Federal Funds, per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance in 1962-63	-.508
Average Number of Different Methods of Nomination for Election to School Board	.482
Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Retired	-.372
Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Service Workers	.332
Percent of School Board Members with Occupational Classification of Skilled Craftsmen, other Skilled Workers and Foremen	.327

Code________________

FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY OF SCHOOL BOARDS

A Brief Inquiry on Financial and Other Factors Related to Fiscal Dependence and Independence

---

This is a questionnaire. It seeks answers that are matters of fact, but facts that are not available anywhere except in the records of individual school districts.

Every effort has been made to spare your time. Requested is information from your budget (for three separate years); on your enrollments (either ADA or ADM); and certain specifics about teaching staff and salaries.

With data from other sources this information will help determine whether there are any differences in the finance and staffing patterns of school districts that are fiscally independent compared to those that are fiscally dependent. The first set of questions overleaf is intended to provide the basis for classifying your district as one or the other.

When information has been processed from the nearly 2000 districts asked to participate, a special report will be returned to you in appreciation for your assistance.

Return to:

Institute of Administrative Research
525 West 120th Street
New York, New York 10027

____
Name of School District

____
Superintendent

____
Name of Person Completing Form

____
Title of Person Completing Form

K 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Please circle lowest and highest grade levels your district serves.

please turn over

I. Please check the statements which best apply to your school district.

A. The entire budget or tax levy is approved annually or regularly by public vote.________________________________

B. The school board determines the budget (or tax levy) without public vote or approval of any other agency as follows:
1. Entire budget______________________________
2. That part of budget below a legal tax limit____________

C. If you checked "B-2" above, what is the amount of tax limit below which the board is independent?

$____________per $1000 property valuation   Assessed___ or True_____ (equalized)

D. If there is a legal tax limit, the budget may exceed it if approved by:
1. Public vote______________________________
2. Municipal government agency____________________
3. County agency____________________________
4. State agency_____________________________
5. Other__________________________________ (please specify)

E. Approval of the entire budget is required by an agency other than the school board.______________________________

If yes, kindly specify: Municipal___ County___ State ___ Other ________ (please specify)

If yes, is it: line-by-line budget check___ by major categories___ by budget total___

F. School board members are elected.__________________________

If yes, kindly specify:
1. non-partisan, separate election____________________
2. non-partisan, combined with other elections____________
3. partisan, separate election________________________
4. partisan, combined with other elections______________

G. School board members are appointed_________________________

If yes, kindly specify:
1. appointed by municipal agency or official(s)____________
2. appointed by county agency or judge_________________
3. appointed by state agency or official(s)______________
4. other__________________________________ (please specify)

please go on

H. A state audit is mandated.______________________________

If yes, please specify:
1. by city office or agency______________________________
2. by county office or agency______________________________
3. by state office or agency______________________________
4. by public or certified public accountant______________
5. other______________________________
(please specify)

II. Please indicate the following financial information to the nearest dollar for the years requested.

	1962-63	1952-53	1942-43
A. Total School Budget for all purposes.	$______	$______	$______
B. How much of the above was for:			
1. Teachers' salaries	$______	$______	$______
2. Transportation	$______	$______	$______
3. Debt service	$______	$______	$______
4. Capital outlay	$______	$______	$______
5. Food services	$______	$______	$______
6. Retirement and Social Security	$______	$______	$______
7. Library books	$______	$______	$______
8. Audio-Visual aids	$______	$______	$______

C. Amount of Total School Budget

	1962-63	1952-53	1942-43
1. Raised locally (school district, city, town, township or county)	$______	$______	$______
2. From state sources (not including federal funds disbursed through state)	$______	$______	$______
3. From any other sources (including federal funds)	$______	$______	$______

please go on

D. What was the local property tax rate for schools in 1962-63?
$__________ per $1000
Assessed___
or
True ___
(equalized)

E. Please check if there is a local (city) sales or income (wage) tax levy____________________

If so, what percentage of this went for schools in 1962-63?
__________%

What percentage of this went for other local purposes in 1962-63?
__________%

III. For these years kindly indicate your

	1962-63	1952-53	1942-43
Average Daily Attendance	______	______	______
OR			
Average Daily Membership	______	______	______

IV. Please give the following information on school district salaries and employees

A. Total number of fulltime[1] certificated teachers[2] employed by your district for 1962-63.____________________

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[1] Kindly count a person teaching fractional time fractionally.

[2] A teacher is defined as a homeroom, subject, or special subject (art, physical education, music, industrial arts, etc.) person in instruction. Not library, guidance, administrative or supervisory personnel.

B. What was the date of adoption of your current salary schedule for teachers____________________

1. What salary is indicated on the initial step for beginning teachers?__________$________
2. What salary is indicated on the highest step for experienced teachers with maximum preparation$________
3. What salary is indicated on the highest step for experienced teachers with minimum preparation$________
4. What salary is indicated for a teacher with five years of training (master's degree or equivalent) on the tenth step?__________$________

C. Please indicate the numbers of teachers currently employed with
1. Bachelor's degree____________________
2. Master's degree____________________
3. Doctor's degree____________________

please turn over

D. Please indicate the number of guidance counselors currently (1963-64) employed.________________________________

E. Please indicate the number of librarians currently (1963-64) employed by your school district.________________________

F. Some school districts obtain services gratis from other agencies. Please indicate the equivalent number of such fulltime[1] certificated personnel (such as physicians, dentists, nurses, psychiatrists) supplied your district in 1962-63 by other agencies.____________________________________

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[1] Kindly count persons working fractional time fractionally.

G. Please indicate the number of fulltime[1], salaried secretarial and clerical personnel currently (1963-64) employed in your district.____

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[1] Kindly count persons working fractional time fractionally.

H. Please indicate the total number of currently (1963-64) operational school buildings in your district.______________

A. How many, if any, of these are on double sessions?_______

J. If your district operated an adult education program in 1963-64, kindly give the total number enrolled.______________

K. If your district operates a summer school program, kindly give the total number currently enrolled. (If not possible, please give last summer's figure.________________________________

Thank you

Please close and turn to back

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PART II

FISCAL STATUS AND SCHOOL POLICY-MAKING IN SIX LARGE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICTS

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CHAPTER 1

A CONCEPTUAL MODEL FOR RELATING FISCAL STATUS TO CHANGE IN SIX LARGE CITY SCHOOL DISTRICTS

Introduction

The second phase of the study provided for "the development of a more detailed research design to probe more intensively into the fiscal and administrative operations of twenty large city school districts, based partly on the results of the first phase of the study and on a further identification of problems peculiar to large cities."[1]

Part II of this report presents the research design and initial findings based on a pilot test in six cities.

The statistical analysis carried out in connection with the first phase of the study yielded results for large city school districts which were inconsistent with the findings of districts that fell into the smaller size categories.[2]

Below the level of size represented by 50,000 pupils, the condition of fiscal dependence finds the average district of each group operating a less adequately financed program than any other type of district, whether it be a fiscally independent, public vote or tax limit district. However, among the very largest districts (those with 100,000 pupils or more), the value of fiscal independence for the school board is questionable, since the seven fiscally independent districts in this largest group show a mean net current expenditure of $401 per pupil compared to $432 per pupil for the ten districts of the dependent groups.[3]

It has been known for many years that extreme school district size has a deleterious effect on the adequacy of the educational programs and on returns for money spent. The complexities of giant operation appear to be such that staff communication, public expectancy, and unit variability within the school systems are seriously hampered. For the last three decades a number of studies have attempted to assess the influence of bigness upon policy-making and educational costs. Studies by Ebey,[4] Cillie,[5] Westby,[6] Hicks[7] and Leggett and Vincent[8] have all dealt with the lack of adaptability of big city shcool systems and the costs inherent in their situation.

The fiscal position of the big city in its attempt to support education is related to a complex variety of influences related to the distribution of political power, ethnic composition of the pupil population, voter attitudes to the schools, pressure from civil rights and community groups, strength of teachers' union as well as fiscal status.

The traditional dichotomy of fiscal independence/dependence breaks down in explaining spending patterns in the big cities. In examining the data available in response to the Vincent questionnaire, we wondered why the dependent districts spent more than their independent counterparts. We attempted to develop complementary information on specific districts with the following results:

1. The City of New York school district is fiscally dependent upon the municipal government, yet it has spent more on education than any district and its expenditures have risen phenomenally in the last ten years, reaching $960.38 per pupil in 1965-66.[9] The sharp increase in school spending appeared to result from the mayor's commitment to school spending resulting from well placed

pressure from the civil rights groups and the teachers' union with effective support from several community groups. The beneficiary of the increased spending was primarily the staff in the form of higher salaries, shortened teaching assignments and increased fringe benefits. Though fiscally dependent, the board enjoyed considerable budgetary freedom through an informal agreement providing lump-sum appropriations by the city to the school board.[10]

2. In Philadelphia, the board had been legally fiscally independent of city government until 1963. However, the school board was fiscally dependent upon the state legislature because it had no tax leeway. In order to raise the limit, the school board had to look for political support from the Philadelphia legislative delegation which was controlled by the Democratic and Republican party leadership. The business manager of the school system, who had a working arrangement with party leaders, pursued a conservative fiscal policy in return for their support and succeeded in limiting school expenditures. In this case "fiscal independence" led to a closed system of school policy-making with the board heavily dependent financially upon party leaders.

Since 1966, the Philadelphia Board has been fiscally dependent upon the city with the mayor appointing school board members. The board has been able to obtain increased financing because, under a strong chairman the board has established an independent base of power through support from the business community and by encouraging greater community concern for school problems.[11]

3. In St. Louis, the school board is fiscally independent of both city and state government, receiving its taxing power directly from the voters. Yet the board has been forced to pursue a conservative spending policy because it is dependent upon voters who are largely indifferent to school needs. The board has not been willing or able to develop a strong base of community support which it can count upon to press for increased school financing.[12]

These three examples illustrate the complexity of the problem of big city school financing that had been oversimplified in the fiscal independence/dependence dichotomy. Further, because our findings in New York City tended to validate that bigness, itself, was a critical variable in school adaptability, we sought to develop a model that would consider the overall problem of bigness in its relation to adaptability as well as provide insights on the impact of fiscal status on financing and also on the distribution of power within the system.

We saw the function of the model as a conceptual framework which would direct our investigation to the most significant variables in school district operations. In defining it as broadly as possible, we sought to include all significant influences on school district operations though we recognized that it could not be tested statistically nor could it now be made fully operational. We then sought to test the model by field research in each of six cities, three of which have been and are legally independent, two of which have been and are now dependent and one which was in transition from independence to dependence.

Choice of Innovation as an Output in a Conceptual Model

The development of a model that might provide a basis for evaluating fiscal and administrative operations of a school system required that we define an appropriate output that could be explained in terms of administrative and fiscal inputs.

In many studies, the emphasis has been on outputs related to student achievements. Test results provide a quantitative measurement and they have been used rather extensively. Because the tests given in school districts are not comparable, the evaluation is necessarily confined to the individual district. This reduces the possibility for comparative analysis. Further, the heavily weighted influence of socio-economic factors limit the usefulness of this measure in comparing and evaluating fiscal and administrative operations.

Some studies, including this one to a limited extent, suggest that standards of "good" educational policy are often based on assumptions that "more is better." For example, many sources evaluate school systems in terms of ratios of special personnel to the number of teachers or students and teachers to students. School systems are thus compared and those with the highest ratios are assumed to be superior. Still others use per capita expenditure, teachers' salaries and class size as a basis for measuring effectiveness construing these inputs as outputs and designating systems accordingly. This approach may be effective in larger statistical analyses, but they fail to explain why these differences exist and the efficiency with which school resources are allocated.

We determined to try an alternative approach that would measure output at the margin, in terms of the innovation in a school district. This measure of output has the advantage of reflecting not only financial inputs, but the effectiveness of administration and the community and political pressures that are brought to bear on the school board. The measure assumes that adaptability of a school district is its most important characteristic. This assumption is justified on the grounds that the most critical issue facing large city school districts is their ability to adapt their organizations, administrations and programs to the changing socio-economic characteristics of their pupil populations. Thus large city school districts must adapt to the problems of bigness (through decentralization), large bureaucracies (through delegation of power to district superintendents), depersonalization (through variegated programs), _de facto_ segregation (through bussing, pairing, educational parks, specialized schools and school reorganization) and growing numbers of disadvantaged children (through compensatory programs, pre-kindergarten and new programs.) Whether these programs provide meaningful solutions is of less significance to this study than the fact that some attempt is made to face up to the problems.

The disadvantage of using innovation as an output is the measurement problem. How can a comparative measure be developed and expressed in quantitative terms? The following suggestions are preliminary and tentative and no attempt has been made for such quantification in this study. They are offered in the hope future research will be able to refine them more precisely than we have been able to do in this limited study of six school districts.

Innovation

Innovation is defined as the successful introduction to an applied situation of means or ends that are new to that situation. The adaptability of a school district may be evaluated in terms of its receptivity to innovation and the ability to diffuse change throughout the system.

Innovation, so broadly defined, is always present in some degree in all school systems no matter how receptive or unreceptive they may be to change. But not all innovation is meaningful, and much of what may be of significance is so limited in application that it is unique rather than characteristic of the system.

Thus, it is necessary to establish qualitative criteria for evaluation of innovation in the system. We have done so by specifying three major problems of large city school systems and examining the changes that have occurred in attempts to deal with these problems. The major problems were identified as follows:

1. Change in socio-economic characteristics of the pupil population of large city systems with growing numbers of children from low-income families with low academic performance replacing middle income children who have migrated to suburban systems.
2. Administrative problems relating to school district size, namely the increasing centralization of power in the hands of central bureaucracies.
3. Obstacles to integration inherent in the traditional "8-4" and "6-3-3" grade groupings between elementary and secondary schools and the neighborhood school concept.

These three problem areas have been identified in all of the school districts studied as areas of community concern. Innovation, as an output, has been classified, therefore, into three categories:

1. Program innovation for the disadvantaged, especially compensatory education programs.
2. Administrative reorganization, that is, the redistribution of

power within the school bureaucracy.

3. School reorganization, that is, the redistribution of grades among elementary, middle and high schools.

Most large city school systems have considered or adopted programs with the same or similar objectives in each of these three areas. They may be ranked on the basis of leadership (the date the program was adopted as board policy), receptivity (how long it took to reach a policy decision after the proposal was first made) and implementation (the extent to which the program has been implemented after a given period of time.)

Considerable experimentation with a statistical device is necessary in order to obtain a single ranking on the basis of innovativeness after the data have been collected. It may be that all large city districts can be ordered; at the very least the districts can be classified into a number of discrete categories.

Inputs

Three categories of factors are believed to be related to innovation: administrative organization of a school district; extent of participation in school policy-making; and allocation of financial resources.

The primary determinants of a high order of inventiveness requires an environment which encourages and is supportive of change. It also requires an administrative structure that is adaptable and able to adjust its operations to new objectives and new methods. Organization specialists have concluded that an organic structure in which authority resides in expertise rather than hierarchical position is more flexible and therefore inclined to innovation. Some experts have indicated the importance of power equalized participative management as a means of overcoming resistance to change. Therefore, we hypothesized that innovation is related to the following factors: bureaucratization measured in terms of the relative importance of administration to instruction; internalization measured in terms of the openness of the administration to outsiders; decentralization measured by the power distribution between central headquarters administration and administration in the schools; and leadership measured by the power of the superintendent in administering the school system.

We also hypothesized that school systems tend to stay at rest unless external forces upset the equilibrium. Although change could occur from within the system if change mechanisms could be institutionalized, we believe that most pressures for change are exogenous to the system, originating in the community in which the system functions. Thus, the nature and extent of participation was considered a separate input.

Finally, we believed that change was more likely to result if new financial resources were made available to implement change. Existing funds have been shown to be committed to a given pattern of organization and construction, mandated by existing institutional arrangements. Although funds could be shifted within a system, past studies of budget-making procedures suggest that funds, once committed, are difficult to shift. Change could be facilitated more easily with new funds that could be allocated to new programs and patterns of administration.

The classification of inputs within these three categories are described in the following chapters.

Selection of the Six Cities

Thus pilot studies of six large city school systems were undertaken, using a conceptual framework assuming that innovation was a valid measure by which big city school systems could be evaluated. Innovation was believed to be related to administrative organization, nature and extent of participation and school financing.

The six pilot cities were not selected at random. New York City was chosen because (1) it is the largest of the cities, (2) it spends more for schools than any other big city district and (3) though fiscally dependent, the school system operates with maximum budgetary flexibility. Chicago, the second largest of the city school districts was chosen as an independent system that came closest in size to New York. Detroit and St. Louis were both chosen as independent systems because they operate under elected school boards and have tax leeway subject to public vote. Baltimore was selected as the dependent counterpart to St. Louis because of its location as a "border" city. Philadelphia was selected as a dependent counterpart to Detroit because it was approximately the same relative size. It was also chosen because of its recent change in fiscal status from an independent to a dependent system.

CHAPTER 2

INNOVATION AND ADAPTATION TO CHANGING SCHOOL NEEDS

The results of the study support Austin Swanson's finding that "large systems appear to have an absolute rigidity that defies the forces which are so important in shaping the operations of small systems."[1] How paradoxical it is that those very school systems which face far-reaching changes in their communities and clientele are least adaptive and, in fact, resistant to meaningful innovation. Outputs of the six cities were almost non-existent in terms of tangible effective innovations with widespread and relevant impact on the system.

Detroit and Philadelphia showed a slight edge with more administrative reorganization and a greater response to compensatory education needs earlier than the other cities. Philadelphia's recent upheaval in administrative personnel suggests broad changes in its approach to the role of public education. Both Detroit and Philadelphia have also taken particular advantage of federal aid programs. The Detroit picture is more one of a gradual and continuous change, while Philadelphia represents a recent radical change that is currently in a transitional phase with tremendous implications for adjustments within the next five years.

St. Louis and Chicago appear to be the cities with the least innovation in any of the areas outlined for study. Baltimore indicated very minor adjustments in organization. An early pre-school program (prior to federal aid), which was abandoned several years later, was reinstated on a very small scale.

New York City was the most difficult to analyze, because many programs were announced and never implemented; others are instituted on a small scale experimentally and then abandoned. Our conclusion was that New York had adopted several compensatory education programs, e.g., special service schools and corrective reading programs. However, their overall impact has been limited. No administrative reorganization of significance has been implemented in New York City although regular announcements are made regarding the strengthening of district superintentents' offices.[2] School reorganization has been adopted (namely the four year high school and flexible intermediate school) but it is also slow in being implemented. It is interesting that often the other cities will imitate and model programs after what they interpret as innovative in New York City, although New York City may abandon the same experiment as unsuccessful. This tends to give the impression that New York City is the most innovative district when it is not.

Identifying Innovation in the Six Pilot Cities

Innovation was identified in three broad categories: (1) program innovation for the disadvantaged, (2) administrative reorganization and (3) school reorganization. These three categories not only indicated response to the pressing problems of big city systems; they also covered the broadest possible range of fundamental institutional changes in the school system.

No judgment was made regarding the effectiveness of particular innovations except to evaluate their pervasiveness throughout the system. Claims of new programs were checked to ascertain whether they were implemented and the extent of implementation throughout the system. Often these changes were more nominal than actual. On occasion announcements were made and rescinded months later. The determination of dates of origin and implementation were based on data collected from field surveys, the press, and budget documents. The school system staff in each city provided information of the extent of implementation. In each city top administrative staff were asked to provide judgments regarding major innovations in the system. This served as a cross check on other listings. Innovations were reveiwed for a fifteen year period with emphasis on the decade 1954-64.

Within the "program innovation" category, it was necessary to refine further the classifications. From initial surveys it was determined that several kinds of compensatory education programs were most likely to be developed: pre-school plans, after-school clinics, summer school programs, special reading programs, special schools, and in-service training. Whether the programs were adopted before or after federal aid was extremely significant. Those systems which responded to the needs of compensatory education prior to federal aid were considered to be more innovative and those which utilized federal aid most advantageously were considered more flexible.

Administrative reorganization required distinguishing changes in circulation of leadership from intrinsic institutional change. Shifts in power from the central bureaucracy to other participants was considered the most relevant kind of administrative innovation. Changes in recruitment policy for school administrators to attract professional administrators outside the field of education would also be very relevant. Internal reorganization or adjustments in staffing would be another aspect of adminstrative reorganization.

School reorganization included any change in basic school structure, that is, reorganizing along a 4-4-4 pattern, the creation of special categories of schools, and the adoption of new school situations, e.g., ungraded classes.

Independent Studies of the School System

During the period 1954-1964, several of the cities had major independent studies of their school system which included recommendations for change.[3] The sponsorship, participation and responsiveness to the reports is suggestive in itself.

New York City is perhaps the most studied city of all.[4] It was also the city that announced acceptance of change most often--and rescinded those plans most regularly. Few of the major recommendations for fundamental changes have ever been implemented widely although they are repeated in each new study.

The studies of New York City's schools fall into three broad categories. The first includes studies initiated by the board and carried out by staff committees, sometimes involving outside resource personnel. They are in response to specific pressures, e.g., civil rights demands, school boycotts, and usually result in a board policy statement. The recommendations are implemented on a pilot basis initially and then either abandoned or not expanded. A second category of studies originate as part of a larger study of city finances or governmental organization and these usually lead to recommendations for fiscal or administrative reorganization. The major result of a series of these studies has been the lump-sum budgetary power extended to the board by the city in 1963. Studies recommending administrative reorganization within the board have been largely ignored. No overall independent study of the school system and the quality of its educational programs has ever been attempted. Nor has the board ever encouraged the formation of a prestigious broad based citizens' committee to prepare an overall appraisal of school problems.

St. Louis was the most unstudied; its board and staff preferring to develop new approaches from within the system. A study by a board member led to the establishment of the "track" system in the city's high schools in 1957. A citizens' advisory committee met and reported in 1963 and the board responded to some of its recommendations.[5] Staff studies led to the present integration policy, adopted in 1964, which, though it emphasizes the neighborhood schools, provides bussing from core schools to reduce overcrowding. A 1964 study by a community group has been largely ignored by the board. A recent study on poor academic achievement by the Chamber of Commerce has led to the establishment of a board committee to study the problem. The board in St. Louis has neither encouraged nor sponsored independent researchers or community groups.

The Detroit board, in contrast, has encouraged the formation of community groups and has used their findings to accomplish change. In 1957, the board appointed a city-wide committee and eight regional citizens advisory committees were given full autonomy, established their own objectives, methods and procedures; independent consultants were retained and the school staff was made available to provide facilities, service and information. Broad and specific recommendations were made on curriculum, personnel, community relations, plant and finance.[6] Many of the report recommendations have been implemented. Detroit continues to use citizens advisory committees to adjust the system gradually, but consistently. The committee reports continue to be referred to as an overall plan for change.

In Baltimore, the attempt to replicate Detroit's use of citizens committees as change agents was a resounding failure. The report of its citizens' committee was more narrowly conceived, yet it was largely ignored by the leadership in the school system. The project and the recommendations were abandoned.[7]

Independent studies of the Philadelphia school system were begun in 1962 after election of a new board chairman. A Special Committee on Nondiscrimination was appointed as a result of presentations from school and community leaders at the fall, 1962 budget hearings pointing to overcrowding and lack of facilities in the schools, especially those in Negro neighborhoods. The committee, which included board members and community representatives, was charged to develop recommendations to foster integration. Shortly thereafter, the board retained William R. Odell of Stanford University to serve as director of an educational survey of the Philadelphia school system. The director had full freedom to select his staff except that none could be hired from the Philadelphia area. His survey was comprehensive and included a broad set of recommendations, many of which reinforced recommendations of the citizens' committee.

Both reports were submitted formally in 1964 and many of their recommendations were adopted while the studies were in process.[8]

Subsequently, when a new board was appointed in 1965, its chairman formed a number of _ad hoc_ task forces to review the above studies and others and provide recommendations for the new board.[9] The recommendations of the task force studies and the preceding studies have been used by the new board as a basis for sweeping changes in the school system, particularly in administrative organization and fiscal management. The board has continued to use the task force approach for effecting changes in the system.

By contrast, in Chicago the Havighurst report was largely ignored. In fact, the battle over initiation of the study is indicative of the closed character of policy making in Chicago's schools. The board of education authorized a school survey in November, 1961 and appointed a three-man survey committee. After more than a year of discussion over the scope of the survey and who would be its director, the survey committee selected Robert J. Havighurst on April 14, 1963 to direct the survey. His appointment was announced on April 22, but on May 23, the superintendent objected on the grounds that he had not been consulted on the design of the survey nor the choice of director. On May 28, the board suggested a compromise committee of three with Mr. Havighurst as chairman and including the superintendent and a third person to be selected by the other two members. The survey, begun in 1962, was to be conducted by the survey staff, outside consultants and staff committees. Subsequently, the staff committees pursued their work independently and the final report was written by the director and the independent consultants. During the course of the work, the superintendent attended only one brief meeting to discuss procedures for the final preparation of the report. Although he received it, he did not comment on the final report. It was therefore issued as a report by the survey director. It is clear that the superintendent objected to the survey as it was defined and would not permit his name to be associated with the final report. That its recommendations were largely ignored reflects the superintendent's objection and the support he was able to obtain from a split board.[10]

Independent studies of the school system were used positively in Detroit and Philadelphia to effect change. A similar approach failed in Baltimore. In Chicago, the survey was ignored. New York failed to implement recommendations of independent studies.

In St. Louis such studies have not been encouraged. A clear relationship exists between innovation in the cities and their attitudes towards the use of independent and community-based studies as a basis for effecting change. The studies, in themselves, are not causative; rather they are a result and reflection of community-board-staff distribution in power within the school system. This will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.

Programs for the Disadvantaged

It is astounding that so little was done in the form of compensatory education in large cities prior to federal aid programs. Population changes reported in the 1950 and 1960 census, as well as school district data, should have stimulated responses to changing circumstances and a changing school clientele. The few programs which were adopted were minimal, affecting few schools and a limited number of school children. Compensatory education for these purposes was defined in six major categories for research purposes: "Great Cities" projects, reading improvement programs, in-service teacher training, pre-kindergarten, summer school programs, and vocational programs. Other miscellaneous specialized efforts were also reviewed.

The Great Cities Projects began in 1957, when school superintendents and board of education members of the 14 largest school systems met to study problems of education in urban areas and the preparation of the urban student for the world of work. Their central hypothesis was that the problems of children with limited backgrounds could be solved by the development of educational programs adapted to their special needs; modifying school organizational patterns; proper selection and utilization of personnel, instructional materials and equipment; and the involvement of parents and the community in the educational programs. Very little that is tangible resulted from these programs.[11]

Detroit was the first to set up a Great Cities Project in three schools in 1959. The programs in these schools included: in-service teacher training, organizational and curricular modifications such as team teaching, non-graded primary, block programming in junior high schools, individualized reading programs, nominal increase in school staff, more appropriate materials, tuition free summer, elementary and nursery school, school libraries kept open, cooperation with and utilization of facilities of the public and private agencies, attempts to involve parents in their own schools. In 1960 the program was expanded to include seven schools.[12]

Chicago began its Great Cities Project in 1961 involving children in 26 classes in 11 schools. The program concentrated on preventing school drop-outs by working with over-age and culturally deprived elementary school children.[13]

Philadelphia's Great Cities Project began in 1960 in six elementary and one junior high school. It was patterned on the Detroit project and emphasized family and neighborhood involvement.[14]

Summer school programs in the elementary schools were begun in Chicago in 1960 in three schools; in 1963 the program was expanded to ten schools.[15] New York City did not start its elementary school summer program until 1964.[16]

Baltimore had a reading program in fourteen elementary schools in 1960.[17] In 1963 Chicago had special reading programs in grades one to three in two hundred schools but almost no follow-up in the upper grade levels.[18] New York's corrective reading program which boasted special teachers in 285 of the 600 elementary schools actually did not service an appreciable percentage of the children in each of the schools classified as in need.[19]

Aside from the "Great Cities" program none of the cities had any special in-service teacher training programs beyond what amounted to a single school experiment in Detroit until 1964. Detroit and Philadelphia developed more extensive programs under federal aid formulas in 1965-66.[20]

Prior to federal aid Detroit had three schools with pre-kindergarten in 1959 and expanded the program to seven schools in 1960. Baltimore had a widely publicized program from 1943-1958 which was abandoned for lack of funds in 1958. In 1962 Baltimore opened two centers for 60 children and later expanded them to 120 children under a Ford Foundation grant. The program was referred to as the Early Admissions Program, designed to help four and five year olds from depressed areas. The superintendent in Baltimore indicated that the EAP program had little impact and was more fanfare than anything else. Philadelphia started an experiment in 1963 for 60 pupils with Ford Foundation funding; in 1964 supplementing Ford Foundation money with its own, the program was extended to include 160 pupils. New York City, in 1963, had 33 schools with pre-kindergarten classes which was further expanded with the implementation of Project Headstart.[21]

The use of school volunteers started as a pilot project in 1956 in New York City. By 1963, there were only 20 schools involved and by 1966 only 1,000 volunteers worked directly through the school system. By contrast, Detroit, which started its program in 1964, had 2,000 volunteers in 137 schools in 1965, and by 1966 had over 3,000 volunteers. Philadelphia began in 1963 and by 1966 had 1,100 volunteers in 57 schools servicing 6,000 children under the program. Baltimore and St. Louis have dabbled insignificantly with the program.[22]

Special programs for vocational training have been given most attention in Detroit which has had a job upgrading program since 1949. In 1962, a Project on Preparing Pupils for the World of Work was begun. This program consisted of early identification of potential drop-outs and development of special curricula to prepare these pupils for the work world. In 1962, 20 new vocational programs were introduced with some on each school level.[23]

Philadelphia has had a work experience program since 1944. In 1964 the program involved 1,200 students in 15 high schools. In 1961, Chicago instituted an Urban Youth Program in five high schools which encouraged drop-outs aged 16-21 to return to school. By 1964 they had reached 5% of the school drop-outs. New York has had a variety of programs similar to those in the other cities, such as work study programs, Operation Return, etc., but they are all limited in scope.[24] Baltimore and St. Louis school systems seem to have almost ignored this area of compensatory education.

The innovation in the schools which can be attributed to federal aid will be discussed later.

Reorganization of Administrative Structure

The innovation output, reorganization of administrative structure, was outlined in four areas of relevant concern: central administration reorganization, decentralization, changes in recruitment procedures for administrative personnel, and reorganization of financial, budgeting and/or planning procedures. Detroit and Philadelphia were the most innovative cities in restructuring their adminsitrative organizations.

Starting in 1956, Detroit divided the city into nine regions with field executives appointed to oversee each region. In 1958, the citizens' committee recommended that the regions be adjusted to include a representative sample of the school population in each region. The recommendation was acted upon by the superintendent in 1964 cutting the city into pie-shaped districts guaranteeing that each slice (district) would include inner city and middle class schools.[25]

In 1967, the field executive's title was changed to regional superintendent. Their salaries were increased and they were provided additional staff. The superintendent in Detroit indicated that further budgeting and personnel powers would be provided to the regional superintendents in the near future. In 1966, the post of community agent was established. The agent is not selected from the teaching staff, but has a social work background. Although they work with principals, agents are responsible to the community relations division. Their task is defined as cementing the school-community partnership concept, consistent with Detroit's policy of encouraging community participation.[26]

In 1967, the new superintendent in Detroit changed all titles of his central staff to effect the newly adopted policy of annual review of new appointees. Prior to this, all administrative appointments, although not legally carrying tenure, were considered permanent. No administrator had ever been reviewed before nor had anyone been removed from office. The appointment of an assistant superintendent (apparently the second most important person in the Detroit system) with a non-education background in 1960 was a major change in recruitment of administrative staff. The appointee was well known to the community as executive director of a civil rights group and an active participant in various prestigious civic committees.[27]

Detroit has not moved significantly in the area of adjustments in its financial or budgetary management. In contrast, Philadelphia's extensive reorganization has been in this area. The Philadelphia school district, under its new board and superintendent, has drastically changed its budgeting and accounting systems to a "planning, programming budgeting" type of analysis.

The new finance director was a member of a public accounting firm's task force staff which originally recommended the changes. His background is in accounting, not education. The top level staff of the finance division has been completely changed.[28]

Recruitment procedures for top level staff at headquarters has been directed toward bringing in people of diverse backgrounds, ignoring educational training as the criteria for hiring. The superintendent is recruiting all over the country for appointment of principals. In 1964, a personnel department was established and examination for junior and senior high school principals was adopted.[29]

Earlier reorganizations in 1962, 1963, and 1964 had established the superintendent as executive officer, and directors of 17 special divisions were established.[30]

Although decentralization has been talked about in Philadelphia since the Odell report in 1962, no action has as yet been taken in that area. The new superintendent, however, has been advocating decentralization as the next large area of concern for his administration.[31]

New York City, Chicago, and St. Louis had decentralized districts prior to 1954. Both New York and Chicago increased the number of districts during the period of analysis. In 1967, New York City gave additional powers to district superintendents in budgeting and personnel. Their staffs were also increased. St. Louis did not make any changes in the districts during the period of study.

Baltimore divided the city into geographic areas for the elementary divisions in 1954, but nothing has been done since then. It is notable that Baltimore's area directors are located at headquarters.[32]

In the discussion in Chapter 4 there is a summary analysis of comparative decentralization in the six cities which indicates that Detroit's local superintendents are the strongest. More important is the fact that all six of the cities have highly centralized administrative structures and suffer from a headquarters syndrome. Traveling from one headquarters building to another in the larger districts impresses one with the remoteness of central staff from local schools, communities and needs.

Baltimore and New York City are seriously studying program budgeting, and St. Louis has it under discussion. Otherwise, no changes in financial management or budgeting organization were reported.[33]

School Reorganization

Little has been done in any of the cities to reorganize the schools, except that in 1964, New York adopted a policy for a four-year comprehensive high school and a flexible middle school. By 1967, 134 elementary schools, or 22%, terminated at the fifth grade or lower. Forty six of the intermediate schools, or 33%, did not go beyond the eighth grade.[34]

The comprehensiveness of the high school has not been clearly defined or outlined, but all high schools have some ninth grade students, with 1/3 of the system's ninth grade students attending high schools.

Philadelphia has a six-year building program (1967-72) which is geared toward a 7-4-4 pattern of grade organization. (They aim for two years of pre-kindergarten, one of kindergarten.) The four-year high school is referred to as 'comprehensive' but no particular budgeting or programming has been developed to indicate how the four-year comprehensive high school will differ from the three-year high school, except for the addition of the ninth grade. This building program is expected to completely reorganize the system by 1975.[35]

A comprehensive high school plan which would include academic and vocational programs under one roof was adopted as policy by the New York City board in 1965 only to be rescinded by its superintendent in 1967 as unworkable. St. Louis is now considering offering academic work at its regular high schools and transferring its students to existing vocational schools for technical training one day a week.[36]

Although there is discussion almost everywhere of educational parks, it is in the early stages of planning only in New York and Philadelphia. New York has plans for educational parks in two areas, as pilot experimental projects. (Adopted in board of education budget, September 29, 1965.) Philadelphia is planning a study for three proposed parks; administrators interviewed conceded that there would probably be no parks built.[37]

Other Areas of Innovation

In 1964, New York established four sets of paired elementary schools as the first step in what was projected as a long-range program. No additional pairings were attempted and the board of education has indicated that none are planned for the future. Detroit had one set of paired schools. No other school system studied had any pairing or other version of the Princeton Plan.[38]

Overcrowding generally has been more acute in the ghetto areas of core cities. Chicago and St. Louis built schools inside the ghettos to relieve the crowding, but these buildings were placed in areas which precluded any natural integration. Philadelphia, in its building program, appears to be placing more emphasis on reorganization and the elimination of obsolescence than on immediate relief for overcrowding. St. Louis has been bussing Negro children to white areas since 1964 in order to relieve overcrowding. Baltimore has done the same since 1963. New York has had its Open Enrollment and Free

Choice Programs for children in segregated schools, and some zoning and bussing is done to relieve crowding. Detroit adopted a policy on overcrowding in 1961, but little, if any, implementation is visible.[39]

All of the cities, except Baltimore, have done some experimenting with special schools. Chicago had a High Transiency Program in 1955 in which a little over 10% of the schools were involved. In 1961, eleven schools were part of a Great Cities Project. Detroit began its Great Cities Project with three schools in 1959, expanded it to seven in 1960 and with federal funding, continued the expansion to include 27 schools.[40]

St. Louis established a category called "Rooms of Twenty." There are five such schools, and, in addition, one class of twenty in each elementary school. Four special schools for intellectually gifted were set up and several schools within the ghetto areas have one class for gifted children. St. Louis has also established three special categories of high schools: two-year job-oriented terminal programs for the educationally retarded; tutorial schools with late afternoon and evening classes for students with discipline and attendance problems; and Abraham Lincoln School which provides remedial work for potential drop-outs to get them back into the regular high school program.[41] Special continuation work-school programs have long been established in New York.

New York began a Demonstration Guidance Program with one junior high school in 1956. In 1959, it was expanded, as the Higher Horizons Program and put into operation in fifty elementary and thirteen junior high schools. The evaluation of the program several years later conceded its failure. A category of Special Service Schools was also established in the 1950's, and by 1963 forty five percent of the junior high schools were designated. In 1964, the More Effective Schools were established and this expanded to include 21 schools in 1965.[42]

Philadelphia set up its Magnet School Program schools in 1966. These schools are designed to attract children from different areas of the city and thus produce integration.[43]

Between 1962 and 1965 Detroit shifted its teaching personnel to establish balanced staffs in all the schools.[44]

All of the school systems have begun to use some non-graded primary organization for grades K-3, but New York and Baltimore are still regarding the program as purely experimental. Philadelphia, since 1961, has non-graded the first three years in all schools. St. Louis began ungraded primary schools in the first three years in 1959 and it is now implemented in all schools. Detroit, which had a kind of departmental system in its early grades, changed to a self contained class, began a non-graded experiment in 1965 and by 1966 had implemented the non-graded 1-3 in most schools. Chicago began its non-graded experiment under the name Continuous Development Program in 1957 in a few schools,and by 1963 it was in effect in 200 schools with an additional 100 planning to use it the following year. In addition, some of the schools were trying the plan in grades 4-6. Baltimore had 10 schools using non-graded 1-3 in 1962, and now has 26 schools with some non-graded classes, including seven schools completely non-graded K-6. New York City has only 10 schools with non-graded K-2 although the first experiment started in 1962 with one school.[45]

Federal Aid and Innovation

The lack of accurately detailed information about the actual budgeting of individual programs, and overlapping and contradictory reports on federal aid from each of the cities makes it impossible to fully evaluate, on a comparative basis, the relative impact of federal aid programs in the cities.

For example, New York, in its Report of Federal Programs for the Fiscal Year 1967, makes no mention of pre-school programs. A telephone call to the board of education indicated that this year the board is financing its own pre-school program. A look at the budget for 1966-67, however, itemizes an Expanded Pre-Kindergarten Program at $2,447,028 under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.[46]

In reviewing the data, however, it is clear that federal aid has in its short history influenced innovation in all of the cities. Increased interest in and development of compensatory education programs in each of the cities is readily discernable. Federal project officers have been appointed in all of the school systems and generally their role is one of planning and program development. Each of these officers were interviewed during the field research trips and their offices were the most stimulating at headquarters. Receptivity to experimentation was more evident in these offices than it was elsewhere in the system. This is not to suggest that resistance to change has disappeared. In fact, in several of the cities, the federal project officers indicated problems they encountered in trying to encourage the development of programs under federal aid. However, for political as well as economic reasons, federal funding has pushed school people to innovation. The press in some of the cities has been quick to question the failure of school officials to take full advantage of federal aid and in some cases the need to return unspent federal funds.[47]

In all of the cities federal aid has been used to institute pre-school education, in-service teacher training (particularly for the teacher of the disadvantaged), work study projects, summer school, adult education and remedial reading programs. In almost all of the cities these programs were non-existent or minimal prior to federal aid. The Banneker Experimental Program in St. Louis, the only large scale innovation in compensatory education, was financed with federal funds.[48]

In some of the cities, programs have been developed in educational television and curriculum research which otherwise might not have emerged.[49] Very few of the cities have taken advantage of federal funds for community relations experimentation but it is likely that more will be forthcoming in this area in the near future.

In attempting to evaluate some comparative use of federal funds, we estimated a four-year aid average per average daily attendance for each city. Philadelphia apparently took the greatest advantage of the programs with an average aid ratio for the four year period at $245.35, New York City was the lowest with $81.41.[50] Although this is not in itself indicative of flexibility, it does suggest the ability of a system to respond to a new situation.

The period of federal aid is still too recent and the sample of cities too limited to draw any further conclusions from the data regarding a comparative judgment on the relationship of federal aid to innovation.

CHAPTER 3

THE PROCESS OF CHANGE: CASE STUDY OF PHILADELPHIA

The forces that contributed to the decline of the public school system are the same in all large urban systems. The cities' schools suffered a long period of neglect and low fiscal priority during and subsequent to World War II. Capital expenditures, curtailed during the war, were insufficient in the late 40's to replace an old and deteriorating school plant. Teachers' salaries were low and potentially competent teachers were attracted to other fields and suburban school systems. Over-centralization and unmanageable school bureaucracies emerged to limit change and discourage initiative and innovation. The malaise in the cities' school systems was widespread throughout the forties and fifties, but a cult of "professionalism" insulated the school bureaucracy from outside criticism.

More recently the insularity of the cities' schools has begun to break down. Initially Russian space successes awakened public interest in education, its goals and its operation. The growing proportion of Negro pupils in the Northern urban ghetto schools made apparent the extent of segregation: the failure of the schools to cope with the changing composition of the cities' pupil population made the school system an obvious target for civil rights groups. The Supreme Court decision of 1954 gave impetus to the demands for quality integrated education. And the civil rights movement, that focused Northern protest on the school system, made criticism of the schools respectable again. The thrust of the civil rights groups in the early sixties may well have been the triggering force that will lead to urban school reform in the seventies.

What differentiates Philadelphia from other large cities is not the need for reform, but that reform seems to be taking place. More important in some respects than the change itself is the process of change. An analysis of how and why school reform in Philadelphia was possible can add much to our understanding of large city school systems.

The Philadelphia school system following World War II offered a paradox in microcosm of big city school systems.

The "Credo" called for an apolitical institution devoted to educational needs and governed by a board of notables "above criticism" and above the political partisan issues that supposedly corrupt and destroy professionalism in education. In practice, political considerations were paramount in school-budget making and indirectly influenced all educational policy. The schools were governed by a highly political business manager and the school board served largely to satisfy the public view of the system as apolitical.

Philadelphia's Old Board of Education

The Philadelphia school system was unique in that its school board was appointed by the Court of Common Pleas. This system was believed to assure recruitment of the most qualified persons on a nonpartisan basis, but quite the opposite effect resulted. The Court of Common Pleas looked to the city's party leaders for recommendations for school board members and the Democratic and Republican party leadership favored loyal supporters of the political parties.

The influence of party leaders over the Court resulted from the operation of the "sitting judge" procedures used in Philadelphia. Candidates for the Court were selected by agreement among both political parties, and the candidates so selected enjoyed the support of both parties. The judges knew the sources of their support and acted accordingly.[1]

The board that emerged from this selection process comprised members of the Philadelphia business community who were less concerned with educational policy than they were with avoiding controversy and limiting school expenditures to acceptable levels. Their avoidance of controversy was dictated both by political and personal reasons. School issues were bound to be highly controversial and embarrassing to political candidates who might be forced into taking a public position. Not only would such a position violate the accepted "Credo" of an apolitical school system, but it could be politically disastrous. It also suited the board members to avoid controversy that would inevitably tarnish their reputation and the prestige of a board position as one of bestowed honor. The board was thus conservative and closely aligned with the city's political leadership.

The board was also a venerable one, self-perpetuating by the selection process and through a tradition of successive reappointments. Although board members were initially appointed to six-year terms, members were generally reappointed until they decided to retire. For example, in 1961 when the Chairman retired from the board, he had served for over twenty years.[2]

Controversy was avoided through a "gentlemen's agreement" to resolve all conflicts in executive session and present united support of the majority position at public meetings. Board meetings tended to be routine and public participation was virtually non-existent. That some conflict did exist is indicated by the large number of executive sessions that were reported in the public records. However, criticism of the board's policies was in bad taste, politically hazardous, and potentially disastrous for anyone with ambitions for leadership in the downtown business community.

Financing Philadelphia's Public Schools Under the Old Board

The board not only was successful in avoiding controversy over educational issues, but also in limiting school expenditures to levels acceptable to municipal officials. That the board was economy-minded reflected not only the large representation of the business community among its members, but also the power of its business manager and the subtle political relations between the board and city government with respect to tax policy.

The Philadelphia school system was legally fiscally independent of the city government, i.e., the board had its own taxing and debt-incurring power and did not have to secure municipal approval for its budget. In practice the school system was heavily dependent on the city's Democratic political leadership that controlled both the city government and the city's legislative delegation to the state assembly.[3]

Philadelphia's school budget is financed primarily by a tax on real estate, but the board's taxing power was limited to a maximum millage established by the Pennsylvania State Legislature. Since World War II, the board levied the maximum rate permitted under state law. Periodically, it was required to seek increases in the tax limit, but it did so with great reluctance and as infrequently as possible. The legislature resisted raising the tax limit except in response to considerable local pressure. Such pressure was effective only with substantial support from Philadelphia legislators, requiring local party leadership approval of the increase. Support was forthcoming only if the requests were modest, politically acceptable, and did not conflict with other municipal needs.

A strong and independent school board would have campaiged hard for public support to obtain needed funds. The Philadelphia school board with its conservative orientation was content to limit its expenditures to amounts that could be financed within existing limits. Only in 1949, 1957, and 1963 was the board successful in raising the tax limit, and then for modest amounts that did not provide for needed tax leeway. In other years, increases in operating expenditures were modest and resulted from small increases in the values of taxable property.[4]

Similarly, the school debt could not exceed 2% of the value of property taxable for school purposes without voter approval. Throughout most of this period capital expenditures were limited to amounts that could be financed within the 2% debt limitation.

The school board, faced with the choice between mobilizing public support for adequate school financing and limiting expendures to levels acceptable to the local political leadership, chose the latter course of action. The result was austerity capital and operating budgets throughout

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the post-war period with a consequent deterioration in school plant and the quality of school instruction. A second consequence was a continuing dependence by the school board on the city's political leadership and the emergence of the business manager as the most powerful person within the school system.[5]

Role of The Business Manager and The Supervisory Staff

Legally, the business manager and the superintendent of instruction possessed equal power within the system. Both were appointed by the board, but while the office of superintendent changed hands over the years, the business manager held his position for over 25 years and became the most powerful person within the school system.

As business manager, he controlled school district contracts and purchased school supplies. He also controlled 200 patronage jobs in the school district and paid the salaries of 260 district employees who worked in other city departments. These latter jobs are major sources of patronage for the party in power. Thus, the business manager had considerable political power. He used that power effectively to enhance his position and influence party politicans whose approval was essential for legislative support for school tax increases. He also exercised the power that was legally the school board's. Because board membership was largely honorary and politically dictated, the board was content to permit the business manager (who often had veto power over their appointment) to run the system.[6]

The business manager saw his role both as a custodian of public funds and an arbiter of internal disputes within the system. He was less concerned with educational policy than he was in limiting school tax increases to acceptable levels. And, of course, the role he played was consistent with the needs of the groups that ran the city.[7]

The paradox of the Philadelphia school system was, that despite the commitment to the "Credo" and supposed fiscal independence, it was in fact deeply involved in local politics in such a way that public review and participation was impossible. For example, until 1960, the board's budget submission was a two-page summary prepared by its business manager and cleared first with "City Hall". The detailed report was presumably locked in the business manager's desk and never made a part of the public record. There is some doubt as to whether it was ever made available to board members.[8]

The supervisory staff carried forth a minimum program for the district. The sanctity of the staff was preserved. Although associate and assistant superintendents were not given tenure and served under one year contracts, no superintendent was ever replaced. Informal arrangements assured life tenure to every supervisor. Even under a new superintendent, appointed after the business manager's death, no meaningful staff changes were made. Philadelphia's inbred bureaucracy continued to function as it had before. Over the years so little was done beyond the routine minimum operation of the school system that responsibility for policy-making is not difficult to pinpoint. The staff was free to develop curriculum and educational policy. The board was generally cooperative. But the parameters of educational policy were set by the control of financial and organizational management exercised by the business manager.[9]

The Legacy of the 1940's and 1950's

As a result of inadequate spending and insulation from the community, and political control, the Philadelphia public school system in the 1960's was among the poorest urban systems in the country. Elementary and junior high school pupils achievement ranked well below national urban norms in every category tested.[10] Philadelphia was second among large city school systems in the proportion of pupils attending private schools. With but one exception, its professional staffing ratio was lower than every other city in the country.[11] It ranked seventh in current expenditures per pupil among the eleven largest school systems and its low expenditures reflected below average teachers salaries.[12]

It's school plant was obsolete and overcrowding was widespread throughout the system. In 1965, over 70% of the city's public schools were over thirty years old; 63 elementary schools which provided 15% of the total elementary school capacity were of non-fire resistant construction and built prior to 1907.[13] Nearly 60% of the elementary schools were overcrowded;

83% of the junior high and 89% of the high schools were also classified as overcrowded.[14]

The absence of effective criticism limited not only controversy, but innovation. A review of school policy over the last decade failed to identify any significant new programs. In 1960 the Great Cities Project and the Educational Improvement Program were adopted but only in response to pressure from civil rights groups and then on a pilot basis only.[15]

Reform in the Philadelphia School System

Today the Philadelphia school system is moving rapidly towards major improvement. That reform has come to Philadelphia's schools is clear and that it is directly identified with the new board chairman, and his perception of his role as a "change agent", is clearer still. The circumstances leading up to his appointment may turn out to be the most dramatic revolution in a city school system in the post-war period.

A major achievement of the reform forces in Philadelphia was the

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new home rule powers given the school board by the state legislature in the summer of 1963. On July 31, 1963, despite opposition from members of the Philadelphia school board, the teachers' union, the mayor, city council, and numerous civic associations, the Pennsylvania State Legislature passed House Bill 367 which transferred taxing power for the city's schools from the state to the city. The law set in motion a series of changes that altered radically the distribution of power within the system and set the potential for widespread school reform.

The law empowered the city council to authorize the school board to levy any tax that the city could levy for general tax purposes, except that no school wage tax could be levied on non-residents. The transfer of taxing power effectively made the school system fiscally dependent on municipal government.[16] With the transfer of taxing power, a Home Rule Charter Commission was established to recommend procedures for selection of board members and operation of the school board. The resulting recommendations, adopted by referendum, provided for appointment of members of the board by the mayor using a screening panel device.[17]

A former mayor of Philadelphia, and a leader in the city's reform movement, was persuaded to accept appointment to the board. He did so with the understanding that he would serve as its chairman and would be given veto power over other board appointments.[18] The members of the screening panel were anxious for him to lead a reform movement within the school system and the former mayor was willing to assume this responsibility only if he could be assured of conditions necessary for him to be effective. The new board began to function even before it took office.

Shortly after his appointment in September, 1965, the new chairman established three task forces to report to the incoming board on the issues facing the Philadelphia school system. The composition of the task forces facing the Philadelphia school system. The composition of the task forces was in itself symbolic of the changed attitude toward public education. Rather than rely upon the professional staff for technical expertise, the new chairman chose incoming board members, community leaders, and outside specialists for membership on the task forces. A staff person was assigned to each task force to serve only in a liaison capacity. The choice of task force members and their method of operation was directed at breaking down the insularity of the school system and laying school policy-making open to purposeful public participation.[19]

The task forces began their work by holding a joint public hearing at which close to fifty organizations were represented. All were highly critical of the school system or some aspect of its operation. The hearing pointed the way for the policy recommendations that were to follow.[20]

The task forces recommended far-reaching changes in community relations, curriculum, financing, budgeting and administration. Recommendations followed a pattern, attacking the insularity of the schools. They included open school board meetings, recruitment of non-instructional professionals from outside the educational establishment, recruitment of teachers and administrators from outside the system, and involvement of community leaders and parents in school policy-making, and the use of volunteer instructional and non-instructional help. School reorganization on a 4-4-4 basis was urged.[21]

In the same spirit, the new board continued to involve community leaders in school issues, through open meetings, responsiveness to studies by community groups and periodic consultation among board, staff and community groups. For example, in January, 1966, the chairman appointed a thirteen-man committee, including executives of leading Philadelphia banks and businesses, to study financial needs.[22] The board also sponsored a three-day seminar to provide an opportunity for community groups and the

and businesses, to study financial needs.[22] The board also sponsored a three-day seminar to provide an opportunity for community groups and the

professional staff to interact on a variety of school problems.[23]

One of the most controversial areas of new board policy has been its aggressive recruitment of outsiders for the system.

The supervisory staff is being reorganized and thirty-five top level appointments have been made with the promise of more to come. Many of the new staff appointees are not professional educators and have no experience in the system. A new superintendent was appointed from a suburban district in New Jersey. He has indicated his desire to bring in people from around the country to stimulate change and assure its implementation. Those who are his immediate assistants are talking about the coming school revolution. Some of the outsiders recruited to the system are replacing administrative personnel, graduates of Pennsylvania normal schools, who rose through the ranks from teacher to principal to professional administrator. The effort to bring in fresh thinking has been extended down to the teacher level through an ambitious nationwide teacher recruitment program.[24]

The thorough going revision of financial management will provide the ground work for planned revitalization of the system. Building on task force recommendations on budgeting, the school district is in the midst of implementing a "planning performance, budgeting" system. A consultant to the task force from a national CPA firm has been retained as the new director of finance. He is adjusting the system to long-range planning based on demonstrated priorities which will be determined in precise program evaluation. The goal of the system is to assure program evaluation and measure individual school needs as well. Adjustments have required new staffing, re-training of old staff and most important, top level policy acceptance of the new technology and its potential role in school policy-making. The board and the new superintendent have given complete support to the implementation of the new budget and accounting procedures. It is likely that PPB will be one of the built-in mechanisms for change which traditional school system management lacks.[25]

A second mechanism for change is the establishment of long-range planning for school organization, program and curriculum. The planning function, supported by a federal grant and headed up by a former business executive, will provide for a continuing review of educational innovation and its adaptation for implementation in the Philadelphia school system.[26]

An obvious and dramatic demonstration of the board's public support has been the significant increase in school spending. While fiscally independent the school district's capital and operating budget increases were minimal, largely determined by its business manager and the political leadership with whom he was aligned. During the past two years, school spending has increased 50%, a record increase for the district and equal to one-half the increase in the preceding ten years.[27]

The school district has undertaken a massive $450 million rebuilding program that will replace or renovate virtually every school building in the system. In May, 1966, voters approved the first phase of the program by authorizing a $60 million increase in school debt. Further requests for increases are planned for each of the years through 1972.[28]

Though the extent of actual change thus far has been relatively limited--the new board has been in office for only a little over a year. The nature of accomplished change is, however, highly significant. By moving outside the community for new and needed expertise, by seeking out and providing mechanisms for encouraging community involvement and by pioneering in long-range planning and evaluation, the Philadelphia Board has set the stage for changes yet to come. That so much has been accomplished in so short a time is a remarkable feat for a school board whose heritage had been one of the most backward large-city school systems in the country.

The Process of Change

The organizational changes that have taken place in the Philadelphia school system are more widespread and far-reaching than have been experienced in any large city school system in the country. There has been a complete redistribution of power from an insulated bureaucracy supported by local politicians to a strong reform board supported by a broad community power base.

The redistribution of power resulted from a shift in taxing power from state to city and appointment of the board from the Court of Common Pleas to the mayor. But these legal changes were the apparent results of the forces that were contending for control of the school system during the period 1962-1964.

The struggle for reform can be summarized as follows. The environment for reform was established on the one hand by the city-wide reform movement that was active in Philadelphia in the 1940's and 1950's and the complete deterioration of the schools that made the need for reform apparent to all. The initial pressure for reform arose within the board, in the person of a board member, who pressed hard for increased financial support. As a dissident voice within the board, she broke its seeming unity and encouraged outside criticism. Subsequently, the civil rights groups found in the overcrowded schools an issue that the board was forced to respond to. Their response took the fom of the appointment of a board-community "Committee on Nondiscrimination" that provided a forum for voicing discontent and served to mobilize the disorganized and weak community groups concerned with schools.

When the pressure for additional financing met the strong opposition of party leaders, a crisis developed that brought into being a coalition of the reform members of the business community, civic groups and civil rights groups. The reform members of the business community played a key role, through the Greater Philadelphia Movement, in giving power to the growing revolt and transforming the issue from increased financing to reorganization of the school system. The issue, thus joined, was fought in the state legislature. There, a Republican governor with the support of a Republican legislature was unwilling to bear the onus for raising Philadelphia's school taxes. Philadelphia's Democratic legislative delegation could not be united in support of a comprehensive tax program. The governor with widespread support from Democratic reform elements in Philadelphia and support from community groups in the city, was able to shift taxing powers from the state to the city despite widespread opposition from the school board, the school bureaucracy, city council, the mayor and the local Democratic party leadership. Subsequently, the Philadelphia reform movement with broad community support was able to install a leader of the reform movement as chairman of a newly constituted board appointed by the mayor. The new board with no commitments to the city's party leadership, city council, or the school bureaucracy, and with community support, was able to move rapidly and effectively to use their power to achieve sweeping organizational changes.

School Reform and the Reform Ethos

The city-wide reform movement of the 1940's and 1950's restructured Philadelphia politics and influenced the development of a reform coalition which was activated in the school reform movement. It also provided a psychological setting in a reform ethos that still pervades Philadelphia politics. It is that attitude which supplied the public support which is so necessary.[29]

For the first half of the twentieth century, the Republican machine in Philadelphia was secure in its local control with the support of important business groups, it was unchallenged in its position until the post-war period. Like most other cities in the country, Philadelphia, in 1946, faced the impact of the accumulated lag in physical plant and housing. Transportation problems were at their peak. The static Republican city administration seemed to be ignoring the pressing problems of urbanization. The combination of inaction by those in power, the abandonment of the Republican machine by business interests and the sudden concern of "dislocated aristocrats" in civic affairs were the source of a reform coalition which was to revitalize Philadelphia politics.

The reform movement joined local business groups and a weak Democratic party organization in the battle for control of the city. The movement called not only for "throwing the rascals out" but for reorganization of the city government and a concentrated attack on urban problems. One reformer had already emerged as a leader of the city planning crusade and planning and revitalization of the downtown area was to become the center of the reform platform. Two reformers were elected in 1949 as controller and treasurer. The first all-reform administration was elected in 1951 under a reform mayor. In 1951, charter reform overhauled the city government and paved the way for political institutional change.[30] The reform was not merely a switch in the political party in power, its leadership was dedicated to changing the attitudes and institutions in Philadelphia. Its reaction was immediate and impressive. The financial structure of the city was completely revised. Departments were reorganized and personnel practices drastically adjusted to the merit system. Trained specialists were brought into the city administration. Urban renewal and traffic control were tackled on a long-range basis. As a result of these efforts, Philadelphia has one of the most extensive urban redevelopment programs of any city in the United States. Over $400 million is invested in the downtown Penn Center project. The Center idea was the first demonstration of the mayor's determination to project the dynamic quality of reform in Philadelphia. Two years after his election ground was broken for the Center. In addition to the Center, the reformers were instrumental in other renewal projects. Close to $10 million has been spent in the Society Hill area and the Eastwood renewal is the largest in the country.[31]

Later in the 1950's, the dynamist of reform was projected to mass transportation. Under a reform administration the Broad Street subway was extended and money was loaned to the Philadelphia Transportation Company for 270 new subway cars.[32]

Better municipal services were achieved through expansion of taxes. The reform mayor campaigned on a plank of high taxes for better services. The public response indicated its approval of the reform approach and its commitment to change in the system. These changes continued throughout the 1950's although internal struggles in the reform organization were apparent.[33]

The reformers were not concerned with the Democratic party organization and although they controlled the city government, they ignored the party. The reformers have been criticized for failing to construct a mechanism for carrying on the reform through the Democratic party.[34] However, the impact of the movement as it effected institutional change in Philadelphia city government and in the physical changes in the city cannot be denied. Public confidence in change and the willingness to accept and encourage reform are a by-product of the political upheaval of the 1950's which still influence political attitudes in the city. Local business groups (particularly the Greater Philadelphia Movement) emerged during the reform era as vital forces in local policy. Civic groups were encouraged to support their cause. Local newspapers supported reform programs during the 1950's and shaped public opinion as a constructive force. They made change appear not only desirable but necessary. Each of these forces fed upon the reform movement at the same time that they fed it. All were to become important to later efforts in school reform.

While the reform movement and its urban renewal program began a transformation of the city's municipal facilities, the board of education failed to cope with the need for a major new construction program.

The Philadelphia school system emerged from World War II with a relatively obsolete school plant and severe overcrowding resulting from ten years of limited capital expenditures. While in the preceding thirty years, 1907-1936, an average of four to five new buildings were added to the system every year, only 16 new buildings were built during the ten years ending in 1946. After the war, little was done to compensate for the limited construction during the preceding ten years. Quite the opposite, the Board of Education built fewer schools between 1947 and 1964 than it had in any twenty year period (except for the World War II years, 1937-46) since 1900.[35] The restraint in building resulted from the board's reluctance to increase school debt beyond the 2% limit thereby requiring voter approval.

In 1959, a long period of relative stability of school enrollments ended. School attendance in 1959 rose by 5,000 pupils and increased by an additional 5,000 pupils in 1960, an increase in two years of more than half of the total increase in the preceding seventeen years.[36] New capital expenditures were needed and the district had reached the statutory limit on new borrowing. The business manager obtained legislative authority to raise the debt limitation from 2% to 3% of assessed valuation providing $45 million in new borrowing capacity. However, any borrowing above the 2% limit required voter approval of the bond issue. In receiving the authority, he made it clear that he would submit only a $10 million bond issue for voter approval that together with the $5 million in borrowing capacity available under the old limit would permit a $15 million bond issue. The $10 million figure was acceptable to the Democratic chairman and the bond issue was approved overwhelmingly on a low voter turnout. By limiting the bond issue and thereby getting party support the business manager was again able to delay public discussion and possible controversy over a school issue.[37]

But the climate in 1960 was very different than in earlier years. Overcrowding was most severe in the non-white schools. A 1966 study classified the city's school system into 12 planning areas and analyzed racial composition and the extent of overcrowding in each of these areas. Elementary schools in four of the planning areas (Center City, Germantown-Chestnut Hill, Upper North Philadelphia, and West Philadelphia) had severe overcrowding; all four planning areas had predominately Negro enrollments. Three out of the four planning areas with little elementary school overcrowding were predominantly white neighborhoods (Kensington, Roxborough-Manayunk, and Near Northeast); the fourth area with little overcrowding was South Philadelphia in which Negro enrollment was predominant. Of the four remaining areas in which elementary schools were moderately overcrowded, two were predominantly white (Olney-Oak Lane, Far Northeast Philadelphia), and two were predominantly Negro (Southwest Philadelphia and Lower North Philadelphia). Further, concentration of older buildings were in planning areas also characterized by a high enrollment of non-whites, severe overcrowding and inadequate plant sites.[38]

Although parents of school children may not have been aware of the poor quality of instruction or the inbred bureaucracy that administered Philadelphia's school system, they could not fail to notice the overcrowded classes and deteriorated buildings in which their children received their education. And if the inadequacies of the school plant escaped the notice of white parents in the outlying areas of the city, they did not escape the notice of civil rights leaders who saw in the severely overcrowded ghetto schools a major effect of _de facto_ segregation.

Civil Rights and School Reform

The civil rights movement, though relatively weak in Philadelphia, played a significant role in achieving school reform, initially by pointing to the overcrowded conditions in the Philadelphia schools and subsequently by joining with other groups to achieve school reform.

Philadelphia schools were hardly pioneers in pressing for integrated education. As late as 1935, Philadelphia's schools were segregated, a factor explaining the high proportion of Negro administrators in the school system.[39] Following residential patterns in all northern cities, the school system remained *de facto* segregated as it still is today.

The Supreme Court decision in Brown vs Board of Education, Topeka, was hardly noticed in Philadelphia. It wasn't until 1959, five years later, at the urging of the Education Equality League, that the board expressed a firm belief in non-discrimination. The statement simply affirmed "that there shall be no discrimination because of race, color, religious or national origin in the placement, instruction and guidance of pupils..."[40]

Two years later, dissatisfied with a policy without a program, and lacking wide support for community action, the NAACP provided counsel in a suit against the Board of Education by several parents including Terry Chisholm in behalf of his son, Anthony. The suit asserted that the board, in providing portable classrooms at a crowded school, 98% Negro, rather than in providing transfer to an underutilized school, had committed an act of purposeful segregation.

The suit and other civil rights activity aroused concern over overcrowding of public schools in the Negro sections of the city.[41]

At the fall, 1962 budget hearings, various school and community representatives protested overcrowding, inadequate facilities, poor student achievement and teacher shortages, primarily in schools in Negro neighborhoods. A new board president had been recently elected and he responded to community criticism in early 1963 by appointing a Special Committee on Nondiscrimination comprising three board members and one hundred others including school officials, community leaders and interested persons. The committee was the first instance of open policy-making in the Philadelphia school system. It brought together a wide variety of persons concerned with schools thereby mobilizing community interest and participation, which continued throughout the period during which major changes were made in the fiscal and political structure of the school system.[42]

The Role of the Greater Philadelphia Movement

The Greater Philadelphia Movement is the instrument of reform for the business community in Philadelphia. Organized in 1948, it has less than fifty members, mostly corporation lawyers and bankers. Although others are co-opted into membership, e. g. from labor and the Jewish community, control is firmly in the hands of the main line families.[43] It has the support of the press and exercises control over a number of non-profit corporations and in this sense is the closest thing to a non-profit holding company. GPM supported the reform mayors.

But the reform movement had ignored the education issue throughout the "fifties". Former Mayor of Philadelphia and School Board Chairman Richardson Dilworth, himself, had said:

> "We had so many other things that we had to do and nobody worried much about the schools ... We just figured they were all right ... We just didn't realize how neglected they were becoming". 44

In September 1960, GPM undertook a study of the Philadelphia school system. Initially the study was to focus on the school teachers, examining teacher recruitment and personnel problems. During this period the schools were confronted with major personnel shortages, primarily the result of low starting salaries and the more attractive suburban school settings. In making its 1960 study, GPM was determined to use its own field researchers relying upon the school staff only for specific information.

Midway during the study--sometime in late 1961 or early 1962-- the study's objectives were shifted away from personnel policies to the much more significant and sensitive issue of financial administration and selection of school board members.[45] The reasons for the shift are hard to discern but they seem to be related both to the growing anxiety over overcrowded facilities brought to the public's attention by the Chisholm suit and the growing pressure from certain board members for increased financing.

One member of the study group, who now holds a key policy-making position in the schools, played a major role in the shift in emphasis of the study. He had ties to GPM through the business community and also to the Citizen's Committee for Public Education that was then the only effective independent civic group concerned with education issues.[46]

The GPM report was a direct attack on the school board. It was a vote of no confidence, not only in the board, but also in the fiscal and administrative structure of its schools.

The GPM report was issued in two parts. Part A was transmitted on May 17, 1962, to the then chairman of the school board, and it covered administrative problems; Part B, which dealt with personnel problems, was issued six months later. Part A had great impact on the community, not only because its recommendations suggested a major redistribution of power in the system, but also because it was a GPM document. The Greater Philadelphia Movement has pressed hard for any recommendations it made and has usually been successful in securing their adoption.[47]

The principal recommendations in the study called for mayoral appointment of a new school board using a screening panel device, transfer of power to set the maximum tax rate from state to city, establishment of unit control by downgrading the business manager's position to associate superintendent, and as a continuing policy, board authorization of independent study of school district problems.[48] All of the report's major recommendations were ultimately implemented.

The School Board

Although civil rights group pressure and the GPM study were vital to school reform, the timing of reform, delayed as it was until and beginning as it did in 1962, was tied to the power distribution within the school system. Until 1962, the chairman of the school board was a member of long-standing and a respected and powerful member of the downtown business community. He gave the school board the full prestige of his presence and effectively set it above criticism. Under the chairman, the board's action were private, and public participation was actively discouraged. The chairman could count on the business manager to manage the school system's finances with restraint, and modest financial needs could be met through personal negotiations with local political leaders.

The business manager's control over school system finances was not seriously challenged until 1958, when a newly appointed board member pressed successfully for a board study of the schools "current needs". She is a prominent civic leader and wife of one of Philadelphia's most successful financiers. The Greenfield report recommended increases in teacher's salaries and more funds for textbooks thus shaking the otherwise constrained financial balance achieved by the conservative board and the business manager. She independently developed public support and succeeded in obtaining an increase in the real estate tax limit from $1.40 to $1.60. The Democratic county chairman had pressed for increased state aid, but the legislature had rejected increased aid in favor of the tax limit increase.[49]

In 1961, the business manager suffered a serious heart attack and was placed on a rigid medical regimen thereby reducing his effectiveness. His illness coupled with a board member's presence as a proponent of increased spending and the growing activity in the Negro commuity for school integration changed the character of school board membership from one of "bestowed honor" to one of political sensitivity. In1962, while the business manager was ill, the chairman retired from the school board. Shortly thereafter, the business manager died, ending 25 years of unparalleled power in the school system.[50] The power gap left by the departure of these two persons opened the way for reform.

The chairman was replaced by another as school board chairman. Whereas the former's presence on the board placed it above criticism, the new chairman invited criticism. He has been described as "overbearing, a veritable 'bull in a china shop'." His position was vulnerable and criticism of the school system became fashionable.[51] The new chairman's response to criticism was the appointment of the Committee on Nondiscrimination. This further opened school policy-making to public participation.

During this period, the Citizens' Committee on Public Education was rejuvenated and joined in the growing controversy over the schools. One board member has been supported in her crusade for better financing by the committee. Though relatively small and without a broad base of support, the citizens' committee comprised a core of knowledgeable and hard working persons concerned with quality education. Its membership was drawn from local parents groups whose interest had broadened from local concern to overall school problems.

Faced with growing financial crises and mounting civil rights pressure, the Citizens' Committee began to stimulate interest in school reform through criticism of school board policy. Their participation as disinterested persons concerned with quality schools encouraged wider participation by non-education interest groups.[52]

The Fiscal Crisis

With the death of the business manager in 1962 (between the issuance of Part A and Part B of the report) and the retirement of the chairman (before Part B of the report was issued), power on the board shifted to those persons pressing for increased expenditures and financing. A 1961 deficit had been covered by the discovery of a "camouflaged reserve" accumulated by the business manager.[53] But in late 1962, the board faced a major financial crisis requiring an increase in taxes. The president of the board stated that the school system needed $50 million over the next five years.

At that time the Pennsylvania State Legislature was Republican controlled and a Republican Governor was in office in Harrisburg. While the city was controlled by the Democrats who faced an election in 1963. The board sought the governor's help in securing a tax increase proposing a surcharge on the federal income tax and a penny a pack cigarette tax. The governor did not support the cigarette tax and the Democratic mayor of Philadelphia opposed the income tax. The Republican majority in the legislature stipulated that as a condition to any comprehensive tax increase, every member of the Philadelphia delegation (all but two of 39 were Democratic) would have to support the program.

The board president, early in 1963, wrote to every legislator, appealing for support for the tax program. The Democratic county chairman proposed a bipartisan move for a tax increase. However, when specific programs were proposed, they were opposed by one or another of the participants.

Finally, on February 9, the governor supported the GPM recommendation and suggested a shift of taxing power from the state to the city. The shift was opposed by most members of the school board who feared "political interference" and the mayor and city council who did not want responsibility for levying increased taxes. The move was also opposed by the Democratic county chairman.

GPM took the initiative in forming the Educational Home Rule Assembly to press for implementation of its recommendation. EHRA added the prestige of a number of civic groups including the Citizens' Committee for Public Education to the power of GPM and mobilized support for home rule power.

A bill to effect the shift in taxing powers was introduced in the House of Representatives by a Republican representative who had close ties with GPM. The Democratic City Committee immediately circulated a petition opposing the shift. As a result of a meeting with the school board chairman, the Governor agreed to temporarily shelve the shift proposal, while the board and city officials attempted to develop a tax program with broad city support. The Democratic county chairman brought together sixty community leaders (excluding Citizens' Committee and GPM) to develop a program. They agreed on nine separate taxing powers, which would have netted $9 million short of the board's requirements. The proposal had broad community support.

As a result of pressure from the Philadelphia Teachers Union upon the governor and his own pressure, the Ways and Means Committee reported all nine measures to the floor. The Philadelphia Democratic delegation supported three of these measures and left the assembly when the other six measures came up for a vote. The three measures that passed were 1% tax on ground rents, 2% on parimutual betting and an increase in the real estate tax rate.

The governor then announced that he would sign no tax bills unless the home rule bill was also passed. Opposition to the home rule bill was developing because of the concern that it would provide for an elective board. The governor conferred with the executive director of GPM, who opposed an elective board. Out of this meeting came a proposal for the establishment of a Home Rule Charter Commission to determine the method of board selection which would be submitted to referendum.

Opposition by the school board president and city council members was of no avail. The bills shifting taxing power and establishing the charter commission were both passed.[54]

During the course of the meeting of the legislature, GPM led the coalition of groups that supported fiscal home rule. It provided widespread community support for the governor which was necessary to counteract the opposition of the board and the city's political leadership to the transfer of taxing power. GPM and its Educational Home Rule Assembly played the determining role in the transfer of taxing power and assured the reform movement a major role in control over the city school system. Though their role was a necessary condition for reform it was not a sufficient one. They needed and obtained the support of the Citizens' Committee and other civic groups for effective action.

The Home Rule Charter Commission

The shift in taxing power from the state legislature to the city was an interim measure subject to final resolution by referendum. The charter commission was empowered to prepare a home rule charter for the schools including recommendations for method of board selection and its taxing power.[55]

The issue was widely debated in the community. On the one hand there were some who supported a fiscally independent elected board that would have its own taxing power. GPM campaigned hard for its recommendations for an appointed board to be selected by the mayor using the screening panel device. They also favored giving the city council the right to establish tax limits while retaining in the board complete power over its budget preparation and administration.

The issue was debated widely in the press and public forums throughout 1964. The Citizens' Committee for Public Education played a significant role in the debate both by providing a forum for discussion and by its support of the GPM recommendations. The Greater Philadelphia Movement and its director retained their influence and it was GPM's recommendation that was adopted in the charter commission report.[56] The report was submitted to referendum on May 18, 1965 and was easily carried.

Role of the Mayor

The mayor was an unwilling recipient of his newly received powers over the city's schools. In past years, no mayor of Philadelphia would openly indicate a policy position on education matters. To do so would expose him to accusations of political interference. But also there was recognition by Philadelphia's mayors that there was little to be gained and much to be lost from involvement in school policy.[57]

Under the old structure, the mayor had no formal procedural role as do several large city mayors. Now, under the Home Rule Charter, the mayor had the responsibility for appointment of the board of education and direct concern over the allocation of financial resources for the city's school system. The mayor has, thus far, continued the tradition of non-involvement despite his formal power. He has been able to do so, forced to do so, because of the screening panel's recommendation of a prominent reformer as school board chairman.

As a former mayor of the city and a popular and powerful political figure in his own right, the new school board chairman has been able to function independently of city hall. It seems, also, the he was the personal choice of the reform movement and GPM for school board chairman. When his name was first suggested and he expressed interest in the position, the screening panel would consider no other person. That the mayor agreed to both his appointment and his condition of acceptance, that he have veto power over all other appointments, testified to the strength of his support in the city.

Conclusion

Reform in Philadelphia was achieved through a coalition of the reform movement, education interest and civil rights groups. The civil rights groups, though politically weak and generally ineffective at the time, drew public attention to the sad state of the city's schools. They served as a catalyst for growing community concern which activated existing civic groups and helped mobilize public support for the schools. In other cities these pressures led only to increased spending in an effort to satisfy civil rights groups. In Philadelphia, because of the combination of other circumstances described, fundamental reform was achieved.

Change has occurred in Philadelphia primarily because the reform movement was willing to accept political responsibility for school policies. Representing as they did the economic power establishment in the city, they saw in the dilapidated state of the city's schools, a serious threat to the economic future of the downtown business community. They were not willing to accept school reform solely in terms of increased expenditures. They sought, through administrative reform, to establish control over the system, open it wide to public scrutiny and thus achieve basic and meaningful changes in program and direction.

The radical changes that have occurred in Philadelphia are directly the result of the involvement of the downtown business community who saw in school reform a first step in alleviating the social and ethnic problems that face the city. It was the involvement of GPM that differentiates Philadelphia from other large cities in the nature of the changes that have been effected.

Prior to 1964, the Philadelphia schools were legally fiscally independent of municipal government, but heavily dependent fiscally, politically and academically on the city's political leadership. Public participation was non-existent and the school system was a closed system. Today, Philadelphia's schools are legally fiscally dependent on the city governement, but they operate with maximum fiscal freedom with no significant interference from city hall. The system is more open, with responsibility clearly defined in the board chairman. Public participation at this policy-making level is widespread with major interest groups such as Urban League, Citizens' Committee, Equal Opportunity League, the Pennsylvania Federation of Teachers and others actively studying school problems and influencing school policy.

It is not fiscal status that explains the district's independence from or dependence upon municipal government. It is the strength of the school board and its political leadership and the character of public support which are important. A weak board or an apolitical board can become dependent upon political leadership in seeking a necessary share of public resources for its support, whether dependent or independent fiscally. A strong board, one that is able to develop its own independent political power base, with strong political leadership is able to function with maximum freedom both from city and state governments and its own administrative staff no matter what its fiscal status.

Illustration 1 shows the present distribution of power in decision-making in Philadelphia, indicating the significant role of community groups in school policy-making.

ILLUSTRATION 1

PARTICIPATION IN POLICY MAKING... PHILADELPHIA*



DECISION MAKERS

SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS

BOARD

INFLUENCE WIELDERS

HEADQUARTERS STAFF

GREATER PHILADELPHIA MOVEMENT

AD HOC COMMITTEES

PHILADELPHIA FEDERATION OF TEACHERS

REACTORS & SUPPORTERS

PRESS

DOWNTOWN BUSINESS COMMUNITY

OTHER CIVIC GROUPS

CIVIL RIGHTS GROUPS

CITIZENS COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC EDUCATION

PERIPHERAL GROUPS

MAYOR

STATE OFFICIALS

PARENTS GROUPS

* DEPENDENT (Independent until 1966)

CHAPTER 4

SCHOOL STRUCTURE AND POLICY-MAKING AS THEY INFLUENCE CHANGE

Inputs are classified under three major functions: 1) administrative organization, 2) participation, and 3) allocation of financial resources. Each of these functions is influenced by a series of conditions which have been developed for analytic purposes and are described under each function.

These inputs were tested to try to establish relationships between characteristics of school systems and the output of innovation. Since so little difference was demonstrated in outputs one could anticipate great similarity in the inputs.

As Chapter 2 concluded, Detroit and Philadelphia were the two cities which seemed to show greater flexibility and receptivity to change. Part of the objective of the study was to explain the reason for that distinction. St. Louis and Chicago were the most static systems while Baltimore and New York City fell somewhere in-between but closer to the static model. It should be repeated, however, that the six school systems were generally not innovative and differences, particularly between the latter four, were small.

Of the three functions the most direct and clear cut cause and effect relationship with innovation appears to be public participation. The only apparent difference in any of the seven conditions or functions among the cities was in that area. The Detroit school system is a more open participatory system encouraging wider public participation than any of the other systems. More alternative choices are presented for policy making because of the proliferation of influence wielders and reactors and supporters. This circumstance can explain the greater flexibility and innovativeness of the Detroit school system. Similarly, the process of change and reform in Philadelphia further supports the relevance of broader public participation to change in the school system.

On the other end of the scale Chicago, St. Louis, Baltimore and New York City proved to be more closed systems with very limited outside participation. The cities did not differ appreciably in the area of school expenditures, nor did any of them show significant changes in the level and kind of expenditures made. In administrative organization some minor differences again distinguishing Detroit and Philadelphia were apparent but those differences were largely feedback and had been cited as outputs because they were of so recent vintage. The broader distribution of power in Detroit in the administrative structure and change in recruiting in Philadelphia were not influential factors as inputs. It did seem likely, however, that administrative reorganization in both cities would produce or had already produced other innovations in their respective school systems.

Some of the conditions which were originally hypothesized as relevant to innovation, and accepted by many to be significant, proved tentatively invalid. Such factors as selection of a superintendent from outside the system, fiscal status, and method of selection of the school board did not vary to any appreciable extent with output. In most other areas similarity was the predominant finding. The detailed discussion of the findings in each of the functions and conditions which follows provides further evidence for the conclusions.

Adminstrative Organization

Analysis of the administrative organization of the six districts identified the following problem areas:

1. Size of the bureaucracy.
2. Insularity of the staff resulting from promotion procedures that limited the opportunity for recruitment of outsiders and non-education administrative professionals.
3. Overcentralization of power in implementing policies.
4. Weaknesses inherent in the superintendent's office because of his lack of full power in selecting the top administrative staff.

These weaknesses in administration were identified in the pilot test of the City of New York school system. Thus, our analysis of other school systems emphasized these measures of the administrative structure.

Size and Role of the Bureaucracy

The development of ratios of bureaucratization did not suggest any significant relationships in the sample of six cities. No conclusions could reasonably be drawn to show that the level of bureaucratization influenced the adaptability of the system. Nor did fiscal independence and size of bureaucracy prove to be related.

Administrative staff was defined to include all professional supervisors ranging from bureau chief to superintendent. The number of persons holding such positions were identified and comparisions were made on the basis of staffing rate per 1000 pupils. Detroit had the smallest administrative staff of .32 per 1000 pupils in average daily attendance.

It had fewer professional administrators than Baltimore and Philadelphia which were smaller districts. Philadelphia and St. Louis both had administrative staffing ratios of .80 and Baltimore had a ratio of .64. Chicago and New York had smaller ratios of .43 and .57 respectively, reflecting in part the size of the districts. (See Table 4-1.)

Two districts are differentiated by these ratios. New York has more administrative personnel on a per pupil basis than Chicago despite its dependent status and its large relative size. Further analysis showed that the ratio for New York more than doubled during the ten-year period rising from .24 in 1955 to .57 in 1965. Ratios for the other cities except Detroit remained approximately the same. In Detroit, the ratio rose by less than one-third. During the same period, administrative costs rose by 233.4% in New York, more than double the increase in Baltimore and St. Louis and slightly less than three times the increase in the other districts. The data suggest that the administrative staff in New York City is high and rising more rapidly than in the five other cities.

Detroit, on the other hand, shows a relatively low administrative staff ratio, though its fiscal status would suggest that it would have to provide services that municipal government provides in the dependent districts. Detroit's administrative costs rose by only 81.5 % in the ten years ending 1965.

Viewed another way, administrative staff was analyzed in relation to classroom teachers. Detroit again showed the lowest ratio of less than one administrator per 100 teachers, New York and Chicago were 1.2, Philadelphia was 1.9, and Baltimore was the highest at 3.1. (Data was not available for St. Louis.) The ratios in 1965 were almost identical with 1955 except for New York City where the ratio doubled between 1955 and 1965. (See Table 4-2.)

Table 4 - 1

Administrative Staff[a] Per 1000 Pupils In Average Daily Attendance
Six School Districts
1955/56, 1960/61 and 1965/66

	Independent			Dependent		
Year	Chicago[b]	Detroit[c]	St. Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia*[b]
1955/56	.39	.22	n/a	.74	.24	.75
1960/61	.38	.29	n/a	.63	.38	.81
1965/66	.43	.32	.80	.64	.57	.80

n/a = not available
*Independent until 1966.

[a] Administrative staff includes superintendents (deputies, associates and assistants); directors and assistant directors; administrators and assistant administrators; coordinators; bureau chiefs; supervisors; and all others of similar rank and responsibility.

[b] Data for the calendar years 1955, 1960 and 1965.

[c] Detroit data is based on September membership rather than A.D.A.

Source: Statistical reports and research material supplied by the boards of education of the six school districts.

Table 4 - 2

Administrative Staff[a] as a Percent of the Number of Classroom Teachers[b]
Six School Districts
1955/56, 1960/61 and 1965/66

	Independent			Dependent		
Year	Chicago	Detroit	St. Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia*[c]
1955/56	1.25%	.86%	n/a	3.10%	.61%	1.94%
1960/61	1.15	.80	n/a	2.82	.85	2.04
1965/66	1.24	.92	n/a	3.11	1.18	1.90

n/a = not available
*Independent until 1966.

[a] Administrative staff includes superintendents (deputies, associates and assistants); directors and assistant directors; administrators and assistant administrators; coordinators; bureau chiefs; supervisors; and all others of similar rank and responsibility.

[b] Does not include teachers assigned to administrative duties at headquarters.

[c] Data for the calendar years 1955, 1960 and 1965.

Source: Statistical reports and research material supplied by the boards of education of the six school districts.

Several factors interfere with the usefulness of the data--the title descriptions for administrators vary from city to city making it difficult to determine accurately the number of administrators on a comparable basis. Comparable data has been assembled to the extent that the persons in classification specified by the school district are engaged in such work. For example, we have determined that in New York City almost 1000 teachers are assigned to central headquarters, performing administrative functions. Further, size is a factor, the larger the district, the greater economics of scale we would expect. Size explains New York City and Chicago's low ratios. Finally, we would expect that fiscally independent districts would require larger administrative staffs but the data do not bear this out. In summarizing, the only conclusions we can draw are that Detroit seems to have smaller bureaucracies than the other cities, and New York seems to have grown very rapidly during the last ten years. (See Tables 4-3 and 4-4.)

The power of the top adminstrative staffs were examined in relation to three categories: powerful, limited power, and little power.

Detroit and New York are the only cities which could be categorized as having powerful administrative staffs. Staffs in the other cities are strong but would be categorized as limited in power.

The strength of administrative staffs in New York City and Detroit is in part reflected in their organization. The Detroit Organization of School Administrators and Supervisors has a collective bargaining agreement with the board of education. The New York City Council of Supervisory Associations successfully established a salary ratio in state legislation which provides for automatic adjustment of salaries to meet increases in teachers' salaries. In both cities these groups make policy statements. The New York City group is more vocal in expressing opposition to change and

Table 4 - 3

Top Administrative Staff
Six School Districts
1966 or 1966/67

	Independent			Dependent		
Position	Chicago	Detroit	St.Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia[*][a]
Superintendent	1	1	1	1	1	1
Deputy Superintendent			1		8	
Executive Deputy Supt.					1	
Associate Superintendent	5			2	1	5
Assistant Superintendent	10	6	9	6	49	
Director	38	33	19	27	40	16
District Superintendent	28					10
Region Superintendent		9				
Others:						
Attorney	1		2			
Secretary	1	1			1	
Secretary-Treasurer			1			
Assistant Secretary	1					
Asst. Sec.-Treasurer			2			
Commissioner			1			
Asst. Commissioner			1			
Asst. to President	1					
Examiners	2				8	
Law Secretary					1	
Total	88	50	37	36	110	32
Total Top Administrative personnel per 100,000 students in A.D.A[c]	17.6	16.7[b]	33.6	21.2	12.1	13.9

*Independent until 1966.

[a] Data is given for the calendar year most recently available - 1964.

[b] Detroit uses September membership rather than A.D.A.

[c] A.D.A. figures for 1966/67 based on projections computed from the average rate of increase of the three previous years.

Source: Budgets, statistical reports and research material supplied by the boards of education of the six school districts.

Table 4 - 4

Administrative Costs
Six School Districts
1955/56, 1960/61 and 1965/66
(millions of dollars)

	Independent			Dependent		
Year	Chicago[a]	Detroit	St. Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia*[a]
1955/56	3.55	2.16	1.00	.97	10.19	2.64
1960/61	4.35	2.75	1.30	1.17	15.62	3.10
1965/66	6.12	3.92	2.06	2.04	33.97	4.72
Percentage Increase: 1955/56 - 1965/66	72.4%	81.5%	106.0%	110.3%	233.4%	78.8%

*Independent until 1966.

[a] Data for the calendar years 1955, 1960 and 1965.

Source: Budgets, annual financial reports and research material supplied by the boards of education of the six school districts.

often will disagree with adopted board policy.

Only in New York City does the supervisory staff have tenure in office. In all of the other cities, however, no supervisor was ever removed from office. Interviews verified that informal tenure in the other cities was as strong as formal tenure in New York City. In all of the cities the supervisory staff was most influential in budgeting and curriculum policy-making. In several of the cities, particularly New York City and Chicago, the supervisory staff was consulted in the appointment of the superintendent. (See Table 4-5.)

Insularity of the Staff

Top staff was chosen from within the system in every city but Philadelphia and, to a minor degree, Detroit. Educationists' monopolized top administrative positions in the school systems regardless of the character of their tasks.

Table 4-6 indicates the wide acceptance of insiders as administrators in the large city school systems. The promotion process reinforced by regulations requires every administrator to have come up through the ranks starting as teachers. In all of the cities requirements for examination and review in the appointment of administrators gave incumbent administrators the strongest role in the process.

In all the cities written and oral testing is used to establish eligibility for principal. In Detroit, Baltimore, New York and Philadelphia candidates for principal also are interviewed or approved in one way or another by a committee, usually composed of assistant, district or area superintendents, principals and members of a personnel committee. Appointments are generally made by the immediate supervisor and approved by the superintendent.

Table 4 - 5

Role of Administrative Organizations
Six School Districts
1967

	Independent					Dependent		
	Chicago	Detroit		St. Louis		Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia*
Professional Organization	CPC	MAESP	OSAS[a]	ESPA	HSPA	BPA	CSA	PPA
Size	400	130	900			300	4,000	
Meet with School Officials	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Activities:								
Shape Policy:								
Curriculum			X				X	
Budget			X				X	
Salary Negotiations	X		X				b	X
Prepare Proposals, Make Policy Statements	X	X	X				X	

*Independent until 1966.
[a]Recognized bargaining agent.
[b]Ratio agreement on salaries.

Source: Field interviews.

Key:
CPC - Chicago Principals Club
MAESP - Michigan Association of Elementary School Principals
OSAS - Organization of School Administrators and Supervisors
ESPA - Elementary School Principals Association
HSPA - High School Principals Association
BPA - Baltimore Principals Association
CSA - Council of Supervisory Associations (Federation)
PPA - Philadelphia Principals Association

Table 4 - 6

Non-School Professionals and Outsiders in
Top Administrative Staff
Six School Districts
1967

Independent			Dependent		
Chicago	Detroit	St. Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia*
None	Deputy Superintendent in charge of school-community relations[a] (1) School - Community Agents[a] (40)	None	Superintendent of Schools[b] (1) Director of Music[b] (1) Director of Art[b] (1) Director of Physical Education[b] (1) Director of Special Education[b] (1)	None	Superintendent of Schools[b] (1) Administrative Assistant to President[a] (1) Assistant to Superintendent[a] (1) Business Manager[a] (1) Director of Data Processing[a] (1) Director of Financial Planning[a] (1) Assistant Director of Financial Planning[a] (1) Controller[a] (1) Director of Development[a] (1) Director of Integration and Intergroup Education[a] (1) Director of Planning and Research[a] (1) Assistant Superintendent of School Facilities[b] (1) Director of Informational Services[a] (1)

*Independent until 1966.
[a] Non-school professionals
[b] From outside of school system

Source: Field interviews.

Assistant or district superintendents or their equivalents are appointed in Philadelphia and Baltimore by a committee with the approval of the superintendent. In Philadelphia the board of education must also approve. In other cities the superintendent appoints with board of education approval. In all instances, board of education approval is automatic.

Although, technically, most administrators are appointed for specific terms of office, few have ever been removed. The only possible break in this procedure is in Detroit where a one year review has been established for all supervisory appointments.

Much of the change in staff in the Philadelphia school district is on the top level where, for the first time, a concerted effort has been made to recruit professionals from outside the school system. There is already evidence that these "new" professionals are planning a greater degree of innovation.

In all the cities there is a stated preference for local talent. Only Philadelphia and Detroit have made an effort to recruit out of the city. Even when superintendents are chosen from outside the city they are reluctant to recruit non-local people for staff.

Decentralization

Each of the six school systems have some form of decentralization. The district superintendents (Chicago, St. Louis, New York and Philadelphia) region superintendents (Detroit) and area directors (Baltimore) are administrative officers concerned with school activities in a part of each of the school systems.

In order to identify the extent of decentralization in each of the cities, certain key powers of the district superintendents were examined.

The first was budgetary power. Some degree of budgetary power is necessary for the assistant superintendent to function independently. The powerpotential can vary from no powers at one extreme to full control over the formulation and administration of the budget within the district, on the other hand. All district superintendents played some role limited largely to co-ordination of budget requests for supplies and equipment from the schools and formulation of staff requirements from enrollment estimates and predetermined staffing ratios. But the presence of real budgetary power requires either that an assistant superintendent play a major role in formulating the budget for his district based on his assessment of educational needs, or, alternatively, be given a specific amount to spend, and have the discretion to allocate the available funds according to his assessment of school needs.

Personnel power is also believed to be significant. Superintendents could have no power, evaluation powers only, power of transfer of principals and teachers, appointive powers in addition to the above and complete power over appointment, transfer evaluation and removal of staff.

Participation in general policy formulation may range from no participation to completeindependence over policy formulation at the district level. He may play some role in central policy-making as a reactor to policies under consideration or he may participate with the superintendent in an administrative policy-making council. The district superintendent may also be examined in terms of the discretion he exercises in implementing policy. Does he have the power to adopt general policies, formulated centrally, to the needs of his district or is he compelled to administer instructional programs in his district in accordance with specific policies formulated centrally?

Salary may also be indicative of the power of the assistant superintendents and is considered in assessing his powers.

Finally, the nature and size of the assistant superintendent's staff may be indicative of the overall role he plays in the school district.

Short summaries concerning the role of the district superintendent in each of the systems follow. Heavy emphasis is placed upon the real powers of the district superintendents rather than their formal powers.

Chicago. There are twenty-seven district superintendents in Chicago. The local school districts in Chicago have local school boards which exercise very little power. The boards possess no appointment or budgetary powers and have no staffs. They do not appoint district superintendents. District superintendents are appointed by the general superintendent who has never seen fit to fire one.

The district superintendents have small staffs. Their offices include two persons performing duties of a clerical nature in addition to a supervisor and a psychologist. The supervisors, however, are responsible to the central office and not to the district superintendent.

In an interview, the controller of the Chicago Board of Education pointed out that principals and district superintendents played a small role in the budgetary process. Principals make requests for supplies and equipment which are invariably cut by the district superintendent who coordinates the budget requests of the schools in his district. New funds, according to the controller, are under the control of the general superintendent.[1]

A professor at Northwestern University noted that the superintendent ostensibly increased the power of district superintendents in 1959. He suggested, however that the district superintendents were unwilling to take on the increased responsibility and the general superintendent was unwilling to delegate authority. Recommendations which were made by the district superintendents were generally ignored.

The general superintendent, however, was hesitant to appoint principals or vice-principals who were opposed by the superintendent of the district in which the school was located.[2] The new general superintendent has said that he will improve the low calibre district superintendents and give them more power.

Detroit. On March 14, 1967, the superintendent submitted a reorganization plan to the Detroit Board of Education; part of the reorganization plan dealt with the decentralization of the school system.

The title of the nine field executives was changed to regional superintendent. Each of the region superintendents was given a region assistant and a maintenance and operations assistant. These two officials are directly responsible to the region superintendent. Prior to the change, any staff assistance for the field executives had come from the central office.

The region superintendent's functions include school-community relations, supervision of staff, approval of major requisitions and reorganization plans within his region. They are responsible to the assistant superintendent for elementary education and to the deputy superintendent (administration). Each of the regions has between 30,000 and 35,000 pupils. Along with the reorganization plan went salary increases to $21,800.[3]

In an interview, the superintendent said that the region superintendents were not really aware of what was going on in the system as a whole. He said that a greater degree of decentralization was needed including further budgeting and personnel powers for the region superintendents.[4] If official statements can be taken as an indication of projected policy, more decentralization will be forthcoming in Detroit. In a statement made at the time he submitted his reorganization plan, the superintendent said: "Eventually, it is hoped that a budget designation shall be made for each school and region in order to permit for flexibility within the overall policies of the board of education while at the same time holding the field executives and the principals accountable for efficient and adequate use of textbooks, supplies, repairs, etc."[5]

St. Louis. The six district superintendents in the St. Louis school system are appointed by the board of education upon the nomination of the superintendent.

The budgetary powers of the district superintendents are minor. They make estimates of the amount of supplies and equipment and the number of teachers needed in their districts. These latter estimates, however, involve no discretion since they must be made according to predetermined formulas (e.g., there is a set pupil-teacher ratio.) Further, the secretary-treasurer makes independent enrollment estimates which are invariably lower and are usually adopted.

The personnel powers of the district superintendents seem to be much more important. They can appoint principals for schools within their districts. They may choose any person on the eligible list (regardless of position on that list) and from any part of the school system. Appointments are subject to the approval of the superintendent and the board. Such approval is ordinarily granted.

The district superintendents also supervise the work of principals and teachers. To aid them in this task there are three subject area supervisors assigned to the office. Each superintendent also has one secretary to perform clerical tasks.

The district superintendents are responsible primarily for the instructional aspects of the entire school program. Prior to this year the district superintendents were concerned only with the elementary schools. High schools are now coming under the jurisdiction of the district superintendents.

One of the district superintendents is engaged in a special program in his district, financed by the federal government. It is notable, however, that this enterprise, known as the Banneker District Community Project, is highly innovative.

Baltimore. Baltimore has no district superintendents as such. In 1954, however, the post of area director for elementary education was created. There are, at present, seven area directors for elementary education and two area directors for secondary education.

The area directors seem to be without an appreciable amount of power. They maintain offices in the central headquarters buildings and the impression gathered from an official explanation of their function is that they serve chiefly as funnels for communication between schools and the central headquarters. They lack any sort of budgetary or personnel powers. Principals remain responsible to the assistant superintendent for elementary education. They are described as working as a team with the assistant superintendent and the director of elementary education. In this teamwork they presumably bring to light the special concerns and problems of their district; they have no power to operate independently.[6]

These impressions are borne out by an assistant superintendent who stated that the area directors have no budgetary powers. The superintendent has the power to appoint the area directors but according to the assistant superintendent, all the present area directors were appointed through the personnel office.[7] The present superintendent admitted in an interview that despite the existence of the area directors the system is not really decentralized.[8]

An area resource team consisting of a supervisor of elementary education and specialists in elementary education, art education, music education and physical education is assigned to each area. This team (located at headquarters) is responsible both to the area director and the elementary supervisors.

New York. New York City has thirty district superintendents who are appointed by the superintendent of schools with the approval of the board of education. The present superintendent has announced increased powers for district superintendents in personnel and budgeting. The district superintendent may now allocate financial resources and personnel among the schools of his district. He may choose principals from among the top three on a list provided by central headquarters. Teachers are assigned to schools by the central staff and district superintendents may transfer them within the district but only with the teacher's consent.

In 1967, local school boards were given the power to recommend names of candidates for the position to the superintendent. This was to allow for the expression of local opinion in the selection process. In the first attempt by a local board to use the power the superintendent refused to appoint the nominee of the local board. This seems to indicate that local opinion and preferences will not be allowed to interfere with the determination of the central administration.

The district superintendents in New York City are severely limited in the amount of budgetary discretion they can exercise and their personnel powers are similarly restricted. The strength of the central headquarters bureaucracy seems to be the chief inhibiting factor. Although the district superintendents are the chief avenues of possible decentralization of the system they are virtually powerless in the formulation of school policy. They feel that they cannot pinpoint problems and that even if they could they would not be able to do anything about them. They are hampered by small staffs which are largely clerical. Their main function seems to be to serve as a buffer to protect the central bureaucracy from dissatisfied parents.

In a series of interviews conducted by the study staff we found that the district superintendents are generally unwilling to exercise the little power that they do possess. The efforts to achieve a degree of decentralization by the board and the last two superintendents have met with two major obstacles, the vested interests of the central decision-making core at headquarters and the unwillingness of the district superintendents to take on the added responsibility. Many studies of the New York City school system have repeated the call for decentralization, but little has been accomplished.[10]

Philadelphia. There are, at present, nine district superintendents for eight districts within the Philadelphia school system. The size of the districts varies from 20,000 to 40,000 pupils. Two districts are predominantly white, two predominantly Negro and four are termed mixed.[11] The Odelll study suggests that the optimum size for a school district is 20,000 and he recommends the immediate creation of two new districts in order to reduce the size of the two largest districts.[12]

The district superintendents are chosen by the superintendent. They are appointed on a year-to-year basis but they always have been reappointed.

According to a deputy superintendent, the district superintendents have negligible power. They possess no budgetary powers and their personnel powers are severeley limited. They have no authority to appoint principals (although Odell says they play an informal role in their selection) or to transfer teachers within their districts. They do rate principals and teachers. Neither teachers nor principals, however, are ever rated unsatisfactory. District superintendents do make curriculum recommendations to principals and implement guidelines set at central headquarters.[13]

The district superintendents in Philadelphia are plagued by the problem of insufficient office space (they are located in schools within their districts), and inadequate clerical staff. They are supplied with five clerks from headquarters. The size of the staff does not vary with the size of the district or with the special problems a district may have. No professional staff is directly responsible to the district superintendents.

According to Odell, the district superintendents are mainly concerned with the elementary schools. Attention given to the high schools depends upon the background and the concerns of the individual superintendent.

The Odell survey advocated more responsibility for district superintendents. However, it recognized that district superintendents were not ready to receive new responsibilities. Several other groups in Philadelphia and the new school superintendent have also supported greater decentralization and there is now a movement developing in that general direction.

Rankings of the Six Districts. The district superintendents have been ranked in each of the four categories of comparison outlined above-- budgeting, personnel, general policy, and staff--and a composite ranking was developed. (See Table 4 - 7.)

The rank given to each system in each area may well be argued with. Since the focus of interest is real power and not the legal or formal power, judgment of the authors enters into the ranking. Differences in rank may often be attributed to the general impression of the system that has been conveyed. This is particularly true when the differences between the systems seem imperceptible from the information that was available.

Table 4 - 7

Composite Ranking of Six Districts
According to Power of District Superintendent
1965

District	Budgeting	Personnel	General Policy	Staff	Composite
Independent					
Chicago	2	3	4.5	3.5	3.25
Detroit	1	4	1	1	1.75
St. Louis	4	1	2	6	3.25
Dependent					
Baltimore	5.5	6	4.5	2	4.50
New York	3	2	4.5	3.5	3.25
Philadelphia*	5.5	5	4.5	3.5	5.00

*Independent until 1966.

In the area of budgeting, Detroit has been ranked first. The region superintendents may now approve major requisitions made by schools in their districts, thus playing a role in the formulation of the budget. This in itself is not a great deal of power, but in comparison to the other systems it is relevant.

Baltimore and Philadelphia have been ranked last because the area directors in Baltimore and the district superintendents in Philadelphia have no budgetary powers.

In Chicago the district superintendents play a minor role in budget formulation; St. Louis is ranked fourth because budgetary power does exist even though it is minimal; New York is ranked third because of the board's stated policy to extend budgetary power to the associate superintendents.

St. Louis has been ranked first in regard to the district superintendents' personnel powers. This ranking has been based on the district superintendents' power to appoint principals from anywhere on the eligibility list. The superintendent plays a role in the selection of principals and this power is considerable in comparison with the other systems. Baltimore ranks last because the area directors have no personnel powers.

New York was ranked second because the district superintendents may select a principal from among the top three names on the eligible list. But they have limited teacher transfer and rating powers. This placement may well be argued with because so few district superintendents have exercised this power.

Chicago has been ranked third (district superintendents apparently give their informal consent to the appointment of principals; Detroit fourth (supervision of staff), and Philadelphia fifth. Philadelphia's district superintendents do have the power to rate teachers and principals; however, this power can be considered perfunctory because all ratings are satisfactory.

The general policy role of the district superintendent is most difficult to rate. From the information available, such powers appear to be small. It is true that they may sit on various councils but their voices do not seem to carry much authority. Their role seems to consist almost entirely of making curriculum recommendations and assuring that policies set down by central headquarters are followed in their districts.

The only exceptions to these generalizations are Detroit and St. Louis and these exceptions may well be minor. In Detroit the region superintendent may make reorganization plans for his district. In St. Louis the superintendent of the Banneker district is being allowed to carry on an innovative program with federal funds.

Detroit and St. Louis were therefore ranked first and second, respectively. The other four systems, because no differences could be found at this time, were classed together and given a ranking of 4.5.

Staffing provided a further basis for ranking. Detroit was ranked first for providing the region superintendent with a good staff. The region superintendent is the only one of the local superintendents in any of the systems with a professional staff directly responsible to him. Despite location at the central headquarters the area director of Baltimore is ranked second because a professional staff is at least partially responsible to the area director. In none of the other cities is a professional staff responsible to the district superintendent.

The table shows that Detroit's region superintendent is the strongest of any of the district superintendents.[13] His budgetary and general policy powers are greater than those of the other district superintendents, and he has a professional staff directly responsible to him.

New York, Chicago and St. Louis rank second, their district superintendents being very close in powers and staff, although in St. Louis staff aid is insufficient.[14] Baltimore is fifth and Philadelphia sixth. Both have district superintendents with almost a complete absence of power, and Philadelphia has poor staff facilities.

Conclusions. The emphasis placed upon differences in the school systems may have led to the conclusion that there are great differences between the systems. In reality, the differences are minor and the similarities striking. Detroit might be the only exception to this generalization. The difference between Detroit, on the one hand, and New York and Chicago, on the other, is greater than the difference between New York, Chicago and Baltimore. (See Table 4-7.)

Certain general conclusions are notable:

1. The district superintendents, almost without exception, are nearly totally powerless. They have not served as an innovative force in their school systems. Their potential for doing so is very sharply limited because they do not have the power necessary to initiate programs on their own.
2. The district superintendents' chief function seems to be to serve as a liaison between the central administration on the one hand and the schools, parents and other community groups on the other. They tend to act as a buffer protecting the central staff from parental dissatisfaction.

3. Secure tenure is a relevant factor characteristic of district superintendents. Even in Philadelphia, where there is an annual appointment, they are always reappointed. None of the cities, except Detroit, provide for review of the district superintendents.
4. In nearly all the cities recommendations have been made to increase the power and responsibility of the district superintendents. The delegation of power at this point, however, might be extremely difficult. James W. Fesler has pointed out that if authority is not delegated soon after the creation of an agency the agency will not be able to attract good men to its field service. This lack of good men in the field makes later decentralization even more difficult because mediocre men are not likely to be trusted enough to have authority delegated to them.[15]

This very problem was cited by Odell in Philadelphia. While favoring decentralization he was reluctant to recommend anything more than a gradual start, beginning with two districts.[16] It seemed quite clear that he was not altogether satisfied that the present district superintendents had the competence to make decentralization work. The same problem has arisen in New York City.

The Superintendent

The superintendent as the chief executive officer of the school system was a subject of primary concern.

The power of the superintendent is a function of tenure, salary, control of budget, power of appointment, relations with the board and extent of municipal and state involvement. On the basis of these criteria, the status of large city superintendents can be categorized as limited or strong.

Relatively strong superintendencies were found in Detroit, Chicago and Philadelphia; weaker ones in St. Louis, Baltimore and New York. (See Table 4-8.)

Control of the Budget. In all of the cities the superintendents prepare and control their own budgets. Only in St. Louis does the superintendent of instruction legally share power with four other executives - the building commissioner, the auditor, the secretary-treasurer and an attorney. In the past his power was limited to instructional programs, but at present, at the board's discretion, he functions as chief executive officer as well as executive budget officer of the system.[17] A bill is now pending to further strengthen his office by giving him power to appoint his own budget director and staff. In Philadelphia, the business function was not centralized under the superintendent until 1963; in New York unit control was established as early as 1903.

Power of Appointment. The power of appointment strengthens the superintendencies in Detroit and Philadelphia. In Detroit, the new superintendent can review appointments after one year. In Philadelphia, the new superintendent has been given added strength by the board to recruit personnel from outside the city. In addition, new directors have been recruited from outside the education field.

In contrast, tenured assistant superintendents in New York City severly limit the power of the superintendent. The previous superintendent, was unable to penetrate the huge bureaucratic system because he could not hire top personnel who would be loyal to him. In Baltimore, the superintendent has no contract but works on a day-to-day basis.

Superintendent's Role in State Relations.

Because education is a state function, the percent of state aid may reflect the superintendent's power. In Detroit, during the administration of

Table 4 - 8

School Superintendents
Six School Districts
1900 - 1967

	Independent			Dependent		
	Chicago	Detroit	St. Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia*
Beginning of present Superintendent's term	1966	1967	1965	1965	1965	1967
Tenure of Superintendent (years)	4	3	4	b	6	3
Average term of Office (years)[a]	7	12.8	9	8	9	7
Age of present Superintendent	50	55	n/a	50	54	40
Salary of present Superintendent	$48,500	$33,000	$25,000	$35,000	$40,000	$32,000
Number of Superintendents appointed from inside system	5	4	7	4	7	5
Number of Superintendents appointed from outside system	6	2	1	5	2	6
Powers of Superintendents:						
a) budget coordinator	X	X	X	X	X	X
b) chief executive	X	X		X	X	X
c) review of top supervisory staff		X				
d) top administrative staff appointed from outside system		X				X
e) overall power S = strong L = limited	S	S	L	L	L	S

n/a = not available

[a] 1900-1964.

[b] Serves at pleasure of Board of Education.

*Independent until 1966.

Source: Statistical data from boards of education of the six school districts and interviews conducted in each district.

the former superintendent (1956-66) the percent of operating expenditures covered by state aid was the highest of any city.[18] Recent increases have been in effect in Chicago, Baltimore and Philadelphia. Despite increases, however, Chicago ranks lowest with St. Louis in the proportion of state aid to total revenues. State aid in St. Louis has remained at about twenty percent for the past ten years, while the percent in New York has remained constant for six years.[19]

The importance of the role of the superintendent in securing state aid is evidenced in the success of the superintendent (1956-66) in developing two special programs for Detroit.[20]

In Baltimore, under a former superintendent (1946-1953), the percent of state aid doubled enabling new programs and new buildings to get underway. Two other superintendents in Baltimore were skiddish about involvement in politics and state aid was relatively low under their administrations.

In St. Louis, the new superintendent is a lobbyist for the board in Jefferson City and he has succeeded (with board members assistance) in obtaining the governor's support for greater state aid.

Tenure. The argument for long tenure for an executive is based on the notion that it takes from three to five years to initiate a program and even longer to build it into the system. But tenure, alone, does not insure innovation or strength. A former superintendent of St. Louis enjoyed long tenure (twenty-three years) but the limited powers of the superintendent in St. Louis confined his role to maintaining the status quo. The former superintendent of Chicago had the second highest tenure (thirteen years). Although he is credited with increased school construction, few innovations were adopted during that period. In Detroit, the superintendent's ten years in office were marked by innovation. There were many complaints, however, that he did not delegate responsibility. In Philadelphia, a superintendent had a tenure of nine years, from 1955-1964. He was dominated by the business manager, and educational needs were subservient.

All of the superintendents have contracts except the superintendent in Baltimore. The superintendent's contract in New York City is the longest (6 years), Philadelphia and Detroit's are the shortest (3 years). In average term of office Detroit's superintendent was the longest. It would seem, therefore, that long tenure in itself does not insure innovation in the school system nor is it directly related to the strength of the superintendent.

Relations with Board. There was no evidence in the cities to suggest that any of the superintendents now influence directly the appointment of board members. Prior to 1961, the business manager in Philadelphia was said to play a major role in board appointments.[21] None have tenure of office under contracts longer than the board's term of office. All in practice, serve at discretion of the board.

In Chicago, school board-superintendent relations have frequently been uncertain. In the 1930's, an NEA investigation revealed the president of the school board was, in effect, the chief administrator of the school system. In the postwar era two superintendents dominated the school environment. Both seemed to have worked successfully with their boards for most of their careers. At the end of his tenure the former superintendent had divided support on the board because of his opposition to a survey of the Chicago schools and his failure to cooperate with the board's integration plans. The latter issue finally led to an open rupture.

In Philadelphia, Detroit, and St. Louis, boards have strengthened the superintendency. By contrast, in New York City, superintendents have conflicted in competition for power.

Salary. Some indication of the importance given to the superintendent's position may be seen from salary level, particularly as compared with that of the mayor's or other city officials. In Chicago, the superintendent's salary is highest at $48,500. The mayor of Chicago receives $35,000. The next highest superintendent's salary is in New York City at $40,000. The mayor receives $50,000. In Baltimore, the superintendent receives $35,000 as compared to $25,000 for the mayor. In Philadelphia, the superintendent receives $32,000 as compared to $30,000 for the mayor. In Detroit, the superintendent's salary is $32,000, $2,000 less than the mayor's. In St. Louis both the superintendent and the mayor receive $25,000. In Chicago, Baltimore and Philadelphia, the superintendent of schools is the highest paid city official. Of the superintendents ranked strong only in Detroit is the superintendent paid less than the mayor. (See Table 4-9).

Insider-Outsider. In analyzing the board's selection of a superintendent, insider vs. outsider is the most frequently mentioned criterion. We did not find this by itself to be predictive of a superintendent's power.

According to Carlson,[22] when boards are dissatisfied, they choose outsiders and tend to pay them higher salaries and give them greater support. Yet, in New York City, the relations between the board and the former superintendent, an outsider, were marked by conflict. It would seem that in New York City the problem of an outsider establishing his authority is further complicated by the strength and competition for power with the top administrative staff. Reviewing the history of the New York City superintendency, we find that it was an insider who achieved the greatest measure of innovation.

Outsiders can bring new ideas into a system as evidenced by the former superintendent in Detroit. Yet, it should be noted that it was his successor, an insider, who initiated review of appointments and is directing a reorganization of the staff.

Table 4 - 9

Salary and Term of Office of
Mayor, Superintendent, and City Council
Six School Districts
1967

	Independent			Dependent		
	Chicago	Detroit	St. Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia*
SALARY (per year):						
Mayor	$35,000	$35,000	$25,000	$25,000	$50,000	$30,000
Superintendent	48,500	33,000	25,000	35,000	40,000	32,000
City Council[a]	8,000	17,500	5,000[b]	6,500[c]	10,000	15,000[d]
TERM OF OFFICE (in years)						
Board of Education	5	6	6	6	7	6
Mayor	4	4	4	4	4	4
Superintendent	4	3	4	e	6	3
City Council[a]	4	4	4	4	4	4

*Independent until 1966.

[a] St. Louis = Board of Aldermen

[b] President gets $7,500

[c] President gets $10,000

[d] President gets $20,000

[e] At pleasure of board

Sources: Field interviews.
Information Please Almanac and Year-book (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967), p. 624.

In Baltimore, an outsider did not cultivate close municipal and state ties, whereas, his successor, an outsider, is actively doing this.[23]

In Chicago, an outsider was innovative in curriculum but failed over a larger period of time to satisfy other pressing demands for integration and compensatory education.

In general, it can be tentatively said that in cities with a strong affinity for insiders, such as New York and St. Louis, such affinity may be a sign of inflexibility. However,wide acceptance of outsiders will not necesarily result in greater innovation, but it does suggest a more open system.

Participation

The Participants

Within any school system, the potential participants in the policy-making process are essentially the same. Legal power is usually divided between a board of education and the superintendent. The bureaucracy breaks down into the central administrative bureaucracy, field administrators, top supervisory staff, and middle management. Organizations representing each of these groups are common in the larger school districts, and the activities of each can be significant. Teachers and teacher organizations, parents and parent organizations, are also potential participants. Specialized education interest groups (ad hoc and permanent) have been active in many communities, and their role can be a vital one. In the general community, there are other potential participants - local, state and federal officials, civic groups, the press, business organizations, and individual entrepreneurs seeking the rewards of the school system. Interrelationships between these potential participants, the relative power of each, and their role in particular decisions, differs with the nature of the issues and the political environment of the school system.

Participation in school policy formulation can take three forms: (1) closed -- only the professionals in the system participate; (2) limited -- the board of education and/or the mayor and specialized educational interest groups participate; and (3) wide -- groups not wholly concerned with school policy participate.

The participants analyzed for the study are school boards, teachers' organizations, community participants and government officials. Community participation includes direct participation (voting) and indirect (through interest groups.) The latter are divided into special education groups, civic organizations, civil rights groups and *ad hoc* agencies. In classifying the six cities the most open systems were Detroit and Philadelphia. These cities had a larger number of influence wielders, reactors, and supporters. In both cities participation was encouraged as was opposition. In the four other cities participation was limited to the school establishment. It is notable that those cities with the strongest boards also were the most closed systems.

School Boards

The study compared the relative strength of the boards in each city as well as the responsiveness of the board to the community. On the basis of these findings city school boards were classified strong or weak. Those boards which had a term of office longer than the superintendent and/or longer than the mayor, participated effectively in budgeting (raised or lowered the budget), had active standing committees and staff are classified as strong.

In all of the cities the board members had longer terms of office than the superintendent and the mayor. (See Table 4-10.)

Table 4 - 10

Board of Education:
Size, Term of Office, and Method of Selection
Six School Districts
1967

	Independent			Dependent		
	Chicago	Detroit	St. Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia*
Size	11	7	12	9	9	9
Term of Office (years)	5	6	6	6	7	6
Method of Selection[a]	M-C-SP[b]	E	E	M-C	M-SP	M-SP

*Independent until 1966.
[a] E = Elected
M = Appointed by Mayor
C = Council Approval Required
SP = Nomination by Selection Panel
[b] Selection panel is extra-legal

Source: Field interviews.

In four of the six cities, the board presidents complained about their inability to make budget policy. In Detroit, the board had to face the reality of voter control which limited new funds that could be raised through taxation. Chicago and Philadelphia through most of this period, had to rely upon the state legislature to raise the tax limit. New York and Baltimore were dependent upon the city government for funds.

Philadelphia (under the new board) and St. Louis were the only cities in which the board chairman felt they exercised adequate budgeting discretion. The board in St. Louis was concerned about the lack of funds and the difficulty of obtaining voter approval in tax elections, but the board chairman believed that the board budget was a "needs" budget and they were able to raise the funds they required. The new board chairman in Philadelphia has been able to obtain whatever taxing power he has needed from the Philadelphia City Council that sets the tax rate for schools.

With respect to staff, none of the boards have built independent staffs of any size. All depend on the superintendent and administrative staff for information and assistance. The Chicago board has an influential and independent legal staff of eight, a secretary and one other staff member. New York City also has a legal staff, a research staff of three and an executive assistant. In St. Louis, five separate officers report to the board, but the board has no separate staff of its own. Baltimore also has no staff at all.

As regards standing committees, New York City and Philadelphia have no standing committees. Chicago has two, St. Louis and Baltimore have three and Detroit has five. (See Table 4-11.)

Frequent executive sessions of a board of education can be interpreted as reflecting a strong board which exercises power independently. In Chicago, Baltimore, St. Louis and Philadelphia the board holds frequent closed executive

Table 4 - 11

Board of Education: Operating Procedures
Six School Districts
1967

	Independent			Dependent		
	Chicago	Detroit	St.Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia*
Standing Committees	X	X	X	X		
Committee Meetings Closed		a	X	X		
Number of Monthly Open Meetings of Board	2	2	1	2	1	2
Holds Executive Sessions	X	X	X	X	X	X
Board Members Hold Informal Meetings with Outside Groups	X	X	X	X	X	X
Board Has Own Staff	X				X	X
Contract Negotiations With Union	X	X	n/a	X	X	X

n/a = not applicable
*Independent until 1966.
[a] Meetings of Personnel Committee are closed, others are open.

Source: Field interviews and data provided by the boards of education.

sessions as compared to the other cities. It should be noted that executive sessions might also reflect greater removal from public review and a more closed system.

The school boards in Chicago, Baltimore and St. Louis appear to be the strongest. Philadelphia and Detroit follow close behind and then New York City. Cities otherwise classified as the least open in the study are those with the strongest boards of education.

A comparison of the composition of the boards suggests great similarity and only minor differences. All of the boards' memberships take into account the need to represent ethnic and religious groups. All but St. Louis have two Negroes serving on the board; St. Louis has three. All the Negroes on the city school boards are professionals not intimately identified with civil rights causes. New York City and Philadelphia each have one woman and Baltimore has two serving on the board. Chicago, Detroit, and St. Louis have three women. In each case the women are representatives of established local women's civic groups. Each board includes representation of the three religious groups although not necessarily in strict proportion to the population of the city. The religious balance appeared to be a more sensitive issue in New York City than in any of the other cities. The panel selection device in Philadelphia, New York and Chicago has made little difference in the composition of the board as compared to other cities or as compared to memberships on earlier boards in their own cities.

The most common advanced degree for board members is the law degree. In each of the cities at least one and usually more of the board members are lawyers. In St. Louis four of the twelve members are lawyers, in New York and Philadelphia three members of the board are lawyers. Approximately two-thirds of the board members have some college degree, generally a Bachelor of Arts.

Chicago, New York City and Detroit have labor represented on the board indicating the importance of unions in those cities. In St. Louis labor has been excluded from the board.

Approximately two-thirds of the board members in every city are over fifty years of age. Only one board member in any of the cities is under forty years of age.

Detroit, Philadelphia and St. Louis have religious leaders on the board. The business community is represented on all of the boards except New York. St. Louis has the largest representation of the business community. New York City has six board members with a background in professional education, St. Louis and Baltimore have three members with an education background and Philadelphia has one. Teachers are not represented on any of the boards. (See Tables 4-12 and 13.)

Although no attempt was made to systematically collect data on the number of board members with children in the public school system it seemed evident that few of the board members in any of the cities had children in the public schools. The age factor alone would limit such a possibility.

Teachers' Organizations

The ever increasing role of the teachers' union and/or associations, particularly in salary negotiations, is of particular interest to analysis of the shifting roles of participants and their relative commitment to change in the school system.(Table 4-14.) The teachers union is recognized in Baltimore (1967), New York City (1963), Philadelphia (1965), Chicago (1966), and Detroit (1964.) The union in each of those cities has been primarily concerned with salaries and conditions of employment, at least these are the issues that they have bargained on most strongly. Recognized unions are, of course, stronger and tend

Table 4 - 12

Board of Education:
Age, and Educational and Professional Background
Six School Districts
1967

	Independent			Dependent		
	Chicago	Detroit	St. Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia*
Size of Board	11	7	12	9	9	9
Age:[a]						
30 - 39			1			
40 - 49		3	2	2	2	1
50 - 59		3	8	4	4	2
60 - over		1	1	3	3	3
Educational Background by highest degree:[b]						
High School Diploma		3	2	2	1	5
Bachelor's		2	6	1		
Masters				2	2	
Law		1	4	2	3	3
Ph.D.				1	3	
M.D.		1		1		1
Professional Background:[c]						
Educator			2	3	6	1
Labor Leader	2	1			2	
Accountant					1	
Attorney	1	1	3	2	3	3
Civic Organizations	2	3	3	2	1	1
Medical Doctor		1		1		1
Religious Leader		1	2			1
Politician						2
Engineer						1
Business Administrator	2	2	4	2		1

*Independent until 1966.

[a] Data not available for Chicago. Data available for only six members in Philadelphia.

[b] Data not available for Chicago.

[c] Data available for 7 members only for Chicago.

Source: Biographical data furnished by boards of education.

Table 4 - 13

Board of Education:
Religious and Racial Composition and Sex
Six School Districts
1967

	Independent			Dependent		
	Chicago	Detroit	St Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia*
Religious Ratio[a]	4-2-5	0-1-3[c]	4-1-4[c]	1-2-6	3-3-3	2-2-5
Racial Composition[b]	9-2	5-2	[illegible]-3	7-2	7-2	7-2
Number of Women	3	3	3	2	1	1

*Independent until 1966.

[a] Catholic - Jewish - Protestant.

[b] White - Nonwhite.

[c] Incomplete data.

Source: Biographical data of board members.

Table 4 - 14

Role of Teacher Organizations
Six School Districts
1967

	Independent				Dependent			
	Chicago	Detroit	St. Louis		Baltimore		New York	Philadelphia*
Professional Organization	CTU[a] (AFT)	DFT[a] (AFT)	SLTU (AFT)	SLTA (NEA)	BTU[a] (AFT)	PSTA (NEA)	UFT[a] (AFT)	FT[a]
Size	1400+	6000	1200	1800	1800	5000[b]	40,000	6700
Meet With School Officials	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Activities:								
Shape Policy-Curriculum								X
Budget	X	X			X	X	X	X
Prepare Proposals, Studies, Make Policy Statements			X	X			X	X
Salary Negotiations	X	X			X		X	X
Collective Bargaining	X	X	c	c	X		X	X
Strike					X		X	
Strike Threat	X		X		X		X	
Sanctions						X		
Grievance Procedure	X	X			X	X	X	X
Support Tax Program								X
Meet With City Officials	X				X	X	X	

*Independent until 1966.
[a] Recognized bargaining agent
[b] Membership includes administrative staff.
[c] Collective bargaining prohibited by state law.
Source: Field interviews.

CU = Chicago Teachers Union
DT = Detroit Federation of Teachers
S.TU = St.Louis Teachers Union
S.TA = St.Louis Teachers Association
HU = Baltimore Teachers Union
ESTA = Public School Teachers Association
UFT = United Federation of Teachers
FT = Federation of Teachers
AFT = American Federation of Teachers
NEA = National Education Association

to be more influential as participants in the school policy process, especially in policies that relate to teaching loads and teacher assignments. In Detroit, Philadelphia and Chicago, the union conducts its negotiations largely with the superintendent and seldom meets with the board. The union in Chicago and New York City and the PSTA in Baltimore have used their political leverage to bypass school officials and negotiate directly with the mayor to secure salary increases. In New York City and Philadelphia the union contract tends to contribute to a lack of flexibility in educational policy. Efforts to secure decentralization in New York City have run up against the restrictions in the present contract which limit personnel transfer, salaries and review procedures.

In Baltimore, the PSTA and the BTU have been competing with each other for recognition and as a consequence, the PSTA has become more militant and critical of the school system. Its direct influence, however, is not appreciable. In June, 1967, the BTU achieved recognition in a closely contested election.

There are two competing groups of teachers organizations in St. Louis (the AFT and NEA groups), neither of which are recognized bargaining agents. In Missouri collective bargaining for teachers is prohibited by state law. The teachers organizations in St. Louis are the weakest as compared to organizations in the other cities.

The unions have generally been uninterested in areas outside of the salary issue except in New York City where the UFT was instrumental in the creation of "More Effective Schools" and regularly voices public views on particular school issues. The New York City union has the strongest role of any of the unions in the various cities.

In several of the other cities the unions have issued reports and studies with recommendations for school improvement. Generally, these recommendations are not particularly influential in the determination of school policy.

The ever increasing strength and gradual recognition of teachers union in large cities reflects the emergence of a significant new participant in the school policy process. The New York City experience serves as an example of the trend. Thus far, the role of the unions is one of limiting flexibility and stifling innovation -- as contracts become more extensive this trend will probaby be intensified. It is notable that teachers as a group have had almost no role in determining local school needs or curriculum.

Community Participants

Any definitive measure of community participation is most difficult to achieve. The role of outside participants in school policy making is continuall shifting depending upon the issue. Yet it is the presence of the variety of participants that may determine the responsiveness of the system to public demands.

School Voting and Elections. Direct public participation includes the presence or absence of opportunity for direct participation as well as the degree of actual participation. Direct voting on school issues takes place only in the independent districts, and in those districts such public votes are limited to tax and debt questions and in two districts to school board elections.

In Detroit, St. Louis and Chicago the voters are required to vote on increases in school taxes and on school debt. The level of participation in voting, however, indicates the minimal role of direct elections as a means of stimulating community interest. In St. Louis in April, 1967, for instance, 27.2 percent of those eligible to vote voted in the school tax election. (Table 4-15.) The tax increase was approved by 76 percent of those voting. In the last twenty years fourteen votes have been held; twice the voters have

Table 4 - 15

Vote on School Tax Elections
Chicago, Detroit, and St. Louis
955 - 1967

City and Date of Vote	Registration	Votes Cast		Affirmative Vote	
		Number	% of Registration	Number	% of Votes Cast
Chicago:[a]					
Special Millage Election - 2/67		725,056		453,905	62.6
Detroit:[b]					
Millage Election - 1959	848,738	303,558	44	194,557	64
Millage Election - 4/63	855,974	346,545	48.4	135,141	39
Regular Election - 11/63	853,990	285,506	32.4	180,860	63
Millage Election - 5/66	768,711	147,561	19.2	67,815	46
Regular Election - 11/66	785,226	357,137	45.5	192,240	54
St. Louis:[c]					
Primary Election - 3/55	331,910	111,493	33.6	90,309	81
Special Election - 4/56	346,161	62,019	17.9	42,173	68
Special Election - 3/58	357,387	94,562	26.5	59,574	63
Special Election - 4/59	305,903	79,419	24.3	34,944	44
Special Election - 3/60	319,695	102,878	32.2	65,842	64
Special Election - 1/62	330,778	96,141	29.1	64,414	67
Alderman Election - 3/63	292,039	98,932	33.9	49,565	50.1
Special Election - 5/65	299,025	64,462	21.6	29,653	46
Special Election - 6/65	299,025	122,273	40.9	83,146	68
General Election - 4/67	259,623	70,675	27.2	53,713	76

[a] State statute provides for referendum to increase taxes; tax may not be raised more than 15¢ in any one election.

[b] Total millage for city and school district combined cannot exceed 50 mills.

[c] Can raise millage up to 3 times base with simple majority; after, a 2/3 majority is needed. If no election is held for two years, then voters must reaffirm base.

Sources: Statistical data provided by Board of Education, City of Chicago; Board of Education, City of St. Louis; and Report of Vote, November, 1963 and May, 1966, Citizens for Schools, Detroit.

failed to approve increases. In both instances the question was returned to the voters for approval and was dutifully approved. In only one year (1953) did more than 50 percent of the registered voters turn out for the elections - the usual response is between 20 and 30 percent of the electorate voting.[24] (Table 4-16.)

In Chicago from 1957-1967 there were three school bond and one school tax election. All were approved with well over 60 percent of the vote. The tax election in 1967 was the first to be held by the board under state legislation passed in 1965.[25] Taxes levied by the board are subject to statutory limitations by the state. The current law provides for a maximum of $1.71 on the education fund which may be increased by referendum to a $2.01 maximum. In any one referendum the levy may not be increased by more than 14¢. Currently, because of the integration problem, the board does not want to go to the public on any issue and is trying to have the referendum provision deleted from the state law.[26]

In Detroit, the defeat of increased millage in May, 1966 led to a resubmission of the issue in November. In the May election, [illegible] percent of the registered voters participated.[27] After a well organized campaign supported by all of the local labor, business and civic groups in the city and with mayoral support, 61.9 percent of the voters turned out to approve the increase. In May there had been 129,646 blank votes cast: in November blank votes had been reduced to 9,118.

School board elections in Detroit and St. Louis are non-partisan; these are the only cities of the six included in the study which hold such elections. In Detroit, the UAW and the Democratic party are influential in nominations and elections. Board elections in both cities are held at the same time as general local elections. In St. Louis a reform group was organized in the early 1960's to promote reform candidates for the board. CAPS (Citizens

Table 4 - 16

Voteon School Bond Referenda
Cicago and St. Louis[a]
1955 - 1967

City and Date of Vote	Registration	Votes Cast		Affirmative Vote	
		Number	% of Registration	Number	% of Votes Cast
Chicago:[b]					
Special Election - 6/57		790,813		684,240	86.5
Special Election - 4/59		705,113		539,802	76.6
General Election - 11/66		557,024		405,405	72.8
St. Louis:[c]					
Special Election - 3/60	319,695	98,008	30.7	62,236	63.5
Special Election - 3/60	319,695	96,322	30.1	63,493	65.9
Special Election - 5/60	319,695	57,297	17.9	35,826	62.5
General Election - 11/60		165,722		99,657	60.1
Special Election - 1/62	330,778	95,477	28.9	63,585	66.59
City Election - 3/62	330,778	133,560	40.4	98,301	73.6

[a] Data for Detroit not available; bond referenda held in 1959, 1963, and 1964. 1959 passed, but subsequent referenda were defeated.

[b] State Constitution sets debt limit of 5% of taxable property.

[c] School bond issues are passed by a 2/3 majority of those voting in bond referendum.

Sources: Statistical data provided by the Board of Education, City of Chicago; and Board of Education, City of St. Louis

Association for the Public Schools) (the reform group) functioned during two board elections. In 1961, they elected five board members and in 1963, four without opposition. The chairman of the board, was the major influence in CAPS and internal disagreement with his position is believed to have led to its dissolution. A new group organized and the school board chairman has since supported that group and its candidates for election.

School board elections in St. Louis have been under the control of the school board since 1963 and as such do not provide the kind of mechanism for participation that could be considered especially significant. Several groups and individuals in St. Louis indicated their impression that the board ignores the community once elected to office.

Hearings. More indirect forms of public participation are common to all of the other cities in varying degrees. School board hearings on budget matters are held in Chicago, New York and Philadelphia for one day in each city. The hearings in each city are generally attended by the most well organized groups in the city and present only a very limited sounding board for other dissenters. Open board meetings in the other cities allow for discussion of the budget but again the lack of public information limits the usefulness of these sessions. In some instances, other limitations, such as space, further restrict the value of hearings. The Baltimore hearings take place in a room which holds less than 30 people. In New York City in 1967, speakers at the hearings sat-in to protest the limited time available to present their points of view.

Public hearings are seldom held on issues other than the budget although several of the cities have held hearings on integration in recent years.

Interest Groups. The role of interest groups in the various cities is vital to the issue of participation. Such groups can be divided into

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those which are concerned only with education and those which are general but active in education. The effectiveness of these groups is related to their organization, size of staff, character of membership and leadership. Their influence is measured by their entre to the system and the extent to which their proposals are translated into policy. We have attempted to determine the extent to which these groups are innovative, supportive of innovation, supportive of budget increases, supportive of school officials and critical of school officials. (See Tables 4-17 through 22.)

Education Groups. All of the cities have special educational interest groups. These include parent groups and citizen organizations. The parent groups in all of the cities play generally the same role. They are not strongly organized centrally nor do they have any professional staff except in New York City.[28] Their concerns are, therefore, largely with local and individual school problems. They are generally supportive of school officials especially in the areas of budget and special services. Parent groups tend to be less organized and active in the ghetto areas of each city. Exceptions are notable. In Detroit the Mothers Clubs have been active in achieving special services. In St. Louis, the parents groups have emerged as participants in school affairs in the Banneker District with the encouragement of the local superintendent.

Citizens' committees for schools function in all of the cities; their character and power varies from city to city.

In Philadelphia, New York and Chicago, these organizations are standing committees coordinating the work of affiliated groups in the area of education. They do not have their own memberships. In Philadelphia and Chicago, they have no professional staff, only an executive director. The New York City group, in contrast, has a sizable professional staff. As a group, these

Table 4 - 17

Interest Groups
School District of the City of Chicago
1954 - 1967

Name of Group by Area of Activity	Professional Staff	Activities				Primary Role S - Supportive C - Critical A - Change Agent
		Meets With School Officials	Prepares Proposals	Conducts Studies	Shapes Policy	
Education:						
Coordinating Council of Community Organizations		X	X	X		C
Citizens School Committee	X	X	X	X		S
Parents Teacher Association		X		X		S
Teachers for Integrated Schools		X				
Teachers for Quality Education		X				
Civil Rights:						
NAACP			X	X		
Urban League	X	X	X	X		C
CORE[a]						
Civic:						
League of Women Voters				X		S
Labor and Business:						
Association of Commerce and Industry		X				

[a] Role too limited to permit evaluation.

Source: Field interviews.

Interest Groups
School District of the City of Detroit
1954 - 1967

Name of Group by Area of Activity	Professional Staff	Activities				Primary Role S - Supportive C - Critical A - Change Agent
		Meets with School Officials	Prepares Proposals	Conducts Studies	Shapes Policy	
Education:						
Parents Teachers Association		X				S
Citizens Advisory Committee						
1957 - 59		X	X	X		A
1960 - 62		X	X	X		A
Mothers' Club		X				
Citizens Committee on Equal Opportunity	X	X	X			C
Citizens Study Committee on the High Schools		X	X	X		
Civil Rights:						
NAACP	X	X		X		C
Urban League	X	X	X	X		C
Civic:						
League of Women Voters		X		X		S
Jewish Community Council	X	X		X		S
Labor and Business:						
Trade Union Leadership Council	X	X				
United Auto Workers	X	X				S

Source: Field interviews

Table 4 - 19

Interest Groups
School District of the City of St. Louis
1954 - 1967

Name of Group by Area of Activity	Professional Staff	Activities				Primary Role S - Supportive C - Critical A - Change Agent
		Meets with School Officials	Prepares Proposals	Conducts Studies	Shapes Policy	
Education:						
White House Conference on Education	X					
Citizens Association for Public Schools[a]						
Washington University Graduate School of Education		X	X			
Parents Teachers Association		X				
Patrons Alliance		X				
Civil Rights:						
CORE		X				
Urban League	X	X				
NAACP	X	X	X	X		C
Civic:						
League of Women Voters	X					S
Labor and Business:						
Teamsters Joint Council # 13	X					
Chamber of Commerce	X	X	X			

[a] No longer in existence, has been replaced by Citizens for Quality Schools

Table 4 - 20

Interest Groups
Baltimore City School District
1954 - 1967

Name of Group by Area of Activity	Professional Staff	Activities				Primary Role S - Supportive C - Critical A - Change Agent
		Meets with School Officials	Prepares Proposals	Conducts Studies	Shapes Policy	
Education:						
Parents Teachers Association						S
28 Parents Groups		X	X	X		C
Citizens School Advisory Committee			X	X		
Civil Rights:						
Urban League						
NAACP						
CORE						
Civic:						
Greater Baltimore Committee						S
League of Women Voters		X				S
Americans for Democratic Action						S

Source: Field interviews.

Table 4 - 21

Interest Groups
City School District of the City of New York
1954 - 1967

Name of Group by Area of Activity	Professional Staff	Activities				Primary Role S - Supportive C - Critical A - Change Agent
		Meets with School Officials	Prepares Proposals	Conducts Studies	Shapes Policy	
Education:						
Public Education Association	X	X	X	X		S
United Parents Associations	X	X		X		S
Citizens Committee for Children	X	X	X		X	S
Civil Rights:						
Urban League	X	X				
NAACP	X	X				
CORE						C
Civic:						
Citizens Union	X			X		
Women's City Club			X	X		
Citizens Budget Commission	X			X		

Source: Field interviews.

Table 4 - 22

Interest Groups
School District of Philadelphia
1954 - 1967

Name of Group by Area of Activity	Professional Staff	Activities				Primary Role S - Supportive C - Critical A - Change Agent
		Meets with School Officials	Prepares Proposals	Conducts Studies	Shapes Policy	
Education:						
Citizens Committee on Public Education	X	X	X	X		S
Educational Home Rule Assembly		X			X	A
Civil Rights:						
Committee on Non-Discrimination		X			X	A
Urban League	X	X	X	X		C
NAACP						C
Civic:						
Greater Philadelphia Movement	X	X		X	X	A
League of Women Voters		X				S
Citizens Council on City Planning	X	X		X		S
Home and School Councils		X				S

Source: Field interviews.

organizations cannot be classified as innovative; they tend to be more supportive than critical of the school system and its policies. They have good relations with school officials and are called on for support regularly.

On the other hand, citizens' committees have been organized in Detroit and to a lesser extent in Philadelphia on an _ad hoc_ basis with the cooperation or participation of the board. They are given specific assignments by the board and are furnished with staff. They include influential members of the community including the business leadership of the cities. They usually conduct studies and make recommendations which are seriously considered and often adopted by the board. Though convened on an _ad hoc_ basis, the committees replace old ones, so that one or another is in operation.

In St. Louis, a citizens' committee was convened by the board to examine integration policies and some of its recommendations were adopted.

Civic Organizations. General civic groups are not particularly active in school affairs in most of the cities. The Leagues of Women Voters spend a small percentage of their time and energies on education and are generally observers of the scene supplying information to their membership rather than participating in the development of policy.

Only in Philadelphia and Detroit and to a very limited extent, in St. Louis, have business groups and prominent economic notables become involved directly in school affairs. As noted in the description of school reform in Philadelphia, the Greater Philadelphia Movement was a prime element in the achievement of change and continues to be an active participant. In Detroit, the UAW encourages its membership to become involved through citizens committees and provides guidance for participation through its education section. The union also supports candidates for board offices and has encouraged new school programs.

Business leaders from the three automobile makers and Hudsons Department Store have also been significantly involved in school matters. The lack of involvement by business groups and unions in other cities is in sharp contrast to Philadelphia and Detroit. Business participation explains in part the greater openness in these two systems and perhaps also their greater receptivity to change and innovation.

Civil Rights Groups. Civil rights groups have only recently entered the school scene. As a result of the 1954 Supreme Court decision they were instrumental in every city in exposing school policy to public view. Although their emphasis has been largely in the area of school and staff integration, their impact was primarily in the area of demonstrating the closed character of school politics.

Civil rights groups are reactors to the school establishment. They serve as opposition groups, and their influence is negligible in terms of policy responses. The lack of adoption of integration programs and also the lack of general improvement in ghetto schools in all of the city school systems studied indicates their powerlessness. City school officials are, however, concerned with what their reaction will be to programs and policies.

Urban League, NAACP, and CORE function in all of the cities. CORE is the most militant and the least well organized in all the cities and it has been the group least involved with education. Although the NAACP generally sports large memberships in each city, it is the Urban League which provides organization, professional staff and education departments and financing for the most comprehensive programs. However, the Urban League is generally the most supportive of the system. The civil rights groups appear to be better organized and more active in education matters in Detroit and New York. In New York City local ad hoc groups have carried a large part of the civil rights protests in the schools. The recent emphasis in New York City is for local control of the schools. This kind of local initiative does not seem to be as prevalent in the other cities and may indicate a disenchantment with city-wide civil rights groups activity in New York.

In Detroit, TULC (Trade Union Leadership Council), an organization of Negro trade union leaders, has actively worked toward job training of Negro youth in the public schools. They enlisted the support of the board of education and the superintendent in their fight to change union policy which discriminated against Negroes, particularly in their apprenticeship programs.

Other. In several of the cities, religious groups and organizations concerned with special programs, i.e., the handicapped and retarded, tend to function as supporters of school policy. Their educational role is, however, limited to a narrow area of interest and they are more often supportive than innovative.

It is evident from the survey of community participation that the six city school systems display different degrees of openness and receptivity to such groups. In Detroit, the system appears to encourage outside participation and involvement which is not necessarily supportive of the establishment. Although the Detroit school system organizes the citizens committees, it does not attempt to control or even direct them. This reflects a corollary willingness to view the school system in the broadest social role. It is not surprising, therefore, that Detroit proved to be the most innovative of the school systems studied.

In contrast, in St. Louis and Chicago, the systems are virtually closed to public participation although both are independent school districts. In both cities the school establishment controls all aspects of school policy. The number of influence wielders and reactors and supporters is negligible. (See Tables 4-17 though 22.) In New York City, although organizations proliferate, they are supportive or non-influential.

Government Officials and Governments As Participants

Municipal. The role of municipal officials should be viewed from three prospectives: first, in terms of financial influence, particularly in the dependent districts; second, in terms of the selection and control of the board; and third, in terms of influence on other school policies. Of the local officials in every city, it is the mayor who is most involved in education. In only two cities did we find any evidence of other city officials who were influential in any school decision. In Baltimore, the finance director and the financial advisor to the city council were instrumental in reducing the school budget on two occasions.[29] In New York City in 1967, the city council increased the school budget overriding the mayor's veto of their action. Borough presidents in New York have, on occasion, influenced the determination of site selections as have other elected officials in some of the other cities.

Although in every city public statements of the mayor indicate a desire to be removed from educational matters, the evidence suggests that in both dependent and independent districts, except St. Louis, his role may be influential in related areas. In the dependent districts the mayor is responsible for approving the education budget. Except for New York in 1967, the mayor has been supportive of that budget. New York City had a lump-sum budget for education which was changed by the mayor in 1967 to a five-program budget. In fact, in New York City, the mayor's review of the budget tends to be limited in scope and more routine than incisive.

Although the mayor is not required to approve the budget in the independent districts, there was a clear working relationship between the mayor, school board and superintendent in Detroit and Chicago on the financial needs of the school district. Informal meetings between the mayor and the superintendent are held regularly in Detroit and Baltimore, and on occasion in Philadelphia, New York and Chicago. Informal meetings with board members occur in Chicago, Detroit, New York and Philadelphia. In Chicago, New York and Baltimore, the mayor has been an active participant in salary negotiations. In fact, in Chicago, an independent district, the mayor stepped in to negotiate a salary increase although funds were not available in the school budget. The mayor indicated that he would secure additional state aid for those purposes.[30]

In four of the six districts, the mayor is responsible for appointments to the board of education. In three of the districts, Philadelphia, Chicago and New York the panel selection device has been used. Under this procedure recommendations are made to the mayor by an independent panel. Presumably, the mayor will have less political control of board members nominated under this system. In Philadelphia, the board chairman insisted upon a veto power over all other board appointments. In Chicago the mayor asked the panel to add a name to their list of nominees and appointed the candidate he had suggested. In New York City the same ethnic, religious and borough balance has been maintained despite the use of a selection panel. Furthermore, no incumbent failed to be renominated and reappointed. The selection device limits the pressures on the mayor from prospective appointees, but the mayor may still influence panel selections.

In all of the cities the term of office of the board members exceeds that of the mayor and consequently his political control may be limited by that factor. It does not appear that the mayor exercises any direct control over the board even though he may have been the source of their appointment.

There is no evidence that any mayor influenced directly the appointment of the superintendent. In Detroit, Baltimore and Chicago there was some suggestion that the mayor had been consulted on the appointment.

In all of the cities the mayors have been happy to insulate themselves from responsibility on school issues. In many instances in recent years crises over integration have threatened to involve the mayor but in almost every city they have successfully averted the danger. The argument for insulation of the public school system and protection of professional expertise has had as its corollary the notion that political interference is defined as any attempt by the mayor or any public official to commit or engage himself in any way in school matters. The mayors have generally accepted that credo. Involvement in school affairs might have serious political implications where the mayor could not produce effective change. The citizenry, on the other hand, have suffered by the lack of any public sounding board and their inability to pinpoint responsibility for the failure of the school system on the only city-wide elected official in Baltimore, Chicago, Philadelphia and New York.

The only city in which the mayor has exhibited a direct and continuing interested concern in school affairs is Detroit where the school board is elected. The mayor's Commission on Children and Youth meets regularly with the superintendent or the board to discuss school matters. The organization of his federal aid program is another means of guaranteeing cooperation with the school system. In New York City the new reform mayor has shown signs of breaking with the traditional "hands-off" policy on schools. In his recent action on the budget he has indicated a desire to guarantee greater financial accountability on the part of the school system to the city. The appointment of an education director under the new Human Resources Administration further implies a more direct and comprehensive role for the mayor in education in New York City in the near future. The mayor has also been outspoken on several of the recent school controversies, generally critical of the school establishment. It is not surprising that school officials and the board have responded strongly to his recent actions charging him with "political interference".[31]

The mayor appears to play a less important role in St. Louis. In interviews conducted in St. Louis, it was generally agreed that the mayor was not permitted to become involved in school matters.

Although education comprises the largest share of any local budget and is by far the most important function of local government, the highest city official - the mayor - in almost every city has been isolated from a decisive or responsible role in school policy. The two reform-oriented mayors, in Detroit and New York, provide the exceptions to the general rule of non-participation. (See Table 4-23.)

State Participation. State education departments, state legislators and governors necessarily participate in city school policy making. Their role is primarily a financial one. Since local school districts are dependent on state aid for a large measure of financial support, state aid programs become in essence a manifestation of local educational policy.

In other non-financial state areas state education departments have been ill-equipped to deal with the problems of large urban cities. Their organization and programs have been concerned primarily with the problems of rural and suburban districts. Only recently have any of the states even considered a new role for themselves in relation to the large city districts. None of the departments have city divisions or specialists in urban problems. In most cases the technical staff and professional expertise of the city school district exceeds that of the state education departments and has, therefore, tended to undermine the potiential role of the state education staff. State politicshave also operated to widen the gap. Large cities often tend to be controlled by the Democratic party while state governments are controlled by Republicans. Anti big-city politics are another aspect of the problem encouraging conflict rather than cooperation.

Table 4 - 23

Mayor's Role In Education
Six School Districts
1967

5

	Independent			Dependent		
	Chicago	Detroit	St. Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia*
Appoints Board	X[a]			X[b]	X[c]	X[c]
Approves Budget				X	X	X
Involved in Teacher Salary Negotiations	X		n/a	X	X	
Informal Meetings with Superintendent	X	X		X	X	X
Informal Meetings with Board	X	X			X	X
Issues Public Statements on School Issues	X	X			X	

n/a = not applicable

*Independent until 1966.

[a] With council approval and extra-legal selection panel nominations.

[b] With council approval.

[c] With selection panel.

Source: Field interviews.

In a study of the politics of education in three states[32] the authors suggest, however, that large city delegations to the state legislatures, if they are unified, can get more school legislation advantageous to them. Perhaps more important than political conflicts is the lack of unified city education interests operating on the state level. This failure reduces the pressure for state education programs for cities. In Baltimore, city officials complained that school officials politicking on the state level conflicted with the efforts of other city officials.[33] The Usdan study of educational power in New York State also concluded that New York City's influence was minimal on the state level.[34] Similar conclusions have been made regarding Detroit's role.[35]

In some instances, state governments tend to be more conservative, thus limiting their own role. One can project, however, that the state, if it chose to be, could become a strong influence for change in local school systems. In New York State for instance in 1961, after pressure had mounted locally, the state commissioner of education was instrumental in having the state legislature remove the entire board of education in New York City. The commissioner also subsequently recommended the change in procedure for selection of school board members. However, his constant pressure and condemnation of _de facto_ segregation in New York City have been completely ignored.

In Illinois and Michigan elected state superintendents of education are more influential with the legislature and the governor on school policy than are the appointed state officials in the other states,[36] yet this has not worked to the advantage of either Detroit or Chicago in terms of state aid programs.

State aid has come to be an increasingly significant source of funds for financing educational expenditures in the six cities studied. This increase does not reflect increasing state concern with big-city school problems, but rather the growing pressure on the state to assume a larger share of financing of all school systems within the state.

A comparison of the 1955 with the 1965 data shows that the districts that are dependent directly upon local officials for financial support have received larger increases in state aid in proportion to total revenues than the independent districts, perhaps reflecting the greater political bargaining power of municipal officials in the state legislature. In New York and Baltimore, the mayor, who has had to raise revenues for schools, represents the school district before the state in appealing for state aid. In Philadelphia, during this period, the school district has had to obtain increased taxing power from the state directly and/or additional aid, and the battle has been fought for the school system by local party leaders. On the other hand, the independent school systems had to rely to a greater extent on their own political influence in the state and their school officials appear to have had less influence in obtaining increased financing.

Data available for the period 1962/63 for eighteen (18) independent and dependent large city districts confirm that the dependent districts received larger amounts of state aid per pupil than their independent counterparts, with state aid for dependent districts growing at a faster rate.[37] (See Table 4-24.)

State aid has had minimal impact on innovation in the six districts studied. Because the preponderant amount of aid is allocated on a formula basis rather than on a program-by-program basis, state aid has substituted for local taxes in support of traditional programs. With the exception of New York City all of the state aid in the cities goes for support of regular school programs, special programs for the handicapped, and to a minor extent, for vocational training. In New York City, $200,000 out of $320 million went for experimental programs. This is in contrast to federal aid which is allocated largely on a program basis requiring the school system to adopt the program in order to qualify for the federal funds. (See Table 4-25.)

Table 4 - 24

Comparison of State Aid to Total School Revenues
City and State-Wide Data
Six School Districts
1955 and 1965

	Percent of Total Revenues				Differences Between City and State Percentage	
	1955		1965			
	City	State	City	State	1955	1965
Independent						
Chicago	18%	16%	23%	23%	2[a]	-
Detroit	40	38	35	45	2[a]	10
St. Louis	23	30	23	32	7	9
Dependent						
Baltimore	18	25	31	33	7	2
New York	26	25	37	44	1[a]	7
Philadelphia*	24	41	34	43	17	9

*Independent until 1966.

[a] Percentage of current expenditures covered by state aid in city exceeds state-wide share.

Sources: City data from annual reports of the boards of education. State data for 1955: Biennial Survey of Education Statistics, 1954/56 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Office of Education, 1959), p. 72. State data for 1965: National Education Association, Estimates of School Statistics, 1966-1967 (Washington, D. C.: National Education Association, 1966), p. 31.

Table 4 - 25

Distribution of State Aid Among Programs
Six School Districts
1965[a]
(millions of dollars)

	Independent			Dependent		
	Chicago	Detroit	St. Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia*
Support of Regular School Programs	58.7	57.9	13.7	21.9	321.0	38.3
Special Education	9.1	1.0	.8	.3	-	8.3
Teacher Training			.1			
Experimental Programs					.2	
	67.8	58.9	14.6	22.2	321.2	46.6

*Independent until 1966.

[a] 1964/65 for Baltimore, Calendar year 1965 for Chicago and Philadelphia, 1965/66 for other districts.

Source: Annual reports and budgets of the boards of education.

Federal Participation

The federal government is a relatively new but extremely important participant in large city school policy. As noted above in Chapter 3 the innovation output of all of these cities was largely conditioned by federal aid programs. Theodore Lowi in his study of New York City, *At the Pleasure of the Mayor*, concluded that external forces were the primary causes of innovation. It is clear that the emerging role of the federal government through the office of education is as an external force promoting the greatest change in the large city school districts that have been witnessed in the course of their history. Although the comprehensive federal aid programs in education are relatively new, their impact can be witnessed in each of the cities. Compensatory education was virtually non-existent prior to federal aid. The proliferation of experimental programs can be traced directly to the influence of federal aid policies. Pre-school education is now widely accepted under "Headstart" auspices.

The only major compensatory program in the city of St. Louis is in the Banneker project which is ~~complete~~ly federally funded. St. Louis also began a summer program in 30 schools with federal funding. Philadelphia has many programs begun with federal funding in the areas of work training, community action counseling services, teacher training and retraining, reading clinics and summer schools. Detroit has similar programs, including one for continuing education of pregnant girls. Baltimore began a compensatory program called Upward Bound with federal funds. New York City has programs similar to those in the other cities.

Federal project directors in each of the cities strain to come up with acceptable programs to be eligible for federal assistance. Appendix A, Tables I through VI indicate that federal aid now represents a sizable proportion of city school district expenditures. In Philadelphia federal aid is now 19.6%. New York has the lowest ratio of federal aid at 5.2%. Per capita federal aid to the cities per average daily attendance on a four-year average strongly suggests that political pressure is no small factor in securing large amounts of federal aid. Philadelphia has the highest per capita at $245.35. Chicago is next highest with $200.16. New York and Baltimore are the lowest with respectively $81.41 and $87.84.

Federal aid is significant not only in the amounts of money but in terms of the kinds of programs which are stimulated by it. The routine and status quo thinking of educational bureaucrats in normal budgeting processes is no longer acceptable under the federal aid programs. Younger and more vigorous administrators have been engaged in the development of federal programs. One of the most important requirements under TitlesI and III of the Elementary and Secondary Education Acts of 1965 and 1966 is for the education establishment to cooperate with the local community groups. Although many of the cities have ignored the provision, in some it has assured participation of groups which have heretofore been removed from school affairs. Detroit is the only city in which a viable relationship has been established among the mayor, the school system and local community groups. The federal aid programs in Detroit reinforced the community-school concept and the open participatory quality of the school system. In contrast, in New York City the education committee of the Anti-Poverty Operations Board has repeatedly criticized the board of education and the superintendent for proceeding with federal programs without consultation.[38]

Federal aid has also encouraged greater cooperation between religious schools and the public school system. Although in several of the cities, primarily New York, there has been a public reaction to increased aid to religious institutions, competition between the systems and pressure for limiting support to public education has been undermined.

There is no question but that federal aid has to some degree disrupted the school systems. There are those people who will be critical of its influence and suggest as Willis did in Chicago that they will not adjust the school system to obtain federal funds which are wasteful. Some of the systems have also channeled funds into existing programs by relabeling them. The intrinsic value of federal aid, however, is in the degree to which change can be affected as a result of the scramble for federal funds. As long as federal guidelines require experimentation and innovation and encourage broader participation they can accomplish what no other element in the city school structure has been able to achieve over the last thirty years - - a more flexible and responsive school policy process. (See Table 4-26.)

Foundation Support

Private foundations have also contributed to the innovativeness of some of the school systems. They generally award their grants for experimental programs, thus encouraging change in the system.

Detroit, Philadelphia and Chicago received funds from the Ford Foundation for their Great Cities Projects. Philadelphia also received Carnegie Foundation funds to begin its Magnet Schools Program. Baltimore began its preschool classes and its Project Mission with Ford Foundation funding. Although the St. Louis public school system did not directly receive the funding, it participated in a Carnegie Foundation supported study conducted by Washington University on Child Motivation to Achieve. New York City is currently negotiating with Ford Foundation for three local school demonstration projects which will include wider local control and community participation. In each case experimentation in the foundation sponsored effort was far greater than in the regular school program.

Table 4 - 26

Distribution of Federal Aid Among Programs
Six School Districts
1965[a]
(millions of dollars)

	Independent			Dependent		
	Chicago	Detroit	St.Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia*
mpensatory Education	1.8	4.9	7.0	6.2	83.6	6.3
e-School	4.5	1.7		.2		6.0
rk Study	9.3	2.2	.9	1.6	4.6	.7
ult Education	.5	.3		.3	1.9	.3
ucational T.V.		2.2				.2
acher Training		1.5	.1		1.3	4.1
mmunity Relations						.9
rriculum and Guidance	1.1	5.9	.1	1.1	3.5	2.7
	17.2	18.7	8.1	9.4	94.9	21.2

ndependent until 1966.
966/67 for Baltimore and New York.

urce: Data furnished by boards of education.

Allocation of Financial Resources

Changes in the level of expenditures were thought to be a significant corollary of innovation. The level of school expenditures at any given time are committed to a given educational process with specified programs, defined staffing ratios and established salary scales. As a result, expenditures pattern and its determinants, once established, are difficult to change. In budget-making parlance, existing expenditures (adjusted for changes in the number of pupils, negotiated salary increases, and automatic increments) are considered the "mandated" expenditures for the subsequent year's budget. If significant changes associated with "quality improvement" are to be effected, they can be only through budget appropriations in excess of the mandated increases. Our study of the New York City school system disclosed that, over the last decade and despite a more than doubling of the school budget, only a small percentage of the budget increase could be associated with significant changes in the educational process. Almost all of the increased expenditures were mandated by either enrollment increases or negotiated increases in salaries. Similar results were expected to be found in other cities.

Increases in Expenditures

Fiscal inputs varied considerably from city to city ranging from a low of $503 per pupil in St. Louis in 1965/66 to a high of $960 in New York City. New York City's expenditures were far in excess of the next closest city, Philadelphia which spent $588 per pupil.

The differences in spending, on a per pupil basis, are largely explained by differences in teachers' salaries and to a lesser extent by differences in class size as shown in Table 4-27. When the six cities are ranked by expenditures and teachers' salaries the rankings are identical. The ranking by class

Table 4 - 27

Current Expenditures, Teachers' Salaries and Class Size Six School Districts 1965/66[a]

District	Amounts			Rank		
	Current Expenditures Per Pupil	Average Teachers' Salaries	Class Size[b]	Current Expenditures Per Pupil	Average Teachers' Salaries	Class Size[b]
New York	$960	$8,044	27.7	1	1	1
Philadelphia	588	7,228	31.5	2	3	3
Detroit	562	7,555	31.3	3	2	2
Chicago	542	7,024	33.6	4	4	4
Baltimore	530	6,908	35.8	5	5	6
St. Louis	503	6,882	33.8	6	6	5

[a] Chicago and Philadelphia, 1965 calendar year.
[b] Mean class size for New York City, pupil-teacher ratio for St. Louis and median class size for other cities.

Sources: Current expenditures per pupil from Appendix A, Table XI; average teachers' salaries from 22nd Biennial Salary Survey of Public School Employees (Washington, D.C.: National Education Association, 1967); class size data in Appendix A, Table XIII.

size closely follows but is not identical with the expenditure rankings.

Higher teachers' salaries and median class size may be related to innovation though the relationship is not direct. More likely teachers' salaries are related to competition with other salaries on a regional basis and do not necessarily result in recruitment of higher quality teachers. All of the cities compete with their suburbs and teacher shortages suggest that on a regional basis, cities are usually at a competitive disadvantage.

Even if we could assume that higher salaries are related to quality of teaching, they would not necessarily result in innovation. In fact, the greater the budgetary commitment to salaries, the less funds may be available to districts which budget at close to maximum class size (e.g., St. Louis.) In fact, New York's superiority in staffing reflects its investment in the more effective school programs to some extent but more probably the shorter teaching day for the city's teachers and the resulting additional number of specialized teachers in the school system.[39]

Expenditures rose more rapidly in New York, in total, and on a per pupil basis during the ten-year period. The rate of increase in New York (120.1%) was well above the increase for Baltimore (77.3%), St. Louis (75.5%) and Philadelphia (75.2%,) Detroit (60.5%) and Chicago (58.5%) had the lowest increases on a per pupil basis of the six cities studied.[40] As a group, the fiscally dependent districts increased current expenditures at a higher rate than the independent districts, but the reasons may be more closely related to fiscal resources than fiscal status. Detroit and Chicago, with the lowest rate of increase in school spending, had to raise 40% and 47% respectively of its new funds through increases in the tax rate. New York, by contrast, raised only 10% of its new funds through tax rate increases. The dependent districts also have been more successful in obtaining state aid, thereby reducing the impact of school expenditures on tax rate increases. (See Table 4-28.)

Table 4 - 28

Sources of New Funds
Six School Districts
Received Between 1955 and 1965

	Independent			Dependent		
	Chicago	Detroit	St. Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia*
Total New Funds (In millions)	$185.8	$ 72.8	$ 36.7	$ 65.2	$598.4	$ 71.1
Percentage Increase	128.5%	71.8%	139.0%	192.3%	146.9%	92.9%
Sources (percent of total):						
Increase in Local Property Tax Base	13.4%	0.8%	0.0%	18.6%	48.0%	3.2%
Increase in Local Tax Rate	47.4	40.4	53.7	39.7	9.8	43.2
State Aid	26.2	28.3	22.6	37.4	37.3	46.1
Federal Aid	7.1	27.2	20.7	3.8	0.9	5.5
Other	6.0	3.3	3.0	0.5	4.1	2.0

*Independent until 1966.

[a] Philadelphia and Chicago, calendar years, 1955 and 1965; other districts fiscal years beginning 1955 and 1965.

Sources: Revenue data from appendix A, Tables I - VI. Local tax allocated between base and rate increases based on data found in appendix A, Table VII.

Innovation does not necessarily require new funds, but money helps. St. Louis has avoided innovation programs that require higher school expenditures because of the severe fiscal restraints under which it operates. The same is true of Baltimore, but to a lesser extent. Detroit has relatively high expenditures per pupil despite fiscal restraints, and was judged to be the most innovative of the six cities studied. New York, on the other hand, has increased its school expenditures at a high rate, but ranks low in innovativeness.

Fiscal Status and Financing

Fiscal status and financing are related, but not in terms of the fiscal independence/dependence dichotomy. The two public vote districts, Detroit and St. Louis, were remarkably similar in their sources for new funds. State aid was a relatively poor source of new funds in both districts and neither district had an appreciable increase in real property values. Thus, they had to rely heavily upon tax rate[41] increases to raise new funds and in both cases, public votes were required for such increases. (See Table 4-28.) Both boards have followed conservative spending policies in order to minimize tax rate increases, and this is evident from their relatively low tax rates for schools. Even so, both cities have had to make considerable local tax effort merely to maintain their relative position and some expected improvements. Detroit raised its tax rate by 51% during the ten-year period while the rate increase in St. Louis was 90% though their absolute levels are relatively low. (See Table 4-30.)

During this period, St. Louis' expenditures rose by 116% compared to a 74% increase in Detroit. (See Table 4-29.) St. Louis was not more generous with its schools, rather its greater fiscal effort reflects the higher enrollment increase in that city.[42] There are clear indications that expenditure

Table 4 - 29

Percentage Distribution of Increased Current Expenditures
Made by Boards of Education
Six School Districts
1955 - 1965[a]

Expenditure Category	Independent			Dependent		
	Chicago	Detroit	St. Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia*
Increase in Expenditures:						
Amount (millions of dollars)	$136.8	$63.5	$28.6	$50.6	$526.0	$71.4
Percentage of 1955 Expenditures	105.4%	73.7%	116.0%	129.7%	149.7%	103.8%
Instructional Costs:						
Salary Increases	19.3%	34.1%	27.8%	23.1%	20.7%	38.3%
Enrollment Increases	31.6	13.2	25.3	29.6	11.9	19.6
Staffing Ratio Improved	26.9	22.2	10.3	25.8	14.9	12.5
Administration	1.9	2.8	3.7	2.1	4.8	2.9
Maintenance and Operation	11.7	18.5	11.9	10.4	7.5	11.9
Fixed Charges (Primarily fringe benefits)	9.4	6.5	14.9	8.3	17.9	6.6
Other	3.6	.5	3.6	4.5	16.6[b]	4.0
Unaccounted For	(3.9)	1.2	2.5	(3.8)	5.7	4.2

*Independent until 1966.

[a] Fiscal years beginning 1955 and 1965 except for Chicago and Philadelphia which are for calendar years.

[b] Large increase due to transportation costs and transfer of school lunches into this budget category.

Source: Comparison of differences by category between 1955 and 1965 expenditures data. Instruction costs were distributed on the basis of enrollment increases, changes in average salaries, and staff increases. Unaccounted for differences arise because of estimating procedures. Data obtained from boards of education annual reports 1955 and 1965.

Table 4 - 30

Local Tax Effort For Schools Expressed as a Tax Rate Per $1000 of Full Valuation
Six School Districts
1955 and 1965[a]

District	1955	1965	Percentage Increase
Independent			
Chicago	$6.69	$11.50	71.9%
Detroit	5.45	8.24	51.2
St. Louis	4.67	8.87	89.9
Dependent			
Baltimore	7.64	13.80	80.6
New York	11.25	12.47	10.8
Philadelphia*	7.86	12.13	54.3

*Independent until 1966.

[a] Fiscal years beginning 1955 and 1965 except for Philadelphia and Chicago which are for calendar years.

Source: Appendix A, Table VIII.

increases in both cities were minimal. Median class size was reduced by only 3.3% in St. Louis and 1.1% in Detroit compared to a range of from 8-10% for the four other cities.[43] Salary increases (including associated fixed charges) that had to be met accounted for 40.6% of the increased expenditures in Detroit and 42.7% in St. Louis. (See Table 4-29.) St. Louis allocated only 10.5% of its increased funds to improved staffing ratios accounting for a relatively small increase in supervisory and counselling staff and a minimal reduction in class size. Detroit, on the other hand, allocated 22% of a smaller increase in expenditures to improved staffing ratios, with a large portion of the increase going to increased supervisory and counselling staff.[44] The latter difference in the pattern of expenditure allocations is consistent with Detroit's efforts, albeit small, for decentralized adminstration and improved guidance. But clearly, expenditure increases in both cities were constrained by concern over securing voter approval for tax rate increases. Interestingly, federal aid provided a substantial portion of increased funds only in these two cities amounting to 27% in Detroit and 21% in St. Louis. (See Table 4-28.) Such funds were used in both cities to finance special programs primarily the "Great Cities" project in Detroit and the "Banneker" project in St. Louis.

Philadelphia[45] and Chicago both were fiscally dependent upon the state legislature during this period and a comparison of their fiscal operations suggest the fiscal restraints resulting from this arrangement. Both districts increased expenditures by approximately the same percentages during this period, but the sources of new funds were quite different. Philadelphia had only 3.2% of its new funds from increases in market valuation during this period while Chicago had a more substantial source of funds of 13.4% from increased valuations.[46]

On the other hand, 46.1% of Philadelphia's new funds came from state aid compared to only 26.2% in Chicago. (See Table 4-28.) Enrollment increases were greater in Chicago,[47] but despite this pressure, the school district was able to allocate 27% of its increased spending for improvement in staffing ratios (See Table 4-29), reducing median class size by 10.0%.[48] Philadelphia allocated only 12.5% of its increased expenditures for improved staffing, reducing median class size by 9.5%.[49] However, Chicago increased supervisory and counselling personnel by 145 % during this period compared to an increase of only 44% in Philadelphia.[50] Chicago allocated only 29% of increased expenditures to instructional salary increases (including associated fixed charges) while Philadelphia's instructional salaries took 45%. (See Table 4-29.) Most of Philadelphia's salary increases and staffing ratio improvements occurred during the last two years of the period after the death of its business manager. In summary, both cities had relatively small expenditure increases, and differences between the two are in the substantially greater portion of state aid in Philadelphia and the greater fiscal effort required in Chicago to meet rising enrollments out of limited local resources.

Baltimore and New York were fiscally dependent upon municipal officials during the period covered by the study. Both increased expenditures at a higher rate than any of the other four cities. State aid and increased property values provided major sources of new funds in both cities amounting to 56% of new funds in Baltimore and 80% in New York City. (See Table 4-28.) Baltimore allocated a larger portion of its increased funds to improved staffing ratios (See Table 4-29), with the difference primarily reflected in expanded counselling and supervisory staff.[51] Class size in both cities was reduced by approximately the same percentages.[52]

That Baltimore had to rely to a greater extent on tax rate increases reflects the larger increase in enrollments in that city and its smaller increase in real property values.

New York City could clearly have increased spending at a still higher rate given its large increases in state aid and property values. That it did not is indicative of its tie to a traditional pattern of annual expenditure increases. The lack of real property tax rate increases in New York relative to other cities suggests that state aid is an alternative source of funds rather than an incremental source, and when state aid increases, it simply is a substitute for local fiscal effort. Federal funds by contrast, are allocated on a program basis often requiring increased local spending. Federal aid encourages innovation while state aid does not.

Capital Expenditures (See Tables 4-31 and 4-32.)

Capital expenditures on a per pupil basis are highest in New York City where they are financed within a city-wide legal debt limit. Capital expenditures have also been relatively high in Baltimore where school construction loans are financed through the city subject to state legislative approval. In recent years, as much as 12% of the total expenditures were financed out of the current tax levy.

Detroit has had considerable difficulty in securing voter approval of recent bond issues and this is reflected in relatively low capital expenditures on a per pupil basis. In 1959, voters approved a $60 million school construction program to finance expenditures over a five-year period and the increase of capital expenditures in 1961-65 ($419 per pupil) reflects implementation of this program. A second bond referendum was presented to the voters in April 1963 and failed. A slightly reduced program was submitted to referendum in 1964 and it also failed.[53]

Table 4 - 31

Capital Expenditures
Six School Districts
For the Periods 1956-1960 and 1961-1965[a]

District	Total (millions)		Per Pupil	
	1956-1960	1961-1965	1956-1960	1961-1965
Independent				
Chicago	$119.3	$162.0	$300	$358
Detroit	61.8	110.0	245	419
St. Louis	13.0	8.4	146	86
Dependent				
Baltimore	43.9	55.2[b]	316	425[b]
New York	446.0	499.2	539	556
Philadelphia*	61.8	53.4	299	239

*Independent until 1966.

[a] Fiscal years beginning in indicated years except for Chicago and Philadelphia which are calendar years.

[b] Excludes data for 1964/65 which was not available.

Source: Appendix A, Tables IX and XV.

Table 4 - 32

Capital Expenditures in Total and Per New Pupil
Six School Districts
1955 - 1965[a]

District	Capital Expenditures (millions)	Increase In Pupils	Capital Expenditures Per New Pupil
Independent			
Chicago	$281.3	147,369	$1908.81
Detroit	171.8	20,384	8428.18
St. Louis	21.4	19,856	1077.76
Dependent			
Baltimore	112.9[b]	38,016	2969.80
New York	945.2	108,192	8736.32
Philadelphia*	115.2	33,303	3459.15

*Independent until 1966.

[a] Fiscal year beginning 1955 to 1965 except Chicago and Philadelphia which are calendar years.

[b] Estimated for 1964 based on 1960-63 average.

Source: Appendix A, Tables IX and XV.

Capital expenditures in Chicago were somewhat lower than Detroit in the five years ended 1965/66 reflecting legislative debt-ceilings that are raised periodically as total debt approaches the statutory limit.

Philadelphia and St. Louis had the lowest capital expenditures of the six districts studied. The low expenditures in Philadelphia resulted from the long reluctance of the school board to go to referendum for authorization to increase expenditures beyond amounts that could be financed within a 2% debt limit.[54] Capital expenditures for most of this period were limited to additional borrowing capacity available through debt retirement.

St. Louis' capital expenditures during the past five years are less than $100 on a per pupil basis. The low spending results from the board's inability to secure a two-thirds majority on bond referenda. It has done so only once out of five attempts during the past ten years.[55] Current capital expenditures are now financed out of current revenues.

A further analysis of capital expenditures based on increased enrollment is shown in Table 4-32. New York and Detroit rank well above the other cities with expenditures of over $8,000 per pupil; both had low enrollment increases. Baltimore and Philadelphia have spent $3,000 and $3,500 respectively per new pupil. Chicago with a relatively high enrollment increase has spent only $1,900 on a per pupil basis over the ten years. St. Louis despite its relatively stable enrollment has spent only $1,100. Those districts with high enrollment increases have not had adequate expenditures for both school expansion and to provide additional capacity.

Clearly, the level of capital expenditures is related to fiscal status. New York and Baltimore have spent large amounts for school replacement and reservation relying primarily upon the city to raise the necessary funds within the debt limit. In Chicago, capital spending requires state legislative approval which has been given within circumscribed limits. In Detroit, Philadelphia and St. Louis, the requirements for voter approval have limited capital spending. In Philadelphia, the board had been reluctant, until 1963, to submit a bond issue to referendum. Bond issues have been defeated repeatedly in Detroit and St. Louis.

Conclusions

All of the districts have operated under fiscal restraints. In Detroit and St. Louis a justified fear of voter rejection of the tax rate increases has resulted in conservative spending policies. State legislative limits in Philadelphia and Chicago have limited spending in those cities. New York and Baltimore have increased spending more than the other four cities, but not to the extent necessary for broad innovative programs. Only New York City appeared to have sufficient leeway to provide for a substantially increased tax effort for schools but the city limited spending primarily to amounts that could be financed through increased property values and additional state aid.

Expenditure increases in each of the cities were limited to amounts necessary to provide for traditional salary increases, enrollment increases and small improvements in staffing ratios. In the absence of strong community support for innovation, it is not suprising that expenditure increases were limited to traditional patterns.

The differences between the impact of state and federal aid are interesting. The former has been used to reduce local tax effort while federal aid is directed to specific program innovation. The latter rather than the former approach offers fiscal support for innovation.

CHAPTER 5

COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION IN TWO INDEPENDENT DISTRICTS, A STUDY IN CONTRASTS: CASE STUDIES OF DETROIT AND ST. LOUIS

Introduction

Detroit and St. Louis are both fiscally independent. Both have elected school boards with taxing power subject only to voter approval. But here the comparison ends. In Detroit, the school system has established informal ties with the mayor and has encouraged widespread community participation. In St. Louis, the board has avoided any ties with municipal officials. It has also been unwilling or unable to encourage community involvement in school affairs. Fiscal status does not seem to be the factor influencing public participation or independence from city hall; rather, it is the culture of the city and the board's perception of the function of community groups.

Detroit

Detroit appears to be the least insulated of all the large city school systems. Participation by non-professionals has greater acceptance and in some respects it has been encouraged from within the school system. This is not to suggest that Detroit has resolved the fundamental problems of large city schools, but rather that movement is evident and related innovations can be discerned.

The Detroit school system is fiscally independent and is operated under a seven-member elected board of education.[1] Board elections, like city elections, are non-partisan. In 1916, the procedure for election of board members was changed from the ward system to at-large election in an effort to reduce political party involvement. At the same time the power of the superintendent was increased and he became the chief executive officer of the school system.[2] This shift in power to the professionals was similar to what was happening at that time in large cities throughout the country. School reform was manifest in removing education from "politics" and reinforcing professional control. However, during the late 1940's and 1950's there was a growing movement to widen the role of the community in public education. This was to compensate for rising criticism of the lack of community responsiveness by the board.[3] It is likely that the stimulus was a product of general city-wide attitudes.

Businessmen in Detroit have habitually supported political ventures for other than selfish reasons perhaps because "... in Detroit there is not the usual social chasm between the principal businessmen and the principal office-holders". The unions are tightly organized, militant and have a large membership. Also, the ever increasing Negro population has a generous percentage of extremists among its numerous organizations which include the Urban League, NAACP, Trade Union Leadership Council (TULC), and Group on Advanced Leadership (GOAL).[4]

The participatory role of the unions and the big three automobile manufacturers in city affairs insured their constant concern with educational goals and policies.[5]

The mayor's enlightened city politics also spilled over into school affairs. The mayor has been described as a "gifted young political comer" who doubled as president of the Conference of Mayors and National League of Cities in 1966. Shortly after taking office in 1962 he hand-picked his police commissioner and reorganized what had been a "hawkish" police department into a community-minded, socially conscious arm of the municipal government. During his years in office there have been no major scandals or racial flare-ups. By using imaginative approaches he obtained about $200 million in federal funds which have been used in Detroit's Negro ghettos.[6]

Informed segments of the community were aroused by the needs of the school system.[7] In the late 1940's various citizens groups combined to press for stronger, more representative, board of education members, and by 1956 when a new superintendent was appointed, this goal had been partially achieved. The new superintendent was selected partially because of his commitment to citizen participation.[8]

Perhaps the most significant evidence of concern with public participation was the creation of the Citizens' Advisory Committee in 1957. Although the superintendent was given credit for the creation of the committee, the pressure for citizen involvement was evident before his appointment. In fact, in early board interviews with the new superintendent, he was questioned closely as to his attitude toward citizen participation to assure the board of his commitment.[9] Immediately after his appointment, a citizens' committee was established to review the status of schools and to make appropriate recommendations for their improvement.

Citizens Advisory Committee

The first Citizens' Advisory Committee on School Needs was composed of 280 citizens from a wide variety of organizations. It was chaired by George Romney. The varied character of the membership representing all segments of the population was indicative of the desire to involve a broader community. The committee was divided into eight regional committees whose members lived or worked in the area they studied.[10]

The committee's recommendations in 1958 were many and covered curriculum, personnel, school community relations, school plant and finance. Annual promotion, lowering of entrance age for kindergarten, self-contained grades 1, 2, and 3, smaller class size, expansion of work training programs, establishment of comprehensive high school and a continuation of experimental programs were some of the major recommendations. The committee further proposed that regional district boundaries be redrawn to include all ethnic, racial and religious groups in each. They suggested that a committee on equal educational opportunity be established to make recommendations to alleviate the problems caused by segregation. A ten-year building plan was developed to provide adequate seats for a full day for all students based on a 6-3-3 program which Detroit had adopted in 1919 and reaffirmed in 1955.[11]

The board of education adopted the report in its entirety.[12] The citizens of Detroit supported the report by voting in 1959 for a $32 million bond issue for school construction and an increased in the millage rate.[13]

In January 1960, the board of education established the Citizens' Committee on Equal Educational Opportunities. This was a smaller committee of 32 people experienced in community work and interested in education. The fact that some of their recommendations were identical to those of the first citizens' committee indicates that the board was finding it difficult to implement some of the proposed changes. The repeated recommendations included annual promotion, self-contained lower grades, and evaluation of teaching programs. Stressed repeatedly was the need to change the regional boundaries of the local districts to include all ethnic and racial groups.[14]

This committee made the first school racial count in over thirty years in 1961 and again in 1962 just before issuing its report.[15] This count pinpointed the practice of maintaining all-white staffs in all-white schools and all-Negro staffs in all-Negro schools. It also highlighted the dearth of Negro principals and supervisors. Their recommendations revolved around the need for desegregation of the staffs as well as the student bodies, free transfer, bussing to relieve overcrowding, smaller class size and a special approach in the culturally disadvantaged communities. They also recommended that the board of education adopt a by-law favoring equal educational opportunity and provide for evaluation of the efforts of the administration to carry out this policy.[16]

The board of education approved the committee's report, and followed it with a "Statement Concerning Non-Discrimination in Schools" and one on the "Treatment of Minorities" in textbooks.[17] The board began to shift its teaching staff to achieve integration, and by 1965 claimed to have a balanced staff in all schools.[18] New policy also required prior experience in a variety of schools as a prerequisite for promotion to principal.[19] In 1963, regional district lines were redrawn so that each region would have a measure of integration and each regional superintendent would face the problems of inner city and more middle class schools.[20] Non-graded primaries which had been experimented with in the Great Cities Schools in 1959 were implemented in most schools by 1966.[21] Thus, although not all of the recommendations were implemented, a large share of the major areas of concern were taken care of. Continued use of the citizens committee approach was evidence of its acceptance.

Citizens' Study Committees on the High Schools

Citizens' committees to study each high school in the city were established in 1966.[22] Action was triggered by what is referred to in Detroit as the "Northern Confrontation". The students of Northern High School boycotted their school for four days because the principal supressed a student newspaper article which was critical of the school.[23] The new committtees were to concentrate on the needs of the high school and make appropriate recommendations to the board of education.

As a first step, questionnaires were sent to students, parents and teachers.[24] It is too early to determine the effectiveness of this new enterprise but earlier experience suggests that it will serve the continuing effort of community involvement.

In addition to the citizens's study committees, Detroit also is engaged in community planning for community schools. Nearly 200 people from all kinds of organizations, business and labor, civil rights groups, as well as individual parents, educators, students, professionals and some classified merely as resident, worked together to formulate plans for the new Eastern High School and Family Center. A broadly based steering committee of 44 people coordinated the many sub-committees and submitted the plan to the board of education in 1963.[25]

Public Participation and Innovation

The new superintendent has a background of dedication to community participation. He served as staff research director for the first citizens' advisory committee and strongly supports expansion of the concept. Although Detroit is an independent district, the superintendent meets regularly with the mayor and considers his relationship to the mayor appropriate to the fulfillment of public education goals. The mayor, in turn, indicates his support and interest in public education issues in announcing for board candidates and millage campaigns.[26] The tone of the city administration has certainly influenced attitudes in education. The creation of the school-community agent in 1966 is a direct outgrowth of the general attitude which appears to pervade the system in terms of assuring community acceptance and involvement.[27]

The appointment in 1966 of a former head of a civil rights group as deputy superintendent in charge of community relations, is indicative of the school system's dedication to broadening the scope of community involvement.[28] He also had served as an active member of the first Citizens' Advisory Committee.[29]

Of all the systems studied, Detroit has wider acceptance of a broader social concept for the school system and is more intimately involved in providing appropriate mechanisms for fulfillment of that goal. What effect this has had on the outputs of the system is extremely relevant. The summary in Chapter II suggests that Detroit has been a more flexible school system. Starting in 1949, Detroit developed one of the most comprehensive vocational education programs to be found in any of the cities.[30] In 1962, the World of Work Project and twenty new vocational programs were instituted in the elementary and high schools throughout the city.[31] Detroit was the first city to develop a demonstration project under the Great Cities Program which they financed themselves.[32] The project included after-school programs and parent involvement. They were the first large city school system of the six studied to organize in-service training workshops for teachers in compensatory education.[33] The record is not overpowering but, in comparison to the other cities, their actions were early and their system proved more receptive to new programs.

In school reorganization there were no relevant changes until 1965 when a non-graded primary in grades 1 and 2 was established.[34] However, in administrative reorganization, Detroit has moved ahead of the other systems in its recent announcement of one year review of administrative staff which will include a review of all of the top incumbent staff.[35] Up until this year, although their positions did not include tenure, top staff were virtually immovable once they were appointed.

In addition, a deputy superintendent, formerly with the Michigan State Department of Education, has been hired to take charge of all business matters, including purchasing, payroll and accounting. The new deputy began by working in liaison with an accounting firm which was studying the school system's business procedures.[36]

In 1956, Detroit established nine regional field executives as a means of achieving some degree of decentralization; more recently the boundaries of the regions were changed to assure that each regional executive covered inner city as well as fringe area schools.[37] Although regional executives have limited powers, there is currently talk of expanding their role by providing budget discretion and additional personnel.[38]

Fiscal Independence as a Factor

One of the significant questions regarding the Detroit school system is the degree to which fiscal independence has influenced the relatively open quality of participation. There are two manifestions of fiscal independence which can be related directly to the issue of participation - the election of school board members and the voting on millage. The non-partisan character of the school board election is a carry-over from city elections which are also non-partisan. The general politics of school board elections are not too different from general elections in the city. Save Our Schools is a small nominating agency for the school board election which leans toward the UAW position. The union slate and SOS slate are usually the same. SOS although limited in size, includes representatives of the teachers union, labor, leaders in the Jewish community, and to a lesser extent, civil rights groups.[39]

The school board elections do not seem to be a vital means of activating community involvement. The nominations are rather closely controlled and the same people recur as regular candidates. Voting is not particularly stimulated, and a very small percentage of those eligible to vote turn out for school board elections. The Negro community and other groups have not responded to these elections as a meaningful means of participation.[40]

The calibre and representativeness of the board in Detroit does not appear to be significantly different from non-elected boards in other cities. One source noted that board members were more influential neighborhood people, not well known in the city as a whole.[41] The board represents largely middle-class interests. Several years ago an outspoken liberal left the board protesting against its inability to make significant progress.[42] There is nothing to suggest that elections have contributed to participation or to improving the role or calibre of the board.

There is quite a bit of civic organization which is activated for millage campaigns. After the 1957 defeat of millage and the 1959 defeat of the bond issue several groups were motivated to support education needs. The Detroit Board of Commerce was one of the groups which prior to 1957 had not been involved in school affairs but was most active in supporting the five mill increase in 1966. In fact, the Board of Commerce organized other groups to campaign for the increase.[43] That millage campaign was also fully supported by the Detroit labor unions. The UAW has an education department and its leaders and members are encouraged to take part in school affairs. UAW received a federal grant recently to work in cooperation with the board of education on a "Back to School" project.[44]

Several sources in the city indicated that UAW and the Board of Commerce financed the millage campaign and their cooperative effort and support was vital to its success. A fairly informed group in the city attributes great power to the union even in the selection of the superintendent.[45] The union's role cannot be related solely to millage campaigns and school board elections; one would have to assume that UAW would play a principal role in school affairs, as it does in city affairs, whether the system was independent or dependent. Campaigns and elections are the more overt means of participation.

The Catholic Archdiocese also gave the last millage campaign strong support; it helped organize the Catholic vote in the campaign.[46] The opposition to millage came from the small property owners who are not well organized.

An Open School System

Other civic group activity in school affairs is more reflective of general participation in city affairs. The Urban League education staff meets with the superintendent and attends board meetings regularly. The entire staff of the League is made available for millage campaigns. The League conducts education studies on special issues and has been influential in pressuring for an increase in the number of Negro administrators and school staff integration. The League considers that most of its success is in handling individual school problems. The NAACP with a smaller professional staff, also boasts an active education program. They conduct studies, issue reports and speak before the board of education. They indicated, in interviews, the board and the new superintendent are receptive and sympathetic to their pressures.[47]

Generally, the Detroit Negro community is described as having more committees on education and human relations than other large cities. Detroit also has the largest Negro middle class community of all the cities studied.[48] The active role of Negro groups is a combined product of the Detroit political culture and the middle-class Negro population, and it is not at all related to the fiscal independence of the school system.

The League of Women Voters spends about 10% of its organizational time on education issues, but it was active and supportive in the various millage campaigns. PTA's play somewhat the same role in Detroit as they do in all other large cities. Generally they are concerned with individual school needs and are supportive of establishment policy.[49]

The mayor's role in school affairs has already been referred to in terms of his overall approach, his personal and regular contact with the superintendent and his public support of millage and certain board candidates. In addition, all federal funds that come into the city go through a Special Coordinating Committee in the mayor's office, and thus funds for education pass through that committee. And, as mentioned earlier, a special effort has been made in Detroit by the mayor to encourage the board to seek poverty funds for educational purposes.[50] The Mayor's Commission on Children and Youth has an Advisory Committee on Education which transmits recommendations to the superintendent. This committee is also in close touch with the citizens' advisory committees.[51]

Staff members in the mayor's office attend meetings arranged by the superintendent and close contact with the schools is maintained through each of these procedures.[52] Cooperation between the mayor and the school system is not a product of fiscal independence but rather a product of the total commitment of the mayor to educational needs and the willingness of school officials to cooperate with city officials for mutual advantage in minimizing school crises.

There is no question but that the relatively open quality of school decision making in Detroit is distinctive in comparison with the other five cities studied. It is also apparent that the general political and social environment of the city is the major stimulus for that circumstance. Fiscal independence, as such, has not been especially important in contributing to the general quality of the system nor to its financing. The mechanisms provided for participation are an outgrowth of the commitment of school officials to civic and city involvement, and are not provided by either elections or voting on millage. Millage campaigns may be a rallying point for coalitions of groups around school issues; they may also serve to publicize school needs; but, in themselves, they cannot explain the participatory character of school decision-making. Illustration 2 shows the pattern of community involvement.

St. Louis

The St. Louis school system is fiscally independent of city and state government. The system is governed by a twelve-member board of education, elected for six-year terms at regular elections in odd-numbered years.[53] Of all the cities studied, St. Louis alone had no unit of government standing between the voters and the board with regard to taxing power. Although the

ILLUSTRATION 2

PARTICIPATION IN POLICY MAKING... DETROIT*



DECISION MAKERS

BOARD

SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS

HEADQUARTERS STAFF

INFLUENCE WIELDERS

CITIZENS COMMITTEES

DETROIT FEDERATION OF TEACHERS

ORGANIZATION OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS AND SUPERVISORS

MAYOR

PARENTS GROUPS

REACTORS & SUPPORTERS

CIVIL RIGHTS GROUPS

BUSINESS GROUPS

STATE OFFICIALS

OTHER UNIONS

PERIPHERAL GROUPS

MAYOR'S COMMISSION ON CHILDREN & YOUTH

PRESS

*INDEPENDENT

board operates under a tax limit of $1.25, (per $100 of assessed valuation of real and personal property) it may exceed that limit with voter approval, as it now does. Voter approval is required of all increases, and in the absence of an increase, the prevailing tax limit must be reaffirmed every two years.[54] Although the board enjoys tax leeway subject only to referendum, a practical limit is established at $3.75 (three times the constitutional limit.) Increases beyond $3.75 must be passed by a two-thirds majority.[55] A two-thirds majority is also required to pass school bond issues.[56]

The school board operates independently of city hall. Although the mayor has legal authority to make interim appointments to fill school board vacancies and to appoint independent auditors for the school system, neither of these powers has given the mayor any role in the school system. The mayor exercises no special political role in dealing with the governor or the state legislature. These contacts are made directly by board members and the superintendent.[57] Although the mayor's endorsement along with other endorsements by community leaders is sought in support of the tax-rate elections, such endorsements are generally freely given with no strings attached.[58] The only exception is the present mayor ~~(Alfonso J. Cervantes)~~ who insisted on an independent budget review when asked to endorse the most recent tax-rate rise.[59] St. Louis was the only city studied in which we could identify no informal ties between city hall and the school system.

St. Louis, thus, came closest to the classical model of fiscal independence of all the cities studied. Yet fiscal independence has not provided the school system with advantages that allegedly devolve from the system. School expenditures are relatively low, reflecting low teachers' salaries and high pupil-teacher ratios.[60] Except for several programs financed through federal aid, compensatory education has not been provided for the large number of disadvantaged children in the system. Capital expenditures are low, primarily because of the difficulty the board has experienced in obtaining the two-thirds majority vote on bond issues.[61] Members of the board are conservative in proposing school tax rate increases, reflecting the conservatism of the city and the concern of school board members that tax rate elections may be lost.

Public participation and involvement in school affairs is minimal. School board meetings are open to the public but rarely do more than a handful of persons attend a meeting.[62] This is true even when issues of major policy are discussed. The absence of education interest groups and community organizations concerned with education issues is striking. Local parents-teachers associations exist throughout the system but their meetings are poorly attended and deal with unimportant local issues. Coordinating PTA committees are so weak that the board cannot depend upon them for support in the conduct of school affairs. The absence of such community participation has required that the board develop its own political organization in order to mobilize support for tax rate and school bond referenda.[63]

Limited Community Participation

There are several exceptions to the general lack of participation in school affairs. The most striking of these is the growing participation of parents in the Banneker school district.[64] The participation is a direct outgrowth of a federal grant to the school board to increase community involvement. Parents groups are well-organized and parents meetings are well attended. Participation in the district is, of course, board rather than community-directed and the parents groups are not likely to challenge board policy. Yet the Banneker experiment is a meaningful start in a community characterized by widespread apathy.

Civil Rights Activity and School Integration

The civil rights groups in St. Louis are extremely weak and only once did they exercise any successful pressure against the school system. In 1964 they combined to protest the school board's method of transfer of pupils from overcrowded segregated schools to underutilized white schools.[65] Under the board program, complete classes of children were transferred together with their teachers only to be segregated within the receiving schools. As a result of the protests, the board modified its policy and now transfers children of all grades from a given geographical area into integrated classes in the receiving schools.[66]

The civil rights groups in St. Louis are accomodating rather than militant. The Urban League is concerned primarily with economic issues, though recently it has proposed educational parks as an alternative to the board's present neighborhood school policy.[67] The NAACP is weak and has not been concerned with schools. ACTION, a more militant group, has a small core of leaders but their interest in schools was limited to the bussing controversy.[68]

The board has followed a conservative policy on integration. It favors bussing to underutilized schools and provides such bussing for 2,700 pupils.[69] The board abolished its segregated school system in 1954 and has effectively integrated its top administrative staff.[70] An assistant superintendent for integration has been appointed to further plans for integration.

However, the board's integration policy is limited by its commitment to the neighborhood school concept.[71] It has been unwilling or unable to undertake a massive rebuilding program to alleviate overcrowding in the ghetto's schools. The board also has attempted to treat all schools within the systems equally in the allocation of tax funds, thereby limiting the possibility for special programs in the ghetto schools beyond those financed with outside funds.

The lack of more positive board action can be attributed in part to the ineffective mobilization of civil rights groups. There is a fear on the part of prominent Negroes of reprisal because many are dependent economically upon the business community.[72] One Negro civil rights worker complained that all promising leaders are co-opted into municipal government or the federal poverty program, and once there, their militancy disappears.[73] Negro leaders who are still militant, he continued, are subject to pressures ranging from loss of job to imprisonment.[74] Also, the attitude of the Negro administrators that the system is doing all it can, and their concern with the exodus of white pupils and white teachers to the county system, has served as reinforcement to the board's position.[75]

Political Organization for School Board Elections

A second area of sporadic community involvement is in school board elections. Prior to 1959, the St. Louis school system was controlled by an alliance of Democratic committeemen and municipal officials.[76] School board elections are held biannually at the same time as municipal elections,[77] and thus the campaign for school board members could be run by the party machinery. An organized political effort is required because a candidate must obtain over 6,000 signatures on a nominating petition to be placed on the ballot.[78]

Control over the school system prior to 1959 was a political prize. It was a major source of patronage and every non-teaching position had a political price tag attached to it.[79]

In 1953, a number of civic leaders concerned with schools, primarily from the West End Community Conference, began to meet informally. Their goal was to achieve reform in the school system by supporting a slate of candidates for the school board. A reformer was elected to the board in the 1953 election.[80] In 1955 two reform candidates were elected; none ran in the 1957 election.

During this period the reform member was a dissident within the board working hard to create a public issue over school corruption. In 1959, he financed several law suits against school officers accused of corruption. He succeeded in forcing the building commissioner out of office. He also succeeded in photographing school maintenance personnel working at the home of the school board president while on the school payroll.[81] The resulting publicity made the school board election of 1959 a major issue and the reform slate was elected. In 1960 the reform group formed an organization known as CAPS (Citizens Association for Public Schools) and, in 1961, after a bitterly fought election, all five CAPS candidates were elected and the reform group took control of the school board.[82] A reform leader was elected president and the board moved quickly to establish a merit system for the non-instructional staff.

With political patronage no longer available, party leaders lost interest in school board elections. CAPS ran four candidates in 1963 and they were unopposed. CAPS dissolved after the 1963 election as a result of internal dissension. It has since been replaced by a smaller, narrowly based, Citizens' Committee for Quality Schools. Reform candidates were elected in 1965 and 1967 with little opposition.

Election campaigns for the board of education are expensive, running to as much as $30,000.[83] In addition, a campaign requires a well-organized corps of political workers to obtain the necessary nominating signatures and get out the vote.[84] With only four members standing for election every two years, a working control of the board requires successive election victories. Only a well-organized and well-financed group can hope to obtain control over the system. The old board was difficult to replace. The new board will be more difficult still to defeat because of the absence of a "payoff". Since the reform slate was elected, the only opposition has been from several labor unions which are now excluded from representation on the board.[85]

The present board is a self-perpetuating one. It is most often criticized for insulation from the community and its failure to stimulate wide community participation in education. Criticism is also voiced against its conservative financing policies and its failure to deal with the low achievement of its Negro pupils.[86]

School Board

Control of the school system was clearly in the hands of the board and the major power within the board is the initial reformer elected to the board. His power derives from the major role he played in the reform victories in the 1959 and 1961 elections. He also commands respect because he is well-informed about board matters and devotes a high proportion of his time to school affairs. He does so in terms of policy issues, avoiding day-to-day involvement in operational matters which he leaves to the school superintendent. Even his critics admit that he is "90% perfect". One of his detractors states that if he had to choose one person to run the school system, he would choose the reform leader though he disagrees with him on individual issues.[87]

The reform leader's power also derives from the influence he exercises over school board nominees. He is said to have vetoed a candidate supported by the CAPS board because he disagreed with the candidate's position on a number of issues. He is also said to arrange financing for school board elections.[88]

Clearly he is the dominant voice on the school board. He served as board president for three successive terms.[89] The board functions through its committees on the whole and *ad hoc* committees on special issues. He has headed up several important *ad hoc* committees. He is also considered to be the most persuasive board member and participates most extensively at board meetings.[90] Though not now a member of the board's budget committee, he attends its meetings and exercises considerable influence.

Other Community Participants

The League of Women Voters spends about 20% of its activity on schools. Most of their concern has been in statewide problems primarily directed at increasing state aid for schools and broadening the city's fiscal powers.[91]

The Chamber of Commerce has an education committee which plays a role in support of tax-rate increases. Recently, they issued a study pointing to major deficiencies in reading and arithmetic that they identified among high school graduates. They were instrumental in having the board appoint an *ad hoc* committee to investigate possibilities for improving instruction.[92]

All of the above groups and others, such as the Citizens' Committee on School Tax Reform, are supportive of the school system and played a limited and peripheral role. There is no watchdog group with broad concern for education operating on a continuous basis.

Weaknesses of the Elected Board

The absence of widespread community participation in school affairs is a serious concern in a city where the board exercises the considerable power that it has. There is effectively no countervailing power to the school board in the community and the complaint most frequently heard is the lack of responsiveness of the board to the community. One labor leader, though admitting the old board was corrupt, preferred it because it was closer to the community. He eschewed the new board as a "blue ribbon" panel, isolated from the people who elect it.

On the other hand, the board is accepted as sincere and uncorruptable. One critic interviewed stated that public apathy is partially the result of satisfaction with the work of the school board. "If the board was a bad board," he stated, "CAPS would reemerge in an attempt to replace it".

The school board does reflect the general conservatism within the city in its spending policies, its limited building program and its adherence to the neighborhood school principles. The business community is well represented on the board and a member has ties to Civic Progress, a small elite group of business leaders who comprise the power of the downtown business community.[93] The board must also look to the city's voters for fiscal and political support in a city in which one-third of the voters are Catholic and nearly one-fifth are elderly persons with no children in the school system.[94] These limitations require that the board exercise fiscal restraint.

One can only speculate about whether the board would pursue more aggressive spending policies if it could establish wider community participation in school affairs. Certainly, wider community participation would be likely to lead to more divergent views within the board itself and encourage serious consideration of alternatives to its present policies.

Innovation in the School System

Innovation in the school system during the past ten years is relatively limited. The school board has played some role in pressing for change and some innovation has come from the staff itself. Community pressures for innovation are minimal. Though ideas are suggested to the board from time to time from community persons, there is little outside pressure for their implementation.

The first three years of elementary schools are ungraded throughout the system. Each of the schools throughout the system has one class limited to twenty pupils (average class size is around 35) who have special problems. Additionally there are five school each with eight "rooms of twenty" in the ghetto areas. Four elementary schools have been set aside for gifted children and are open for enrollment to children throughout the system. All of these innovations were at the suggestion of the superintendent.[95]

By far, the most ambitious program in the district is the experimental program in the Banneker district initiated by its assistant superintendent. The district, with substantial federal support, has developed compensatory programs for the disadvantaged and has successfully elicited greater parent participation. A number of groups have suggested that the Banneker program be expanded to other districts, but the superintendent has been reluctant to do so and points to the lack of funds.[96]

A Head-Start program was begun with the cooperation of the school system in 1965, but it is now administered outside the system through the Human Development Corporation. The HDC has initiated a volunteer improvement program for adult education which they hope the board of education will continue.[97]

The "track system" was initiated in the high schools in 1957 at the suggestion of a board member. There are four tracks in the system, one to receive elementary school graduates from the "gifted schools" and three others for other elementary school children. Students may shift from track to track. The system is now experimenting with subject-area tracks.[98]

At the superintendent's suggestion, three special high school programs have been established. Two-year terminal high school programs oriented to job training are established for elementary school children who graduate with fourth-grade reading levels. Tutorial schools conducted in late afternoon and evening are established for difficult discipline cases. Opportunity schools service students suspended for disciplinary or attendance problems but who have the potential for reentering regular high schools.[99]

The board has constituted an ad hoc Committee on Instruction to examine academic performance in the high schools. The committee was formed in response to a Chamber of Commerce report criticizing the board for graduating students who lack basic reading and arithmetic skills. The committee has recommended that each high school graduate be required to pass a "comprehensive efficiency and review" examination to qualify for an academic diploma. Other students would receive a certificate. The recommendation has stimulated opposition primarily from civil rights groups.[100]

The administrative staffs of the public school system meet periodically with their counterparts in the Catholic and Lutheran systems to discuss new programs and exchange new ideas.[101]

In summary, it may be said that innovations in the St. Louis system are limited to federally funded programs or programs that require only limited funds. Community pressure for innovation is minimal and suggestions from the community are not enthusiastically received.

Prospective Changes in Fiscal Status

Members of the school board are satisfied that the election of board members provides the best opportunity for maintaining a qualified and independent board. There is some concern with the lack of community organization. The superintendent has worked hard to establish a parent's congress consisting of one or two representatives from elementary and high schools. They now meet periodically to discuss school problems. He has also encouraged principals to establish better community liaison, but they have difficulty in doing so because almost all live outside of their school districts.

There is considerable concern about the fiscal constraints that the board sees as obstacles to increased spending. Paramount among these is the requirement of a two-thirds majority for approval of a bond issue. A number of groups support a proposal to lower the two-thirds majority requirement on bond issues to a 60% majority.

Board members have expressed concern over the requirement for periodic voter approval of tax rates even when an increase is not sought. The League of Women Voters had proposed that only tax rate increases should require voter approval, and should an increase fail, they suggested that the rate revert to the previous rather than to the constitutional base rate. Tax rate elections failed only twice during the last twenty years. In the most recent cast, a rate increase of 28 mills received only 46% of the total vote with only 22% of these registered voting. The rate increase passed one month later with 68.32% infavor and 41% of those registered voting.[102] There has also been some interest in a broader based tax for school support; both an income tax and a sales tax have been discussed.

There is also present pressure from school officials and community groups for increased state aid for education. This year, with support from the governor, the state legislature has expanded state aid to cover kindergarten programs for the first time.

Conclusion

The St. Louis school system, responsible directly to the voters, has the greatest degree of fiscal independence of all of the cities studied. The board has pursued a conservative fiscal policy mindful that the majority of the registered voters do not have children in the school system. Capital expenditures have been modest largely because the board has had difficulty in obtaining a two-thirds majority rate for bond issues.

Fiscal independence has not encouraged widespread community participation. The board has given only limited encouragement to the independent community groups that exist and has not had notable success in building its own community relations. Outside independent pressure was effective only with respect to the bussing issue and the CAPS campaign for school board reform. There is no education interest group operating on a continuing basis. Civil rights groups, such as NAACP, Urban League, and ACTION, have minimal influence on board policy. The League of Women Voters and the Chamber of Commerce play a supporting role and are concerned primarily with fiscal issues.

The absence of independent education interest groups and the weakness of civil rights groups have resulted in an absence of pressure for expanded compensatory programs and other innovations requiring sharply increased expenditures.

Faced with a conservative voter tradition and little community pressure, the board has moved slowly towards costly innovative programs.

There is some feeling, apparently justified, that the board is far too insulated from its public and this insulation hampers innovation and the fiscal support necessary to accomplish change.

A comparison of Illustration 3 with Illustration 2 reveals graphically the basic differences in community participation and contrasts the open character of the Detroit school system with the closed school system of St. Louis.

ILLUSTRATION 3

PARTICIPATION IN POLICY MAKING... ST. LOUIS*


DECISION MAKERS
INFLUENCE WIELDERS
REACTORS & SUPPORTERS
PERIPHERAL GROUPS
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
MAYOR
STATE OFFICIALS
SUPERINTENDENT OF INSTRUCTION
ST. LOUIS TEACHERS UNION
CIVIL RIGHTS GROUPS
CITIZENS FOR QUALITY SCHOOLS (Active only during School elections)
HEADQUARTERS STAFF
BOARD
BUSINESS COMMUNITY
PRESS
METROPOLITAN YOUTH COMMISSION
ST. LOUIS TEACHERS ASSOCIATION
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
COMMUNITY RESOURCES
WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON EDUCATION
PARENTS GROUPS

*INDEPENDENT

CHAPTER 6

THREE STATIC SYSTEMS: CASE STUDIES OF NEW YORK, BALTIMORE AND CHICAGO

Four of the six cities studied, New York, Chicago, Baltimore and St. Louis, were categorized as less innovative. (St. Louis is discussed in Chapter 5.) Ranking these four cities proved almost impossible because all were so close in terms of programs and receptivity to change. It did appear that New York City showed greater flexibility than Baltimore, St. Louis and Chicago in certain key areas. Although structural change is lacking, New York has done more in compensatory education. New York City was also more studied and had as a result adopted more pilot and experimental programs in school reorganization. In relating inputs to capacity for change in the four cities, New York City demonstrated a wider degree of public participation although it was more limited by its administrative structure.

New York City[1]

Innovation and responsiveness to change are difficult to build into any bureaucratic system, and education policy in New York City partly reflects that circumstance. The isolation of school administration from the city government and from outside influence has been the most significant trend in education in New York City over the past two decades. The emotional commitment to professionalism, although not inviolate, tends to oppose any attempts to promote new policies or alternate courses of action as "political interference."

The school system has appeared paralyzed in the face of the massive school problems of the post war years. Despite its series of compensatory programs (Special Service Schools, More Effective Schools, Higher Horizons), it has shown itself unable to adapt or innovate adequately to stem a precipitous downhill trend. Large, cumbersome, and burdened by a congested bureaucracy, the school system has suffered from inertia or has responded dilatorily to the new major demands being made upon it.

New York City has not witnessed any meaningful change in curriculum, administrative structure, teacher recruitment, appointment and training, or general organization for at least three decades. Lack of innovation and continued reliance on past programs and practices is especially notable in two major areas of school policy - curriculum development and budgeting. Both are so completely controlled by the supervisory bureaucracy at headquarters that even satellite groups with special interests have been removed from policy decisions. These two areas provide examples of closed participation.

Budget policy can be a major instrument for developing continuous evaluation of and innovation within a system, or it can be merely a bookkeeping operation supporting the status quo. The board has received a lump-sum appropriation since 1962[2] and is able to shift funds from one program to another without specific approval of the mayor, board of estimate or bureau of the budget. It is also essentially free from state controls. Though the board has extensive control over the area, its budget making is incremental and nonprogrammatic. The determination of the size and content of a given year's budget is based on the previous year's budget, allowances being made for increased costs of equipment and supplies, scheduled salary increments, and increased rates of pay. There is little flexibility because of a temendous number of commitments which have been made years in advance. Most items are automatically approved year after year.

Adjustments to local needs are non-existent except for formulas established for Special Service Schools, and individual principals are given no budget leeway. (Each district superintendent and principal has a small fund to meet special costs.)

The procedures and time schedule suggest the pressures on budgeting policy that make the process more a matter of routine than intensive analysis. Budgeting is a central operation, developed at school headquarters and controlled by the core supervisory staff. The supervisory staff's discussions, held from the middle of August to the middle of September, define the objectives and govern preparation of budget requests by the various divisions and bureaus. Each division submits its formal budget request to the system's office of business affairs in late September. Each superintendent who heads a division at headquarters reviews requests under his jurisdiction prior to their submission and again in hearings after submission. The compilation prepared by the office of business affairs is submitted to the superintendent of schools in early November, and then to the board of education. The board holds public hearings at the end of December and the budget is adopted by December 30.

Final acceptance must await the presentation of the entire city budget by the mayor to the board of estimate and the city council in the following April. There are public hearings at the time the mayor presents his budget to the board of estimate. After the mayor's budget is prepared with a lump-sum appropriation for education, the board of education must adjust its line-item schedule to the lump-sum appropriation. Usually this is accomplished within a week to meet the scheduled hearings on the city budget. Final adoption of the city budget may not come until as late as mid-June.

These procedures and the time schedule suggest the pressures on budgeting policy that make the process more a matter of routine than intensive analysis.

Citizens' groups have little opportunity to study the budget or offer alternatives. Their influence on budget policy is therfore severely restricted. (In 1965 there was only a four-day period between the publication of the budget and the first public hearing.) The board of education, itself, has inadequate staff and time to carefully review the budget. The lack of program analysis impedes the board's ability to contribute significantly to budget policy. The budget document is never reviewed as a whole, in tne sense of re-evaluating existing programs and activities.

Policy changes can be made after the adoption of the budget. The board of education can transfer large sums of money without prior public notice or hearing. More important, policy formally adopted by the board could be changed through a process of staff modification. Thus, the transfer of teachers to other than teaching assignments can result in an increase in class size despite the fact that the justification for creating additional positions may have been to reduce class size.

The office of business affairs maintains strict control over budget policy. An interview with its current director made it clear that he saw no need to provide more information on the budget to the public or outside groups. The office is currently programming IBM equipment for budgeting and financial purposes and, once this is completed, the factor of prohibitive costs alone could be used as an argument against changes in procedures.

The four or five headquarters superintendents who review budget requests are the first and final authority in the translation of programs to budget policy. The central budgeting staff establishes the standard for the entire school system, tying the hands of the local school administrators and undermining their ability to respond to individual needs. At present, the budget cannot be viewed in any way as a tool of the superintendent, and it is even less a statement of board of education policy.

In the area of curriculum, if one reviews the adoption of a single change, such as the introduction of Negro history, interest-group influences (particularly civil rights groups) and board pressure are evident. In some cases, such as recent changes in mathematics and science curriculum, the national scientific community has indirectly influenced revisions. The introduction of such changes, however, does not touch on the basic design of curriculum as a whole.

Curriculum is defined by educators as organizationally planned and controlled experiences designed to educate students. It involves content and process. Curriculum development is the political process by which choices are made for changing educational institutions.[3] It is this process with which we are concerned.

The deputy superintendent in charge of curriculum and instruction in New York City is administratively responsible for the coordination of curriculum development and implementation. In that capacity he is a major influence in planning curriculum programs and in the initiation of curriculum research projects.

planning curriculum programs and in the initiation of

Until recently, research and evaluation were entirely distinctive tasks, separate from curriculum development. Curriculum development and implementation is now in the hands of a deputy superintendent (and his small cabinet.) Under the deputy superintendent is the bureau of curriculum research. Many of the decisions that are naturally involved in the preparation of curriculum bulletins are routinized by procedures in the bureau.

For example, the bureau reviews and rewrites all bulletins which provide guidelines for school curriculum in each subject area. All bulletins are reviewed within a three-to-five-year period. At the beginning of each year the bureau staff reviews bulletins which are three-to-five-years old and selects those to be revised. In some instances, the decision to revise is in response to a recommendation of the deputy superintendent.

The only group of teachers noticeably involved in curriculum policy are high school department chairmen's committees. As subject matter specialists, they maintain an active interest in their fields and are more concerned with the curriculum content. Junior high school teachers participate in curriculum revision only in rare instances. Elementary school people are almost never involved. The school people utilized in curriculum revision are usually administrative personnel, principals, and assistant principals. There is very limited use of consultants outside of the system. Although curriculum theory stresses flexibility and innovation, the procedures for the development of curriculum in New York City are constrained by the bureaucratic structure.

Most principals have little time to develop programs for introducing new curriculum to teachers. Time restrictions for teachers' meetings (under the current union contract)make communication or discussions difficult to arrange. Generally, experimentation is limited, and evaluation has been ineffective. Evaluation of curriculum is almost never made, except as such evaluation is part of a larger program (i.e., Higher Horizons or the More Effective Schools programs.) The separation of research, evaluation, and curriculum development functions cuts off the possible sources of innovation from the curriculum policy-makers. Interest groups rarely participate in curriculum decisions.

School integration policy has become one of the most important and sensitive areas of school decision making. The major pressure in New York City for the board to take a position on this issue was external, a direct outgrowth of the 1954 court decision. Conflict within the board and indecision in the administrative bureaucracy obstructed clarification of the board's policy.

In 1957, outside interest groups supported the board's policy of integration. Teacher rotation and rezoning were the most controversial elements in the policy. Delay and postponement allowed time for opposition coalitions to develop. Indecision in the inner circle of decision-makers fostered confused concern and resentment in the community. The neighborhood school became the first line of defense of those who opposed rezoning and transfer. The headquarters staff fully supported the concept of the neighborhood school, and their inaction was, in effect, a veto of board policy. Although a new board of education was appointed in 1961, and included several supporters of stronger integration policy, no radical changes in implementation were forthcoming.

The school integration issue is the only area in which public response has been vociferious and active. It has attracted probably the widest public participation of any educational issue of the past two decades.

The Union

Prior to the election of the United Federation of Teachers in 1959 as the recognized collective bargaining agent for the city's school teachers, the board of education had the upper hand in determining salary policy. In the last three salary negotiations (1961, 1963, 1965), the union has demonstrated its growing importance in policy making. Negotiated contracts, largely a product of union ingenuity, have become major policy documents for the city's school system. The union contract determines wide areas of personnel practices, expenditures, and teaching allotments. Because teachers' salaries and benefits represent half of the total education budget, the union is directly involved in matters of finance. The union's potential power to participate in other policy areas has not been fully realized because of its own decision to concentrate its attention on salary scales and related benefits.

The teachers as a group do not participate in curriculum development. Nor is there evidence to indicate that they were consulted on integration policy or about the problems of ghetto schools.

The union's membership, some 40,000, comprises the largest group of professionals in the school system. In the few areas (outside of salary policy and related fringe benefits) on which it has taken a public position, it appears to have been motivated largely by a desire to maintain the status quo. The union has fought (both publicly and privately) transfers of experienced teachers to difficult schools, and the rotation plan has remained a voluntary program (with little participation.) It has also questioned the advisability of a 4-4-4 school reorganization because the plan threatens the status of the junior high school teacher. On the other hand, it has advanced the More Effective School proposal that called for the creation of several specially staffed schools with low pupil-teacher ratios. In interviews conducted with union leaders, there was some expressed concern that their own positions of power might be threatened if they violated the narrower interests of their membership. Thus the New York teachers' union acts as an obstacle to change in the system rather than an innovator.

the junior high school teacher. On the other hand, it has advanced

The Board, the Superintendent and the Bureaucracy

In the institutional setting of the school system, the most significant appointments are the board members and the superintendent.

Administrative appointments under the superintendent are circumscribed by examination and tenure procedures, a factor which tends to insulate the bureaucracy further.

The president of the board has been the single most persistent and influential participant in the selection process. The bureaucracy in the New York City school system follows an expected behavior; it has always strongly supported the appointment of someone from within its own ranks. Indeed, the procedures and influences in the choice of the superintendent precondition his ability to control the system he must direct. His choice is so much dependent upon his ability to rise within the system that he can hardly be expected to challenge it once he takes office. His own rise to power is an indication of his acceptance of established interests and loyalties; his success as superintendent is a further measure of his willingness to support and enhance those interests.

Nine superintendents have served since 1898. The first superintendent's tenure was the longest, 20 years. The other eight have had notably shorter terms. The relatively short tenure of the last four superintendents (respectively: 5, 11, 4, and 3 years) has undoubtedly taken its toll as far as the power of the office is concerned. One of the most confusing aspects of New York City school administration has been maintenance of a relatively limited chief executive vis-a-vis the growth in power of the administrative staff. In part, it has been the very strength of the bureaucracy that has undermined the role of the superintendent.[4] Open conflict between the superintendent and the board was evidenced in three of the last four administrations, one such conflict resulting in the superintendent's dismissal. (He happened to be the only superintendent who had no previous experience in the New York City school system.) Although over the long run the board has lost power vis-a-vis the bureaucracy and special interest groups, vis-a-vis the superintendent, it still remains the more powerful. The last two board presidents have indicated a day-to-day involvement in school affairs that in all probability ought to be left to the superintendent as well as a general lack of reliance on the superintendent for policy recommendations.

There are important structural limitations to the superintendent's executive powers which must be considered. New York City's school superintendent lacks the most essential power of a strong executive, the power of appointment and removal. The system's supervisory staff is developed completely through inside promotions. Tenured superintendents hold top policy-making jobs, allowing the superintendent little flexibility in appointments. Assistant superintendents receive tenure after a three-year probationary period. The superintendent is further weakened by his dependence on the board of examiners who can delay examination and approval of candidates for assistant superintendent whom the superintendent may wish to appoint to his own staff.[5]

The effect of this is that no superintendent can rely on his own team of trusted advisors. Appointments from outside the system are almost nonexistent. Any superintendent from outside the system is likely to find his task all the more difficult. The one such superintendent in New York City was Calvin Gross, who served from 1962-1965. A magazine article, written after his dismissal, noted that "Gross could have made a real dent on the New York City schools if only he had had a handful of trusted special assistants."[6]

The superintendent must cope with the potentially competing interests of his own supervisory bureaucracy.[7]

On occasion, directives and policy statements issued by the superintendent on key policies have been attacked by his own staff, both by the staff's professional organizations and through the organized committees on which the staff members sit.

The board is the official policy-making body for the school system and its nine members are charged with long-range educational planning. Traditionally, appointment to the board has reflected careful consideration of local interests which was manifested in an implicit religious formula of 3-3-3 - three Catholics, three Jews, and three Protestants - and in the appointment of either a Negro or Puerto Rican or both. These balances have been maintained in the current selection process.

Essentially, the board is a mediator of disputes rather than an initiator of policy. Its role has been largely of balancing conflicting interests and pressures. The board nominally participates in all major decisions. It spends a great deal of its time, however, on sensitive issues where the balance of power fails to produce a concensus. And they are not necessarily major areas of policy.

In various areas selected for study, the board's role ranged from superficial participation (in the budget process) to formulation and promulgation of policy - and failure to achieve it (in school integration.) On the two major salary increases to emerge in recent years, the board participated in early negotiations but was satisfied to shift final responsibility to the mayor or his mediators. Selecting a superintendent is the area in which the board exercised most direct power.

Lacking a staff, the board has had to withdraw from an effective policy role as the school system has grown larger and more complex. The bureaucracy and special interest groups have gained power by means of their expertise, while the board, lacking expertise and political leverage, has lost power.

The core supervisory group within the bureaucracy, which holds most of the decision-making power, includes some 30 headquarters staff members including the executive deputy superintendent and the deputy superintendent in charge of instruction and curriculum, the board of examiners, 20 of the 30 assistant superintendents, and a few active directors of special bureaus. Much of the power lodged in the central staff has prevented the expansion of the district superintendents' role.

The entire core supervisory group, with the exception of two assistant superintendents, was bred within the New York City school system. A review of the background of the 26 top supervisory staff members revealed a general pattern. Having served as principals or assistant principals, they were brought into the board on special assignment and/or had served on special committees. Assignment to headquarters staff by school division reinforces the loyalties of staff members to that division and its supervisory staff. In all reorganization proposals, these loyalties have repeatedly fostered preservation of the status quo.

Overcentralization has long plagued the city's school system, and several studies have stressed the need for thorough administrative reorganization.[8] Yet it seems clear that any efforts along these lines have been thwarted by the vested interest of the staff in maintaining the status quo.

Outside Participation

In New York City, there are two interest groups which share the responsibility for overseeing educational policy: the United Parents Associations and the Public Education Association. The staffs of both organizations work closely together.

On the whole, the role of both associations is supportive rather than criticalof educational policy. Their inclination is to work within the structure, focusing on particular problems. Both groups exercise little influence in the area of curriculum. Both have supported increased school expenditures and larger city and state appropriations.

Public participation in school policy formulation is circumscribed by the lack of visible decision-making , the general shortage of information available to the public, and a deficiency in the means for participation. The highly centralized organization of the school system is a serious deterrent to communication between parent groups and policy-makers. In short public education policy has become the province of the professional bureaucrat, with the tragic result that the status quo, suffering from many difficulties, is the order of the day.

Illustration 4 depicts the relationships between the decision-makers, the influence wielders and the reactors and supporters in New York City.

ILLUSTRATION 4

PARTICIPATION IN POLICY MAKING... NEW YORK CITY*



DECISION MAKERS

INFLUENCE WIELDERS

REACTORS & SUPPORTERS

PERIPHERAL GROUPS

BOARD

SPECIAL EDUCATION GROUPS
(Public Education Assn.)
(United Parents Assns.)

SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS

OTHER CIVIC GROUPS

HEADQUARTERS STAFF

UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS

STATE OFFICIALS

COUNCIL OF SUPERVISORY ASSOCIATIONS

PRESS

MAYOR

CIVIL RIGHTS GROUPS

*DEPENDENT

Baltimore

Baltimore should be a city on the verge of change. After twenty-four years of political domination by the Democratic machine, it elected a reform mayor in 1963. A new superintendent of schools, with experience in urban affairs, was appointed in 1966. Yet, in the spring of this year an official of the NEA commented on the city school system, "I don't believe I've ever left a city as discouraged as I did after our visit to Baltimore".[9] The Public School Teachers Association, local affiliate of the National Education Association, imposed sanctions on the Baltimore public school system because of city officials' failure to provide adequate financial support. Among the "shameful" conditions cited were neglected buildings, low salary scale,lack of accredited teachers, low expenditure per pupil and above average class size.

From 1956-1966 school population rose 26 percent. Accompanying this growth was a change in the composition of the white and Negro populations. The exodus of white middle-class and influx of poor southern Negroes have resulted in a non-white school population of 63 percent, the highest of the six cities.

As early as 1950, the Report of the Board of School Commissioners stated:

> "The colored schools in the heart of the city have felt the impact of the steady growth in pupil population most severly. Most of the schools which have felt the burden heaviest are in buildings which have been scheduled for replacement since the time of the Strayer survey in 1922." 10

The problems of the inner city have multiplied in the last decade.

While other cities have taken advantage of outside funding, Baltimore has been dragging its heels. A former superintendent sought and obtained Ford Foundation money for the Early Admissions Program in 1962; but Detroit had received such funds six years earlier. When federal funds were made available through ESEA, Baltimore was slow in getting aid and even returned $3.1 million in 1966. A high official in the school system suggested that it was exceedingly difficult to get the staff to respond to federal aid programs and develop experimental projects for funding.[11]

In 1964, the Citizens' School Advisory Committee chastised the school board for failures of the system because its annual budget was "based on minimum needs of the school system."[12]

As a fiscally dependent district, Baltimore must submit its budget to the city for review. The pivotal step in this process is the approval of the director of finance who is appointed by the mayor but acts independently of the mayor. The director has seen his role as one of paring the board budget. The board, in response, has been conservative in its requests. In 1966, for the first time, the city council also cut $2,000,000 from the education budget. The funds were earmarked for salary raises for top administrators. For the most part, though, the city council's interest in education centers on site selection.

The School Superintendent

Baltimore's school failures certainly cannot be attributed to the calibr of its superintendents. From 1953-1964 it had two prestigious superintendents in charge of the school system. One (1953-1960) is currently the dean at Teachers College, Columbia University and the other is currently dean at the Washington State University. Both, however, declined to play a "political" role in the city to secure support for the school system. The incumbent superintendent with previous experience as superintendent in New Haven clearly indicated his acceptance of a political role. The attitude of the two former superintendents can explain in part the inability of the Baltimore school system to adjust to the pressing needs of the changing population.[13]

Although small innovation programs were attempted during an earlier administration, a pre-school program which had been in operation for fifteen years was cancelled for lack of funds. To his credit, a former superintendent did establish an education council with NDEA funds to upgrade the science curriculum. But throughout his administration he did not make demands on the city fathers. A former superintendent was credited with Project Mission and a study by the Citizens' School Advisory Committee.[14] However, basic problems of overcrowding in school and high teacher turnover remain unsettled.[15]

The Board of School Commissioners

The board of school commissioners in Baltimore is considered to be a conservative body with limited responsiveness to changing needs in the community. Seven of the nine board members are over fifty years of age. All are prestigious citizens. The board conducts two open meetings each month; however, it meets in a room which holds less than ten observers. A request to move the meetings to larger quarters was rejected by the board. The board president who has served in that capacity for ten years is intensively involved in school affairs on a day-to-day basis. He keeps a close watch on the actions of school officials, overseeing all changes in the system.[16]

In a study of community participation in board decision making in Baltimore, Smoley evaluated their role concluding, "that the School Board does not consider many issues concerned with significant policy matters." Sixty percent of its time was spent on personnel and twenty on site selection.[17] In its community relations role the board virtually ignored the recommendations of the Citizen's School Advisory Committee and has not made any significant effort to encourage community participation in school affairs.[18]

Community Participation

Community participation in education in Baltimore is limited. Smoley concluded that groups came together only as particular issues affected them. The business community has not displayed an interest in education and remains aloof from issues when they are raised.[19]

The local PTAs and other groups such as League of Women Voters and Council of Jewish Women while voicing an interest in excellence in the schools, have tended to be supportive of the status quo. The NAACP has worked mostly through the courts. The civil rights groups have not been well coordinated or particularly active in school affairs. Although Baltimore was designated a CORE target city in 1967 and school officials were concerned with possible additional pressure, no relevant influence was exerted regarding education policy. According to our informants, however the only effect was the creation of a Mayor's Task Force on Equal Rights under the Community Relations Commission which had an education committee. The committee confined its role to issuing critical statements stressing the need for quality education. It made recommendations on curriculum, finance and integration of schools and school staff.

In 1960, an ad hoc citizens group (28 Parents) was created to meet the problems caused by racially changing neighborhoods. Although there was a policy of open enrollment and free transfer in the city, several schools were districted to prevent integration. Overcrowded Negro schools were surrounded by white schools. Negro children from the overcrowded schools were bussed to Negro schools rather than to neighboring white schools. Pressure on the superintendent and the board produced no results. The "28 Parents" group prepared a study, hired an attorney and, subsequently, filed a brief accusing the school system of a segregationist policy. Their demands led to an end to districting and a new kind of free transfer policy. It also led to increased bussing. Although the group is still active it is viewed by many as extremist and much of its activity is ignored.[21]

Two teacher groups in Baltimore have emerged as protestors of school policy. The continuing rivalry between the Baltimore Teachers Union and the Public School Teachers Association has made both more militant. However, in a closely contested election in May, 1967, the Baltimore Teachers Union became the recognized bargaining agent. Their demands at present are largely in the area of salary and working conditions but on several occasions both groups have been critical of other school policies.[22]

None of these groups represent a meaningful challenge to the school system or school policy. The administrative staff and the board has had a free hand in maintaining the system and doing business as usual. Few changes have been effected in internal structure or programming. Area directors reside at headquarters and most of the decision-making takes place centrally. Nothing has been done realistically to cope with teachers shortages (only 30% of the teachers in elementary schools have college degrees) or the declining educational level of the school population.[23]

Some changes in Baltimore can be observed since a new superintendent was appointed in 1965. The school budget was increased in the last year and the state-aid formula has been adjusted upwards. The business community has become more concerned with school needs as a result of its involvement with urban renewal.[24] Generally, however, there is a static quality in the school situation.

Of the six cities studied, Baltimore faces extremes in most of the problem areas of large cities. Its total non-white population is the largest (35 percent), and its declining economic resources are a source of concern. In 1966, the city finally succeeded in securing much needed additional tax revenues from its newly adopted earnings tax. However, the political leadership in the city appears to be overwhelmed by the magnitude of urban deterioration. A prominent city official suggested the basis of the problem in a recent statement:

> "We have a particular problem here in Baltimore. We are the only major city in the state, so we stand alone. We also have the problem, possibly to a greater extent than some of the other large cities, that an overwhelming proportion of the state's Negro population is concentrated within the city, with all the associated factors of low income and high need for social services. This creates not only an economic division within the state but also an ethnic division which is difficult to deal with on a political basis.
>
> "Baltimore is a very old city and this also contributes to problems that have a fiscal implication. We have very little undeveloped area and a lot of obsolescence, and while this gives us an opportunity for the future, it's going to require some courage in deciding what kinds of investments one can prudently make." 25

The accumulation of urban problems in Baltimore and the inability of the city's leadership to make any meaningful dent in solutions is obviously conditioning the circumstances of public education. Although a dependent district, city officials have generally insulated themselves from school problems, in large part to avoid blame for failure. The Democratic candidate for mayor in 1967 expressed concern with the problems but complete frustration about solutions coupled with a conviction that he must remain detached. Until there is greater acceptance of responsibility for education in a wider segment of the Baltimore community, it is unlikely that much innovation can be anticipated. (See Illustration 5.)

Chicago

Chicago school officials pride themselves in their claim for independence from all political interference. The school system is independent, and as such does not rely on the city for its funds. The concern with political interference can be traced back to the 1930's and early 1940's when a school crisis was attributed to political encroachment on education.

In 1944, spurred by charges of various civic and educational organizations, the National Education Association launched an investigation of the Chicago schools. Their findings produced an indictment of the school system and its officials, from the superintendent to the board of education. Among other acts of misconduct, the superintendent had recommended the use of his own textbooks in the system. As a result, he was expelled from the NEA in 1946. Financial irregularities, and the intimidation of teachers through the operation of an employee spy system were also cited. The board was charged with nepotism in its appointments as well as allowing political influence in contracts and appointments. The board president was further charged with interfering with the functions of the school superintendent.

A sub-committee of the city council attempted to whitewash the NEA findings. Hearings were held, and the council reported that no charges

ILLUSTRATION 5

PARTICIPATION IN POLICY MAKING... BALTIMORE*


DECISION MAKERS
INFLUENCE WIELDERS
REACTORS & SUPPORTERS
PERIPHERAL GROUPS
BOARD
SUPT. OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION
HEADQUARTERS STAFF
MAYOR
CITIZENS SCHOOL ADVISORY COMMITTEE
CIVIL RIGHTS GROUPS
BALTIMORE TEACHERS UNION
GREATER BALTIMORE COMMITTEE
PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS ASSOC.
MAYOR'S COMMITTEE FOR COMMUNITY RELATIONS
PRESS
OTHER CIVIC GROUPS
BUSINESS COMMUNITY
PARENTS GROUPS

* DEPENDENT

against the board could be sustained. They observed that the system was fully accredited by the North Central Association of College and Secondary Schools. A few days later, this Association announced that unless drastic changes were made, accreditation would be withheld. Their move pulled the bottom out of the system.

In September, 1946, the superintendent resigned. The mayor established an advisory committee, and the Commission on School Board Nominations was formed.[26]

"The experience left Chicago's citizenry with a hypersensitivity to possible injection of political influence or considerations into the school system and accentuated the separation...between public schools and city government proper."[27] Although the charges themselves were an indictment of the school officials, the interpretation of that era of school history was manifest in condemnation of city politics which was to influence school affairs for years to come. Political relations with the mayor and other political leaders in Chicago are now sub rosa.

Under the present policy the board of education holds two open meetings each month. Committee meetings are also public. Only when the board enters executive session or meets to discuss personnel or site selection are the meetings closed to public scrutiny. However, there is indication that in recent years the board has held more frequent executive sessions.[28]

There is little question that some members of the board are personal friends of the Mayor although selected under a panel nomination procedure.[29] The mayor appoints the eleven member board with the aid of the Commission of School Board Nominations. The commission nominates three individuals for every board vacancy. The mayor, however, is not compelled to follow their recommendations, since they have no statutory sanction. The mayor, himself, makes the appointments to the nominating commission. In a recent appointment the mayor requested the commission to add a name to the list of nominations after the nominations had been presented to him. The commission did so and the mayor appointed his own candidate.[30]

In May, 1966, the teachers of Chicago elected their bargaining agent. Because the Chicago Education Association (affiliated with the NEA) declined to be placed on the ballot, the Chicago Teachers Union was the only choice presented. In October, the CTU began its first negotiations with the board. Dissatisfaction with the board's offers prompted the union to threaten to strike for January 9, 1967. On the eighth, the mayor summoned all interested parties to his office to settle the new salary increase. Referring to this incident, a union official stated that while the mayor doesn't appear to be pushing, he gets what he wants.[31] The additional cost for the increased salaries was covered by state aid secured by the mayor.

The Budget

Budgeting in Chicago is controlled by the administrative staff at headquarters. Because the board members are not equipped to understand fiscal matters and terminology, they are willing to abdicate their budget making responsibilities to the professional bureaucracy.

The preparation of the budget requires an estimate of the financial condition of the system at the beginning of the fiscal year (January 1), and a forecast of expected revenues for the year. It also involves a determination of changes in existing programs as well as deciding whether to initiate new ones. Further, wages and salaries must be set (a procedure complicated by the new powers of the union), and a building program formulated. "The General Superintendent is required to furnish the board, by December 1, projected balanced sheets and estimates of revenues and expenditures for the ensuing year."[32]

A public hearing on the budget is required by law. Many citizens' groups have pressured for the resolution of the underlying program and wage issues before expenditure needs are dealt with. However, many of the most significant proposals are not presented to the board until the final days of the budget sessions, not permitting analysis or discussion.

Law requires that the budget first be prepared as a tentative document. The intent is to enable the public to be properly informed and to promote extensive discussion. In actuality, the procedure does not work. Many important matters are not reflected in the tentative budget: rather, they are added only at the last minute. As a result, the public has incomplete data and is unable to participate fully in the budget procedure. Figures in the budget are not accompanied by explanations. "Capital expenditures totaling many millions of dollars might have only two pages devoted to them, whereas far less significant items are covered in detail."[33] The finally adopted budget is even more cumbersome. Data appear in considerable detail for each school. "Because of some strange quirk, the definitive budget is never seen by board members until after the board has ostensibly adopted it by acting upon prior summary presentation."[34]

Resources are divided by the board into seven separate funds, each being a distinct fiscal entity.[35] A problem arises in that the lines of demarcation between the funds are often not clear, and therefore require interpretation. After the first half of each fiscal year, the board may, by a two-thirds vote, and with no hearings, make transfers of appropriations. Throughout the entire budget making process, no evaluation of expenditures is made to determine performance. The public is unable to tell how results compare with original goals or plans. The superintendent also has limited control over the budget because his policy making powers relate only to a narrow segment of the budget above the amounts required for mandatory expenditures and increments.[36]

In 1960, in order to strengthen his own position, the superintendent began an experiment by holding budget hearings on a district by district basis. The board was not involved at all in the district hearings, and when members attended they did so only as guests of the superintendent and acted as observers rather than participants.[37] It is to be noted that the board accepted this arrangement willingly and without question.

After the 1963 hearings, which were unruly due to civil rights demonstrations, the superintendent discontinued the procedure. He stated his reason as "... the press of other business, the fact that he and his staff have 'been around the city for four years' and the fact that the tentative budget now is available earlier for consideration by the organizations."[38]

The law also requires that an audit be made at least annually by certified accountants appointed by the board.[39] These auditors are, in addition, to examine the business methods used and make recommendations for changes where necessary. Unfortunately, the board pays little attention to the auditors and the recommendations made. The general superintendent tends to act as the intermediary between the auditors and the board, and any intended relationship between the two is more theoretical than real.[40]

The lag between the adoption of the budget and actual collection of taxes necessitates the use of tax anticipation warrants. These warrants are not general obligations, they have no maturity date (they are paid as taxes are collected) and as a result, the board must pay a higher rate of interest. A working cash fund was established through the sale of bonds in an attempt to lessen the board's dependence on the short term obligations; but a large amount of warrants must still be sold each year.

Because of the uncertainty and complications in marketing the obligations, the board looks to the major Chicago banks and financial community to place the warrants. At least one board member is closely associated with this sector and he forms the link to the system through his associations. Underlying this relationship is a "...deference on the part of the board and an eagerness to stay in the good graces of the financial community."[41]

Bonds are sold to raise funds for school building purposes. They are authorized by the state and approved at referenda of the city's electorate. Tax increases also must pass voter approval. Public participation can be characterized by the wholesale acceptance of the tax increases and bond issues, without receiving a full accounting on the performance of the school system or an evaluation of program expenditures.[42]

Innovation

During the period studied, Chicago had no major school or administrative reorganization. The system has moved from 14 districts in 1955, to its present 22 districts. Suprrintendent Willis expanded the district superintendents' role though his approval was needed for any actions. Chicago had no change in recruitment procedures or selection of personnel.

The official organization of the school system is 8-4. There has been no indication of consideration of 4-4-4 reorganization. Willis, though, did begin to set up 7-8th grade centers. There were no city-wide plans for the program and it has remained experimental.[43]

In compensatory education Chicago has had only limited programming. Prior to the introduction of federal funds, Chicago had no pre-kindergarten program. In 1961, the Chicago Great Cities Project included twenty-six classes in eleven schools.[44] One board member considered the summer school program as one of the city's most important programs.[45] The program was begun in 1960 and utilized three elementary schools. By 1963 the program had expanded to 10 schools, grades 1 to 6, with 600 pupils in each school. Classes are limited to twenty-five. The purpose is to provide as much individual attention as possible for each pupil.[46] With the introduction of federal funds, some of the summer schools now have pre-kindergarten classes. There are no other significant compensatory education programs. Although Chicago is the largest recipient of federal aid funds of the six cities studied it has used those funds mainly for the reduction of class size and the pre-school program.

The Superintendent and the Board

After the resignation of the superintendent in 1946, and the appointment of six new board members, an outsider was appointed to the superintendency. A change in the Otis Law of 1917 was secured to combine the business manager and superintendent into the position of general superintendent. The 1946 appointee became the first unit superintendent in the city. He received a four year contract and $25,000 to become the highest paid public official in Illinois.[47] He believed that a superintendent must maintain contact with the schools and community. He worked with business leaders, labor, civic leaders, and school principals in a Community Coordinating Council. The first outsider retired in 1953 after seven years as superintendent. In his place, another outsider, was appointed.

The new appointee's personality was, in a large part, responsible for board frustration and its subsequent abdication of power. When he first became superintendent he was receptive to suggestions and ideas from both within and outside the system. Community groups were able to contact him. But by 1957, few in the city could get to see him. He had insulated himself from outside pressures and insisted on loyalty from his staff. While many of the board members resented his attitude, no action was taken.[48]

He made plans to decentralize the system and increase the power of the district superintendents. From 1959, they were given the responsibility to submit their own budgets on a per pupil basis. But even though they were given new powers, they needed his approval for any action they wished to take.[49]

As superintendent, he undertook almost everything himself despite objection from his staff. He developed a reputation that he could not deal with people. His attitude towards the union was negative and he purposefully ignored it. His attitude to civil rights groups was much the same.[50]

His top educational staff included no outsiders, though he himself was an outsider. When he came to Chicago, he brought with him the only outside person he had, whom he appointed as budget director.

In the early 1960's various citizens' groups advocated a comprehensive survey of the Chicago schools. They believed that due to increased birth rates following World War II and changes in the socio-economic and racial composition of the city, an examination of education practices was warranted. In November of 1961, the school board authorized a school survey and appointed a committee of its own members to discuss the survey's possibilities. At this point, the superintendent supported the survey.[51] In April, 1963, the survey committee decided to ask Robert Havighurst to direct a full scale, broad study of the Chicago School System. After the appointment was announced, the superintendent stated his opposition to the survey and to Havighurst. After the superintendent threatened to resign over the issue, the board capitulated to his demands and appointed a three-man committee including the superintendent and Havighurst to conduct the study. After his appointment to the committee, the superintendent offered little cooperation, and rarely attended a meeting.[52]

The final report of the Havighurst study was submitted to the board in 1964. Not only were the recommendations never adopted, but they weren't even discussed by the board.[53] This lack of action can only be attributed to the superintendent's power over the board.

In an interview, one board member suggested that the source of the superintendent's power arose from a split within the board on a number of issues and the superintendent's ability to retain the support of the majority.[54] However, a better explanation is that the superintendent in Chicago has been an extremely strong policy maker over the years.

The superintendent's most long-standing disagreement with the board was over integration. He attempted to mask the problem, but with little success. When he discontinued district budget hearings it was because the civil rights groups were using them as a means of protest.[55]

Though the board was committed to integration of both staff and pupils, the superintendent fought for the neighborhood school principle. Apparently he won, for his massive building program only served to promote and increase the segregation pattern then prevalent. In effect his building program negated the board's policy. Large schools were built within the Negro ghetto areas, and smaller facilities were constructed in white neighborhoods.[56]

In 1965, as a result of a complaint to the Office of Education from the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations (a civil rights council), over $30 million in federal funds was withheld from Chicago. The CCCO charged gerrymandering of school districts along racial lines and discrimination in vocational school programs.[57] The payment of funds was stopped because of the protest and the Office of Education scheduled an investigation of the Chicago system. However, due to the intervention of the mayor, the investigation was cancelled and the funds were released.[58]

In 1963, the board ordered the integration of two schools through a pupil transfer program (twenty-four students were to be involved). The order was issued despite the superintendent's objection and was supported by the Courts. The superintendent submitted his resignation to the board. The board voted to reject his resignation and then voted to rescind its order.[59]

In 1965, the superintendent's contract came up for renewal. The board was split on his retention. A compromise was reached and he was rehired under an agreement that he would retire when he reached his sixty-fifth birthday at the end of a year.[60]

He retired in 1966, and another was hired to replace him. The replacement was no stranger to the Chicago school system. Earlier he held the post of assistant superintendent in charge of purchasing. He headed a committee appointed by the board to search for a new superintendent and many observers saw his appointment as no surprise.[61]

With the advent of a new superintendent, the board seems determined to regain control of the system. An atmosphere of 'wait and see' prevails within the city as various groups await the new superintendent's programs. So far, he has not taken any action and, as a result, the status quo has been maintained.

The Union

The Chicago Teachers Union claims a membership of about 14,000.[62] The union is interested in higher salaries and increased benefits. They have not been a positive force in promoting new ideas.

The union is a major obstacle to integration of the staff. They oppose any change in the present teacher transfer policy which attempts to distribute non-tenured teachers throughout the system. Under present policy a teacher may apply for a transfer after one semester in a school by placing his name on lists for four different schools. When his name comes up, he is generally given the appointment. The board had ruled that a school could have no more than 95% certified teachers. At least 5% of teachers in each school would not have tenure. In 1964, the board tried to change that ratio to 90:10, claiming that the teacher shortage necessitated the change. The altered ratio would have increased the difficulty of white teachers transferring out of ghetto schools. After the union threatened a strike, the board pulled back. During the recent contract negotiations, teacher transfers have again become an issue, and the union's position on the issue is unchanged.[63]

Public Participation

The civil rights groups in Chicago have exercised little influence on the public school system. Their most dramatic move was in 1965 when they were temporarily successful in stopping federal funds to the system.

The major civil rights group is the Coordinating Council of Community Organizations. While officially this group is comprised of forty-five business, civic, civil rights, church and professional groups, it has evolved into primarily an organ for the civil rights groups.[64]

The individual civil rights groups in the city are the NAACP, CORE, and the Urban League. Of the three, only the Urban League shows signs of actively attempting to influence the school system. Presently, this group is studying the feasibility of reorganizing the schools into a series of educational parks.[65] (The Urban League in Philadelphia proposed a detailed plan, but it was rejected.)

Two other groups devote all their time to education, and yet have little impact on the system. They are the PTA and the Citizens School Committee. Neither group has attracted more than a handful of Negro members.

The PTA meets occasionally with Redmond, but has little contact with the board. Its members are primarily interested in narrow local issues. Several of the PTA groups appear yearly at the budget hearings to plead for extra money for their schools. Their effect on the total system is negligible.[66]

The Citizens' School Committee is comprised of approximately 200 organizations plus 1,000 individuals.[67] Their main activity is preparing studies and proposals and appearing at budget hearings. They also have a place on the Board of Nominating Commission. The organization has not adjusted to changing city needs. Organized in 1933, it applauded the 1946 appointee as superintendent and enjoyed a close and influential relationship with him.[68] Many of the members of the CSC are the same as those active during his tenure. Most actions today are compared with what he did or would have done.

While the organization makes proposals for change to the board (such as reconstituting the Board of Examiners to exclude the superintendent), it is generally supportive of the system. They didn't approve of the previous superintendent, but supported many of his programs.[69]

The combination of a strong mayor, a weak board, and thirteen years of "iron rule" leadership of the superintendent has left its mark on the Chicago school system. Voting and fiscal independence have certainly not stimulated participation. The Chicago system is virtually closed to the outside participant. The universities and local experts are completely removed and there is little evidence that change will occur. (See Illustration 6.)

Conclusions

Although the center of educational power in the three cities described above varies from the bureaucracy in New York City to the superintendent in Chicago, they have in common a general lack of public participation in the creation of school policy and a tendency to avoid innovation in a period when their responsibilities have been greatly changed and their clientele press for adjustment. None of the three systems have been responsive to mounting pressures and, in fact, reflect a kind of inflexibility which can only be attributed to

ILLUSTRATION 6

PARTICIPATION IN POLICY MAKING... CHICAGO*


DECISION MAKERS
INFLUENCE WIELDERS
REACTORS & SUPPORTERS
PERIPHERAL GROUPS
MAYOR
BOARD
GENERAL SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS
HEADQUARTERS STAFF
CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION
CITIZENS SCHOOLS COMMITTEE
STATE OFFICIALS
PARENTS GROUPS
CIVIL RIGHTS GROUPS
COORDINATING COUNCIL OF COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION
PRESS
ASSOCIATION OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY

* INDEPENDENT

a high degree of insularity developed over the years. In each case, prestigious superintendents, even those from outside the system, have not made any real difference in the structure. Political forces have served to reinforce insulation by removing themselves from responsibility and not insisting upon accountability from the education establishment. As a group they represent a more static kind of large city school system, more descriptive of other large city school systems perhaps than Detroit and Philadelphia.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

Similarity in the problems of large city school systems are matched by the similarity in causes and solutions. Obsolete plants, a lag in capital expenditures, highly centralized bureaucratic systems insulated from the public, growing lower-class non-white populations and inability to adjust programs and institutions to changing needs are symptomatic of all of the city school systems studied.

It is somewhat ironic that public education, which had been nursed on the theories of participatory democracy of John Dewey, has over the years become perhaps the most non-public of governmental services. Public school systems have removed decision-making from the agents closest to the school child -- the teachers and parents, violating traditionally established goals of public education. The concept of public accountability has been abandoned. The school professionals have convinced the various public interests that only they are qualified to make policy. Whether a district is fiscally independent or dependent does not influence the fact that a small core of school people control decisions for public education in every large city.

In each city, school people (reinforced by public attitudes which they have shaped) are emphatic about the need to assure professional decision-making. Public officials are excluded from public education by charges of "political interference," although in many instances such "interference" would more appropriately be classified as an effort to guarantee accountability of public expenditures for public services. Parents have been sidelined in educational policy-making constantly reminded by professionals of their lack of expertise. In almost every city, business groups have abdicated responsibility for public education, as have other organized civic groups.

The insulation of public education is twofold: bureaucratic centralization (or more accurately over-centralization) which is a product of size, reinforced by an idealogical rationale of professionalism, which is a product of the vested interests of the educationists. The result is a static, internalized, isolated system which has been unable to respond to vastly changing needs and demands of large city populations.

Because participants in the policy process are so limited, alternatives are also limited, and school policy choices are narrowly conceived. Innovation is rare, and creativity, competition and experimentation are discouraged.

Detroit and Philadelphia are identified in this study as school systems which are somewhat apart from this pattern. In both cities insulation was less striking and participation of those outside the school establishment was greater. In Detroit a variety of public interest groups were encouraged to participate through the "citizen committee" device, also the comunity-school concept was considered a vital aspect of school policy goals. The number of groups which are critical of the system and offer alternatives is larger than in the other cities. The interest of public officials is also evident.

In Philadelphia business and reform political leaders entered the school scene after a long period of disinterest. Through their efforts the system was exposed to new pressures for change and revitalization. Although still in a transitional stage, the reform of the Philadelphia system has stressed change in top personnel and structure. In the other cities, by contrast, concern with questions of form (i. e., use of the selection panel device or selection of a superintendent from the outside) have not produced significant adjustments conducive to fundamental reorganization.

✓

Perhaps the most significant conclusion one can draw from this comparative analysis is that school systems are very much a product of the political culture of the city, regardless of fiscal status. They reflect the city in microcosm. The general character of community interest and level of organization of various segments of the public in local affairs is likely to be replicated in school affairs. In Detroit, the UAW, civic groups and civil rights groups are active in city affairs in general and their interest is carried over to the education area. In Chicago, these groups are operating ineffectively or on the fringe of city politics as they do in school affairs. A strong mayor with a highly centralized party structure have virtually closed off public participation in the city and in the school system. Reformism has been instrumental in Philadelphia and Detroit in creating an atmosphere conducive to change and flexibility, although resistance in the school system may be strong and result in delay, was was true in Philadelpha and currently in New York City. Political reform movements in a city seem to provide the means and the atmosphere for change in the schools.

Although school people and systems are divorced from city politics in form, the influence of a city political culture pervades school politics. The school system in St. Louis, although fiscally independent, reflects the traditionally conservative policies of the St. Louis business community -- low taxes and low expenditures are the mainstay of city and school policy. Isolation from the city and city politics in the form of fiscal independence, therefore, may produce all of the disadvantages which it seeks to avoid.

On the other hand, school systems seem to have little influence on the political culture of the city. It would be worthwihile to explore further the circumstances in which an atmosphere of school reform and institutional change predate city reform. There are those who have suggested that educational institutions could or should play such a role in society.

Another significant finding in the study is the relevance of the attitude and role of the business community in both city and school politics. In all but three of the cities studied, the business community has abdicated its role on school issues. These are the more static systems. In Detroit and Philadelphia the business groups have strongly encouraged interest in public accountability and have supported more flexible school policy and greater emphasis on public evaluation. In St. Louis the influence of the business community is more conservative but also less direct. In New York City, Chicago and Baltimore the business groups are inactive; all are more closed systems and also more rigid systems. It may be that the Philadelphia and Detroit business groups represent the "reform-city revitalization" orientation which seeks change by involvement rather than the more traditional economy-minded business group approach which is identified with a watch-dog role.

As regards the issue of public participation, many of the groups studied in each city are supportive of established policies. They hesitate to be critical and, as a result, offer too few alternatives to professional thinking. They generally do not challenge the effectiveness of policies once implemented. Comparative analysis identified the civil rights groups as a general exception to this characterization. These groups have replaced the reformers of the turn of the century as critics of the school system. In some cities they represent the only protest or opposition group. Their influence on policy proved to be limited but their role as an opposition is an important one. It was the civil rights group in every city which challenged existing policies and reaffirmed that education was indeed a public function and, therefore, subject to public review. Although more militant groups may have antagonized large segments of the community, and their efforts to achieve integration were unsuccessful, they raised significant questions regarding school policies and policy-making.

In New York City, Detroit and Philadelphia these groups have demanded greater public participation, and it may be that the ultimate development of these mechanisms for public participation will produce opposition groups that will encourage the development of more flexible school policy. Their pressures may also be the source for change in the highly centralized professional structure.

Another conclusion which the study can affirmatively suggest is the importance of external forces as change agents. Federal and foundation programs were primary instruments in encouraging innovation. The efforts of both groups are largely conceived as a means of experimentation and thus in their essence have a guaranteed innovation factor. Too often, however, programs may be abandoned after funds expire, as was true of the early pre-school program in Baltimore, or changes are confined to a small segment of the system as is the case in the Banneker District in St. Louis. Foundation and federal efforts do not produce fundamental institutional changes. Increasing efforts by the federal government which include goals of broadening participation would probably be more influential in producing such changes.

Our hypothesis that fiscal status is of limited significance in explaining differences in innovation and financing seems to be supported by the six-city study. Fiscal restraints imposed by direct voter action on tax limits and bond issues are at least as restrictive as restraints established through direct municipal control over school budgets. State legislative controls, such as those employed in Chicago and Philadelphia appear to be the least desirable, placing the school district in the hands of the legislature which generally means in the hands of the party leadership. Such controls also give rural and suburban legislators considerable power over city school issues which are properly matters for local home rule.

Levels of financing in the six districts seem to be related to the pressures for increased expenditures and their relative intensity. Enrollment increases and salary increases must be met and seem to be the strong determinants of the level of expenditures. The way in which they are met and any extra efforts in staffing are related to the sources of new funds. In the districts that were able to finance expenditures through increased property values, enrollment increases were accommodated with increased staffing ratios and reduced class sizes. Where increased funds had to be raised through higher tax rates, funds for increased expenditures were more difficult to obtain.

At the outset of the study, we believed that innovation was dependent, in part, on the level of new funds made available to the district beyond those necessary to cover traditional increases. We still believe the relationship to hold, but it is not a very useful one in explaining fiscal operations. We now believe that increased expenditures are a function of the level of innovation and not the other way around. None of the districts had substantial "discretionary funds" from local sources with which they could innovate. Rather *all expenditures* were mandated in the sense that they resulted from pressures generated from enrollment increases, teachers' demands for salary increases or reduced teaching time or state mandated programs. Funds will be allocated to new programs only if the pressures for their implementation are as powerful as those exerted by staff and administration to meet their own needs. The conclusion, again, is that innovation can only be achieved as a result of strong community participation with the power to compel both new programs and expenditure increases necessary to finance them. The brief experience in Philadelphia under the new chairman suggests that substantial community involvement provides both the pressure for change and a community atmosphere favorable for obtaining the necessary financing.

Fiscal independence has been advocated to assure the political independence of the school system from such undesirables as "partisan" politicals and political patronage in staff recruitment. Our finding is that the political independence of a school board is not assured by fiscal independence -- the experience of St. Louis prior to 1959 and Philadelphia prior to 1965 testify to this -- but rather upon the board's ability to develop its own base of power through support from community groups. Such support is strengthened where school policy-making is open and community participation is meaningful.

Finally, we offer in Appendix C, a design that we believe can provide a useful framework for extending this study to all large city school districts. It should provide a useful mechanism for meaningful comparison of school system operations.

APPENDIX A

FINANCIAL AND STATISTICAL TABLES

I. Sources of Funds - Chicago
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Table I

Sources of Funds
School District of the City of Chicago
1955 to 1967
(millions of dollars)

Year	Local Taxation	State	Federal	Other	Total
1955	$113.6	$25.9	$1.5	$3.6	$144.6
1956	121.9	28.2	1.7	3.4	155.2
1957	135.8	29.3	1.8	5.0	171.9
1958	150.5	30.7	1.9	5.7	188.8
1959	163.2	37.9	2.8	5.5	209.4
1960	177.5	47.3	3.0	7.2	235.0
1961	197.8	49.6	3.3	5.4	256.1
1962	204.9	51.7	3.5	5.2	265.3
1963	215.5	62.0	3.9	6.5	287.9
1964	221.8	67.3	4.4	6.1	299.6
1965	226.6	74.5	14.6	14.7	330.4
1966	228.8	83.1	39.2	7.9	359.0
1967	233.2	110.6	41.0	12.4	397.2

Sources: Annual Financial Report of the Board of Education,1966.
Annual Budget, Board of Education, 1967.

Table II

Sources of Funds
School District of the City of Detroit
1955/56 to 1966/67
(millions of dollars)

Year	Local Taxation	State	Federal	Other[a]	Total
1955/56	$56.2	$41.1		$4.1	$101.4
1956/57	58.0	46.7		1.9	106.6
1957/58	61.3	45.5		0.8	107.6
1958/59	59.7	46.1		0.8	106.6
1959/60	84.7	42.7		3.4	130.8
1960/61	90.6	42.9	$0.4	4.2	138.1
1961/62	88.5	44.6	1.8	4.2	139.1
1962/63	86.8	48.4	1.3	4.5	141.0
1963/64	87.6	48.8	2.6	6.7	145.7
1964/65	86.2	52.1	5.5	6.1	149.9
1965/66	86.2	61.7	19.8	6.5	174.2
1966/67	80.4	67.1	15.0	6.1	168.6

[a] Federal aid is included in 'other' through 1959/60 'other' also contains county aid and miscellaneous revenue.

Sources: Budget of the Board of Education 1959/60, 1960/61, and 1964/65.
Annual Financial Report Fiscal Year ended June 30, 1966.
Research material from Board of Education, Budget Department.

Table III

Sources of Funds
School District of the City of St. Louis
1955/56 to 1966/67
(millions of dollars)

Year	Local Taxation	State	Federal	Other [a]	Total
1955/56	$19.7	$6.0		$0.7	$26.4
1956/57	22.3	7.3		1.0	30.6
1957/58	22.7	7.9		0.9	31.5
1958/59	25.1	8.1		0.8	34.0
1959/60	25.8	8.5		1.2	35.5
1960/61	28.8	8.5		1.3	38.6
1961/62	29.8	11.6		1.2	42.6
1962/63	29.6	11.7	$0.6	1.1	43.0
1963/64	35.5	12.5	1.2	1.4	50.6
1964/65	34.6	12.7	1.3	1.4	50.0
1965/66	39.4	14.4	7.6	1.8	63.2
1966/67	39.4	15.7	8.0	1.3	64.4

[a] Other includes Federal aid through 1961/62.

Sources: Official Procedures of the Board of Education of the City of St. Louis.
Research material from the Board of Education.
Federal Aid to Education in St. Louis, 1965/66.
Budget, Board of Education, 1966/67.

Table IV

Sources of Funds
Baltimore City School District
1955/56 to 1966/67
(million of dollars)

Year	Local Taxation	State	Federal	Other	Total
1955/56	$27.7	$ 9.5	$ .11	$ .18	$37.5
1956/57	31.7	10.8	.12	.17	42.8
1957/58	34.5	12.0	.13	.18	46.8
1958/59	38.6	15.7	.14	.22	54.7
1959/60	38.6	16.5	.12	.22	55.4
1960/61	40.7	20.1	.23	.30	61.3
1961/62	43.4	21.3	.30	.30	65.3
1962/63	43.3	23.2	.37	.21	67.1
1963/64	45.7	25.3	.42	.28	71.7
1964/65	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1965/66	65.7	30.3	2.6	.52	99.1
1966/67	69.8	33.1	10.5	3.9	117.3

n/a = not available.
[a] Includes amounts spent by other city departments.

Sources: Annual Reports of the Board of School Commissioners, 1955/56 to 1963/64.
School Management Cost of Education Index Survey - 1966-67.
Annual Budget, Baltimore City School District - 1966/67.

Table V

Sources of Funds
City School District of The City of New York
1955/56 to 1966/67
(millions of dollars)

Year	Local Taxation	State	Federal	Other	Total[a]
1955/56	$288.9	$105.0	$0.4	$13.0	$407.3
1956/57	303.8	139.0	0.5	13.2	456.5
1957/58	328.5	140.0	0.5	13.9	482.9
1958/59	346.5	162.7	0.6	14.3	524.1
1959/60	373.7	161.9	1.0	14.4	551.0
1960/61	381.9	197.0	4.9	17.4	601.2
1961/62	412.5	201.4	5.1	27.9	646.9
1962/63	460.3	271.0	4.5	29.0	764.8
1963/64	524.1	265.9	4.4	31.1	825.5
1964/65	601.8	269.3	4.6	34.5	910.2
1965/66	535.6	328.0	5.7	136.4[b]	1005.7[b]
1966/67	666.6	377.1	59.8	47.4	1150.9

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[a] Includes amounts spent by other city departments.
[b] Includes funds raised by city through issue of $99 million in capital notes.

Sources: New York City Budgets 1955/56 - 1963/64.
Expense Budgets of the Board of Education, 1964/65 - 1966/67.

Table VI

Sources of Funds
School District of Philadelphia
1955 to 1965 and 1966/67
(millions of dollars)

Year	Local Taxation	State	Federal	Other	Total
1955	$ 58.3	$17.6	$0.009	$0.6	$ 76.5
1956	59.2	20.0	0.013	0.8	80.0
1957	60.7	22.4	0.001	0.9	84.0
1958	64.0	25.9	0.1	1.0	91.0
1959	64.9	28.6	1.8	1.0	96.3
1960	73.7	28.2	1.6	1.1	104.6
1961	75.4	33.2	2.8	1.2	112.6
1962	77.0	34.3	2.0	1.5	114.8
1963	78.7	39.4	3.5	1.7	123.3
1964	89.1	44.7	3.5	2.1	139.4
1965	91.6	50.4	3.9	2.1	148.0
1966/67	107.3	51.8	39.5	3.0	201.6

Sources: Annual Financial Reports of the Board of Education, 1962 and 1965.
The Proposed Operating Budget of the School District, Fiscal Year 1966/67.

Table VII

Percent of Municipal Taxes for School Support
Six School Districts
1955/56 to 1963/64

Year	Independent			Dependent		
	Chicago	Detroit	St. Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia[a]
1955/56	38.5%	33.8%	27.4%	32.3%	23.1%	39.4%
1956/57	36.8	33.7	29.3	35.0	23.2	39.0
1957/58	38.9	32.3	28.2	34.8	24.8	33.7
1958/59	40.5	31.6	29.6	35.7	24.8	34.9
1959/60	40.8	44.9	28.4	34.3	23.4	34.6
1960/61	41.8	41.6	28.6	34.3	23.1	39.2
1961/62	42.8	41.4	29.5	37.2	24.1	36.9
1962/63	44.4	36.3	29.1	35.6	25.2	36.6
1963/64	41.9	35.3	32.6	36.7	25.6	36.4
1964	42.6					41.3

[a] Calendar years 1955-1964.

Sources: "Table on Revenue, Expenditures and Debt for Cities", in Annual Issues of the Municipal Year Book, 1956-1965 (Chicago: The International City Managers Association.)
Annual financial reports, budgets and research material from boards of education of the six school districts.

Table VIII

Local Tax Effort for Schools
Six School Districts
1955/56, 1961/62 and 1965/66

	Independent			Dependent		
	Chicago[a]	Detroit	St.Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia
Tax Levy (millions of dollars):						
1955/56	$113.6	$56.2	$16.7	$27.7	$288.9	$47.0
1961/62	197.8	88.9	25.3	43.4	412.5	62.0
1965/66	226.6	85.6	33.5	65.7	535.6	75.0
Estimated Full Valuation of Real Property (millions of dollars)						
1955/56	$16969	$10314	$3576	$3628	$25680	$5978
1961/62	19015	11344	3721	4309	33634	5863
1965/66	19703	10394	3776	4761	42942	6174
Implicit Tax Rate per $1000 of Est. Full Valuation:						
1955/56	$ 6.69	$5.45	$4.67	$7.64	$11.25	$ 7.68
1961/62	10.40	7.84	6.80	10.07	12.26	10.57
1965/66	11.50	8.24	8.87	13.80	12.47	12.13

[a] Calendar years 1955, 1961 and 1965.

Sources: National Education Association, Selected Statistics of Local School Systems, 1961/62, 1962/63, 1963/64, and 1964/65.
Annual financial reports, budgets and research material from the boards of education of the six school districts.

Table IX

Capital Expenditures
Six School Districts
1955/56 to 1965/66
(millions of dollars)

Year	Independent			Dependent		
	Chicago[a]	Detroit	St.Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia[a]
1955/56	$18.0	$11.7	$1.7	$10.4	$78.5	$17.6
1956/57	20.8	9.5	0.8	9.6	94.1	11.4
1957/58	27.1	4.8	3.4	12.6	120.8	10.5
1958/59	26.9	33.1	4.7	11.3	91.7	13.1
1959/60	26.5	2.7	2.3	10.0	60.9	9.3
1960/61	51.2	19.5	1.0	14.4	66.6	9.3
1961/62	34.9	23.7	0.6	12.0	90.3	6.5
1962/63	37.6	26.5	0.2	14.6	90.9	15.7
1963/64	21.3	22.6	0.5	14.4	112.1	7.1
1964/65	17.0	17.5	6.1	n/a	139.2	14.8
1965/66	26.5	13.3	2.6	n/a	138.0	7.6

n/a = not available.

[a] Calendar years 1955 - 1965.

Source: Annual financial reports of the boards of education and research material from the boards of education of the six school districts.

Table X

Current Expenditures[a]
Six School Districts
1955/56 to 1965/66
(millions of dollars)

Year	Independent			Dependent		
	Chicago[b]	Detroit	St. Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia[b]
1955/56	$129.8	$ 86.0	$ 24.3	$ 39.0	$351.4	$ 68.9
1956/57	145.4	91.0	27.5	43.8	390.0	75.0
1957/58	151.8	97.5	29.1	48.0	408.2	79.6
1958/59	162.5	103.5	29.8	52.4	429.7	83.1
1959/60	179.0	109.0	30.0	53.4	462.0	87.1
1960/61	197.4	119.2	34.1	61.1	509.0	97.7
1961/62	207.8	123.5	40.6	63.8	566.8	101.6
1962/63	226.3	130.0	n/a	69.7	667.7	106.0
1963/64	236.9	126.0	n/a	73.3	727.4	115.2
1964/65	247.5	135.7	48.1	n/a	763.4	128.8
1965/66	266.6	149.4	52.7	89.6	877.4	140.4
% Increase (1955/56-1965/66)	105.4%	73.7%	116.0%	129.7%	149.9%	103.8%

n/a = not available.

[a] Current expenditures exclude debt service and capital outlay but include transportation, school lunch programs, and fringe benefits.

[b] Calendar years 1955 - 1965.

Source: Annual financial reports and research material from the boards of education of the six school districts.

Table XI

Current Expenditures Per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance
Six School Districts
1955/56 to 1965/66

Year	Independent			Dependent		
	Chicago[a]	Detroit[b]	St. Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia
1955/56	$342.11	$315.38	$285.88	$298.99	$436.30	$335.57
1956/57	371.13	328.05	314.71	322.91	478.59	364.59
1957/58	386.88	346.39	328.01	347.53	501.51	385.31
1958/59	398.30	364.47	322.21	366.46	511.45	405.53
1959/60	428.22	384.61	331.20	364.67	536.76	411.84
1960/61	461.33	417.63	364.27	409.95	590.06	451.72
1961/62	471.21	428.68	426.82	413.90	641.33	465.34
1962/63	504.81	445.23	n/a	441.59	735.06	480.32
1963/64	509.41	427.98	n/a	450.02	795.42	505.02
1964/65	511.98	460.54	466.66	n/a	830.08	549.09
1965/66	542.11	506.24	502.68	530.19	960.38	587.94
% Increase (1955/56-1965/66)	58.5%	60.5%	75.5%	77.3%	120.1%	75.2%

n/a = not available.

[a] Calendar years 1956 - 1966.

[b] Detroit uses September membership figures in place of ADA. ADA is roughly 90% of September membership.

Source: Financial and statistical reports of the boards of education of the six school districts and research material from the boards of education.

Table XII

State Aid as a Percent of Current Expenditures
Six School Districts
1955/56 to 1965/66

	Independent			Dependent		
Year	Chicago	Detroit	St. Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia
1955/56	20.0	47.1	24.5	24.3	28.3	25.6
1956/57	19.4	46.0	26.6	24.6	35.6	26.6
1957/58	19.3	44.9	27.3	25.0	34.3	28.2
1958/59	18.5	41.5	27.1	29.9	37.9	31.2
1959/60	21.2	41.0	28.4	30.9	35.0	36.8
1960/61	24.0	37.8	22.5	32.8	38.7	29.0
1961/62	23.9	35.5	28.5	33.4	35.5	32.8
1962/63	22.9	33.4	n/a	33.2	40.6	37.7
1963/64	26.2	38.0	n/a	34.6	36.6	34.7
1964/65	27.2	37.8	26.4	n/a	35.2	35.4
1965/66	27.9	39.4	27.2	33.8	37.4	36.8

n/a = not available.

Source: Annual financial reports, budgets and research material from the boards of education of the six school districts.

Table XIII

Class Size
Six School Districts
1955/56 to 1965/66

Year	Independent			Dependent		
	Chicago	Detroit	St. Louis[a]	Baltimore	New York[b]	Philadelphia
1955/56	37.3	35.4	n/a	39.4	30.1	34.8
1956/57	37.2	34.6	n/a	39.3	29.9	35.4
1957/58	37.2	34.5	36.0	38.5	29.6	35.5
1958/59	37.4	34.3	n/a	37.0	29.6	35.4
1959/60	37.0	34.3	n/a	36.3	30.4	36.4
1960/61	36.3	34.5	35.1	35.5	30.1	36.2
1961/62	35.4	34.1	34.9	35.4	30.6	35.9
1962/63	34.0	34.8	35.0	35.5	30.3	35.7
1963/64	33.4	35.5	34.7	36.1	29.3	35.3
1964/65	33.6	35.6	n/a	36.1	29.1	33.7
1965/66	33.6	35.0	33.8	35.8	27.7	31.5
% Decrease (1955/56–1965/66)	9.9%	1.1%	3.3%[c]	9.1%	8.0%	9.5%

n/a = not available.
All figures are median class size for elementary school except where noted.
[a] pupil-teacher ratio for elementary school.
[b] mean class size for elementary school.
[c] % decrease 1957/58 – 1965/66.

Source: Statistical reports and other material from the boards of education of the six school districts.

Table XIV

Number of Classroom Teachers
Six School Districts
1955/56 to 1965/66

Year	Independent			Dependent		
	Chicago	Detroit	St. Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia
1955/56	12291	8842[a]	3006	4689	34147	7905
1956/57	12887	n/a	3096	4908	35128	8021
1957/58	13433	n/a	3226	5136	36848	8050
1958/59	14080	n/a	3294	5391	38082	8253
1959/60	14689	n/a	3236	5595	38079	8387
1960/61	15303	10464[b]	3419	5844	39142	8519
1961/62	16426	n/a	3494	6020	40099	8697
1962/63	17581	9648[b]	3578	6187	n/a	8793
1963/64	17839	9333[b]	3686	6349	44679	9066
1964/65	18452	10032[b]	3810	6576	45726	9479
1965/66	19019	10223	3977	6910	46980	10048
% Increase (1955/56-1965/66)	54.7%	15.6%	32.3%	47.4%	37.6%	27.1%

n/a = not available.

Sources:
[a] *Biennial Survey of Education in the United States, 1954-1956*, Chapter 3, Section I, pp. 11, 14, 26, 30.
[b] *Selected Statistics of Local School Systems*, *1960/61*, *1962/63*, *1963/64*, and *1964/65*: National Education Association Research Reports.

Budgets, statistical reports and research material from the boards of education of the six school districts.

Table XV

Average Daily Attendance
Six School Districts
1955/56 to 1965/66

Year	Independent			Dependent		
	Chicago[a]	Detroit[b]	St. Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia
1955/56	379405	272528	85001	130472	805407	205457
1956/57	391772	277347	87383	135617	814886	205044
1957/58	392366	281451	88716	138080	813934	206572
1958/59	407988	283850	92485	142945	840161	204988
1959/60	418008	283399	90581	146566	860719	211407
1960/61	427894	285304	93611	149139	862627	216277
1961/62	440995	288146	95121	154131	883792	218438
1962/63	448288	292119	97726	157935	908357	220650
1963/64	465048	294527	100496	162807	914485	228050
1964/65	483414	294727	103073	167136	919665	234571
1965/66	491786	295177	104857	168488	913599	238760
% Increase (1955/56-1965/66)	29.6%	8.3%	23.4%	29.1%	13.4%	16.2%

[a] Calendar years 1955-1965.

[b] September membership given rather than ADA; ADA in Detroit is approximately 90% of September membership.

Source: Annual financial and statistical reports of the boards of education and other research material supplied by the boards of education of the six school districts.

Table XVI

Distribution of Federal Aid
Six School Districts
1963/64 to 1966/67
(millions of dollars)

Year	Independent			Dependent		
	Chicago[a]	Detroit	St. Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia[b]
Total Federal Aid						
1963/64	$ 4.4	$ 2.6	$ 1.2	$ .6	$ 3.5	$ 4.4
1964/65	14.6	5.5	1.3	1.0	3.9	4.6
1965/66	39.2	19.8	7.6	2.6	12.2	5.7
1966/67	41.0	15.0	8.0	10.5	39.5	59.8
Total for four years	$99.2	$42.9	$18.1	$14.7	$59.1	$74.5
Federal Funds Per Pupil in Average Daily Attendance[c]						
1963/64	$ 9.10	$ 8.83[d]	$11.94	$ 3.69	$ 14.92	$ 4.81
1964/65	29.69	18.66[d]	12.61	5.98	16.33	5.00
1965/66	78.57	67.08[d]	72.48	15.43	50.21	6.24
1966/67	80.92	50.47[d]	74.77	61.40	159.79	65.35
Total Federal Funds for Four Years Per Average ADA for the Four Years	$200.16	$145.12[d]	$174.28	$ 87.84	$245.35	$ 81.41

[a] Data for calendar years 1964, 1965, 1966, and 1967.

[b] Data for calendar years 1964, 1965: fiscal years 1965/66 and 1966/67.

[c] ADA for 1966/67, except for Detroit, was projected, based upon an average rate of increase of the three previous years.

[d] September membership rather than ADA.

Source: Annual financial reports, budgets and research material supplied by the boards of education of the six school districts.

Table XVII

Percentage Increase in Instructional Personnel and Their Distribution Between 1955 and 1965 Six School Districts

	Increase in Classroom Teachers			Increase in Other Instructional Staff
	Total	To Cover New Pupils	Improved Staffing Ratio	
Independent				
Chicago	54.7%[a]	29.6%[b]	25.1%[c]	145.4%[d]
Detroit	15.6	8.3	7.3	160.6
St. Louis	32.3	23.4	8.9	42.0
Dependent				
Baltimore	47.4	29.1	18.3	288.4
New York	37.6	13.4	24.2	36.5
Philadelphia	27.1	16.2	11.0	44.4

Sources:
[a] Computed from data in Appendix A, Table XIV.
[b] Appendix A, Table XV.
[c] Total less percentage to cover new pupils (in average daily attendance.)
[d] Computed from differences in total instructional personnel less classroom teachers obtained from annual reports of the six districts for the indicated years.

Table XVIII

School Enrollment
Six School Districts
1956 - 1966

	Independent			Dependent		
	Chicago	Detroit	St. Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia
School Population						
Enrollment - 1956	416,224	280,491	89,182	152,663	899,518	266,190
Enrollment - 1966	570,597	297,035	116,798	192,416	1,084,818	270,499
Percent Increase 1956 - 1966	37%	6%	31%	26%	21%	20%
Racial Composition Non-white - 1966	54%	57%	62%	63%	50%	58%
Percent Elementary School Pupils Attending Private Schools - 1960	35	24.5%	27.7%	19.6%	30.8%	39.3%

Sources: Determinants of Educational Expenditures in Large Cities of the United States, H. Thomas James, James Kelly, and Walter Garms. (Stanford, California, Stanford University School of Education, 1966.)

Status Report/1967, (Chicago: The Research Council of the Great Cities Program for School Improvement, 1967.)

Table XIX

Population
Six Cities
1950 and 1960

	Independent			Dependent		
	Chicago	Detroit	St. Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia
Total City - 1950	3,620,962	1,849,568	856,796	949,708	7,891,957	2,071,605
Total City - 1960	3,550,404	1,670,144	750,026	939,024	7,781,984	2,002,512
Percent Change 1950-1960	2%	10%	12%	1%	1%	3%
Racial Composition Non-White - 1960	24%	29%	29%	35%	15%	27%

Source: Status Report/1967, (Chicago: The Research Council of the Great Cities Program for School Improvement, 1967.)

Table XX

Distribution of Non-White
City, School and School Staff Population
Six School Districts
1960, 1966, 1967

	Independent			Dependent		
	Chicago	Detroit	St.Louis	Baltimore	New York	Philadelphia
Percent Non-white city population (1960)	24%	29%	29%	35%	15%	27%
Percent Non-white pupil population (1966)	54	57	62	63	50	58
Percent Non-white school board members (1967)	18	28	33	22	22	22
Percent Non-white school personnel	n/a					
Elementary teachers		32[a]	58.5[b]	53[c]	8.8[d]	36.5[e]
Secondary teachers		32	36	40	5	21
Elementary principals and assistant principals		n/a	39[f]	20	5	11
Secondary principals and assistant principals		n/a	33	20	2.1	26
Central Administrative personnel		n/a	47.5	24	26.8	17

n/a = not available.

[a] Percentage for Detroit is for 1967.

[b] Percentages for St. Louis are for 1966-67.

[c] Percentages for Baltimore are for 1965.

[d] Percentages for New York teachers and central personnel are for 1966; others are for 1966-67.

[e] Percentages for Philadelphia are for 1966.

[f] Only principals.

Sources: Interview with school officials of the six school districts; Status Report/1967, (Chicago: The Research Council of the Great Cities Program for School Improvement, 1967); Data provided by the boards of education of the six school districts.

APPENDIX B

INNOVATIONS IDENTIFIED IN SIX CITY SCHOOL DISTRICTS

These tables summarize the major recommendations of independent studies of the six city school districts, indicating the date of implementation, where appropriate. Major recommendations are listed under "administrative organization," "school reorganization," and "compensatory education."

If the recommendations have been implemented, the date of implementation appears in parenthesis after the name of the study. An 'a' indicates that the designated city already has implemented the recommendation made for another city.

The independent studies that were surveyed and the abbreviations used to identify them in the tables follow:

Baltimore:

CSAC - Citizens School Advisory Committee, Abridgement of Studies and Recommendations to the Board of School Commissioners of the Baltimore City Public Schools (Baltimore: November, 1964.)

BCRC - Baltimore Community Relations Commission, Survey of Baltimore Public Schools (Baltimore: 1965.)

Chicago:

Havighurst - Robert J. Havighurst, The Public Schools of Chicago, A Survey for the Board of Education of the City of Chicago (Chicago: 1964.)

Hauser - Report to the Board of Education, City of Chicago by the Advisory Panel on Integration of the Public Schools, March, 1964.

Detroit:

CAC - Findings and Recommendations of the Citizens Advisory Committee on School Needs (Detroit, Michigan: November, 1958.)

CACE - Findings and Recommendations of the Citizens Advisory Committee on Educational Opportunity (Detroit: Board of Education, March, 1962.)

New York:

Allen - Desegregating the Public Schools of New York City (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1948.)

CPM - Cresap, Paget, McCormick, Consulting firm.

Schinnerer - Mark Schinnerer, A Report to the New York Education Department (1961.)

S - Y - George Strayer and Louis Yavner, Administrative Management of the School System in New York City, Vol. I and II, October, 1951.

Philadelphia:

Comm. on N-D - Report of the Special Committee on Nondiscrimination of the Board of Public Education of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Submitted to the Board of Public Education, July 26, 1964.

GPM - The Greater Philadelphia Movement, A Citizens Study of Public Education in Philadelphia (May, 1962 and November, 1962.)

Odell - William R. Odell, Educational Survey Report for the Philadelphia Board of Public Education (Philadelphia: the Board of Education, February 1, 1965.)

Task Force - Reports of the Task Force to the Incoming Board of Education (Philadelphia: November 8, 1965.)

Innovations Identified in Six City School Districts
1955 - 1966

Recommendation	Independent			Dependent		
	Chicago (Date Implemented)	Detroit (Date Implemented)	St. Louis (Date Implemented)	Baltimore (Date Implemented)	New York (Date Implemented)	Philadelphia* (Date Implemented)
Administrative Organization						
Supervisory Staff - Organization - Personnel Policy:						
1. Racial Integration		CAC (1959,62)	a			
2. Eliminate Board of Examiners					S - Y	
3. Eliminate Board of Superintendents	a	a			CPM (1962)	
4. Increased Responsibility for Local Superintendents		a			a	Odell
5. Establish Curriculum Development Superintendent	a			CSAC (1964)		a
6. Establish Personnel Superintendent	a	a		a	a	Odell (1964)
7. Establish Examinations for Principals	a	a	a	a	a	Comm. on N-D (1964)
8. Strengthen High School Principals	Havighurst					
General Organization						
1. Central Information Service	a	a		CSAC		a
2. Central Evaluation and Planning					a	Odell (1967)
3. Central Research and Development	Havighurst	a			a	a

Recommendation	Independent Chicago (Date Implemented)	Detroit (Date Implemented)	St. Louis (Date Implemented	Dependent Baltimore (Date Implemented)	New York (Date Implemented)	Philadelphia* (Date Implemented)
4. Create Unit on Integration	Havighurst [a]					Comm. on N-D (1965)
5. Create Citizens Advisory Committee		CAC (1962)				
School Boards						
1. Independent Nominating Committee	a			CSAC	S-Y (1961)	GPM (1966)
2. Board Elections		a	a		S-Y	
3. Reorganization of Local School Boards					Schinnerer (1962)	
Teaching Staff						
1. Outside Recruitment	CAC[a]	a		CSAC (1965)	a	GPM (1964,67)
2. Integrate Staff	Hauser	CACE (1962)	CAC		Allen	
3. Ease Tenure Requirements				CSAC		
School Reorganization						
School Integration Prog.						
1. Open Enrollment	Hauser		CAC		a	
2. Princeton Plan				BCRC		Comm. on N-D
3. Educational Parks					Allen	Urban League
4. Flexible School Boundaries	Havighurst	CAC (1965)	CAC			
5. K-6-3-3		CAC (1960)		a		
6. Middle Schools					Allen	Odell (1967)
7. 4-4-4					Allen	Comm. on N-D (1966)
8. Self-contained Classrooms		CAC(1960)				
9. Team Teaching	a	CACE (1962)		CSAC	a	Odell[a]

Recommendation	Independent			Dependent		
	Chicago (Date Implemented)	Detroit (Date Implemented)	St. Louis (Date Implemented)	Baltimore (Date Implemented)	New York (Date Implemented)	Philadelphia* (Date Implemented)
10. Ungraded classes		CACE (1964)	a			Odell (1961)
11. Educational T. V.	a	a		CSAC	a	a
High Schools						
1. Comprehensive High School		CAC			Allen	Comm. on N-D
2. Four Year High School	a		a		Allen (1965)	
Compensatory Education						
1. Summer High School Program		a		CSAC (1966)		1966
2. Adult Education	Havighurst	a				
3. After-School Program	Havighurst	a		CSAC		Odell
4. Great Cities Program	a	CAC (1959)				Odell[a]
5. Special Guidance Prog.		CAC		CSAC (1966)		Odell (1967)
6. Work-Study Program	Havighurst	CAC (1965)		CSAC (1965)	a	Odell (1967)
7. Kindergarten Expansion						Odell (1966)
8. Pre-Kindergarten	Havighurst[a]	a		CSAC (1965)	Allen (1966)	Odell (1967)
9. Reading Program		a				Comm. on N-D (1966)
10. Smaller Class Size	Havighurst	CAC (1962)	a			
11. Summer Schools	a	a		CSAC (1966)	a	Comm on N-D (1966)
12. Teacher Training	Havighurst	a		CSAC (1966)	Allen (1966)	Odell
13. Use of School Volunteers		a		CSAC	a	Task Force (1967)

*Independent until 1966.

[a] Programs exist independent of studies.

APPENDIX C

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A DESIGN FOR COMPARATIVE RESEARCH ON THE OPERATIONS OF LARGE CITY SCHOOL SYSTEMS

The Model

The output that this design seeks to develop as most indicative of performance is innovation.

Innovation is defined as the successful introduction to an applied situation of means or ends that are new to that situation.

Change is postulated as a function of three sets of variables: (1) changes in the level of school expenditures, (2) administrative process and (3) the extent and nature of outside participation in the system.

Application of the research design involves first the identification of change in selected districts, establishment of measures of change, construction of an index of adaptability and then relating the index to selected measures of the three sets of independent variables. Finally, the relationship of these three sets of variables should be related to fiscal status and other determinants to the extent they can be identified.

Measurement of Outputs: Innovation

For purposes of measurement, innovation as an output is sub-classified into three categories:

1. Program innovation for the disadvantaged (including integration programs)
2. Administrative reorganization
3. School reorganization

Administrative reorganization is defined as a redistribution of power within the school bureaucracy. School reorganization is defined as a redistribution of grades among elementary, middle and high schools.

Changes in these two areas should be classified first with respect to whether or not they occurred and second by the extent to which they have been implemented in the school system.

In measuring program innovation, each of the programs for each of the districts should be identified and the following information obtained:

1. Source of the idea
2. Date issue raised
3. Date accepted as board policy
4. Extent of implementation (percent of pupils eligible for program who are included in program at the beginning of the third year following the adoption of the board policy).

Districts should be ranked in relation to these programs as follows:

1. Leadership - by chronological date of acceptance of program: the earlier the program was accepted as board policy, the higher the ranking.
2. Receptivity - by period of time between the date the issue was first raised and the program was adopted as board policy; the shorter the period of time, the higher the rank.
3. Implementation - by percentage of pupils eligible for program who are included at the beginning of the third school year following adoption: the higher the percentage, the higher the ranking. (Excludes programs adopted subsequent to 1964.)

Districts that have not adopted or implemented one or more of the programs are ranked last for that program category.

Programs are identified in terms of the objectives they seek to accomplish. All of the school districts will fall into one of three categories: those that experiment widely; those that have adopted similar programs in response to community pressures coupled with the availability of funds from outside sources: and those that have few, if any, program innovations. A sufficient number of common programs should be found among districts in the first two categories to permit ranking for "leadership," "receptivity" and "implementation." Those in the third category will by definition be non-innovative.

Ranking of Districts According to Innovativeness

After all of the changes have been identified, pattern analysis or similar techniques may be used to identify the number of categories that can be established. At the very minimum, the twenty [illegible] into one of three categories: "highly innovative ;" "moderately innovative:" and "little or no innovation." Hopefully, pattern analysis will identify more than three categories. At best, all twenty districts may be ranked according to innovativeness.

If output is measured in three to five categories, discriminant analysis may be used to relate the inputs to outputs. On the other hand, more powerful multivariate techniques could be used if all of the districts can be ranked by innovativeness.

Measurement of Inputs

A suggested set of inputs have been defined for measurement.

Changes in the level of expenditures are believed to be a significant corollary of innovation. The level of school expenditures at any given time are committed to a given educational process with specified programs, defined staffing ratios and established salary scales.

As a result, expenditures pattern and its determinants, once established, are difficult to change. In budget-making parlance, existing expenditures (adjusted for changes in the number of pupils, negotiated salary increases and automatic increments) are considered "mandated" expenditures for the subsequent year's budget. If significant changes associated with "quality improvement" are to be effected, they can be only through budget appropriations in excess of the mandated increases. The study of the New York City school system disclosed that, over the last decade and despite a more than doubling of the school budget, only a small percentage of the budget increase could be associated with significant changes in the educational process. Almost all of the increased expenditures were mandated by either enrollment increases or negotiated increases in salaries.

Fiscal Inputs

Variables to be analyzed in relation to changes in school expenditures include:

1. Change in net current expenditures per ADA.
2. Change in net current expenditures per ADA divided by median family income.
3. Change in state aid as a proportion of net current expenditures.
4. Change in local support for schools.
5. Changes in capital expenditures.

Administrative Inputs

The primary determinants of a high level of inventiveness or innovation within any organization are highly creative individuals and an organizational environment that is conducive to creativity. Organization specialists have been concerned for some time with the elements of organization or the kind of structure that encourages innovation. They have concluded that an organic structure, in which authority resides in expertise rather than hierarchical position is more flexible and therefore more inclined to innovation. Some experts have indicated the importance of power equalized participative management as a means of overcoming resistance to change. In the selection of variables that can be measured to determine the relative encouragement of creativity in each of the school systems the following were considered most appropriate:

1. Ratios of Bureaucratization: The ratio of bureaucratization particularly in large systems should indicate whether or not a greater degree of centralization and extensive elaboration of the administrative structure are detrimental to innovation. The ratios are (1) number of central administrative staff to total number of teachers in the system, (2) the increase or decrease in that ratio over a five-year period, (3) the ratio of central administration staff to number of students, (4) its relative increase over a five-year period and (5) change in administrative costs per pupil.
2. Index of Internalization: This index will measure the insularity of the professional staff through its own self selection processes. Measures are (1) total proportion of top supervisory staff (directors and above) appointed from within the system, (2) total proportion of principals appointed from within the system and (3) the presence or absence of special city qualifying examinations.

3. Top Heaviness of System: Another factor to be considered will be the proportion of professional personnel receiving over $15,000 (or some multiple of average taacher's salaries) a year within the administrative structure and the rate of change in the proportion over the last decade.

4. Extent of Centralization: Districts can be classified into three categories.

   Highly Centralized: No local school board and/or local district: budgetary and appointment powers are at central headquarters: local superintendent's powers are limited to providing district-wide services such as substitute teachers; local superintendent has small clerical staff.

   Centralized: Local school boards have only community relation functions; budgetary powers are centralized:

   power to transfer teachers, participate in budget preparation, and have large staff.

   Decentralized: Local school boards have budgetary power to select district superintendents. Local superintendent has appointment over staff, principals and teachers.

5. Power of Superintendent: The superintendent as the chief executive officer of the school system is a subject of primary concern. The categories are as follows:

   Strong Superintendent: Prepares and controls own budget: appoints top supervisory staff; influences appointment of board members: tenure of office under contract longer than the board.

Limited Power: Board has its own advisory staff especially on budget: superintendent must appoint staff from approved lists: serves at discretion of board or for contract term less than board members.

Shared Power: Superintendent reviews budget proposed by board: shares power with top associates in formal organization: plays limited role in choice of top staff.

Weak Superintendent: Role is limited solely to supervision of instructional programs.

Supplementary personal data should be obtained: age, insider or outsider. prior experience. traditions of office for last ten years.

6. Power of Top Administrative Staff: Classification is as follows:

Powerful: Formal organization recognized by school board: makes public policy statements on own initiative; disagrees publicly with superintendent: communicates directly with board members: staff not appointed by superintendent in office: participates in appointment of superintendent.

Limited Power: Informal association: meets periodically with superintendent as group: issues public statements on initiative but is supportive of superintendent.

Little Power: Serves at pleasure of superintendent: limited power for defined roles: implements directives of superintendent: communicates to board through superintendent.

Supplementary data to be obtained: age, background, education and experience of supervisors; selection procedures and tenure regulations of the system.

7. Power of the School Board: Classification is as follows:

    Strong Board: Visible contact with mayor: board term longer than mayor's: standing committees: sizable staff: membership potentially active: superintendent appointed for same terms as or shorter than board members.

    Moderately Strong Board: Staff-mixed characteristics of strong and weak board.

    Weak Board: Serves at discretion of mayor; apolitical membership: no staff: superintendent's term longer than board's term: superintendent participates in selection of board members: no standing committees.

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recruitment of board members.

8. Strength of Teachers Association: Classification is as follows:

    Formally Recognized Bargaining Agent: Bargain on salary and school issues.

    Formally Recognized Bargaining Agent: Bargain on salaries only.

    Dominant Professional Association: Bargain on salary and school issues.

    Dominant Professional Association: Bargain on salaries only.

    Dominant Professional Association: Activity limited to occasional policy statement.

No Dominant Professional Association.

Measurement of Community Participation Inputs

Quantification in this category is most difficult to achieve. The role of outside participants is continually shifting depending upon the issue. Yet it is the strength of their presence that may determine the responsiveness of the system to public demands. Among the outside participants to be considered in this area are (a) direct public participation; (b) special education interest groups; (c) general interest groups; (d) municipal officials; (e) state officials; (f) federal officials and (g) foundations.

1. Direct Public Participation: Direct public participation will be classified (1) on basis of presence or absence of opportunity for direct participation and (2) the actual participation.

Public Vote Districts: Voting on tax limit, budget, or selection of school board when such elections have taken place.

limit, budget, and/or board issue, but where referenda are episodic.

Public Participation at Hearings: Board hearings held routinely on school budgets and/or major need policies.

Limited Public Participation: Public hearings limited to school budget; board meetings open to the public.

No Direct Participation: No public hearings except on school budget; most major policy decisions discussed and resolved privately.

In systems in which regular public votes take place, districts will be ranked in proportion of those voting on school issues in proportion to the number of votes cast for the head of the ticket.

2. Interest Groups (Special Education and General Groups:) The number of groups distributed in these categories will determine ranking.

   Continually Active: Groups that meet regularly with superintendent and staff in order to influence educational policy; prepare proposals on own initiative: maintain professional education staff; shape policies periodically in two of the following areas - budgeting, curriculum, and appointment of superintendent.

   Limited Interest-Action Groups: Groups that deal with education issues on an (ad hoc) basis. One or two areas of interest: part time education staff; (ad hoc) meeting

   Influential Groups: Demonstrate influence on major school policy with no continuing interest.

   In addition, each of the groups in these categories will be classified according to:

   a. Character of members: economic notables: professional educators: civil rights: parents groups: parents association.

   b. Nature of influence: innovative, supportive of innovation; supportive of budget increases: supportive of school officials; critical of school officials: taxpayer groups, etc.

3. Role of Municipal Officials: Separate rankings will be made for financial and selected areas of political influence:

   (a) Financial Categories:

      (1) Fiscally independent school districts with power over tax rates, budgeting, and auditing and operating with debt-tax leeway.

      (2) Fiscal independent school districts operating at or near statutory or constitutional tax and debt limits.

      (3) Fiscally dependent districts receiving lump-sum budget appropriations with right of transfer of funds after budgetary allocation.

      (4) Fiscally dependent districts operating under line-item budget.

   (b) Political Categories: Selection of Board

      (1) Mayor appoints board for longer term of office than his own.

      (2) Mayor appoints board and they serve at his pleasure or for terms of office shorter than his own.

      (3) Mayor appoints board from list submitted by selection panel.

      (4) Mayor appoints board for confirmation by public referendum.

(5) School board is elected at non-partisan elections held in conjunction with other municipal elections.

(6) School board is elected through partisan elections.

(7) School board is elected at non-partisan special elections.

(c) Political Categories: Selection of Superintendent

(1) Mayor appoints superintendent or reviews appointment.

(2) Mayor influences appointments.

(3) Mayor plays no identifiable role in selection of superintendent.

(d) Political Categories: Mayor's Influence over School Policies

(1) Takes regular public policy position on school issues.

(2) Meets with board on school policy.

(3) Issues occasional policy statements.

(4) Removes himself from school issues.

(e) Political Categories: Staff Assistance for Education (Excludes budget function)

(1) Maintains professional education staff.

(2) Designate full-time special assistant on education.

(3) Relies on regular staff assistant who has responsibility for education and other issues.

        (4) Relies upon school board and superintendent for expertise on education.

4. State Participation: Several analyses will be made in this category.
    (a) Percentage of net current expenditures covered by state aid.
    (b) Nature of state aid:
        (1) Program by program allocation.
        (2) Formula-determined aid program plus special program allocation.
        (3) Formula-determined aid program.
    (c) State Policy influence:
        (1) State education commissioner makes periodic recommendations on city education program or exercises statutory authority to intervene periodically in crisis situation.
        (2) State education commissioner plays role in city education program through private intervention with board members.
        (3) State education commissioner is involved in city school policy, if at all, only at invitation of board.

5. Federal Participation:
    (a) Ranking of districts on basis of proportion of federal aid to net current expenditures.
    (b) School district - federal involvement.

(1) High involvement: Designated school official at director (or above level) concerned specifically with liaison with federal government: regular consultation with U. S. Office of Education.

(2) Low involvement: Little liaison or interest in stimulating federally supported programs.

In addition, the nature and extent of federally supported programs will be described and evaluated.

6. Foundation Participation: No specific criteria have been defined. The nature and extent of foundation-supported research programs should be identified to discern any prevailing pattern.

REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 1

[1] Appendix A to Contract No. OE-6-10-124, revised August 10, 1965, p. 12.

[2] See Part I, p. 15, *supra*. The results of the sample of 1177 city school districts were analyzed in six size categories as follows:

Size Group No.	Number of Pupils	n	N
1	100,000 or more	17	21
2	50,000-99,999	47	49
3	25,000-49,999	51	72
4	12,000-24,999	187	299
5	6,000-11,999	317	758
6	3,000- 5,999	558	1589
		1177	2788

[3] See Part I, p. 78, *supra*.

[4] George W. Ebey, *Adaptability Among the Elementary Schools of an American City* (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1940.)

[5] Francois S. Cillie, *Centralization or Decentralization? A Study in Educational Adaptation* (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1940.)

[6] Cleve O. Westby, *Local Autonomy for School Communities in Cities*, revised edition (New York: Bureau of Publications, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1947.)

[7] Alvin W. Hicks, *A Plan to Accelerate the Process of Adaptation in a New York City School-Community* (New York: Unpublished Ed.D. Project, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1942.)

[8] Stanton F. Leggett and William S. Vincent, *A Program for Meeting the Needs of New York City Schools* (New York: Public Education Association, 1947.)

[9] Board of Education, City School District of the City of New York, *Annual Financial and Statistical Report*, 1965-1966 (New York, 1966.)

[10] Marilyn Gittell, *Participants and Participation: A Study of School Policy in New York City* (New York: Center for Urban Education, 1967.)

[11] The financing of the Philadelphia School system will be reviewed in more detail in Chapter 3.

[12] The financing of the St. Louis school system will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.

REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 2

[1] Austin P. Swanson, "Relations Between Community Size and School Quality," *IAR Research Bulletin*, III (October, 1961), 3.

[2] The present superintendent (Donovan) has taken several steps to enhance the position of the district superintendent by adding to the latter's staff and budgetary powers. Under new procedures the district superintendent is given the opportunity to distribute personnel and financial resources among the schools in his district as he sees fit. Whether or not the district superintendents will take advantage of these powers depends upon their willingness to take on responsibility for decision making. From responses to a questionnaire optimism is not warranted. Gittell, *op.cit*., Chapter II, n. 13.

[3] Robert J. Havighurst, *The Public Schools of Chicago* (Chicago: The Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 1964); William R. Odell, *Educational Survey Report for the Philadelphia Board of Public Education* (Philadelphia: The Board of Public Education, 1965); The Greater Philadelphia Movement, *A Citizens Study of Public Education in Philadelphia* (Philadelphia: Greater Philadelphia Movement, 1962); Citizens Advisory Committee, Equal Educational Opportunities (March, 1962); Citizens School Advisory Committee, *Report of the Committee to the Board of School Commissioners of the Baltimore City Public Schools, Abridgement of Studies and Recommendations* (Baltimore, 1964); Citizens Advisory Committee to the St. Louis Board of Education, *Final Report* (St. Louis, 1963.) Currently, several consultant firms are preparing specialized studies of the school systems. Ernst and Ernst is studying business methods of the Detroit system; Booz-Allen Hamilton is studying administrative reorganization of the Chicago system; Stanford Research Survey is doing a budgeting study of New York.

[4] Office of the City Administrator, *Board of Education Organization and Management of School Planning and Construction* (1959); Education Commissioner's Committee on Inquiry into Charges of Waste and Extravagance in Construction of School Buildings in New York City, *School Construction in New York City* (1959); Mark Schinnerer, *A Report to the New York City Education Department* (1961.)

[5] Citizens Advisory Committee to the St. Louis Board of Education, *op.cit*.

[6] Citizens Advisory Committee on School Needs, *Findings and Recommendations* (Abridged) (Detroit, 1958.)

[7] Citizens' School Advisory Committee, *op.cit*.

[8] *Report of the Special Committee on Nondiscrimination of the Board of Public Education of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania* (1964) and Odell, *op.cit*.

[9] Reports of the Task Forces to the Incoming Board of Education (Philadelphia, 1965.)

[10] Havighurst, op.cit., pp. 1-11.

[11] Carl L. Marburger, "Considerations for Educational Planning," Education in Depressed Areas, A. Harry Passow, editor (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1963), pp. 298ff.

[12] Samuel M. Brownell, Pursuing Excellence in Education: The Superintendent's Ten-Year Report (Detroit: The Board of Education, 1966), pp. 15-6.

[13] Havighurst, op.cit., p. 61 and Benjamin C. Willis, 1953-1963: Ten Years of Growing: Annual Report of the General Superintendent of Schools (Chicago: Board of Education, 1964), p. 15.

[14] Interviews with school officials, January, 1967.

[15] Benjamin C. Willis, Ten Years of Growing, op.cit., pp. 14-5 and Benjamin C. Willis, Special Summer Schools (Chicago: Board of Education, 1964.)

[16] Interviews with school officials, April-May, 1967.

[17] Interviews with schools officials, February, 1967.

[18] Havighurst, op.cit., p. 122.

[19] Interviews with school officials and community leaders, May, 1967.

[20] Interviews with school officials, January and March, 1967.

[21] Interviews with school officials, January-May, 1967.

[22] Interviews with school officials, January-May, 1967.

[23] Interviews with school officials, March, 1967 and Ralph Lee, "Stirrings in the Big Cities: Detroit," NEA Journal, LI (March, 1963), 34-7.

[24] Interviews with school officials, January, March, April and May, 1967.

[25] Interviews with school officials, March, 1967.

[26] Norman Drachler, The Superintendent's Pipeline, "A Report on the Board of Education Meeting of March 14, 1967." "Statement by Superintendent Norman Drachler on the Reorganization of the Executive Administrative Staff" (March, 1967) and interviews with school officials, March, 1967.

[27] Interviews with school officials, March, 1967.

[28] Interviews with school officials, January, 1967.

[29] Interviews with local education reporter and school officials, January, 1967.

[30] Odell, *op.cit*., pp. 367-70.

[31] Interviews with school officials, January, 1967.

[32] *One Hundred Twenty-Third Report of the Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore City to the Mayor and City Council*, July 1, 1956 to June 30, 1958 and the Fiscal Years 1956 and 1957, pp. 22-3.

[33] Interviews with school officials, February, April and May, 1967.

[34] Interviews with school officials, April and May, 1967.

[35] School Program Review Committee, *An Analysis of the Proposed 1966-1971 Capital Program and the 1966 Capital Budget of the School District of Philadelphia* (Philadelphia: Citizens Council on City Planning, 1966), p. 7.

[36] Interviews with school officials and community leaders, May, 1967.

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[38] Interviews with school officials, March-May, 1967.

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[41] Interviews with school officials, May, 1967.

[42] Interviews with school officials, April-May, 1967.

[43] Interviews with school officials, January, 1967.

[44] Robert J. Havighurst, *Education in Metropolitan Areas* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1966), p. 213.

[45] Havighurst, *The Public Schools of Chicago*, *op.cit*., p. 122; Odell, *op.cit*., pp. 89-91 and interviews with school officials, January-May, 1967.

[46] Board of Education, City School District of the City of New York, *Expense Budget for the Fiscal Year 1966-1967*; Board of Education, City of New York, *Report of Federal Programs for the Fiscal Year 1967*; interviews with school officials, May, 1967.

[47] Interviews with federal project officers and community leaders, January-May, 1967.

[48] Interviews with school officials, May, 1967 and Samuel Shepard, Jr., "Raise the Standard of School Achievement" in Programs for the Educationally Disadvantaged (Washington: Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1963.)

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[50] Computed from annual financial reports and budgets of the six city school districts.

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[2] Greater Philadelphia Movement, *op.cit*., pp. 9, 12. Odell, *op.cit*., p. 15.

[3] Freedman, *op.cit*., VI, 6. The pre-shift taxing limits were set forth in state statutes: Section 652 of the Public School Code; Act of May 23, 1949, P.L. 1661 as amended (24 *P.S*. 583.1); Act of November 19, 1959, P.L. 1552 (24 *P.S*. 583.10); Act of July 8, 1957, P.L. 548 (24 *P.S*. 583.6); Act of May 10, 1951, P.L. 237 as amended (24 *P.S*.581.32); Act of May 23, 1949, P.L. 1669, as amended (24 *P.S*. 584.1-584.3.) From William B. Castetter and others, *Guide to Apportionment of and Controls Governing Pennsylvania Public School Funds* (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Suburban School Study Council Group E, 1966), pp. 33-4.

[4] Odell, *op.cit*., p. 360, Freedman, *op.cit*., VI, 6.

[5] *Ibid*.

[6] *Ibid*., VI, 2-5.

[7] Interviews with community leaders, January, 1967.

[8] Greater Philadelphia Movement, *op.cit*., Part A, p. 17. Odell, *op.cit*., p. 360. Interview with local education reporter, January, 1967.

[9] Odell, *op.cit*., pp. 19-22. Interviews with community leaders, January, 1967.

[10] Odell, *op.cit*., p. 60.

[11] *Ibid*., p. 344.

[12] *Ibid*., p. 343. Philadelphia Public Education Board, *Journal of the Public Education Board*, 1958.

[13] Odell, *op.cit*., p. 337.

[14] School Program Review Committee, *An Analysis of the Proposed 1966-1971 Capital Program and 1966 Capital Budget of the School District of Philadelphia* (Philadelphia: Citizens' Council on City Planning, 1966), p. 7.

[15] *Report of the Special Committee on Nondiscrimination*, *op.cit*., p. 29. The lack of innovation in the past decade was determined from Odell, *op.cit*., ix; from interviews; and from the failure of the research staff to uncover any innovative programs.

[16] Act of August 9, 1963, P.L. 640. From Castetter and others, *op.cit.*, pp. 33-4.

[17] Act of August 9, 1963, P.L. 643. Educational Home Rule Charter Commission. *Proposed Supplement to the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter* (Philadelphia: 1962.)

[18] Interview with local education reporter, January, 1967.

[19] Eight of the nine incoming board members (Dilworth excepted) participated in the formulation of the task force reports. *Reports of the Task Forces to the Incoming Board of Education*, *op.cit*.

[20] "Report of Task Force on Manpower and Programs to Richardson Dilworth," pp. 5-6 in *Reports of the Task Forces to the Incoming Board of Education*, *op.cit*.

[21] See "Report of Task Force on Manpower and Management," "Report of Task Force on Capital Program and Physical Plant" and "Report of Task Force on Budget Analysis and Procedures," all in *Reports of the Task Forces to the Incoming Board of Education*, *op.cit*.

[22] *The Evening Bulletin*, March 4, 1966.

[23] See School District of Philadelphia, *Current School District Activities: Background Material Prepared for School District Workship* (1966.)

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[25] Interviews with schools officials, January, 1967.

[26] The School District of Philadelphia, *A Comprehensive Program for Innovation: Underlying Premises and Planning Approaches to Force Title III Operational Requests* (1966), pp. 36-45.

[27] *The Proposed Operating Budget of the School District of Philadelphia*, The Fiscal Year Beginning July 1, 1966, p. 6. Board of Education, *Annual Financial Report*, 1965, p. 2.

[28] *The Evening Bulletin*, May 17, 1966.

[29] James Reichley, *The Art of Government; Reform and Organization Politics in Philadelphia* (New York: Fund for the Republic, 1949.)

[30] Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 270. Freedman, *op.cit.*, II, 20-4. Reichley, *op.cit.*, pp. 15-7.

[31] Freedman, *op.cit.*, VI, 34-44. Banfield and Wilson, *op.cit.*, p. 198. William H. Brown, Jr. and Charles E. Gilbert, "Capital Programming in Philadelphia," in Edward C. Banfield, ed., *Urban Government* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), pp. 479-81.

[32] Freedman, *op.cit.*, VI, 14.

[33] *Ibid.*, II, 31.

[34] Reichley, *op.cit.*, pp. 107-14, 123 and Banfield and Wilson, *op.cit.*, p. 125.

[35] Odell, *op.cit.*, p. 337.

[36] From a table prepared by the Division of Research, The School District of Philadelphia and from *Statistical Reports, Department of Instruction*, 1955-56 to 1960-61 (Philadelphia: The Board of Public Education.)

[37] Freedman, *op.cit.*, VI, 8. Greater Philadelphia Movement, *op.cit.*, Part A, p. 20.

[38] Developed from data from School Program Review Committee, *op.cit.*, pp. 4-9.

[39] Interview with local education reporter, January, 1967.

[40] Philadelphia Public Education Board, *Journal of the Public Education Board*, 1959. *Report of the Special Committee on Nondiscrimination*, *op.cit.*, pp. 6-7, Odell, *op.cit.*, p. 29.

[41] *Report of the Special Committee on Nondiscrimination*, *op.cit.*, pp. 37-8.

[42] The Committee made numerous recommendations as it proceeded in its work, many of which were adopted as Board policy in 1963 and 1964. The committee on nondiscrimination ceased to be active as a community force after its formal report was issued in July, 1964.

[43] Freedman, *op.cit.*, VI, 2-3, 6, 8.

[44] Quoted in Bernard McCormick, "The Man in the Double-breasted Suit," *Greater Philadelphia Magazine*, LVIII (January, 1967), 150, 152.

[45] Greater Philadelphia Movement, *op.cit.*, Part A, p. 2.

[46] Interviews with community leaders, January, 1967.

[47] Freedman, *op.cit.*, V, 3.

[48] Greater Philadelphia Movement, *op.cit.*, Part A. pp. 5-7, 32-4; Part B, pp. 1-12.

[49] Freedman, *op.cit.*, VI, 7-8.

[50] *Ibid.*, VI, 12. Interviews with community leaders, January, 1967.

[51] Interviews with community leaders, January, 1967.

[52] Freedman, op.cit., VI, 6, 11-3. Greater Philadelphia Movement, op.cit., Part A, pp. 23, 25.

[53] Freedman, op.cit., VI, 9.

[54] This account taken from The Philadelphia Inquirer, January-August, 1963.

[55] Act of August 9, 1963, P.L. 643.

[56] Educational Home Rule Commission, op.cit.

[57] Freedman, op.cit., VI, 1.

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[2] Interview with Professor Lester Schloerb, former Chicago school officer, April, 1967.

[3] Norman Drachler, The Superintendent's Pipeline, "A report on the Board of Education Meeting of March 14, 1967." "Statement by Superintendent Norman Drachler on the Reorganization of the Executive Administrative Staff" (March 14, 1967.)

[4] Interview with Norman Drachler, Superintendent, Detroit Public Schools, March, 1967.

[5] "Statement by Superintendent Norman Drachler on the Reorganization of the Executive Administrative Staff," March 17, 1967.

[6] One Hundred Twenty-Third Report of the Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore to the Mayor and City Council, July 1, 1956 to June 30, 1958 and the Fiscal Years 1956 and 1957, pp. 22-4.

[7] Interview with Edith Walker, Assistant Superintendent of Elementary Education, Baltimore City Public Schools, February, 1967.

[8] Interview with Laurence G. Paquin, Superintendent, Baltimore City Public Schools, February, 1967.

[9] One Hundred Twenty-Third Report, pp. 134-5.

[10] Gittell, op. cit., pp. 11, 13-4, 82-7, 89 (n. 13.)

[11] Odell, op. cit., p. 20.

[12] Ibid., p. 373.

[13] Interview with Robert L. Poindexter, Deputy Superintendent of Schools for General Administration, Philadelphia, Public Schools, January, 1967. Odell, op. cit., p. 27.

[14] Salaries were not considered in the ranking because in this area relative size of the school system would need to be considered. Detroit and Philadelphia gave their district superintendents a fixed salary, $21,800 in Detroit and $21,000 in Philadelphia. The average salary of New York's district superintendents was $23,485. In Chicago the salary varies from $17,700 to $22,400 per year. The weighted average salary is $21,619. The directors in Baltimore get either $16,000 or $15,700. The salaries of assistant superintendents in St. Louis range from $12,000 to $18,662.

[15] James W. Fesler, Area and Administration (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1949), p. 65.

[16] Odell, op. cit., pp. 373ff.

[17] Interview with board member, St. Louis, May, 1967.

[18] See Table 4-24 and Appendix A, Table XII.

[19] See Table 4-24 and Appendix A, Table XII.

[20] Detroit Board of Education, Project I and Project II for Integration (1965.)

[21] Interviews with Philadelphia educators, January, 1967. For a more detailed duscussion, see Chapter 3.

[22] Richard O. Carlson, Executive Succession and Organizational Change (Chicago: Midwest Administration Center, The University of Chicago, 1962), as cited in Joseph Marr Cronin, The Board of Education in the Great Cities, Unpublished E. Ed. dissertation (Stanford University, June 1965), pp. 281-2.

[23] Interviews with Baltimore educators, February, 1967.

[24] Statistical data provided by the Board of Education, St. Louis.

[25] Statistical data provided by the Board of Education, Chicago.

[26] Interview with official of Chicago Board of Education, March, 1967.

[27] Citizens for Schools, Report of the Vote, November, 1963 (Detroit.)

[28] United Parents Associations, a centrally organized federation of over 400 parent and parent-teacher associations in New York City, has a sizeable professional staff.

[29] Interview with official of Baltimore City Council, February, 1967.

[30] Interview with union official, Chicago, March, 1967.

[31] New York Times, March 23-5, 27, 29-31, April 1, 3, 6, 1967.

[32] Nicholas A. Masters, Robert H. Salisbury and Thomas H. Eliot, State Politics and the Public Schools: An Exploratory Analysis (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964), pp. 26-7.

[33] Interview with official of Baltimore City Council, February, 1967.

[34] Michael D. Usdan, The Political Power of Education in New York State (New York: The Institute of Administrative Research, Teachers College, Columbia University, 1963.)

[35] Masters, Salisbury and Eliot, op. cit., p. 199.

[36] Ibid., p. 277.

[37] See Part I, p. 81, supra.

[38] Interview with Poverty Program official, April-May, 1967.

[39] Gittell, op. cit., p. 81.

[40] Appendix A, Table XI.

[41] Tax rates for schools are placed on a comparable basis by dividing local tax levels by the full valuation of real property.

[42] Enrollments in St. Louis rose by 23.4% during the ten years ended 1965/66 compared to an 8.3% increase in Detroit as shown in Appendix A, Table XV.

[43] Appendix A, Table XIII.

[44] Detroit and St. Louis increased classroom teachers beyond the numbers needed for increased enrollment by 7.3% and 8.9% respectively between 1955 and 1965. Other instructional staff (principals, assistant principals, coordinators, supervisors and guidance counsellors) increased by 160.6% in Detroit, but only 42.0% in St. Louis. See Appendix A, Table XVII.

[45] During the period 1955-1965, Philadelphia's tax rate was established by the state legislature and the city was fiscally independent of municipal officials. See Chapter 3 for discussion of the school's fiscal dependence, during this period, on its business manager and the local party leadership.

[46] Increased value of taxable real estate was estimated by dividing assessed valuation of real property by percentages of assessed to market value, obtained from the National Education Association. The percentage of new funds resulting from increased valuation is shown in Chapter 4, Table 4-28.

[47] Appendix A, Table XV.

[48] Appendix A, Table XIII.

[49] Appendix A, Table XIII.

[50] Appendix A, Table XVII.

[51] Appendix A, Table XVII.

[52] Appendix A, Table XIII.

[53] Chapter 4, Table 4-16.

[54] See Chapter 3 for a fuller discussion of the board's fiscal attitude prior to 1966.

[55] Chapter 4, Table 4-16.

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[2] Cronin, *op.cit.*, p. 194.

[3] Interviews with community leaders, March, 1967.

[4] Edward C. Banfield, *Big City Politics* (New York: Random House, 1965), pp. 51-63.

[5] Interviews with business and labor leaders, March 1967.

[6] *Newsweek*, June 19, 1965, 44-5.

[7] Thomas R. Brooks, "Detroit: A New Model in City Hall," *Reporter*, XXX (April 19, 1964), 25-27; and Ernest Dunbar, "The Mayor Who Woke up a City," *Look* (September 21, 1965.)

[8] Roberta S. Sigel, *Detroit Experiment: Citizens Plan a New High School* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1966), pp. 2-3.

[9] Interviews with members of Board of Education, March, 1967.

[10] George Romney was president of American Motors at that time. Citizens' Advisory Committee on School Needs, *Findings and Recommendations* (abridged) (Detroit, 1958.)

[11] *Ibid*.

[12] Havighurst, *Education in Metropolitan Areas*, pp. 179-80.

[13] Harry Salsinger, "School Bonds Nixed," *Scholastic Teacher* edition of *Senior Scholastic* (November 4, 1964), 1-2.

[14] *Findings and Recommendations of the Citizens Advisory Committee on Equal Educational Opportunities* (Detroit, 1962.)

[15] *Detroit News*, March 14, 1962, p. 48.

[16] *Citizens Advisory Committee on Equal Educational Opportunities*, *op. cit*.

[17] Havighurst, *Education in Metropolitan Areas*, pp. 179-80.

[18] *Ibid*., p. 213.

[19] *Ibid*.

[20] Interviews with school officials, March, 1967.

[21] Interviews with school officials, March, 1967.

[22] Interviews with school officials and community leaders, March, 1967.

[23] Detroit News, April 25, 1966; Detroit News, April 26, 1966.

[24] Interviews with community leaders, March, 1967. Cooperation varied among different segments of the school system. For example, the Organization of School Administrators and Supervisors objected to questionnaires being sent to parents and pupils.

[25] Community Planning for Community Schools, Recommendations for New Eastern High School and Family Center (Detroit: Detroit Public Schools, Ford Foundation, 1963.)

[26] Interviews with superintendent of schools and community leaders, March, 1967.

[27] Interviews with school officials and community leaders, March, 1967.

[28] Interviews with school officials, March, 1967.

[29] Citizens Advisory Committee on School Needs, op. cit.

[30] Detroit Public Schools, Department of World of Work - Vocational Education, Semi-Annual Report (Detroit, 1966); Interviews with school officials and union leaders, March, 1967.

[31] The Research Council of the Great Cities Program for School Improvement, New Programs in Vocational Education (Chicago, 1964); Interviews with school officials, March, 1967.

[32] Carl L. Marburger, "Considerations for Educational Planning," in Education in Depressed Areas, A. Harry Passow, editor (New York, 1963), pp. 298-321.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Samuel M. Brownell, Pursuing Excellence in Education, the Superintendent's Ten-year Report (Detroit, 1966.)

[35] Interviews with school officials, March, 1967.

[36] Detroit News, March 9, 1967.

[37] Interviews with school officials, union and community leaders, March, 1967.

[38] Interviews with school officials, March, 1967.

[39] Interviews with Negro, union and community leaders and school officials, March, 1967.

[40] Interviews with community leaders and school officials, March, 1967.

[41] Interview with a community leader, March, 1967.

[42] Interview with a community leader, March, 1967.

[43] Interviews with civic and community leaders, March, 1967.

[44] Interviews with union leaders, March, 1967.

[45] Interviews with community leaders, March, 1967.

[46] Interviews with community leaders and school officials, March, 1967.

[47] Interviews with Negro and community leaders, March, 1967.

[48] Interviews with Negro leaders, March, 1967.

[49] Interviews with community leaders, March, 1967.

[50] Interviews with school officials and civic leaders, March, 1967.

[51] Interviews with civic and community leaders, March, 1967.

[52] Interviews with civic and community leaders, March, 1967.

[53] Missouri School Laws Applicable to School Districts in Cities of 700,000 or Over, 162.571 RSMo., 162.581 RSMo., 162.601 RSMo.

[54] Missouri Constitution, Art. X sec. 11(b) and Art. X sec. 11(c).

[55] Missouri Constitution, Art. X sec. 11(c). The present tax rate is $2.34 for operating purposes. From chart prepared by Division of Curriculum and Educational Research, St. Louis Public Schools.

[56] 164.151 RSMo.

[57] Interviews with school officials, May, 1967.

[58] Interviews with school officials, May, 1967.

[59] Interviews with community leaders, May, 1967.

[60] St. Louis ranked lowest among the six districts studied in school expenditures per pupil. See Appendix A, Table XI. Teaching positions are budgeted in the elementary schools on a 35-1 ratio. The number of pupils per teacher is 34.2. From chart prepared by Division of Curriculum and Educational Research, of St. Louis Public Schools.

[61] Between 1960 and 1962, six school board referenda were held. The first five failed with from 60.19 to 66.59% voting in favor. The most recent board referendum, held on March 6, 1962, passed with 73.6% voting in favor. From School Tax and Board Election Data, January 1, 1960-November 1, 1965 (St. Louis: Division of Curriculum and Educational Research, St. Louis Public Schools, 1965.)

[62] Interviews with school officials, May, 1967.

[63] Interviews with school officials, May, 1967. The board has established lists of sympathetic voters in each of the elementary school districts and arranges to "get-out-the-vote" at tax rate elections. The board has published a "community relations" guide for use by school principals who are responsible for "community relations" activity in their districts.

[64] Interviews with school officials, May, 1967.

[65] Interviews with civil rights leaders and school officials, May, 1967.

[66] Interviews with civil rights leaders and school officials, May 5, 1967. For official statement of policy see St. Louis Public Schools, Instruction Department, The Status of Integration in the St. Louis Public Schools During the 1964-65 School Year: A Factual Report to the Board of Education, pp. 38-9.

[67] Interviews with civil rights leaders and school officials, May, 1967.

[68] Interviews with civil rights leaders and school Officials, May, 1967.

[69] Interviews with school officials, May, 1967.

[70] St. Louis Public Schools, Instruction Department. The Status of Integration, op. cit., p. 10; Interviews with school officials, May, 1967.

[71] Interviews with school officials and civil rights leaders, May, 1967.

[72] Interviews with civil rights leaders, May, 1967. They indicate that most middle-class Negroes work for white owned business or are self-employed and require outside financing. Economic pressure, they indicate, is used to dissuade such leaders from a militant point of view.

[73] In fact, the school system, itself, provides a relatively large number of jobs for middle class Negroes; emerging leaders have been recruited into the federal poverty program. Interviews with civil rights leaders, May 1967; St. Louis Public School, Department of Education, The Status of Integration, op. cit., pp. 7-11.

[74] One prominent civil rights leader had been sentenced to a nine month prison term for allegedly violating a court injunction. He was arrested outside a local bank in a demonstration aimed at encouraging the bank to hire additional Negro employees. This civil rights leader indicated that the prison term he served was out of proportion to the activity and that his bail had been set at the level for a second-degree murder. He further stated that several of the lawyers who had defended him had been disbarred or were facing disbarment proceedings.

[75] Interviews with school officials and civil rights leaders, May, 1967.

[76] Interviews with school officials, May, 1967.

[77] 162.601 RSMo.

[78] Citizens' Association for the Public Schools, Facts on Its Five Candidates (St. Louis, 1963), p. 10.

[79] Citizens' Association for the Public Schools, Five Top Candidates to Restore Confidence in the School System (St. Louis, 1961), p. 11 and interviews with school officials, May, 1967.

[80] Interviews with school officials and community leaders, May, 1967.

[81] Interviews with school officials, May, 1967.

[82] St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 5, 1961 and interviews with school officials, May, 1967.

[83] Interviews with community leaders active in CAPS, May, 1967.

[84] Citizens' Association for the Public Schools, Facts on Its Five Candidates, op. cit., p. 10.

[85] There are no representatives of labor on the present board. In the last election, the executive secretary of the teachers union and another union person ran against the board slate.

[86] Interviews with community leaders, May, 1967.

[87] Interviews with community leaders, May, 1967.

[88] Interviews with community leaders, May, 1967.

[89] He was elected board president in 1961, 1962 and 1963, the only board member ever to serve as president for three terms.

[90] All of the persons interviewed who attend board meetings agree that Mr. Schlafly participates the most frequently at board meetings.

[91] Interviews with community leaders, May, 1967.

[92] Interviews with Chamber of Commerce officials, May, 1967.

[93] Civic Progress, Inc. consists of the heads of the largest corporations and banks in the city. Organized in 1952, they are active in politics and until this past election their preferred candidate has been elected mayor. Civil Progress comes the closest to a public interest group that we have been able to identify in St. Louis, though, of course, it is an elite organization including only the largest businesses and dominated by family-owned corporations native to the city.

[94] Interviews with school officials, May, 1967.

[95] Interviews with school officials, May, 1967.

[96] Interviews with school officials, May, 1967. We are told that because of a cutback of federal funds the Banneker project will not be funded in the future by federal funds.

[97] Interviews with school officials, May, 1967.

[98] Interviews with school officials, May, 1967.

[99] Interviews with school officials, May, 1967.

[100] Interviews with school officials, civil rights leaders and the education chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, May, 1967.

[101] Interviews with school officials, May, 1967.

[102] From a chart prepared by the Division of Curriculum and Educational Research, St. Louis School System.

REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER 6

[1] This chapter taken from Gittell, *op. cit.* The research for this chapter has been published in the above monograph.

[2] *Local Law No. 19*. Passed by the City Council on April 6, 1962.

[3] George A. Beauchamp, *Planning the Elementary School Curriculum* (New York: Allyn and Bacon, 1956), p. 10.

[4] Sayre and Kaufman attribute the superintendent's limited power to being circumscribed by the board of education, the board of superintendents (since abolished) where he was only one of ten superintendents and the teachers organizations. Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman, *Governing New York City* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1960), p. 282.

[5] While several major studies over the past dozen years have called for drastic changes in the board of examiners in order to improve and facilitate the selection of teachers and promotions to administrative ranks, the board has remained solidly intact. For a listing of these studies see Chapter 2, footnote 4, *supra*.

[6] Allen Talbott, "Needed: A New Breed of School Superintendents," *Harper's Magazine*, CCXXXII (February, 1967), 81-7.

[7] Personal contact between board members and the supervisory staff is not uncommon. Several years ago the situation was so bad that the superintendent issued a statement halting memos that went directly from the staff to board members. *World Telegram and Sun*, November 15, 1963, p. 47.

[8] See Chapter 2, footnote 4, *supra*.

[9] *New York Times*, April 9, 1967.

[10] *One Hundred Nineteenth Report of the Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore City to the Mayor and City Council*, July 1, 1948 to June 30, 1950 and the Fiscal Years 1948 and 1949, p. 73.

[11] Interview with member of superintendent's staff, February, 1967.

[12] Citizens School Advisory Committee, *Synopsis of Studies and Recommndations* (Baltimore, 1964), p. C17.

[13] Interview with school official, February, 1967.

[14] Interview with school officials, February, 1967.

[15] Citizens School Advisory Committee, op. cit., p. C17.

[16] Interviews with school officials and board member, February, 1967.

[17] Eugene R. Smoley, Community Participation in Urban School Government, Cooperative Research Project No. S-029, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University, 1965), p. 170.

[18] Interviews with school officials, February, 1967.

[19] Interviews with civic group officials, February, 1967.

[20] Interview with member of mayor's task force, February, 1967.

[21] Interview with member of 28 Parents Group, February, 1967.

[22] Interview with union officials, February and June 1967.

[23] Citizens School Advisory Committee, op. cit.

[24] Interviews with civic group officials, February, 1967.

[25] John C. Schmidt, "Can Baltimore Solve Its Money Problems?", Baltimore Magazine (January, 1967), 58.

[26] Joseph Pois, The School Board Crisis: A Chicago Case Study (Chicago: Educational Methods, Inc., 1964), pp. 10-5.

[27] Ibid., p. 15.

[28] Interviews with school officials and an examination of Chicago Eucation Department, Proceedings of the Board of Education, City of Chicago, July 1, 1960-June 30, 1961.

[29] Interviews with Chicago educator and Chicago civil rights leader, March, 1967.

[30] Interviews with civic leaders, March, 1967.

[31] Interview with Chicago Teachers Union official, March, 1967.

[32] Pois, op. cit., p. 175.

[33] Ibid., p. 177.

[34] Ibid.

[35] These funds are: educational, building, textbook, playground and recreational, building bond, teachers' pensions and retirement, and bond redemption and interest. Pois, op. cit., p. 179.

[36] Interviews with civic leaders, March, 1967.

[37] "At the 18 district hearings held in connection with the 1961 budget, there were no members present at two of the hearings; 14 hearings were attended by the two female members; and the same duet accompanied by another member appeared at the other two hearings." Pois, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

[38] *Chicago Sun-Times*, September 4, 1963 and as quoted in Pois, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

[39] Illinois, *Revised Statutes*, 1963 C122 sec. 34-50. As quoted by Pois, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 187.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 188.

[42] Interviews with civic leaders, March, 1967.

[43] Interviews with civil leaders, March, 1967.

[44] Interviews with school officials, March, 1967.

[45] Interview with board member, March, 1967.

[46] *The Story of the Special Summer Schools* (Chicago: Board of Education, 1963.)

[47] Harry B. Wilson, "Toughest Job in the Country," *Saturday Evening Post*, CCXXIII (October 7, 1950), 184.

[48] Interview with board of education member, Chicago, March, 1967.

[49] Interview with Chicago civil rights leader, March, 1967.

[50] Interview with union official and civil rights leader, March, 1967.

[51] Havighurst, *The Public Schools of Chicago*, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

[52] *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

[53] Interviews with Chicago educators, March, 1967.

[54] Interview with Chicago board of education member, March, 1967.

[55] Interviews with Chicago civil rights leaders, March, 1967.

[56] Interviews with Chicago civil rights leaders, March, 1967.

[57] "A Chronology of Deferral, *Integrated Education*, III (December, 1965-January, 1966), 8.

[58] *Ibid.*, 9 and interviews with civil rights leaders, March, 1967.

[59] Interview with Coordinating Council of Community Organizations official, March, 1967.

[60] Interview with Chicago board of education member, March, 1967.

[61] Interviews with Chicago educators, March, 1967.

[62] Interview with Chicago Teachers Union official, March, 1967.

[63] Interview with Chicago Teachers Union official, March, 1967.

[64] Interview with Coordinating Council of Community Organizations official, March, 1967.

[65] Interview with Urban League official, March, 1967.

[66] Interviews with Chicago educators, March, 1967.

[67] Interviews with Citizens' School Committee officials.

[68] Interviews with Citizens' School Committee officials.

[69] Interviews with Citizens' School Committee officials, March, 1967.

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Mrs. Shirley Bramhall, President of 28 Parents Group and Chairman, Committee of Education of Mayor's Task Force.
Miss Una Corbett, Chairman, Schools Committee, Baltimore Chapter, Americans for Democratic Action.

Dennis Crosby, President, Baltimore Teachers Union.
Thomas D'Allesandro, Jr., President, Baltimore City Council.
Robert Diggs, President, Principals Association.
Eli Frank, Jr., President, Board of School Commissioners of Baltimore City.
Mrs. Janet Hoffman, fiscal advisor, Baltimore City Council.
Dr. Robert C. Lloyd, Special Projects Division, Baltimore City Public Schools.
Dr. Laurence G. Paquin, Superintendent, Baltimore City Public Schools.
Mrs. Carol Phillips, Educational Chairman, League of Women Voters.
Mrs. Edith V. Walker, Assistant Superintendent, Elementary Education, Baltimore City Public Schools.
J. Woods, Commissioner on Human Relations.

Chicago:

R. Adams, Citizens School Committee.
C. Banas, School Information, Chicago Tribune.
Mrs. R. Fogel, League of Women Voters.
Miss Vivian R. Gallagher, Chicago Teachers Union.
Miss Mary Herrick, Citizens School Committee.
Donald Hill, former Budget Director, Chicago Public Schools.
Mrs. George G. Kolar, Urban Gateways Program.
Robert Lucas, Chairman, CORE.
Mrs. Louis A. Malis, member, Chicago Board of Education.
Dr. Faith Rich, Director of Research, Coordinating Council of Community Organizations.
Professor Lester Schloerb, Northwestern University, former school official, Chicago Public Schools.
David Seldon, Director, American Federation of Teachers.
Sanford M. Sherizen, education research specialist, Chicago Urban League.
Robert Stickles, Controller, Chicago Board of Education.
Meyer Weinberg, Chairman, Coordinating Council of Community Organizations.
Dr. Benjamin Willis, former Superintendent of Schools, Chicago Public Schools.
Nathaniel Willis, Educational Director, NAACP.
Mrs. Charles G. Yarrow, Executive Secretary, Citizens School Committee.

Detroit:

Patrick Basile, Executive Secretary, Detroit Education Association.
Miss Barbara Bommarito, Wayne State University.
Dr. John Burns, Administrative Assistant to Deputy Superintendent Executive Board, Detroit Public Schools.
Carl L. Byerly, Assistant Superintendent, Improvement of Instruction, Detroit Public Schools.
Malcolm G. Dade, Jr., Administrative Assistant, Mayor's Commission on Children and Youth.
Mrs. Avery Davis, Chairman, Educational Committee, League of Women Voters.
Dr. Norman Drachler, Superintendent, Detroit Public Schools.
Mrs. Sara Foley, Vice President, Detroit Council of Parent Teachers Associations.
William Hardy, Education Department, United Automobile Workers.

Mrs. George Hughes, President, League of Women Voters.
Mrs. Roberta Hughes, Secretary-Director, Mayor's Commission on Children and Youth.
Mrs. Mildred Jeffrey, Director of Community Relations, United Automobile Workers.
Arthur Johnson, Deputy Superintendent, Detroit Public Schools.
Mrs. Ola W. Jordan, Acting Director, Education and Youth Incentives Department, Detroit Urban League.
Walter Klein, Director, Jewish Community Council of Metropolitan Detroit.
Charles Lewis, Community Organizations, Mayor's Commission on Children and Youth.
Kenneth Malkowski, Education Committee, Mayor's Commission on Children and Youth.
Conrad L. Mallett, Assistant to the Mayor.
Dr. Louis D. Monacel, Divisional Director, Special Projects, Detroit Public Schools.
Douglas H. Mueller, General Manager, Civic and Community Development, Greater Detroit Board of Commerce.
William H. O'Brien, Executive Secretary, Detroit's Citizen League.
Miss Mary E. Riordan, President, Detroit Federation of Teachers.
Dr. Remus Robinson, member, Detroit Board of Education.
Mrs. William Ruth, League of Women Voters.
Horace L. Sheffield, Administrative Vice President, Trade Union Leadership Council.
Roberta S. Sigel, Wayne State University.
Carl H. Turnquist, Divisional Director of Vocational Education, Detroit Public Schools.
Rev. James Wadsworth, President, NAACP, Detroit Branch.
Richard Wisniewski, Wayne State University.

New York City:

Adrian Blumenfeld, School Construction Expediter, New York City Public Schools.
William H. Bristow, Assistant Superintendent, Curriculum Development, New York City Public Schools.
Gerald Brooks, Bureau of Recruitment, New York City Public Schools.
Dr. Bernard E. Donovan, Superintendent of Schools, New York York City Public Schools.
John Ferris, Administrator, Bureau of Business Affairs, New York City Public Schools.
Lloyd K. Garrison, former President, New York City Board of Education.
Muriel Greenfield, Poverty Program official.
Frederick W. Hill, Deputy Superintendent, Business and Administration, New York City Public Schools.
Jacob Landers, Assistant Superintendent, Integration, New York City Public Schools.
the late Dr. Joseph O. Loretan, Deputy Superintendent, Instruction and Curriculum, New York City Public Schools.
Mrs. Reba Mayer, Principal, School No. 219, Queens, New York City Public Schools.
Frederick C. McLaughlin, Director, Public Education Association.

Mrs. Elizabeth C. O'Daly, Assistant Superintendent, More Effective Schools, New York City Public Schools.
Albert M. Shanker, President, United Federation of Teachers.
Mrs. Rose Shapiro, member, New York City Board of Education.
Harold Siegal, Executive Director, United Parents Associations.
Clarence H. Tompkins, Director of Research, Public Education Association.
Nine District Superintendents, New York City Public Schools.

Philadelphia;

Louis R. Ballen, Director, Integration and Intergroup Relations, Philadelphia Public Schools.
Peter Binzen, education reporter, The Evening Bulletin.
Richard H. de Lone, Assistant to the Superintendent, Philadelphia Public Schools.
Edwin H. Folk, Executive Director, Citizens' Council on City Planning.
Larry Groth, Executive Director, Committee on Human Relations.
Dr. Bernard G. Kelner, District Superintendent, Office of Planning, Philadelphia Public Schools.
Mrs. Sylvia Meek, Director of Education and Youth Incentives, Philadelphia Urban League.
L. L. Moak, Director, Pennsylvania Economy League; Secretary, Bureau of Municipal Research; former Director of Finance, City of Philadelphia.
Miss Celia Pincus, Philadelphia Federation of Teachers.
Robert L. Poindexter, Deputy Superintendent, General Administration, Philadelphia Public Schools.
Frank Sullivan, Philadelphia Federation of Teachers.
Eugene M. Weaver, Director of Financial Planning, Philadelphia Public Schools.
William H. Wilcox, Executive Director, Greater Philadelphia Movement.

St. Louis:

Mrs. Carrie E. Bash, Research Director. Urban League.
Mrs. Ina Boone, Executive Secretary, NAACP.
Andy J. Brown, Jr., formerly of Citizens Association for Public Schools.
Fred Busse, President, St. Louis Board of Education.
William L. Clay, civil rights leader.
David Coltin, Assistant Director, Graduate Institute of Education, Washington University.
Mrs. Merrimon Cuninggim, Vice President of the White House Conference on Education.
Julian Dix, Chief, Division of Education, Human Development Corporation.
Demosthenes Dubose, St. Louis Teachers Union, Local 420.
W. J. Duford, Commissioner, St. Louis Council on Human Relations.
George Fithin, President, St. Louis Teachers Union, Local 420.
Mrs. Elsie Hall, Education Chairman, League of Women Voters.
Walter Hayes, Chairman, Education Committee, CORE.
James E. Hurt, Jr., Vice President, St. Louis Board of Education.
Ralph R. Kirn, former President, St. Louis Teachers Union, Local 420.
Dr. William Kottmeyer, Superintendent of Instruction, St. Louis Public Schools.

Sam Lawson, Secretary and Treasurer, St. Louis Public Schools.
Jake McCarthy, Director of Public Relations, Teamsters Joint Council #13.
Mrs. Glenn L. Moller, Co-Chairman, Missouri Governor's Conference on Education.
Dr. Charles A. Naylor, Deputy Superintendent of Schools, St. Louis Public Schools.
Miriam Oldham, St. Louis Teachers Union, Local 420.
Dorothy Pillman, President-elect, St. Louis Teachers Association.
Thomas Robinson, CORE.
James A. Scott, Assistant Superintendent, Special Assignments (now Assistant Superintendent for Integration), St. Louis Public Schools.
Daniel Schlafly, member, St. Louis Board of Education.
Dr. Judson T. Shaplin, Director, Graduate Institute of Education, Washington University.
William T. Smith, Assistant Superintendent of Schools, Turner Group; Assistant Superintendent in Charge of Elementary Schools, St. Louis Public Schools.
Thomas C. Stevens, Planning Director, Metropolitan Youth Commission.
Andrew Sydnor, Council on Human Relations.
Alvin Wesley, Deputy Executive Director, Urban League.
Mrs. Pearl White, member of Education Committee, NAACP.
Miss Williams, Council on Human Relations.